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Why a Global History of Ideas in
the Language of Law?
A. The history of ideas as a history of languages
Studies on what is referred to as universal history, world story, or, more and 
more frequently, global history are enjoying a heyday.1 This can also be said 
for the global history of ideas,2 which can be considered a variety of global 
history.3 Different methodological approaches can be adopted in a global 
history of ideas. Some authors, like David Armitage, concern themselves 
with the origins and spread of “big ideas.”4 This is not our chosen path; 
with Martin Mulsow, we consider such a narrow concept of “idea” not very 
useful.5 A second and particularly popular approach is to treat the history of 
ideas as a history of interaction6 looking at “intermediaries, translations, and 
networks.”7 This is a tempting perspective,8 and we shall be considering it in 
some detail at a later stage. At present, however, we will be looking at a 
1 See Bayly (2006); Budde et al. (eds.) (2006); Conrad et. al. (eds.) (2007a); Sachsenmaier
(2011); Conrad (2013).
2 On the global history of ideas see, above all, Moyn / Sartori (eds.) (2013); Osterhammel 
(2015); Mulsow (2016); Mulsow (2015).
3 In the view of Conrad – which we share – global history is more a perspective than a 
subject. A vast range of subject matter can accordingly be examined from a global history 
perspective: “Basically, a global history perspective can be adopted by all historiographical 
approaches”, Conrad (2013) 13.
4 See Armitage (2012).
5 Mulsow (2015) 19: “Ideas, theories, portions of theory, points of view in a broad sense are 
conveyed together with the concomitant informational elements, religious attitudes, phys-
ical carriers, and cultural practices. It cannot be helpful to subject the history of ideas to 
puristic reduction.”
6 Mulsow (2015) 1–21.
7 Moyn / Sartori (eds.) (2013) 3–30.
8 See Schuppert, G. F. (2014); Schuppert, G. F. (2015).
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“third way,” at writing a history of ideas as a history of languages: the lan-
guages used in public discourses on the common good and on the good and 
just order of things – the languages, for instance, of theology, philosophy,9
law, and, increasingly, economics.
Centre stage in the history of ideas as a history of languages is John G. A. 
Pocock, who, along with Quentin Skinner, founded the reputation of the 
“Cambridge School of Intellectual History.”10 As the name suggests, it is 
really a style or school of thought,11 whose influence is difficult to over-
estimate.
What this “Cambridge School” is about is perhaps best explained by John 
G. A. Pocock in his now classic 1962 essay “History of Political Thought.”12
Pocock names his point of departure already in the second paragraph: dis-
cussions in the higher spheres of politics are conducted in one or more 
languages that can be described as political language(s): “… a political scien-
tist may … be interested in the relations between the political activities, 
institutions and traditions of a society and the terms in which that political 
complex is from time to time expressed and commented on, and in the uses 
to which those terms are put; in short, in the functions within a political 
society of what may be called its language (or languages) of politics.”13
Quentin Skinner,14 too, posits that political thought is embedded in the 
context of the political life and action of a social community15 and that the 
language used by the people involved is also socially embedded: “The political 
thinker is a social being and his thoughts are social actions or events. The words 
and concepts he uses are part of a shared inheritance which severely con-
strain his liberty to conceptualize and theorize. It is shared inheritance, 
variously named traditions, universes of discourse, languages of legitimation, 
9 Mulsow (2015) 9: “Decisive frameworks for ideas are often philosophical and philosoph-
ico-theological languages. They determine and influence the speech acts performed in 
them.”
10 See the articles in: Mulsow/Mahler (eds.) (2010); the outstanding introduction in Rosa
(1994).
11 See Fleck (1980).
12 Pocock (1962).
13 Pocock (1962) 183.
14 See, above all, his key article: Skinner (1988).
15 Rosa (1994) 199.
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vocabularies, and paradigms, which must provide the context in which 
individual thinkers perform their social actions.”16
On closer inspection, the public discourse in a society uses not only one
political language but several such languages: “Any stable and articulate 
society possesses concepts with which to discuss its political affairs, and 
associates these to form groups of languages. There is no reason to suppose 
that a society will have only one such language; we may rather expect to find 
several, differing in the departments of social activity from which they orig-
inate, the uses to which they are put and the modifications which they 
undergo.”17
Does the language of law have its place in this repertoire? Pocock believes 
so: “Some [of those political languages] originate in the technical vocabulary 
of one of society’s institutionalized modes of regulating public affairs. West-
ern political thought has been conducted largely in the vocabulary of law, Con-
fucian Chinese in that of ritual. Others originate in the vocabulary of some 
social process which has become relevant to politics: theology in an ecclesi-
astical society, land tenure in a feudal society, technology in an industrial 
society.”18
Quentin Skinner, too, not only testifies to the important role of the 
language of law in the political discourse but complains of the predomi-
nance of a “law-centric paradigm”19 that needs to be balanced by a human-
istic-republican paradigm as a sort of counter ideology.20
This brief review of the “Cambridge School” indicates that political lan-
guages are used in every society where policy design and political ideas are 
discussed: until the advent of modernity first and foremost the language of 
theology, in early modern times theological-philosophical language, and, in 
the present age, often the language of economics – reflecting the economiza-
tion of almost all areas of life. Above all in early modernity, the language of 
law predominated among these political languages.
It is our impression that the language of law no longer plays a key, or even 
major role in the history of ideas. At an international conference “Towards a 
16 Boucher (1985) 155; quoted from Rosa (1994) 199.
17 Pocock (1962) 195.
18 Pocock (1962) 195.
19 Skinner (1978).
20 Rosa (1994) 208.
Why a Global History of Ideas in the Language of Law? 3
Global History of Ideas” staged by the Max Weber College for Cultural and 
Social Science Studies at the University of Erfurt in July 2017, law was not 
mentioned. And in his paper on “elements of a globalized intellectual his-
tory of premodernity,” Martin Mulsow21 failed to mention the language of 
the philosophy of law when discussing the globalization of philosophical 
languages.
The marginalization of the language of law to be observed in discourses 
on the global history of ideas and knowledge does not do justice to the 
undeniably prominent role it played in early modernity and fails to recog-
nize the important potential of the language of law for a future history of ideas 
and knowledge.
This is the concern of this book: to explain the language of law as a 
language of politics in discourses on the good and just order of society. As 
the following five points convincingly show, it is well worth examining the 
potential of the language of law for a global history of ideas and knowledge.
B. The language of law as a language of politics relevant to
the history of ideas: five functions in five contexts
I. The language of law as a language of discourses on the legitimacy
of political authority
As Hartmut Rosa has clearly demonstrated for the Cambridge School, dis-
courses conducted in political language are above all discourses about legiti-
macy, a function that comes to the fore principally when old and outdated 
orders are to be overcome. The success of such ventures can be substantially 
furthered if a new language with new concepts is available that is able to 
convey the new content. With reference to John G. A. Pocock, Hartmut Rosa 
writes:
“Revolutions and changes in paradigm occur … Where social or societal changes 
can no longer be adequately captured, legitimized, or explained in the prevailing 
vocabulary; where, to use Kuhn’s terminology, societal anomalies occur. As in 
Kuhn’s theory, anomalies in science impose adaptation of the prevailing paradigm, 
and, if this fails, produce ‘scientific revolutions.’ According to Pocock, a political 
community (in the shape of its political thinkers) seeks to adapt the existing lin-
21 Mulsow (2016).
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guistic system to new situations or to replace it by a different ‘language.’ … An 
example of such a process that Pocock cites are the upheavals in the English political 
system in the 1640s. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the political vocabu-
lary in England was dominated by such ideas and concepts as tradition, convention, 
and custom. The key concepts were ‘ancient constitution’ and ‘common law.’ But 
this vocabulary could be applied only to situations characterized by continuity; it 
was completely unsuited for explaining, let alone justifying radical change.”22
With Pocock’s remarks in mind, we turn to two examples of how the 
legitimacy of political authority is handled discursively in two sublanguages 
of the language of law. The first is the language of global constitutionalism 
with its two legal sublanguages, the language of human rights23 and the 
language of the rule of law.24
The language of global constitutionalism
In the debate about models of global order,25 the concept of global con-
stitutionalism26 plays a prominent part, not in the sense of a utopian call for 
a world constitution, and not – as Anne Peters suggests27 – in the sense of 
“compensatory constitutionalism” to make up for national constitutions’ 
lack of reach, but as a “global legal script” in discourses on the justification 
of political authority wherever and in whatever guise. Mattias Kumm et al. 
have set out this claim to global validity in an editorial marking the third 
year of publication of the journal “Global Constitutionalism.” They first 
address the “Trinitarian mantra of the constitutionalist faith,” namely 
“human rights, democracy and the rule of law”:
“The publication record over the first couple of years also reflects the fact that 
constitutive and fundamental norms that implicate questions of legitimate author-
ity generally include a commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law. The commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law – the Trini-
tarian mantra of the constitutionalist faith – is part of the deep grammar of the 
22 Rosa (1994) 206.
23 On the concept of universal human rights as a “juridified revolution” see Schuppert, G. F.
(2015) 247 f.
24 On the globalization of rule of law principles as an applied case of discursive lawmaking, 
Schuppert, G. F. (2015) 257.
25 See Zürn (2011b) 78.
26 Law / Versteeg (2011) 1163; Schwöbel (2011) 1.
27 Peters (2015) 1484.
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modern constitutionalist tradition. It provides an abstract template of principles in 
the light of which concrete arrangements are negotiated and policies are forged in 
contemporary constitutionalist settings. Within this constitutionalist framework, 
wherever political and legal authority is constituted or exercised, it can be criticized 
or justified with reference to these concepts.”28
On closer inspection, the core of the “global constitutionalism” concept 
consists – secondly – in a global language to be employed in discourses on 
the justification or limitation of political authority. On this claim to universal-
ity, the authors comment:
“The ‘legitimatory trinity’ as a central feature of a modern constitutional discourse 
came into the world with the French and American Revolutions and was internally 
connected to ideas of individual and collective self-government at the time. It went 
through various challenges and permutations before it re-emerged after World War 
II to become a globally hegemonic discourse since the 1990s, both in and beyond 
the state. There is no liberal constitution enacted after 1990 that does not pledge 
allegiance to the trinity in some way. The European Union asserts that these are its 
foundational values, the Council of Europe has embraced it, the UN claims to be 
committed to it and various General Assembly Resolutions have endorsed it. In 
global public discourse this is the language most likely to be used and most likely to be 
effective when either contesting or resisting authority or using it to justify the 
imposition of restrictions on others.”29
The language of legal pluralism
The critical and emancipatory potential of the language of law is demon-
strated by one of the most prominent representatives of legal pluralism, 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (* 1940). His 1977 essay on “The Law of the 
Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada”30
reveals the political thrust of his work: he opposes the state monopoly on 
law and wants to give, or return, a degree of autonomy to the normative 
order, especially in socially disadvantaged communities. In contrast to other 
well-known theoreticians of legal pluralism such as John Griffith31 and Marc 
Galanter,32 “he does not look for legal pluralism in indigenous commun-
28 Kumm et al. (2014) 1.
29 Kumm et al. (2014) 4.




ities. He looks for it in the precarious conditions on the fringes of urban 
centres of modernity: in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. He has given the name 
Pasargada to this urban time-space he studies.”33
He wants to liberate the various social spheres existing in differentiated 
societies from the hegemony of state law and have their intrinsic normative 
value recognized. Innate to the “new legal common sense”34 he propagates is a 
clear emancipatory tendency, which Ralf Seinecke outlines as follows:
“This demands not an instrumental but an emancipatory juridification of social 
affairs. His postmodern law gives back their intrinsic law to social spheres, frees 
them from the exclusive hegemony of state and formal law. This postmodern or 
plural law lends the various social spheres greater potential for reflection because it 
places their (autonomous) law, their (autonomous) power, and their (autonomous) 
knowledge in competition with the law, power, and knowledge of the state and of 
other structural spaces. This juridification of the social measures actual social struc-
tures by the normative standards of the law and puts it under greater pressure for 
legitimation. Law and rightness are more closely related than social authority, social 
power, and social justice.”35
In the emancipation of non-state “normative spaces,” Santos suggests that an 
important role could be played by the language of law, which imagines these 
social spaces and provides not only orientation like a map but can also 
generates its own reality.
“My argument is that there are many unresolved problems in the sociological study 
of the law that may be solved by comparing law with other ways of imagining the 
real. Maps are one such way. There are, in fact, striking similarities between the laws 
and maps – both concerning their structural features and their use patterns. Obvi-
ously, laws are maps only in the metaphorical sense. But, as rhetoric also teaches us, 
the repeated use of a metaphor over a long period of time may gradually transform 
the metaphorical description into a literal description. Today laws are maps in a 
metaphorical sense. Tomorrow they may be maps in a literal sense.”36
Closely related to the language of law as a language of discourses on the 
legitimacy of political authority is its application as a language of political 
change, which brings out its ability to convey new ideas particularly clearly.
33 Seinecke (2015) 209.
34 For more detail see de Sousa Santos (2002).
35 de Sousa Santos (2002) 229.
36 de Sousa Santos (1987) 286.
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II. The language of law as a language of political change
As we have seen, using a language – whether that of theology, philosophy, or 
law – as a language of politics is not about the inconsequential instruction of 
the reader but about achieving something, about changing a social reality no 
longer considered acceptable. To quote John L. Austin, it is about “how to do 
things with words.”37 Heinrich Heine, one of the most acute and sharp-
tongued observers of political affairs in both Germany and France, had this 
to say about the incantations circulating in the political debate on the French 
Revolution: “… they are incantations mightier than gold and guns, words 
with which the dead are called out of their graves and the living sent to their 
death. Words that make giants out of dwarves and shatter giants, words that 
sever all your power like the guillotine a king’s neck.”38
Some will find this too dramatic and will prefer to formulate the issue in 
linguistic terms, speaking of the performative use39 of every language of 
politics. This also holds for the language of law in this capacity.
1. The language of law used in legal policy as “performative language”
In a recent article on “Law as the Subject of Jurisprudence and Law Pro-
duction”, Thilo Kuntz40 complains of the self-imposed, narrow limitation of 
jurisprudence to the law “in force”. He shows that not only classical law-
making but also its realization and interpretation involve producing law in 
and through language. Kuntz calls this performative law production:41
“Law is constituted linguistically whether it is written or unwritten law. The only 
medium available is the linguistic utterance. The type of legal source, law, or ruling, 
whether precedent or some other form is immaterial. There is a ‘fundamental … 
dependence of legal rules and values (requirement, validity, normativity, and obli-
gation) on a legal culture tied to language and its media.’42 The dependence of law 
on language is apparent on (at least) two levels: law is not only linguistically con-
stituted, it is also produced in and through language. The production of law is based 
on speech acts by the competent authorities. It is an example of the possibility of not 
37 Austin (1962).
38 Heine (1971) 103. Transl. R. B.
39 On performativity see Wirth (ed.) (2002); Bachmann-Medick (2009) 104–143.
40 Kuntz (2016).
41 Kuntz (2016) 18.
42 Vesting (2011b) 42.
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only describing the world by means of speech act but also of changing it. In other 
words, the production of law is an example of a performative speech act:43 if some-
one with the relevant authority makes a linguistic utterance to the effect that certain 
conduct is liable to prosecution or that a certain option is available, for instance a 
company limited by shares, performance of these speech acts bring about criminal 
liability and creates the company limited by shares as a legal form. These are exam-
ples of “performance of an act in saying something.”44
If we apply these reflections of Thilo Kuntz on the performative production 
of law to the language of law concerned with political change – that is to say, 
as a language of politics – we can rightly speak of the language of law as 
performative language. This performative language of law can be used in two 
ways: first to defend the existing order – under such headings as tradition 
and acquired rights – and as a fanfare for revolution.45 The latter almost 
inevitably invites brief consideration of the French Revolution and its revo-
lutionary (legal) language.
2. Revolutions and their revolutionary (legal) language:
the example of the French Revolution
When it comes to discussing the French Revolution, it is only right to give 
the floor to a Frenchman. Particularly eloquent is Pierre Rosanvallon, who 
has this to say about the language of the French Revolution:46
“From the beginning of the Revolution it was clear that a new vocabulary was 
needed to describe the motives and principles of the new political order that was 
being established. One no longer spoke of subjects, for example, but of citizens; not 
of a kingdom but of a nation; and so on. It was a time of extraordinary inventiveness 
in this connection, and a novel political language did in fact emerge. But not only was 
it a language in flux, it was liable to be corrupted as well. Some of the most bitter 
recriminations expressed during the Terror concerned just this point. Thus Sieyès, 
the father of the first French Constitution, scathingly denounced “the infamous 
prostitution of the words most dear to French hearts, Liberty, Equality, People,” 
considering “the abuse of what once was a common language” to be by no means 
43 Monography: Müller-Mall (2012).
44 Müller-Mall (2012) 8.
45 On the role of the lawyer, see Schmitt (2008) 491: “Of every revolutionary movement it 
can be said that the lawyer, the ‘theologian of the prevailing order’ is seen as its special 
enemy, while, vice versa, it is precisely the lawyers in particular who are on the side of the 
revolution and who lend it the pathos of oppressed and insulted law.”
46 Rosanvallon (2018) 228.
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the least source of the misfortunes of the age, words having now lost their natural 
meaning and been made to “conspire with the enemies of our country.”47
In view of the susceptibility of probably all political language to abuse, it is 
no surprise that in turbulent revolutionary times attempts were made to 
discipline the use of language; Rosanvallon reports:
“Condorcet’s purpose in founding the Journal d’instruction sociale, in 1793, was more 
pedagogical than punitive. Its objective was to ‘combat political charlatans’48 by 
elucidating the key terms of an orthodox political lexicon and thereby limit variant 
and illegitimate interpretations. The journal’s motto was simply stated: ‘Reason is 
one, and has only one language.’49 In the same spirit, Sieyès proposed that an 
attempt be made to ‘fix the language,’ giving it a stable and permanent form by 
means of conventions, and thus to provided politics with a ‘proper language’ uncon-
taminated by the imprecision of ‘natual language.’ Sieyès was seconded in this by 
Destutt de Tracy, author of five-volume Éléments d’idéologie (1801–1815), who 
sought to create an ‘analytic language’ that would help modify and improve the 
practice of democracy.50 The utopian conception of linguistic purity as the condi-
tion of plain speaking came to nothing in either case, but there was no getting 
around the necessity of confronting fundamental questions arising from the indef-
inite character of political semantics. Democracy is, after all, a regime that unavoid-
ably involves continual and perpetual debate over is basic concepts and terminol-
ogy.”51
The plausible conclusion is that democracy is a form of political sociation 
whose task it is to permanently reflect on the type and quality of the per-
formative language practised within it.
Finally, we take a look at the particularly interesting language of institu-
tional legal thought under the National Socialist regime.
3. The institutional legal thinking of the Carl Schmitt School:
an example of the susceptibility of the language of law to abuse
This is not the place to go into the interesting history of institutional legal 
thought52 or to examine, let alone question, whether we are witnessing a 
47 Guilhaumou (2002) 31, as quoted by Rosanvallon (2018) 228.
48 Condorcet (1793), prospectus of this journal, 10.
49 Condorcet (1793), prospectus of this journal, 10–11.
50 See Schlieben-Lange (1996).
51 Schlieben-Lange (1996) 232–233.
52 See Rüthers (1970); also Meinel (2011).
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renaissance of the institutional perspective53 or its replacement by an indi-
vidual basic rights perspective, such as Hans-Michael Heinig and Christian 
Walter propagate for public ecclesiastical law.54 Instead, we shall examine the 
concrete order thinking of Carl Schmitt, because this example can teach us a 
great deal about the susceptibility of the language of law to instrumentalization.
a) The concept and function of concrete order thinking
The concept of concrete order thinking goes back to the treatise Carl Schmitt 
published in 1934 under the title “On the Three Types of Juristic Thought”,55
which introduces the notion of “concrete order and formation thinking” as 
follows: “every lawyer who consciously or unconsciously bases his work on 
the concept of ‘law’ understands this law either as a rule, or a decision, or as a 
concrete order and formation. This determines the three types of juristic think-
ing that are distinguished here.”56
* Changes in the property regime
In 1935, Franz Wieacker, then teaching law at the University of Freiburg i. 
Br., author of the later “History of Private Law in Europe”57 and professor at 
the University of Göttingen (where the present author attended his lectures 
on Digest exegesis), published a brief work under this heading.58 It reflects 
what a circle of professors of law, young in 1933, understood and propagated 
by “national legal renewal” (“völkische Rechtserneuerung”).
The preface and foreword send a clear message: a new age requires a 
“new” jurisprudence59 and thus new figures of thought – as the example of 
the property concept illustrates:
“After the upheavals of 1933, the clear and precise definition of the forms of thought
within which the property concept is still meaningful in the law of this state must 
be attempted. Even though the National Socialist state promises to care for and 
53 See Vesting et al. (eds.) 2014.
54 See Heinig / Walter (eds.) (2007).
55 Schmitt (1993); English translation by J. W. Bendersky: Schmitt (2004).
56 Schmitt (2004) 7.
57 Wieacker (1996); Wieacker (1967).
58 Wieacker (1935).
59 See Grimm (1985).
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uphold property, there can be no doubt that this decision is grounded in materially 
new values content; all work on renewing property law surely needs to begin with an 
explanation of this content. For it is precisely the property commitments behind the 
legal provision of Article 903 that, in the merging economic regime, determine the 
concrete validity content of the institution ‘property’. In seeking clarity about its struc-
ture, we should not once again posit a new generic concept in the sense of norma-
tivist positivism from which a new property regime is derived by rigid necessity; 
such a concept imposed on the realities of life would be taken to the point of 
absurdity by ongoing legislation. Considering new ways of thinking about property 
serves a different, essentially pedagogical purpose: to present acceptable and 
unequivocal ideas that obviate any return to obsolescent forms of civil law.”60
The postulated redefinition of the property concept is explained in the 
following passage. What the new national order (Volksordnung), divided into 
defined “order circles” (Ordnungskreise), requires is a “bounded property 
regime”:
“This formal version of the task of legal policy will bear no fruit if we do not take 
the concrete structure of the new order into account. This structuring tendency, as 
the Farm Succession Act and the Labour Promotion Act show, leads to the replace-
ment of destructive dialectical group formation in the body of the nation: workers – 
employers; tenants – landlords; city and country by … formations such as the 
Labour Front (Arbeitsfront) and works community (Betriebsgemeinschaft), food pro-
ducers, and farmers. Lawmaking in pursuit of this structural principle is justified by 
the notion that fronts and occupations are subdivisions of the natural order of the 
nation, in which lawmaking through occupational group regulation presents itself 
as the optimal principle for the unconstrained and ordering growth of law. The 
closer these subdivisions are to the given circles of the national order, the more thor-
oughgoing, comprehensive, and stable regulation will be.Thus, family property law, 
which in the Civil Code still purports to represent a concrete basic order, is joined 
by agricultural property law, and in outline also property law pertaining to the 
industrial enterprise. This is the structure we mean when using the ambiguous term 
‘bounded property order’.”61
* Changes in the work regime
Without a doubt, “concrete order thinking” left its mark particularly on the 
work regime. Writing about “civil law theory and fascism”, Ingeborg Maus 
remarks:62
60 Wieacker (1935) 9.
61 Wieacker (1935) 21.
62 Maus (1980).
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“Carl Schmitt’s theory of concrete order thinking is most concrete where it refers to 
the 1934 ‘Act on the Order of National Labour’: ‘the collective wage agreement is 
replaced by a wage order; employers, employees, and workers are the leaders and 
followers of an enterprise who work together in pursuit of business objectives and 
for the common good of the nation and state; the two are members of a common 
order, a community under public law.’63 This definition, especially under Section 1 
of the Act, of a community ideology of the undertaking, in which group freedom of 
contract disappears and the limits to the justiciable legal obligation of the individual 
are abandoned in favour of a duty of loyalty, offers a classical example of perverted 
legislation typical of a constitution-making prerogative state and grounded in ‘con-
crete-order thinking’.”64
What two then standard commentaries on the “Act on the Order of National 
Labour” have to say about Article 1 is both informative and revelatory. 
Ingeborg Maus:
“The first paragraph, a form of preamble, sums up the meaning, content, and ethic 
of the law, so that the following provisions can be understood largely as elaborations 
of these basic ideas … The Act treats this community of all working in the enterprise 
as part of a national community (Volksgemeinschaft). With every single provision, it 
calls upon this spirit of national community, demanding and expecting that all 
individuals fulfil their duties in this sense, but also exercise their rights in this sense. 
The Act deliberately waives all casuistic regulation, being satisfied to establish gen-
eral guidelines and generally define duties and rights. Basically, it leaves detailed 
interpretation to the responsible and conscientious decision of the individuals called 
upon to decide. It places almost unlimited confidence in all those entrusted with 
interpretation.”65
And in the commentary by Mansfeld / Pohl / Steinmann and Krause we find 
the following complementary remarks: “We are dealing not so much with 
legal norms inapt to interpretation by old methods … as with an Act whose 
main sections are less juristic than ethical in import. The aim of the lawmaker 
is rather to educate and form members of the German nation (Volksgenossen) 
than to establish an external legal order for social life, that will become less 
and less necessary as this education succeeds.”66
63 Schmitt (1993) 64.
64 Maus (1980) 133–134.
65 Hueck et al. (1934) 20–21.
66 Mansfeld et al. (1934) 75.
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These passages invite the following conclusion:
A regime like that of National Socialism shaped by political struggle and a 
specific political ideology had to rely on translating its political goals into the 
language of law, as well, and placing law at the service of regime policy. The 
ruling elite of the Nazi state were fully aware that it would be useful if they 
could point to theoretical grounding for such instrumentalization of law 
and present it as “amenable to theory”. In this situation the formulation 
“concrete order thinking” was to prove invaluable. The conclusion of 
Schmitt’s treatise on the three types of jurisprudential thought shows that, 
with concrete order thinking, he presented the Nazi regime with an “appo-
site” mode of reasoning on a silver platter. A somewhat lengthy perusal of this 
“customized” gift is therefore called for:
“… to traditional positivist thinking, the indisputable advance of a new mode of 
juridical thought appears to be only a corrective to its old method, a limbering up as 
in earlier free law movements, as mere adjustment to a new situation for perpetu-
ation and self-preservation of the prevailing type. But the change in jurisprudential 
thinking comes now in conjunction with a change in the entire structure of the 
state. As we have seen, all changes in a mode of legal thought are to be seen in a vast 
historical and systematic context, which places them in the given situation of the 
community’s political life. … The state of today is no longer divided into two in 
terms of state and society, but into three series of orders in terms of state, movement, 
and people. The state as a special order level within the political entity no longer 
holds a monopoly of politics, but is only an organ of the leader of the movement. 
The old decisionist, normativistic or combined positivist legal thinking is no longer 
adequate for a political entity thus structured. What is now needed is a concrete 
order and formation thinking that can deal with the numerous new tasks imposed 
by the state, national, economic, and world-view situation and which can cope with 
the new forms of community. Intrinsic to this advance of a new jurisprudential 
thinking is therefore not mere correction of old positivist methods but a transition 
to a new type of legal thought able to cope with the coming communities, orders, 
and formations of a new century.”67
b) Radical order thinking and the organization of totalitarian rule
Under this heading, the historian Lutz Raphael presents ground-breaking 
reflections68 on how the totalitarian National Socialist regime managed 
67 Schmitt (1993) 54–55. Translation R. B.
68 Raphael (2001).
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– without any resistance to speak of – to organize a close relationship 
between the regime and academia,69 gaining justification of its political 
goals. At the same time, Raphael shows the indispensable role played by 
jurists in translating the language of ideology into the language of law, in trans-
forming political ideology into enforceable official language. With reference 
to National Socialist race theory, he explains that an irrational ideology like 
that of the Nazi state, if it was to be implemented in administrative practice, 
in a bureaucratic, i. e., rule-bound administrative state, had to be translated 
into manageable decisions, that is, into statutory law, regulations, or decrees 
that an administrative staff, generally with legal training, could execute.70 It 
was the job of jurists to transpose ideological policy programmes into a 
language that could be comprehended and carried out by an administration 
operating in the functional mode of rational legal government. Lutz 
Raphael describes this “metamorphosis” of irrational ideology into the osten-
sible rationality of legal and administrative language:
“As professors, judges, and administrative officials, jurists performed key functions 
in reshaping private and constitutional law to meet the political goals of the regime, 
continuously legitimating the wrongful practices of the regime through commen-
taries and decisions. Notably, the important role played by institutionalized racism 
shows the need to take the contribution of legal experts into account when exam-
ining the applied human sciences. Legal expertise was the indispensable prerequisite 
for transforming the defamatory propaganda of the regime or the discriminatory 
allegations of scientists and scholars into the official language of legally relevant clas-
sifications and distinctions. The contribution of jurisprudence must therefore be seen 
in this genuinely ‘political work’:71 ‘The legal facts strengthened the belief in the 
scientificity of race theory and eugenic practices. In turn, the latter were raised to the 
69 Academia was not only unable to oppose the aggressive governmental policy of the Na-
tional Socialists, but, as Raphael notes, experienced a “wave of self-mobilization” for the 
Nazi cause, abandoning prevailing standards of scholarly morality and professional ethics: 
“The willing participation of a broad majority in the academic professions and university 
circles in the ‘national revolution’ was a decisive precondition for the regime itself, after 
eliminating basic critique, to adapt to the existing relation of forces in the universities, 
permitting a limited measure of intellectual freedom of opinion, which established a 
pluralism of discipline-specific theories and schools for all who accepted the official lan-
guage of the new regime and, above all, its political claim to binding interpretation and desig-
nation of the social world.” Raphael (2001) 12.
70 See Bertrand (2012).
71 Pollak (1990) 25.
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status of research areas at the universities. Vice versa, these disciplines contributed to 
the legitimation of conditions that had been created by the new legal frame-
work.’”72
4. A brief interim appraisal
The language of law as a language of politics, being a performative language, 
is always at risk of political instrumentalization. This is demonstrated by the 
French Revolution and by the advent of the National Socialist regime as 
linguistic-conceptual seizure of power. The latter example is so interesting 
because it shows how, through the agency of jurists who saw themselves as 
representatives of a “new jurisprudence,” could be translated into the lan-
guage of law, thus legitimating the totalitarian regime and enabling its 
bureaucratic application. This particular example demonstrates how the lan-
guage of law as a language of politics also operates as an institutional lan-
guage at constant risk of political instrumentalization and even abuse. Not 
only the language of law is necessarily close to the exercise of power: so is the 
legal profession, as Bernd Rüthers has convincingly shown.73
III. The language of law as a language of rights
When the law comes under discussion in its function of creating and guar-
anteeing rights, whether in relations between individuals or between the 
individual and the governance collective to which he or she belongs,74 we 
expect to hear about conceptual classics of the language of rights such as 
subjective public law,75 basic rights,76 and the constitutional guarantee of 
effective legal protection.77 For the moment, however, our attention turns 
elsewhere: to two matters we consider particularly important from the point 
of view of the history of ideas.
72 Raphael (2001) 1–16.
73 Rüthers (1992).
74 Moore (1973).
75 Bühler (1914) 21, 224; Kraft (2008) 14.
76 Comprehensive treatment in: Pieroth / Schlink (2010) 23.
77 Wahl (1985) 222–223.
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1. Hardening political ideas through translation into
the language of constitutional law
Those who have successfully carried out a revolution or have emerged victo-
rious from a political dispute tend to record the result as a perceptible turn 
of events – preferably in the language of law with its promise of permanence 
and stability. In legal and constitutional history, this is demonstrated by the 
fact that almost all legal acts marking revolutions and upheavals are formu-
lated as documents of rights. Wolfgang Knies has this to say:
“Not only the French Déclaration but also the American declarations of rights is the 
outcome of revolutionary history. In formulating individual rights, they could draw 
on the model and material of the seventeenth century English freedom documents, 
which blazed the trail in the dispute between Crown and Parliament, and which set 
out the civil liberties of Englishmen – partly as political demands, partly as con-
cessions by the Crown. In the Petition of Rights (1628), the first Agreement of the 
People (1647), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), and finally in the Bill of Rights (1689), 
we find not only such important, forward-looking principles and rights as equality 
before the law, freedom of religion, no taxation without representation, procedural 
guarantees for detainees, and due process of the law with respect to any encroach-
ment on freedom and property; also the notion of certain natural, innate human 
rights (birth rights, native rights), which – systematically developed by English 
theoreticians of the state, notably John Locke (1632–1704) – already find expression 
in them.”78
Clearly, the strategy of couching the victory of a political idea or other 
course-setting political decision in the form of a constitutional act lends 
palpable shape to the characteristics of a constitution that, following Peter 
Badura,79 can be defined as follows:80
Constitution
* a law set out in a constitutional document, distinguished from the rest of the legal 
order by its legal effect and the import of its subject matter;
* the most outstanding expression of the legal culture of a society, politically doc-
umenting and constantly renewing its unity and self-conception;
78 Knies (1971) 45.
79 Badura (1987) cl. 3757 ff.
80 Schuppert, G. F. (2003) 743.
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* legally effectuating, through the exercise of state authority, the political ideas pro-
mulgated in making the constitution, and hence, above all establishing the unity of 
the legal order;
* imposing the exercise of power under a legal order, eliminating the arbitrary and 
inconsistent exercise of this power, lending it predictability and stability through 
“juristic baptism”.
Every constitution is hence a historical snapshot that breaths and reflects 
the spirit of the times, but which also signals the dawning of a better 
world.81 Presumably, a “good” constitution would therefore have something 
to say even if somewhat antiquated. Writing in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 
the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Bavarian Constitution, 
Heribert Prantl confirmed this in an article entitled “State Love Letter”:
“Although this constitution is a love letter it is not mere waffle. When it addresses 
work, the economy, and social policy, it sounds as if Fidel Castro and Pope Francis 
helped draft it. ‘Every man has the right to gain an adequate livelihood through 
work,’ we read. And: ‘Work enjoys the special protection of the state.’ And: ‘Every 
man has a right to security against the vicissitudes of life.’ And ‘Every worker has a 
right to recreation.’
As we see, this is not taken from a brochure for the 125th jubilee of the German 
Metalworkers’ Union, not from a papal social encyclical, let alone an old socialist 
constitution of an erstwhile Eastern Bloc country. It comes from the Bavarian Con-
stitution of December 1946. This provision on co-determination above establish-
ment level is also there, very clear and very forceful: ‘Workers as equal members of 
the economy participate in formative economic activities together with all other 
persons engaged in the economy.’
All these statements convey a vision and a lesson – the lesson from the mass 
unemployment in the twenties and thirties of the twentieth century, which helped 
bring the Nazis to power. Seventy years ago, this lesson was so clear to the CSU and 
the SPD that agreement on fundamental economic issues proved possible. Even if 
the language sounds a little antiquated and traditionalist here and there, one some-
times has the feeling that this constitution foresaw the difficulties of globalization 
and pointed in the right direction. ‘All economic activity serves the common good’ 
according to Article 151, and ‘the economic freedom of the individual finds its 
limits in consideration of others.’ If we hear this nowadays, the old Heiner Geißler 
comes to mind, or perhaps Sahra Wagenknecht.”82
So much – with regard to the weight of political ideas – for the hardening of 
constitutional law in the mould of the constitution.
81 Preuss (1994).
82 Prantl (2016) 49.
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2. The language of law as dynamic language:
“extending the combat zone”
In a recent article we posited that – in contrast to the classical notion of a 
system upholding and developing a static order – law has to be understood 
as a thoroughly dynamic system,83 because only in this sense can law perform 
its function as the central steerage system for the democratic constitutional 
state, the state under the rule of law.84 If this is so, the language of law can 
also be described as a dynamic language. This is indeed the case.
a) The endogenous dynamics of basic rights
At an early date, basic rights, the focus of the language of rights, moved 
beyond the closed ranks of defensive rights to steadily extend their rich 
functional potential. The history of basic rights can in so far be written as a 
history of expansion.
In his seminal work on the system of subjective public rights,85 Georg 
Jellinek had, in addressing the position of the individual vis-à-vis the state, 
already drawn a distinction between “status negativus”, “status positivus”, and 
“status activus”. “Status negativus” concerns basic rights as defensive rights 
against the state; “status positivus” is determined and guaranteed by basic 
rights in their capacity as entitlements, participatory rights, rights to perform-
ance, and procedural rights. Finally, “status activus” refers to the situation 
“where the individual exercises his freedom in and for the state, helps to shape 
and participate in the state. It is fashioned and safeguarded by civil rights.”86
Taking up and developing this approach, the basic rights theories87 so 
dominant in the jurisprudence of the Bonn Republic took note of constant 
change in basic rights and fostered the process88 in an effort to meet the 
constantly changing challenges of societal reality. The Federal Constitutional 
83 Schuppert, G. F. (2016a); see also Zeh (2006) 123–138.
84 On the law see: Schuppert, G. F. (ed.) (1998).
85 Jellinek (1919) 87ff.
86 Pieroth / Schlink (2010).
87 Still instructive: Böckenförde (1974).
88 See from the perspective of the transition from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Krüper
(2015).
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Court, in particular, has shown considerable initiative with avant-garde 
innovations in basic rights.89 In terms of the problem addressed in this 
introduction, it could be said that, through its rulings on basic rights, the 
Federal Constitutional Court has not only safeguarded the expressive 
capacity of the language of law but has also made it sustainable.
b) The language of human rights as a language of intervention
in political discourses
If what we have said at the beginning of this introduction about the lan-
guage of law as a language of discourses on the legitimacy of political author-
ity is correct, the language of law as a language of politics will always tend to 
be a language of intervention in political discourses and debates. The genu-
inely political dimension of the language of law is impressively demonstra-
ted by the discourse on human rights:
* Human rights as “enabling narrative”
Writing about human rights as a translation problem, Doris Bachmann-
Medick90 addresses the translational potential of the idea of human rights, 
which unfolds above all when the human rights discourse in the sense of 
Dipesh Chakrabarty91 links up with other, politico-social discourses, form-
ing critical-strategic alliances. With reference to Joseph Slaughter, Doris 
Bachmann-Medick sees such a link in the coupling of human rights and 
an “emancipatory” literature such as the bildungsroman:92
“Like Lynn Hunt,93 Slaughter maintains that the programmatic development per-
spective of individual legal claims in the human rights discourse since the eight-
89 A good example is the “fundamental right of the confidentiality and integrity of informa-
tion systems”, BVerfGE 120, 274, 313ff.; see Hoffmann-Riem (2016) § 35: Grundrechtsin-
novationen im Spannungsfeld von Präventionsstaat und technologischer Entwicklung.
90 Bachmann-Medick (2012).
91 Chakrabarty (2013).
92 On the question of how “human rights function as narrative constructions” can be linked to 





eenth century goes back to the humanistic idea of the spiritual development of the 
individual. Like literature, it operates as ‘enabling fiction.’94 It is thus certainly no 
accident, albeit astonishing, that, in drafting Article 29 of the UN declaration of 
1948,95 some delegates controversially invoked a prime literary example of person-
ality development: Daniel Defoe’s ‘Robinson Crusoe’.96 But ‘enabling’ has come to 
mean a great deal more. It also covers giving impetus to political activism through 
‘life narratives,’ ‘testimonios,’ and other forms of self-testimony97 such as those of 
well-known writers: Arundhati Roy writing against the construction of the […] 
Narmada Dam98 and the Nobel Prize winner and human rights activist Rigoberta 
Menchú with her support for the rights of the Quiché-Mayas in Guatemala, which 
she develops in a testimonio.99 Scandalous and moving is the case of the Nigerian 
writer and human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, who for many years championed 
the rights of the Ogoni in Nigeria, a minority whose land has for decades been 
exploited and contaminated by the oil company Shell against the backdrop of their 
oppression and impoverishment. In this struggle for indigenous rights, Ken Saro-
Wiwa was executed – despite all appeals to human rights and despite the constitu-
tion of a local human rights declaration,100 the Ogoni Bill of Rights of 1990.”101
But Bachmann-Medick points to another interesting connection, which we 
shall consider in brief in concluding this look at the language of law as a 
language of rights.
94 Slaughter (2006) 1406.
95 Article 29:
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of 
his personality is possible.
(1) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
(2) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.
96 Slaughter (2006) 1405 f.
97 Schaffer / Smith (2004) 1–34.
98 See Roy (1999).
99 Menchú (2010).
100 Under: http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/RightsDeclaration/Ogoni.html.
101 Bachmann-Medick (2009) 354.
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* From a “needs-centred approach” to a “rights-centred one”
The link between the human rights discourse and the development discourse 
has proved particularly fruitful, notable in the discussion of resource rights;102
Doris Bachmann-Medick:
“Further new translational links arise where, for example human rights issues are 
translated into the development discourse, particularly apparent in the Declaration of 
Development Rights.103 Vice versa, the translation of development debates into 
human rights discourses proves fruitful for human rights praxis. In this fashion, 
subsistence rights such as food, water, and work – as we have seen – are reformu-
lated as human rights.104 At any rate, the translation perspective reveals how margi-
nalized sections of the population can advance their self-empowerment and assert 
their interests; for instance by translating an orientation on needs into an orienta-
tion on rights: ‘The needs-centred approach is being replaced by a rights-centred 
approach’105 – in rural areas, for example, by reclaiming fishing, land, and forest 
rights; in urban areas through claims to housing and residential rights or rights to a 
power supply.”106
If this perspective is extended to include the ever more urgent problem of 
climate change, the “rights-centred approach” and the threats to it posed 
by climate change can be described as follows, to quote Oxfam Interna-
tional:107
102 See further: Schuppert, F. (2012); Schuppert, F. (2014).
103 See Eckert (2009) 318: “Der Aufstieg von Entwicklungs- und Menschenrechtsdiskursen 
verläuft parallel, institutionell gibt es zahllose Überlappungen. Der Frage nach der gegen-
seitigen Prägung dieser Felder wurde bisher nur sehr unsystematisch nachgegangen.”
104 Sachs (2003).
105 Sachs (2003) 30.
106 Bachmann-Medick (2009) 357.
107 Oxfam International (2008).
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How climate change undermines human rights
Human-rights norms in
international law
Current and projected impacts of climate change upon human 
rights
The Right to Life and
Security
“Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person.” 
(UDHR, Article3)
* There will be more deaths, disease, and injury due to the 
increasing frequency and intensity of heat waves, floods, 
storms, fires, and droughts.
* Rising sea levels will increase the risk of death and injury by 
drowning. Up to 20 percent of the world’s population live in 
river basins that are likely to be affected by increased flood 
hazard by the 2080s.
* Heat weaves are likely to increase deaths among elderly or 
chronically sick people, young children, and the socially 
isolated. Europe’s 2003 heat wave – induced by climate 
change – resulted in 27.000 extra deaths.*
Right to Food
“The State Parties to the present 
Covenant, recognize the funda-
mental right of everyone to be 
free of hunger …”
(ICESCR, Article 11)
* Future climate change is expected to put close to 50 million 
more people at risk of hunger by 2020, and an additional 132 
million people by 2050.
* In Africa, Shrinking arable land, shorter growing seasons, 
and lower crop yields will exacerbate malnutrition. In some 
countries, yields form rain-fed agriculture could fall by up to 
30 per cent in central and South Asia by 2050.
* In parts of Asia, food security will be threatened due to water 
shortages and rising temperatures. Crop yields could fall by 
up to 30 per cent in Central and South Asia by 2050.
The Right to Subsistence
“Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, includ-
ing food, clothing, housing …”
(UDHR, Article 25)
“In no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of
subsistence.”
(ICCPR, Article 1.2 and ICESCR, 
Article 1.2)
* Water: By 2020, between 75 million and 250 million people 
in Africa are likely to face greater water stress due to climate 
change. Reduced water flow from mountain glaciers could 
affect up to one billion people in Asia by 2050s.
* Natural resources: Approximately 20–30 per cent of plant and 
animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of 
extinction if average global temperatures rise more then 1.5–2.5 C. 
Coral bleaching and coastal erosion will affect fish stocks – cur-
rently the primary source of animal protein for one billion people.
* Property and shelter: Millions more people risk facing annual 
floods due to sea-level rise by 2080s, mostly in the mega-
deltas of Asia and Africa. On small islands, too, sea-level rise 
is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, and ero-
sion, threatening vital infrastructure, settlements, and facili-
ties that support the livelihoods of island communities.
The Right to Health
“The State Parties to the present
Covenant, recognise the funda-
mental right of everyone to be
free from hunger …”
(ICESCR, Article 11)
* Child malnutrition will increase, damaging growth and 
development prospects for millions of children.
* Increasing floods and drought will lead to more cases of 
diarrhea and cholera. Over 150.000 people are currently 
estimated to die each year from diarrhea, malaria, and mal-
nutrition caused by climate change.
* Changing temperatures will cause some infectious diseases to 
spread into new areas. It is estimated that 220–400 million more 
people will be at risk of malaria. The risk of dengue fever is 
estimated to reach 3.5 billion people by 2085 to climate change.
Sources: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right (ICESCR); the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007, Working Group II; *World Health Organisation.
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3. A second interim appraisal
The language of rights is clearly a classical subdivision of the language of law, 
since it conveys the promising message of individual freedom. But, as we 
know from our examination of “semantic shifts”,108 semantics change and 
must change if they do not only reflect societal change but also accompany 
or even induce it. If the language of rights as a language of politics is to claim 
such a critical-strategic thrust for itself, it assumes the function of equipping 
a vast range of “agents of justice”109 with the vocabulary and conceptual 
repertoire needed for legal discourse as social critique. It is then only a short 
step to the language of law as a language of justice, as we shall see.
IV. The language of law as a language of justice
If, in concluding our tour d’horizon of the functions and contexts of the 
language of law, we now turn to the justice dimension, it is not with the 
intention of losing ourselves in the vast terrain of law as justice.110 We are 
concerned with a specific perspective, namely the role of the language of law 
in the current intensive political discourse on justice; the language of law 
makes itself distinctly heard in these debates.
1. Justice discourses as social critique: the language of law
as social-critical language
There is currently no escaping the call for “more justice”. In 2016, the Social 
Democratic party staged a major “Values Conference: Justice”,111 and the 
Greens, too, give the highest priority to justice – witness their efforts to 
develop a consistent taxation concept. These justice discourses naturally 
address the everlasting topic of all social policy – associated above all with 
the name of John Rawls – distributive justice,112 but especially with social 
108 On the role and function of “semantic shifts” see Schuppert, G. F. (2010) 115ff.
109 See O’Neill, O. (2001); Dryzek (2015).
110 For a good overview on law and justice see: Rüthers et al. (2010) § 9 (222–264).




justice, represented in political philosophy primarily by “social egalitar-
ians”,113 who focus not so much on the distribution of material goods but 
– as Fabian Schuppert has shown – on the demand to treat people as “being 
equal”:
“According to its proponents, social equality is valuable because it protects every 
person’s status as a free and equal member of society. Social equality is concerned 
with the relationships people stand in and what people can do and be within these 
relationships. Phrased differently, social equality concerns more the harmful effects 
of certain social relationships and their associated inequalities, than the equal dis-
tribution of a particular set of goods or the provision of equal initial opportunity. 
This reading of equality distinguishes social egalitarians from classic distributive 
egalitarians, whose focus is determining the adequate currency for egalitarian dis-
tributions and the exact principles of such distribution. […] Social egalitarians thus 
primarily worry about the negative effects of certain inequalities.”114
This “social egalitarian approach” is particularly convincing and promising 
because it connects three functionally related dimensions. First, it focuses on 
the justifiability of existing inequalities, a highly charged issue from the social 
critique point of view; second, it addresses concrete experiences of inequality, 
how social groups115 are affected;116 thirdly and finally, this social-egalitarian 
approach – and this where law comes in – also addresses the remedial 
dimension, exploring how, by what means and by whom unjustified inequal-
ities can be eliminated or compensated.117
2. The demand for global justice as a paradigmatic shift
in the history of ideas
Where justice is concerned, the question automatically arises of whether 
justice is to be conceived of as local, regional, national, or even global: “what 
is the scope of justice?” As Stefan Gosepath puts it:
“Is justice global, universal, boundless? Or are there reasons of any sort, conceptual, 
normative, or pragmatic, to conceive of justice locally – to rather start at home, in a 
113 See especially Anderson (1999); O’Neill, M. (2008); Schuppert, F. (2015a).
114 Schuppert, F. (2015b).
115 On the concept of group in a sociology of inequalities, see Schuppert, G. F. (forthcom-
ing).
116 O’Neill, M. (2008); Schuppert, F. (2015a).
117 See Anderson (2012).
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community or state-society and therefore require less from foreigners than from our 
fellow citizens? In order to find an answer to such questions, I will start […] by 
outlining what I see as a relatively plausible, and not uncommon, egalitarian con-
ception of justice. According to this conception, justice is – at least prima facie –
immediately universal, and therefore global. It does not morally recognize any 
judicial boundaries or limits. […] My conclusion that there is such a [global] 
dimension will consequently lead to many normative-pragmatic questions […] 
especially how best to construct and establish global (or international) institutions 
securing global justice.”118
According to Christoph Broszies and Henning Hahn, the widespread view 
that justice can be conceptualized only in global terms is nothing less than a 
paradigmatic shift:
“The idea that the domain of justice extends beyond the limits of one’s own polity 
or empire marks no less than a paradigmatic shift in the history of ideas. To a certain 
extent, cosmopolitanism follows on from antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern-
ity, but ultimately it responds to genuinely modern experiences and challenges. In 
brief: global justice is a prerequisite of globalization. The associated global mecha-
nisms of exclusion, exploitation, and domination are a basic condition for global 
justice to come to the fore. It is therefore no surprise that the cosmopolitanism-
particularism debate opens a new chapter in the history of ideas.”119
Nevertheless, the notion of global justice has older historical roots:120
“Leafing back through the history of ideas can … prove informative. After all, the 
Stoics introduced the cosmopolitan at an early date, the citizen of the world who 
understands himself as a member of the human race and part of the overall world 
order – and who is consequently not intimidated when threatened with exile 
because of his independent attitude. However, in the ethical cosmopolitanism of 
the stoics, there is little sign of any justice-theoretical cosmopolitanism explicitly 
concerned with the legitimacy of global rule. The same can be said of divine justice 
in the Christian Middle Ages. It was not until modern times that a sustainable 
change is to be observed in state-centric legal thinking and consequently in the 
state-centric understanding of justice. Although the aim of early modern interna-
tional law was mainly to embed (religious) peace in an international legal order, the 
idea of cosmopolitan individual rights was already taking root in the soil of natural 
law. In this connection, Martha Nussbaum points out that Hugo Grotius 
(1583–1645) grounded international law in human dignity, and already in De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis (1625) argued in favour of universalizing legal relations between indi-
viduals.”121
118 Gosepath (2001) 145.
119 Broszies / Hahn (eds.) (2013) 9–52, here 13.
120 Broszies / Hahn (eds.) (2013) 1–14.
121 Nussbaum (2006) 36–39; see also: Fraser (2005).
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Be that as it may. In a globalized world one can think only in global terms, 
which – see Stefan Gosepath – leads directly to the problem that interna-
tional institutions are needed in order to realize justice at the global level. To 
this extent, justice – as we have shown elsewhere122 – is to be conceived of 
primarily as institutional justice, a conclusion that Christoph Broszies und 
Henning Hahn draw in their introduction to the cosmopolitanism-particu-
larism debate:
“‘The world in which we live is not just.’ With this remark,Thomas Nagel begins his 
already seminal article on ‘The Problem of Global Justice.’”123… Nagel describes a 
world that as a whole cannot be just, at least as long as it is divided into separate 
spheres of dominance. This world quite simply lacks the necessary institutions for 
coordinating action and enforcing rules. Seen in this light, the world as it is can be 
neither just nor unjust, so that asking about global justice is pointless. Nevertheless, 
Nagel, too, asserts that the world is unjust. Not perhaps in the same sense as when a 
state apportions well-being unequally across society, denies people democratic par-
ticipatory rights, or discriminates against certain groups. The familiar principles of 
social justice, according to Nagel, are adapted to the nation-state. In many ways, 
however, it makes sense to speak of global injustice phenomena, for instance the 
distribution of climate change costs, veto rights in the Security Council of the 
United Nations, global seed and medicine patents, the exploitation of people and 
nature in the global market, or malnutrition among some billion human beings.”124
This brings us to our last, brief topic.
V. The language of law as the language of a new global order
1. The transformation of statehood as a problem of description
and analysis
Statehood has of course always been subject to change,125 inviting the ami-
able depiction of various stages in its development. One example of such 
scenario painting is offered by Udo di Fabio, who offers a five-stage model:
“The first stage is the arrival of the new idea of the state, which to some extent 
presented itself in the revival context of the Renaissance as a return to antiquity’s 
122 Schuppert, G. F. (2017a).
123 Nagel, T. (2013).
124 Broszies / Hahn (eds.) (2013) 9.
125 See, for instance: Leibfried / Zürn (eds.) (2006); see also the article by Schuppert, G. F.
(2008c) with the reply by Genschel / Leibfried (2008).
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notion of polity. The next stage is abstraction and detachment from the concrete ruling 
figure, which made the state into more than the ideational amplification of a monopoly 
of authority claimed by the prince and his house. A further stage is national magnifi-
cation and merging with the community defined in national terms.The trend from the 
outset, and still predominant today, has been towards rationalization, demystification, 
and complete legal subjugation of state authority in the constitutional state. However, a 
new stage seems to be emerging: the functional dismemberment of the state, the loss of 
state unity and of its ideational significance in a marked shift towards an open and 
integrated state, which – apparently in rejection of the order concepts of modernity – is 
reverting to a complex web of authority.”126
Whether we take this model or that of the shiftdescribed by Philipp Genschel and 
Bernhard Zangl “from authority monopolist to authority manager”,127 every far-
reaching change in statehood is a challenge for all scholarly disciplines that 
address the state, obliging them to examine whether their methodological 
tools suffice to adequately describe and analyse these processes of change.
In the first volume of the Jahrbuchs für Staats- und Verwaltungswissen-
schaft, Claus Offe reflects on a “theory of the state in search of its subject”,128
and Juliane Kokott and Thomas Vesting from the board of the Association of 
German University Teachers of Constitutional Law were commissioned to 
examine public law theory and changes in the subject matter.129 Other 
examples of similar efforts could be cited.130
However, if any scholarly approach is particularly suitable for investigating 
change in statehood, it is the governance approach.This is at any rated suggested 
by the more recent governance literature, as the following examples show.
First, writing about the connection between changes in statehood and the 
governance perspective, Julia von Blumenthal has this to say:
“A link is often established between the increasing scholarly interest in governance 
and political changes. Apart from the processes of globalization already mentioned, 
the financial crisis in the public sector and an ‘ideological shift towards the market’ 
in politics and science are cited in explaining the popularity of the concept. The 
discussion on governance thus belongs in the context of analysing and describing 
changes in statehood. To some extent, governance research adopts a contrary stance 
to scenarios of crisis or even of an end of statehood, seeing in governance proof of 
the adaptability of states to external social and economic changes.”131
126 di Fabio (2003) 20.
127 Genschel / Zangl (2008).
128 Ellwein et al. (eds.) (1987) 30–320.
129 Kokott / Vesting (2004) 7ff., 41ff.
130 See Ladeur (2000) 101ff.; Neyer (2004).
131 Blumenthal (2005) 1150 ff.
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The second example is from Hans-Heinrich Trute, Doris Kühlers, and Arne 
Pilniok, who conclude their article on the governance approach as an ana-
lytical approach in administrative jurisprudence with the following succinct 
remark: “One important achievement of the governance approach is that it 
provides a framework for discussing changes in statehood while ensuring mutual 
interdisciplinary connectivity.”132
The suitability of the governance approach for analysing change in state-
hood is even more obvious if this approach is seen as specifically process-
oriented. In my view, the special “competence” of the governance approach, 
indeed, its specific added value, is its processuality and dynamics.133 It is, 
however, demanding in that, unlike many approaches, it addresses neither 
the sequence of governance levels (local governance, regional governance, 
metropolitan governance, European governance, global governance) nor the 
sequence of governance areas (Internet governance, environmental gover-
nance, governance of financial markets). Instead, it takes a processual per-
spective that seeks to analyse changes in governance structures and explain 
observable processes of change. This processual perspective can unfold in 
four dimensions,134 namely:
* Changing and new actor constellations, drawing on the actor perspectives of con-
trol theory but “dynamizing” them processually;
* Changing and new institutional arrangements and regulatory structures, drawing on 
the institutionalist turn called for by Renate Mayntz,135 enriching it primarily 
from an institutional culture point of view;
* Dissolving or blurring boundaries, such as those between national and interna-
tional, public and private, internal and external, etc., on the assumption that 
observable changes in statehood are above all processes of dissolving and blur-
ring boundaries;
* Changing or new legitimation concepts that overcome the security offered by 
national lines of legitimation, making legitimatory demands on new, notably 
transnational forms of governance.
This brings us to the next point.
132 Trute et al. (2008) 173–189.
133 See Botzem et al. (eds.) (2008).
134 Botzem et al. (eds.) (2008).
135 Mayntz (2005).
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2. In what language is a new global order really described?
The answer is pretty obvious: above all in the language of law, when 
– informed by governance theory – it thinks in terms of regulatory struc-
tures. It suffices to cite Michael Zürn’s “four models of a global order in 
cosmopolitan intent” in which, as the following overview shows, the lan-
guage of law plays a key role.136
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This instructive overview concludes our tour d’horizon of the five functions 




As we remarked at the outset, we are concerned with the potential of the 
language of law as a language of politics for making a meaningful contri-
bution to a future global history of ideas and knowledge. To judge by 
what we have so far “dug up”, this potential can be considered extremely 
high.
It begins with the observation that discourses on the legitimacy of polit-
ical authority as social-critical discourses generally take the form of legal 
discourses. This brings us to the second observation that revolutionary seiz-
ures of power are always legalo-semantic seizures of power, in which the 
“new cause” always comes in the guise of a new language requiring new 
concepts or reinterpreting existing legal concepts.
Third, it is evident that the language of law can make a particularly 
important contribute to the global dimension of a history of ideas. Something 
in the way of a language of global constitutionalism has meanwhile devel-
oped, a particularly interesting phenomenon because it takes up the func-
tion of constitution-making, “hardening” political ideas with all the legal 
consequences for impact and durability. Fourth, this globalization “gene” 
of the language of law as a language of politics is also evident in the spread 
of justice discourses at the global level, where, as inevitable response to 
ongoing globalization, global justice is in increasing demand, thus broad-
ening the very concept of justice (catchwords: environmental justice, climate 
justice).
Fifth, a future world order – however conceived – cannot, it would seem, 
be described without the language of law. Zürn’s overview of the subject 
“speaks volumes”.
In sum: the language of law as a language of politics is, in our view, an 
essential component of a global history of ideas and knowledge, a conclu-
sion we shall be justifying in detail in the course of this book with abundant 
reference to the literature. To begin with, however, the first section considers 
what is to be understood by global history and a global history of ideas. The 
contribution of the language of law cannot be meaningfully discussed with-
out first defining these concepts.
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Part One
Global History as a Global History of Ideas
Introduction
A. How ideas and knowledge travel: a little story to begin with
When people write about the history of ideas and knowledge, they mostly 
focus on how knowledge and ideas spread – not only within a narrow 
compass but also throughout the world or what the people of the time 
consider to be “their” world, for instance Christendom or Islam. Ideas and 
knowledge seem to find it difficult to stay put: they like to be “on the 
move.”1 This suggests it would be useful to look at how ideas and knowledge 
voyaged before the advent of telegraphy and the Internet. A novel, “The 
Thousand Autumns of Jacob de Zoet,”2 gives us a pointer. The hero is a 
young clerk in the employ of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigte 
Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC). In 1799 he takes up his post at a trading 
factory at the gates of the Japanese port of Nagasaki. Since the Japanese 
government is determined to prevent Western, notably Christian ideas from 
entering the country unfiltered, the baggage of foreign arrivals is thoroughly 
searched. Including Jacob’s sea chest. Its contents include a “scarred Psalter 
bound in deerskin,” a family heirloom Jacob’s father has entrusted to him for 
his journey to Asia with instructions to “protect it with your life”. When 
Jacob learns that the bibliophile inspector Ogawa is to examine the chest, he 
fears all is lost:
“Mr. de Zoet,” says Ogawa, “I wish to speak about a book you bring. It is important 
matter …”
1 See, for instance, Smith, P. H. (2009); Secord (2004).
2 Mitchell (2011). The magazine Spiegel has described the work as “a literary travel dream 
and linguistic orgy.”
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Jacob loses the next clause to a rush of nausea and dread. … My career is destroyed, 
thinks Jacob, my liberty is gone …
“In Mr. de Zoet’s chest I found book of Mr. … Adamu Sumissu.” Jacob opens his 
eyes: … “Adam Smith?”
“Adam Smith – please excuse. The Wealth of Nations … You know?”
I know it, yes, thinks Jacob, but I don’t yet dare hope.“The original English is a little 
difficult, so I bought the Dutch edition in Batavia.”
Ogawa looks surprised. “Adam Smith is Englishman?”
“He’d not thank you, Mr. Ogawa!” Smith’s a Scot, living in Edinburgh. But can it be 
The Wealth of Nations about which you speak?”
“What other? I am rangakusha – scholar of Dutch science. Four years ago, I borrow 
Wealth of Nations from Chief Hemmij.3 I began translation to bring” – Ogawa’s 
lips ready themselves, ‘Theory of Political Economy’ to Japan. But lord of Satsuma 
offered Chief Hemmij much money, so I returned it. Book was sold before I finish.”
… “Then, this morning, in your book chest, Adam Smith I find.Very much surprise, 
and to speak with sincerity, Mr. de Zoet, I wish to buy or rent …”
“Adam Smith is neither for sale nor rent,” says the Dutchman,“But you are welcome, 
Mr. Ogawa – very welcome indeed – to borrow him for as long as ever you wish.”4
The theory of political economy might well have come to Japan in this 
fashion – on a ship of one of the world’s biggest trading companies in the 
sea chest of a company officer.
So far so good.
The brief episode from this novelistic “historical cabinet of curiosities”5
has a certain déjà-vu effect, recalling Christopher L. Hill’s assertion in “Con-
ceptual Universalization in the Transnational Nineteenth Century,”6 that it is 
immaterial whether the “circulation of ideas by circulation of books”7
involves the original publication, a translation, or a popularized version:
3 The then director of the trading factory before the gates of Nagasaki.
4 Mitchell (2011) 28 f.
5 To quote a review in the Tageszeitung.
6 Hill (2013).
7 See Gamsa (2011).
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“The fact that many of the concepts arrived in mediated form – through the intel-
lectual vulgate, through translation – means it was not necessary to go to the origin 
to get the concepts, which by this time may have been more recognizable in their 
popularized than in their original forms anyway. Such recognizability came from 
the reproduction of concepts, not their original production. And as much as geo-
politics inflected the creation of equivalents – a key part of the circulation of ideas – 
the readiness with which equivalents were accepted shows that these concepts’ 
lingering associations with particular parts of the globe did not leave them looking 
any less universal.”8
With these considerations in mind, three points should be noted:
* Ideas and knowledge: typical “fellow travellers”
The history of ideas and knowledge repeatedly draws attention to the fact 
that ideas and knowledge9 like to travel in company – riding piggyback, as it 
were, on trade, religion, and the military;10 in our example on the shoulders 
of a group of merchants11 – a species of globalization actor we have dealt 
with elsewhere and whom we shall be looking at more closely in the course 
of this book.
* Transport media for knowledge and ideas
Even though we are not told the titles of all the books Jacob de Zoet had in 
his sea chest – there were some fifty – we nevertheless learn that at least two 
“bodies of thought” were being transported: Dutch Protestantism and the 
economic theory of the Scot Adam Smith. Books were thus particularly 
suitable transport media; a global history of ideas and knowledge always 
has to be a “history of books,”12 as well.
Now, books and printing are not only an important medium for philo-
sophical and economic theories and knowledge but also a key medium of law, 
as two examples will show. The first is Hugo Grotius’ famous work “De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis,” which Thomas Nicklas in 2010 described (albeit with a ques-
tion mark) as “international law for the saddlebag”,13 because King Gustav 
8 Hill (2013) 145.
9 On “knowledge as fellow traveller” see Renn / Hyman (2012).
10 See Mulsow (2016) 6.
11 Mulsow (2016) 6.
12 See Rose, J. (1998).
13 Nicklas (2010).
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Adolf of Sweden, “who landed with his army in West Pomerania in 1630, 
claimed to have it always at hand during his military campaigns.”14
Our second example comes from Thomas Vesting, “Die Medien des 
Rechts: Buchdruck,”15 (“The Media of Law: Printing”), in which he describes 
the Christianity of late antiquity as a sort of “pocketbook religion” because of 
the important role played by the parchment codex as a writing material:16
“These changes in the materiality and format of communication are closely associ-
ated with the religious transformations of late antiquity, notably the rise of Chris-
tianity following Constantine’s victory at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge (312), 
which also proved an institutionally stabilizing movement. While the importance of 
orality for (early) Christianity ought not to be underestimated, Christians were 
eager readers from the outset. They are repeatedly noted as owning books and often 
have to explain themselves, as did the Christians of Scilium arrested and brought 
before the proconsul Saturnius in Carthage; when asked what they had in their 
luggage, they responded: ‘The books and letters of Paul, a just man’. As writers, 
however the apostles had always preferred the parchment codex, which towards the 
end of the second century was practically a Christian innovation, establishing Chris-
tianity in a certain sense as a ‘pocketbook religion’17.”18
* Receptivity for the Other and New
In our first example, it was the “third rank” interpreter Ogawa who was 
eager to translate the theories of Adam Smith in order to introduce them to 
Japan. Thus the spread of ideas and knowledge appears to depend very much 
on the openness of elites in the recipient country; in this connection, Martin 
Mulsow has pointed to receptiveness at the Chinese imperial court:
“Also prominent is naturally the receptiveness of the Chinese imperial court, nota-
ble that of the Kangxi Emperor, the second of the Quing dynasty at the turn of the 
14 Nicklas (2010) 61.
15 Vesting (2013); see also Vesting (2011b) and (2011a) as well as the fourth and final 
volume (2015).
16 On its qualities, see Vesting (2013) 10: “The parchment codex fundamentally changed the 
technical form of the book. It ended the monopoly of papyrus as writing material, which 
since the second millennium before Christ had been made from the papyrus plant har-
vested on the banks of the Nile and glued together into rolls. … [I]n the Mediterranean 
region of late antiquity, calf, goat, and sheepskin was laboriously washed, depilated, bated, 
dried, smoothed, and then folded once, twice or three times When all surfaces had been 
written on and or painted, they were bound together into a codex, which, with its layered 
rectangular pages came very close to the the compact format of the printed book.”
17 Stroumsa (2011) 67 f.
18 Stroumsa (2011) 10–11.
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seventeenth to the eighteenth century, for European mathematics and astronomy 
brought to China by the Jesuits. Catherine Jami tells the story not, as usual, from the 
European perspective but from that of the Chinese.19 Only then does the process as 
a genuine “entanglement” become apparent, for we see how the emperor adapted 
the ideas received and used them to consolidate the Manchu dynasty while the 
Jesuits proved open to adopt Chinese ideas in other areas.”20
So much for our introductory example. What, however, are we to under-
stand by global history and a global history of ideas and knowledge ? In 
considering this question we must constantly keep in mind (“casting our 
eyes to and fro”21) what this means for the language of law as a “language of 
politics” relevant for the history of ideas.
B. What are global history and the global history of ideas?
As Jürgen Osterhammel has repeatedly and knowledgeably shown, there are 
old and new approaches to world history, and, above all, methodologically 
differing ones.22 There is no need to go over them here. Since the concept of 
“global history” appears to be gaining ground and is also more apposite to 
our present project than the somewhat bombastic “world history”,23 we shall 
be drawing on Sebastian Conrad’s24 exemplary definition of global history, 
identifying three approaches.
19 Jami (2012).
20 Jami (2012) 16.
21 A process familiar to all lawyers. The formulation (“Prozess des Hin- und Herwandern des 
Blicks”) goes back to Engish (1963), who discusses the process of applying the law and 
the need to cast one’s eyes to and from between the facts of the case and the legal con-
sequences.
22 Osterhammel (2005); Osterhammel (ed.) (2008) 9–32.
23 It seems to us that Martti Koskenniemi’s scepticism about the term “global history” ex-
pressed in discussion with Alexandra Kemmerer applies to “world history”: “For me the 
call for global history implied a ridiculously exaggerated ambition, perhaps even the old 
European endeavour to find the place where one’s own statements can be stamped ‘glob-
al’, where one can say ‘that is global’ whereas that there is not.” Kemmerer (2015) 38.
24 Conrad (2013); see also Conrad et al. (eds.) (2007b).
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I. Fields and topics of global history
In his highly differentiated introduction to global history, Sebastian Conrad 










There can be no doubt that taking a “global view” of these fields is particularly 
fruitful, and Conrad’s exposition of the topics is extremely interesting, with 
abundant examples, from the global product history of sugar and tea26 to 
oceans as interactional spaces – which we shall be looking at – and the global 
history of migration, a subject of almost depressing topicality: in some 
regards, the treatment of migrants recalls the times of the slave trade.27
Be that as it may, we will not be pursuing this issue-specific approach any 
further. The various levels of analysis – products, geographical determi-
nants,28 governmental structures, global processes – are too heterogeneous; 
this approach offers far too much temptation to include fields – such as the 
global history of communication,29 not to mention the global history of 
ideas and knowledge – that an author might consider just as important.
25 Conrad (2013) 202ff.
26 On sugar, see Mintz (2007); on tea, see Vries (2009).
27 Consider the growing practice of countries targeted by current migration flows of spend-
ing billions to induce governments in migrants’ countries of origin to “keep” would-be 
refugees, or to persuade governments in transit countries to take back the people who 
have passed through them. To this extent, we can speak of the economization of the 
refugee problem.
28 Marshall (2015).
29 See Schuppert, G. F. (2015).
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II. Key concepts and figures of thought
In a 2015 article on “globalification,” Jürgen Osterhammel introduces six 
“figures of thought of the new world,”30 using what we can describe as 
key concepts.31 This arouses our interest: the key concept32 has proved a 
particularly useful device for mapping out an extensive terrain – for instance, 
“changes in statehood.”33 Since by definition no other subject matter is likely 
to have a broader wingspan than global history, the three essential functions 
of key concepts outlined by Andreas Voßkuhle will be helpful:
“The function of key concepts is to make overarching ideas of order fertile for given 
argumentational contexts by concentrating, structuring and rendering comprehen-
sible a mass of information and thoughts in a repository term. While reducing 
complexity they also serve as an inspirational platform by stimulating association, 
lending first shape to ideas still in the making, bringing various perspectives togeth-
er, and offering guidance for the future. In this sense they resemble ‘theories’ … – 
but the format is smaller and the proposition at first glance more simplistic. Key 
concepts are therefore particularly dependent on concretisation; they supply no 
answers but give direction to thought.”34
With these three functions in mind, we turn briefly to Osterhammel’s six 
figures of thought and, in much abbreviated form, to what he has to say 
about them:35
* Expansion
“It is no wonder that more recent global history has developed essentially out of 
the history of imperial and economic expansion … Expansion remains the 
founding figure of thought of global history.”
* Circulation
“The cross-boundary dynamics of expansion processes are often contained and 
channelled in the figure of circulation …” What do we mean [however] by the 
‘circulation of ideas’? Older, somewhat patinated categories like ‘transfer’ and 
‘reception’ were in many regards more differentiated.
* Channelling systems
“Circulation necessarily presupposes a channelling system.” In this context net-
work is the concept often used: “Analytically, the network remains the most 
productive figure of thought for globality, because it allows stable system for-
30 Osterhammel (2015).
31 See Baer (2004).
32 Schuppert, G. F. (1999).
33 See Schuppert, G. F. (2008c).
34 Vosskuhle (2001b); Schuppert, G. F. (1999) 198.
35 Osterhammel (2015) 12 f.
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mation through the institutional consolidation of such interconnected com-
plexes. The transitive concept of networking includes intentional action: there 
is no network without networkers.”
* Densification
“Densification means, for example, multiplying elements and their interrelations 
in a finite world, reducing spacing, increasing the speed and frequency of con-
tact, compressing cause-effect chains. … Densification is relatively easy to 
describe; where it occurs, even statistics will have a great deal to say – for 
instance, statistics on book production and the book trade in the modern history 
of ideas and knowledge.”
* Standardization and universalization
“Standardization and universalization have become fundamental figures of a 
global teleology …. Only rarely is simple convergence meant …. The focus is 
rather on two things: first, on the development of world-society legal norms, 
headed by the much-discussed human rights, and, second, the development of 
systems of technico-economic coordination, such as standard world time or the 
rules of international payments.”
* Spatial asymmetry of power
“If we take the originally critical impulse of global history seriously, it does not 
reduce itself to the genesis of the all-round integrated present. The uneventful, 
creeping filling and densification of the planet – more and more people having 
more and more to do with one another – would be a framing narrative of 
dubious triviality. For this reason, a figure of thought from the dependence 
and world-system theories of the 1970s has remained important, namely spa-
tial asymmetry of power, the asymmetry of subjugation and resistance. The gap 
between rich and poor, between strong and weak corresponds at the interna-
tional level to social inequality within national societies. … The discussion is 
only getting under way on how the history of ideas, especially for the age of 
European world dominance, reacts to such conflictual plurality. At any rate, 
widespread dichotomies such as Occident / Orient, export / import of ideas, 
and Westernization / local knowledge are no longer adequate.”
These six figures of thought look promising and do justice to the basic 
functions of key concepts outlined by Andreas Voßkuhle. The productiveness 
of this approach encourages us to look for key concepts in the global history 
of ideas to allow comparison with the figures of thought discovered there 
with those of Osterhammel for global history.
III. Global history as perspective
Under this heading, we return to Sebastian Conrad’s introduction to global 
history. He begins by asking whether global history is a subject or a perspec-
tive. His answer is clear: global history is primarily a perspective.
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“Is global history … a subject of study or a perspective? Primarily, it is the latter – 
and thus an approach that focuses on certain aspects and contexts. The Kulturkampf 
in Bavaria in the nineteenth century, to take an example, can be examined from the 
point of view of local history, as an issue of cultural or gender history, or as part of 
German history. But it can also be placed in the context of global history – as an 
element in the struggle between the liberal state and the churches that occurred in 
the nineteenth century in many parts of the world: throughout Europe, but also in 
Latin America and Japan. These conflicts were interconnected through various 
channels. Global history is therefore primarily a perspective, and it brings other dimen-
sions, other questions to the fore.”36
I agree with this assessment, above all in the light of my far-reaching expe-
rience with “governance,” my concern at the Berlin Social Science Center 
(WZB) as holder of the research professorship in “New Modes of Gover-
nance” established in 2003. Here, too, the question was whether governance 
was to be seen rather as a subject of study – as implied by such topic blocks as 
“local,” “regional,” and “global governance” to be found in every governance 
manual37 – or as a perspective from which the governance structures of 
modern statehood are investigated in their diversity and specific “mix.” After 
more than ten interesting years in the governance field, we are as convinced 
as Sebastian Conrad that governance is above all a perspective, and a non-
statist one: a non-state-centric point of view operating with institutional 
categories, a standpoint from which the regulatory structures and gover-
nance regimes obtaining in any policy sector can be examined.38
If global history is primarily a perspective – a view repeatedly echoed in 
Jürgen Osterhammel’s presentation of various “globalizations”39 and which 
has recently been affirmed by Philip McCarty40 – it can also be a perspective
in a broad range of topic areas, as Sebastian Conrad concludes:
“Global history is currently a broad trend in both research and teaching. In journals 
and publication series, at meetings and conferences concerned with global history, 
forums for scientific exchanges and discussion on research have developed. They do 
36 Conrad (2013) 12.
37 Benz (ed.) (2004).
38 See Schuppert, G. F. (ed.) (2005) 371–469; Schuppert, G. F. (2007c); Schuppert, G. F.
(2014).
39 Osterhammel (2011).
40 McCarty (2014) 290: “Whatever the object of study or field of inquiry, global perspectives 
shape the kinds of questions we ask, the analytical approaches we take, and the ways we 
engage the world.”
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not operate alongside the rest of the discipline, they are not a luxury one must be 
able to afford. In the twentieth century things were different: then world history was 
an occupation for well-established and mostly older historians. Today, global history 
is even on occasion addressed by theses and dissertations. The approach has also 
found its place in theory, in individual seminars or entire courses of study. Also 
striking is that widely different fields are discussed. Environmental and economic 
historians no less than social and cultural historians lay claim to global history. 
In principle, a global history perspective can be combined with all historiographical 
approaches.”41
If this is the case, a global history perspective would not only be amenable to 
legal history but also necessary in the interests of connectivity. Anticipating 
this observation – which dates from August 2016 – the Max Planck Institute 
for European Legal History launched a series of publications on “Global 
Perspectives on Legal History,” starting in 2014 with “Entanglements in 
Legal History,”42 fully in agreement with the definition of a global history 
of ideas as “histoire croisée” or “entangled history.”43
Thomas Duve, director of the Frankfurt Max Planck Institute, who has 
taken up the cause of this global perspective for legal history44 and launched 
the publication series mentioned, (in which our book “The World of Rules” 
has also appeared45), notes in his introductory contribution to the entangle-
ment volume that a global history dimension has always been immanent in 
legal historiography:
“[…] Legal History may nearly always have harboured a ‘transnational’ dimension 
in the broad sense of the word, especially in consideration of history before and after 
the spread of nationalism in Europe. Our work has addressed a wide array of 
questions relating to the ‘transfer’, ‘transplantation’ or ‘translation’ of normativity. 
It has almost always had to confront the challenge of describing and analyzing 
processes of normative reproduction in rapidly changing historical settings, not 
similar, but neither that different from those we observe today. The globalization 
of law, and of legal thought, is not a new phenomenon.46 Thus, legal history should 
be able to make a contribution to the growing reflection on how different norma-
tive orders emerge, interact, develop.”47
41 Conrad (2013) 13.
42 Duve (ed.) (2014).
43 Mulsow (2015).
44 See also his programmatic treatise: Duve (2012).
45 Schuppert, G. F. (2016b).
46 Kennedy (2006).
47 Schuppert, G. F. (2016b) 6.
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Before considering what is to be understood by a global history of ideas, it 
should be noted that where in the course of this book we use the now 
current term global history, we mean not a subject but a perspective on 
certain historical events or processes. We can then, like the Max Planck 
Institute for European Legal History, write of “global perspectives on legal 
history.”
When working with such a global history perspective, it is useful to make 
use of various key concepts or figures of thought that have proved their 
worth in analysing global history interrelations. Jürgen Osterhammel has 
convincingly shown what key concepts come into question.48
IV. Global history of ideas – three searchlights
To get at what a “global history of ideas” might mean, it is not helpful to 
proceed “globally” like Marcus Llanque, who presents a history of political 
ideas from antiquity to the present day without omitting a single major 
political philosopher in the long trajectory.49 Of necessity Plato and Aristotle 
take the lead with Thomas Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau in midfield, 
while the concluding chapter describes the present as the age of human 
rights without, for a change, assigning responsibility to any philosophical 
thinker. We prefer to sweep the broad terrain of a global history of ideas to 
map out a history of ideas in keeping with the times in the light of the 
following questions:
* What ideas?
* “Global intellectual fields” and “global legal spaces” – What constitutes an intel-
lectual field and a legal space?
* The history of ideas as entangled history?
48 Osterhammel (2015); also McCarty (2014), has identified nine “Integrated Perspectives 
in Global Studies”: “1. Global and Local – Issues at Scale, 2. Interconnecting and Interde-
pendence, 3. Decentralized and Distributed Processes, 4. Synchronic Contextualization, 
5. Historical Contextualization, 6. Critical and Constructive, 7. Breaking Down Binaries, 
8. Hybridity and Flexibility, 9. Multiple Perspectives and Voices.”
49 Llanque (2016).
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Chapter One
What Sort of Ideas?
A. A narrow or broad concept of idea?
We must first clarify what sort of ideas we are actually thinking of when 
tracing the contours of a global history of ideas: Are we concerned primarily 
with so-called “big ideas”50 and major philosophical conceptions, or ought 
we to use a wide-angle lens so as not to leave out too much of interest?
As far as presenting “big ideas” is concerned, Martin Mulsow has identi-
fied a clear trend in this direction: “The big themes are once again being 
pursued across the centuries and now also across the continents. … The 
focus is once again be on thinking itself and its efficacy …”. Can we therefore 
expect a – modified – return to Lovejoy’s “unit-ideas”? By this he meant basal 
ideas51 that have kept going for hundreds or thousands of years, assuming 
ever new forms of expression and entering into different relationships.52
With Martin Mulsow, we take a decidedly different view in the conviction 
that such mega-concepts as “idea” or “knowledge” ought not to be too 
closely tailored from the outset. “Knowledge” – as Wilfried Rudloff remarks 
with reference to the knowledge of local social welfare authorities in Ger-
many53 – “is a complex, flexible, but also, because of its universal applica-
tion, fuzzy concept. It covers everything that individual or collective actors 
use to interpret situations or produce action: know-how and information, 
techniques, world views, experience, customs, values, etc.”54
The same holds for the concept of idea; we therefore agree with Martin 
Mulsow that, in addressing the history of ideas as entangled history, a narrow 
concept of this history makes no sense: “What do transfers convey? … Ideas, 
theories, bits of theory, points of view in a broad sense are conveyed together 
with the concomitant informational elements, religious attitudes, physical 
carriers, and cultural practices. Puristically narrowing down intellectual his-
tory cannot be helpful.”55
In what follows we therefore adopt a broad concept of idea.
50 See Armitage (2012).
51 Lovejoy (1936), Introduction; also Lovejoy (1940).
52 Mulsow (2015) 4–5.
53 Rudloff (2003).
54 Rudloff (2003) 33.
55 Mulsow (2015) 19.
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B. Do disciplines matter?
A closer look at the literature on the history of ideas raises the question 
whether there has been a lead discipline “responsible” for the production of 
successful ideas on a global scale. Depending on what periods are under 
scrutiny and perhaps in varying order, the candidates are theology, political 
philosophy, legal philosophy, and – last but not least – the comparatively 
young discipline of political science. On closer examination, however, it 
seems doubtful whether thinking in terms of separate disciplines within 
the history of ideas makes any sense at all, and whether such an approach 
will not neglect the increasingly obvious need to contextualize the production 
of ideas.56 The following observations also suggest that a discipline-oriented 
approach is inappropriate:
* The difficulty of assignment to a discipline
Turning once again to Marcus Llanque,57 we find the following icons of the 
political history of ideas, to each of whom a specific substantive focus is 
attributed:
(1) Plato, Aristotle, and antique democracy
(2) Augustine of Hippo and Marsilius of Padua: faith, church, and politics in the 
Middle Ages
(3) Thomas More and Niccolo Macchiavelli: politics between Utopia and the pres-
ervation of power
56 Particularly clear in this sense: Koskenniemi (2014) 123: “No doubt the turn to context 
provides an important corrective to ways of doing international legal history. It situates 
past rules and practices in their institutional, economic and political environments, por-
traying the jurists and politicians as active agents in their milieus with distinct interests 
and purposes to advance. … It brings legal principles down from the conceptual heaven 
and into a real world where agents make claims and counter-claims, advancing some 
agendas, opposing others. Meaning cannot be detached from intention, and intention, 
again, appears in action – in the way words are used to attain effects in the world. Histor-
ians of political and legal thoughts should pay attention to the specific moments when a 
text was produced and ask the question of who produced it and for what purpose – 
making agency visible while simultaneously demonstrating the way ideas function within 
linguistic and social conventions agents must follow so as to attain the persuasive effects 
they look for.”
57 Llanque (2016).
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(4) Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and modern contractualism
(5) Montesquieu and Rousseau: politics and society in the Enlightenment
(6) “Federalist Papers” and Immanuel Kant: the constitutional state and the rule of 
law in the Age of Revolutions
(7) Hegel, Marx, and the modern contradictions in society and politics
(8) Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill: the individual and democracy in the 
modern age
(9) Max Weber and John Dewey: the idea of democracy between realism and ideal-
ism
(10) Carl Schmitt and Max Horckheimer: political thought in the epoch of total-
itarian regimes
(11) The present: the age of human rights
This list of names almost automatically invites enquiry of the various disci-
plines as to their choice of icons for their ancestral portrait galleries. Legal 
philosophy would go for Hegel and Kant, but, quite rightly, so would phi-
losophy. Thomas Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Carl Schmitt would be claimed 
not only by the general theory of the state (allgemeine Staatslehre) but natu-
rally also by political science.58 Particularly interesting, of course, is the case 
of Max Weber, one of the greatest legal sociologists. He was also a sociologist 
of religion, a national economist, and, above all, a theoretician of power and 
bureaucracy. This disciplinary diversity in one person was the inspiration 
behind the founding of the “Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural 
and Social Studies” at the University of Erfurt,59 whose fellows are drawn 
from the various disciplines covered by Weber’s research programme. For 
some years now, the present author has been of their number, not least as 
standard-bearer for legal science.
But there is a further aspect. Many of the great names in the history of 
ideas were not only theorizing scholars but also to a greater or lesser degree 
actively involved in the political affairs of their country as what we would 
now call “political consultants.” This was the case for Thomas More and Jean 
58 Interestingly, the frontispiece of the Leviathan not only adorns the front page of the 
eponymous social science journal but – on my initiative when chairman of the organiza-
tion – also featured on the official letterhead for the circular of board of the Association of 
German University Teachers of Constitutional Law until removed on a motion by several 
members on the grounds that Thomas Hobbes was no worthy forbear of the democratic /
liberal theory of constitutional law; nonsense, of course.
59 https://www.uni-erfurt.de/max-weber-kolleg.
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Bodin, and particularly for the putative founder of modern international law 
Hugo Grotius – whose world – as Martti Koskenniemi shows60 – was a multi-
disciplinary one:
“It has become increasingly common to read and understand Hugo Grotius from 
the perspective of his advocacy work De jure praedae (1604–1606) for the Dutch East 
India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie,VOC) and thus at the service 
of the colonial pursuits of his countrymen.61 But surely this welcome corrective to 
the old image of the great humanist may also blind us to the significance of his 
ecumenical projects and writings that manifest his specific religious convictions 
that, again, cannot be dissociated from his belonging to a cosmopolitan social class 
that was viewed with suspicion by the country’s strictly puritan majority. Theology, 
politics and economy – and law – all frame the world in which Grotius operated. 
How to conceive the relations between these contexts is of course subject to ongoing 
methodological debate. Each of the alternatives provide us with a different ‘Grotius’ 
and none with any intrinsic epistemological priority.”62
So much for our first observation.
* The emerging modern territorial state as a state in need of ideas and knowledge
The developing modern territorial state, whose emergence – as Ernst-Wolf-
gang Böckenförde has notably shown63 – can be seen as a process of eman-
cipation from the all-embracing grasp of the lead discipline theology, 
required specific legitimation to consolidate its self-standing as a genuinely 
political entity as well as the “know-how” that we could now call “gover-
nance knowledge.” Historically, they were supplied by what in German was 
referred to as ‘Staatswissenschaft,’64 inseparably associated with the rise of the 
territorial state in modern times, a discipline that managed to satisfy both 
requirements of modern statehood: with a specific theory of the purpose of 
the state – to further the happiness of subjects65 – firstly as theory of legit-
imation while also providing the necessary governance and administrative 
60 Koskenniemi / Orford (2015) 119–135.
61 In the same vein, Van Ittersen (2006); Wilson, E. (2008).
62 Van Ittersen (2006) 125.
63 Böckenförde (2007).
64 See Schuppert, G. F. (2003).
65 See Stolleis (1988) 334ff.
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knowledge66 with the combined efforts of the subdisciplines Policeywissen-
schaft, Kameralwissenschaft, and Ökonomie.
The princely foundation of universities in Göttingen and Halle are also to 
be seen in this context, flagships for the thought of the Enlightenment and 
natural law, which also had to be useful state institutions.67 Chairs of natural 
law were established less in the pursuit of legal philosophy than because of 
the practical value of natural law “in education of administrators and officials, 
in law reform, in recasting the law of nations, in civic education and its 
association with civic religion”.68
In this context, it is particularly worth noting that natural law, although 
regarded as a “Protestant discipline,” was also taught in Catholic territories at 
the explicit wish of Catholic authorities. Katharina Beiergrösslein, Iris von 
Dorn und Diethelm Klippel in “Das Naturrecht an den Universitäten Würz-
burg und Bamberg im 18. Jahrhundert”69 have this to say on the subject:
“… the introduction of natural law as a branch of study also appears to have been 
considered some years prior to Schönborn’s broad programme of reform: already in 
the 1720s, Johann Georg von Eckert, former Hanover councillor and historian, as 
well as professor of history in Helmstedt, who in 1723 had been appointed court 
and university librarian by Johann Philipp Franz von Schönborn in 1723, called for 
the establishment of a chair in natural law. Schönborn’s predecessor Christoph 
Franz von Hutten (1724–1729), too, had already recognized the importance of 
jus publicum and jus naturae, and had demanded that the professors of the law 
faculty hold regular lectures on natural, international and constitutional law. … 
This trend was reflected in Schönborn’s reform programme, which set the number 
of full professorships at four. The required syllabus included not only canon law and 
Roman law but also jus publicum, natural and international law, jus feudale, and 
legal praxis. Friedrich Karl von Schönborn saw natural law in relation to jus pub-
licum, ‘whose true and proper science is of the greatest importance for every ecclesiastical 
and secular principality’. In fact, natural law provided the basis for the theory of jus 
publicum, particularly that part of natural law that dealt with public law, jus pub-
licum universale.70 … The instructions for the professor juris naturae et gentium also 
clearly show that, although natural law continued to be regarded as a basic subject, 
this was no longer only because of jure publico, and thus in relation to Publizistik
66 On state modernization policy during the Enlightenment see Stollberg-Rilinger (2016) 
208ff.
67 Stolleis (1988) 298ff.
68 Haakonssen (2012) 50.
69 Beiergrösslein et al. (2013) 178–179.
70 See Klippel (2010); Klippel (2013).
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(constitutional law). It was now a general basic subject, designed to acquaint law 
students with the structure of all legal scholarship and its methods.”71
So much for our second observation.
* The cross-disciplinary history of the reception of ideas
Carl Schmitt once said that all important constitutional law concepts had 
once been theological concepts.72 This teaches us that ideas tend to leave 
their original river bed and wend their own way. Developing Schmitt’s 
dictum somewhat further, it could be said that originally legal concepts 
transmute into political concepts, indeed by preference into tools of political 
discourse: for – as Thomas Niklas has put it – “The language of law can some-
times be very useful.”73 Niklas cites the example of the Grotian concept of 
“freedom of the seas” as a “means of compensating the power deficits of 
small states.”74 Another particularly impressive example is Bodin’s concept of 
sovereignty, in itself a constitutional law concept,75 whose triumphal pro-
gress was more or less predestined, since it satisfied the needs of the rising 
territorial state to perfection.76
C. The phenomenon of contact zones between disciplines
Turning to the concept of contact zones, we leave aside the spatial sense of 
the term current in the history of ideas,77 which addresses communicatively 
shaped interactional spaces such as the Silk Road or the Mediterranean, apply-
ing it primarily to institutionalized cross-disciplinary interfaces. Taking the 
example of the relationship between the cultural and legal sciences, we shall 
then consider exchange relations between disciplines.
71 Beiergrösslein et al. (2013) 178–179.
72 Schmitt (2009) 43.
73 Vesting (2013) 65.
74 Vesting (2013) 65.
75 See Quaritsch (1970).
76 Schuppert, G. F. (2003) 157ff.
77 The concept of “contact zones” was coined by Pratt (1992) – primarily with reference to 
contact between “imperial and indigenous subjects” within territories under imperial rule.
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* Institutionalized contact zones
Two, perhaps even three examples can show what we mean by institution-
alized contact zones. The first is natural law, a discipline always characterized 
by remarkable internal plurality.78 But, as Knud Haakonssen has shown, 
natural law, despite its internal plurality, had a strong institutional identity, 
marked by a Europe-wide network of chairs in natural law, filled with the 
aid of transnational “headhunters”:
“While natural law as a philosophical and religious doctrine may be of uncertain 
age, address and origins, it is indisputable that the subject took on a distinct institu-
tional identity at a particular time – at least, within a limited span of time – in 
relatively well defined places, namely as an academic discipline in the European 
university faculties from the latter half of the seventeenth century until the end of 
the eighteenth century and, in several places, until well into the nineteenth century. 
There had of course been teaching of natural law as part of philosophy and theology 
since the Middle Ages, but the renewal of the subject that was perceived to happen 
with Hugo Grotius’ De iure belli ac pacis (1625) had a nearly immediate academic 
impact in the context of the new politica. For example, Grotius’s natural law had 
begun to be taught by Henrik Ernst in Sorø Academy in Denmark already in 1634. 
And in 1655 the subject had a special chair devoted to it at the University of 
Uppsala, when Petrus Eliæ Gavelius was appointed to a post in the Law Faculty 
specifically devoted to teaching the law of nature and nations, and, it was under-
stood, to do so on the basis of Grotius’s De iure belli. From then on chairs in the 
subject began to be founded with great intensity. In Germany the first was in 1661 in 
Heidelberg, although not in name certainly in fact, for this was the start of Samuel 
Pufendorf’s career. It was from this position that he was head-hunted to become 
foundation professor of the law of nature and nations at the new Swedish University 
of Lund in 1668. But before that, similar chairs had already been instituted in Kiel 
(1665) and in Greifswald (1666), which had recently become part of the new Swed-
ish empire. The Swedish concern with the teaching of natural law was extended 
from Lund, Greifswald and, in particular, Uppsala to Dorpat (Tartu) and Åbo, 
although separate chairs were not provided in the Estonian and Finnish institutions. 
Similarly natural law was taught at the Ridderakademi in Copenhagen from 1692, 
though at the University a chair was not established until 1732.”79
The second example for an institutionalized contact zone is the aforemen-
tioned Staatswissenschaft, not only a science of legitimation and and purveyor 
of governance and administrative knowledge but also a contact-zone disci-
78 See, for example, Seelmann (2010) 131ff.
79 Haakonssen (2012) 47.
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pline uniting various fields of study useful to the modern territorial state.80
Attempts to carry on this tradition of communication under the umbrella of 
Staatswissenschaft, or even to proclaim a “new” discipline under this heading 
have, as far as we can judge, enjoyed no great success.81
A third example of a scholarly discipline or a research institution seeking 
to relate various perspectives could be governance research,82 which has now 
been institutionalized83 to a considerable degree and whose approach can-
not be claimed exclusively by any established discipline. Under the friendly 
applause of colleagues,84 we have therefore labelled governance a bridging 
concept,85 which unites various scholarly perspectives, thus sharpening ana-
lytical acuity.
So much for institutionalized contact zones between disciplines.
* The relationship between culture and law: dynamic exchanges
Thomas Vesting has shown –notably under the heading contact zones86 – that 
the relationship between culture and law, between the cultural sciences and 
legal science has to be understood as one of dynamic exchange.
Vesting takes it as given that people have to rely on symbolic forms of 
culture for orientation. “If, as does older ethnology, we describe culture as the 
‘quintessence of knowledge, faith, art, morality, law, custom, and all the 
other abilities and habits that a person acquires as a member of society’,”87
it is clear that the specific function culture provides is orientation: “If one 
argues thus, the concept of culture occupies the sphere of transcendence 
abandoned by God and transforms the metaphysical vacuum of modernity 
into an incessant inner-world search for ‘legible’ meaning. For this reason, 
80 See Stichweh (1991).
81 This is also true of “new” theory of the state posited by Vosskuhle (2001a), and for the 
attempt by the present author to revive “Staatswissenschaft” (2003).
82 See Schuppert, G. F. (ed.) (2005) 371–469.
83 In addition to an international network of governance research and the journal Gover-
nance, of which I have long been a member of the board of trustees.
84 See Benz et al. (ed.) (2007) 16: “Governance is thus no more, but also no less that a 
scholarly ‘bridging concept’ (…), which enable problem-oriented communication be-
tween different subdisciplines of political science and between scholarly disciplines.”
85 Again in: Schuppert, G. F. (2007c).
86 Vesting (2015) 131ff.
87 Vesting (2015) 127, with reference to Tylor (1871), quoted there by Baecker (2013) 211.
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too, one can now posit that the ‘question about culture’ is a form of the 
‘question about the world’, and not only a question about the cultural and 
intellectual as opposed to the technical / economic / material.”88
“This insight into the embedding of individual conduct in cultural con-
texts that go beyond his or her person, the ties of the human being to the 
‘traditions within us’ have” – according to Vesting89 – “been elaborated by 
Aleida and Jan Assmann into a theory of cultural memory: the memory has 
not only a neuronal and social dimension, it is not only corporeally embod-
ied and linguistically networked memory: it is also shaped by a cultural 
dimension inscribed in landscapes, places, buildings, pictures, and texts. 
Cultural memory includes not only the ‘functional memory’, the symbolically 
present world, but also a ‘storage memory’, the stocks of tradition that are not 
directly available for communication and which include what has not only 
been forgotten but also repressed.”90
We agree with Vesting that these orientational aids are closely linked to 
institutions and rules, which brings us directly to law and its storage function 
– which we will be considering later in greater detail – and thus to the 
relationship between law and culture. Since Vesting describes this relation-
ship between law and culture, cultural studies, and legal science as entangled 
history, we quote the relevant passage in full:
That for the law of the liberal state a polycentric network of different national 
cultures is constitutive and that this network, like the individual cultures themselves 
are initially cultivated by the printing press could, according to David Wellbery and 
Kart-Heinz Ladeur, be described as the ‘semantic intermediate input’ of culture for 
the legal structure of the liberal state.91 From this point of view, the orientation that 
the culture of printing provides for the liberal state would consist – to put it some-
what differently – in the production of ‘formative texts’, in jointly inhabited narra-
tives, on which law docks as ‘normative text’, as expression of enhanced binding 
88 Vesting (2015).
89 Vesting (2015) 128.
90 See Assmann, A. (2011) 181 f., 188: “In the storage memory, sources, objects, and data are 
collected and preserved regardless of whether they are needed at the present moment; we 
can therefore speak of a passive memory of society. The functional memory, by contrast, is 
the active memory of a we-group. Just as the autobiographical memory supports the 
identity of an individual, the cultural functional memory supports the identity of a col-
lectivity. It contains a small selection from the abundance of handed down stocks impor-
tant for the identity of this group.”
91 Ladeur (2012) 173ff.
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force.92 Niklas Luhmann would perhaps have said that the symbolic forms of the 
culture of printing would then be responsible for a specific ‘cognitive’ infrastructure 
of liberal law over and beyond its normative closure.93 These various conceptual 
strategies for the literary, cultural- science, and systems-theory context (semantic 
input, formative / normative, cognitive / normative) is likely to be particularly useful 
where the relationship between culture and law is seen as dynamic, as a discontinuous 
shift in the density of a contact zone, but not as a rigid boundary and insurmount-
able dividing line. In contrast to Luhmann’s closed legal system that operates only 
within its own boundaries, we must now look for constructions that allow more 
possibilities: on the one hand, the figure of the boundary of the legal system cannot 
be abandoned, nor the structure and intrasystemic ordering competence intrinsic to 
law; on the other hand, the legal system must always be incomplete. It cannot 
process all and every ‘environmental irritation’ in accordance with its own rules. 
And the relationship of the liberal state with culture and the media must be thought 
of and theoretically conceptualized as a locus of transition, of exchange, as a contact 
point, a space of entanglement of cultural-formative and legal-normative phenom-
ena.”94
After this excursion into the relationship between culture and law, we turn 
to a particularly interesting question: what actually constitutes intellectual 
fields and legal spaces.
92 On this terminology see Assmann, J. (2000) 38 f., 146 f.
93 See Luhmann (1993) 77ff.
94 Vesting (2015) 131–132.
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Chapter Two
Global Intellectual Fields and Global Legal Spaces –
What Constitutes an Intellectual Field and a Legal Space?
A. Global intellectual and knowledge fields and legal spaces
as communication spaces
We take the view that global intellectual fields, fields of knowledge, and legal 
spaces are primarily spaces of communication, that it is communication that 
constitutes them. To underpin this thesis, we invite the reader to join us in 
exploring two paths towards understanding this assertion. First, we cast a 
brief glance at the nature of communication spaces.
I. The workings and forms of communication spaces
Communication scientists largely agree that what constitutes communica-
tion communities is the presence of a common communication code by which 
members make themselves understood and which performs functions typi-
cal of a community, namely internal identity consolidation and external 
demarcation. Hubert Knoblauch explains:
“We can speak of communication communities only if the commonalties of commu-
nication and their objectivization are also realized in social structures. Whereas only 
very weak social structures develop, for instance, in relation to television – referred 
to as a ‘public’ (with the exception of fan groups for popular soaps, who actively 
form communities) – the interactive media enable social structures to form: actors 
that build networks in which common topics (job hunting, homosexuality, dental 
phobia) or forms (games, gambling, auctions) are treated communicatively, quite 
clearly form communication communities. As such they share not only common 
codes and forms but also the notion of a community to which one belongs. Still 
more important in the framework of decontextualized communication is the com-
municative marking of an identity corresponding to the community.”95
The religious community is a particularly apt example, which we will be 
looking at below. As Enzo Pace has convincingly shown, an experience of 
faith or an act of faith becomes “religion” only through the development of a 
community-specific communication code:
95 Knoblauch (2008) 85.
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“To sum up, religion as a means of communication therefore means at least three 
things: suggesting the idea of a God that speaks, always choosing privileged inter-
preters to whom He transmits a symbolic code, giving the latter the power to 
establish social links that can no longer be conceived in purely ethnic, territorial, 
tribal and parental terms – worlds that end to wrap individuals up in details (ethnic 
group, tribe, family, territory) – the links must be traced back to a higher code that 
separates individuals from these particulars and makes them feel and act as if they 
belonged to a universal community.
The symbolic boundaries of this community are defined by a communication code, 
the key to which cannot be infinitely duplicated, because it is guarded by those who 
programmed the code and only made accessible (as a sign of their goodwill) to 
someone they trust. Religions basically ask human beings to place their trust in the 
person that a god has trusted with the opening and closing of the communication 
code. Seen from this point of view, faith thus means primarily trust in somebody (be 
it a prophet, a spiritual master, guide or shaman); the community of faith that is 
created relies on a constant process of ritualized communication, by means of which its 
members renew their pact of loyalty to the code transmitted to them, learning to 
discriminate true signs from false, confirming the socio-linguistic evidence that 
enables the community to consider itself as such. Its unity is essentially the product 
of a communicative investment, of a successful communication that publicly 
ensures a formal understanding of the evidence, of the fact that everything is con-
tinuing true to memory. The rites and liturgies of religions can be seen as great 
public communication systems that serve specifically to reiterate (so as to acknowl-
edge and have acknowledged) the content and confines of the communicative pact 
that the community of ‘faithful’ has signed in order to come into being.”96
It is only the existence of such a communication code not tied to a defined 
territory that ensures the functioning of deterritorial communication com-
munities, which – as the overview below shows97 – include both religious 
communities and social movements, which, like the anti-slavery movement, 
are held together by a common idea, in this case human dignity.
96 Pace (2009) 215.
97 Hepp (2008) 135.
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But in speaking of communication spaces, we are concerned not only 
with the nature of communication codes and their decoding, but also with 
the actors communicating with one another, the members of the commu-
nication community and especially with the prominent social group that 
determines communication style and exercises interpretational sovereignty 
over the means of communication used.98 This brings us to forms of com-
munity building in the professions, which generally operate as intensive 
communication communities and, as such, develop their own technical 
language as a communication code.
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II. Professions and their language
It is interesting to see what type of professionalized actor “calls the tune” from 
one period of history to the next. Back in the – hardly conceivable – “age 
without lawyers”99 it was the clergy:
“… the clergy were the leading personalities. The institutional responsibility they took 
on themselves made them the guardians and interpreters of the Ten Command-
ments, the Holy Scriptures, and the earthly standards of divine justice. Their daily 
contact with the faithful, particularly in the confessional, meant that they were 
constantly obliged to judge human conduct. Within the communities of the time 
it was quite normal to turn to the parish priest, the bishop, the monk, or the canon, 
not only in matters of spiritual welfare but also for advice in secular questions, or for 
help and moral support in the business of everyday life (the just price for buying or 
selling, or the right choice of an heir, etc.). It was, it seems, just as usual for the cleric 
who had been consulted to take up his pen and record on parchment the decisions 
and agreements of the parties to a legal transaction. The man of the Church was 
therefore a judge in matters both divine and secular; he was theologian and lawyer, 
rhetor and notary. He knew and judged evil deeds and forbidden thoughts as sin, 
and at the same time as unlawful conduct under civil or criminal law.”100
But the clergyman soon found himself in company. Under the heading 
“Between old and new social estates,” Manlio Bellomo has this to report:
“In the cities a new circle of people took the stage. They included the specialized 
jurists trained in schools of law. These schools became increasingly important; they 
were the cradle of the modern university. They included physicians (now called 
physici), who took over many positions and logical procedures for analysing reality 
from the rediscovered Aristotelian texts, and tested and refined their professional 
qualifications through direct observation. They included scholars, who now attained 
social and political weight, which reached its zenith in the Humanism of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They included artists, above all painters and sculp-
tors. But the money changers – exchange brokers and the highly esteemed financial 
brokers (the modern banking system was coming into being) were also among 
them, contributing to the economic and cultural unity of the emerging Europe 
with major international transactions.”101
We have opted for this actor-specific approach because professions tend to 
develop their own professional language as communication code, with the 
aid of which they can make themselves understood worldwide, wherever 
99 This is the heading of chapter two in Bellomo (2005) 35.
100 Bellomo (2005) 48.
101 Bellomo (2005) 59.
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they happen to be. John G. A. Pocock calls these professional languages 
“institutional languages,” which are to be distinguished from the “languages 
of politics,”102 which arise only in political discourse. In their informative 
article on the Cambridge School and its critics (“Die Cambridge School und 
ihre Kritiker” [2001]), Eckhart Hellmuth and Christoph von Ehrenstein 
remark that:
“For Pocock there are basically two different types of ‘political language’. First there 
are the so-called institutional languages. By this Pocock means idioms that have 
their origin in specific milieus. Pocock cites the example of the cultivation of com-
mon law and the idea of the ancient constitution by English jurists in the seventeenth 
century. Secondly, there are ‘political languages’, which develop in the discourse 
itself. They include, for instance civic humanism, whose genesis and transformation 
Pocock describes in his 1975 magnum opus ‘The Machiavellian Moment’. In this 
monograph, which has remained influential to this day, he traces out the history of 
the participatory civic ideal from Machiavelli’s Florentine city republic to the Amer-
ican constitutional debates in the late eighteenth century. With the discovery of the 
tradition of civic humanism, Pocock dramatically changes the way the intellectual 
household of early modernity is seen. In the Anglo-American culture of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, it now became clear that, alongside natural law, 
which had hitherto been regarded as the dominant idiom, there was a second key 
‘political language’ in use – that of civic humanism – which contemporaries turned to 
in reasoning on the state, society, and law.”103
Our interest focuses on “institutional languages”; Pocock names examples of 
such languages specific to a given profession: “Some will have originated in 
the institutional practices of the society concerned: as the professional vocab-
ularies of jurists, theologians, philosophers, merchants, and so on that for 
some reason have become recognized as part of the practice of politics and 
have entered into political discourse.”104 Of these four, we are particularly 
interested in the language of jurists and theologians because their institu-
tional framing is especially pronounced. In what follows – and this is the 
second path we wish to explore – we consider two “global intellectual fields”: 
the world of law and the world of religion.
102 On the function of “languages of politics” in discourses on the good and just order of a 
polity see Pocock (1962).
103 Hellmuth / Ehrenstein (2001) 159 f.
104 Pocock (1973) 3–41.
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B. Two examples of deterritorialized communication about law
and life-determining ideas
I. The “jus commune” as communicatively generated
and disseminated universalist legal thought
In considering the law of the Middle Ages, various legal regimes have to be 
distinguished, which have in turn to be ranked. Precedence is taken by 
enacted local law, such as local government statutes or the royal prerogative, 
be it that of the Regnum Sicilia or in Castile and Léon, then came customary 
law, and, finally – if the first two levels offered no solution – the jus com-
mune, which in turn was based on the tenets and principles of the “corpus 
juris civilis” and the “corpus juris canonici.”105 What are we to understand by 
“jus commune”?
The particularity of the jus commune is best understood when it becomes 
clear how it was made and disseminated. It was made by a particular species 
of legal actor, who in legal history go by the names of “glossarist” and 
“commentator,” who processed the rediscovered Roman law in the form 
of glosses and commentaries in such a way that the “corpus juris civilis” 
gradually came into being alongside the canon law of the Church in the 
shape of the “corpus juris canonici.”106 Together, the two legal regimes 
formed the “utrumque jus,” whose two pillars had to be mastered by pro-
spective “doctors of law.” The jus commune was taught in the schools of law 
scattered across Europe, for example in Bologna, Padua, Perugia, Montpel-
lier, Toulouse, Orleans, and Salamanca – to mention the most renowned. 
Entire generations of students from everywhere in Europe made their way to 
these places of learning, a process that Manlio Bellomo describes as follows:
“On the road, they met other students from Sicily or the distant British Isles, and 
they made chance acquaintance with fellow travellers and experienced, prudent 
merchants. Their sense of community, of solidarity grew through such contacts, 
and in comparing habits and customs in conversation, they harmonized their var-
ious vulgar tongues through the lexical and grammatical medium of a living, sim-
105 On the overall complex of jus commune see Bellomo (2005) 155ff.: “Das System des ius 
commune”.
106 On the function and importance of glossarists and commentators, see Wesel (1997) 
311ff.
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ple, and flexible language, Latin. Thus, they helped promote a cultural unity that 
was to play a prominent role in the cities.”107
But what was really particular to the jus commune was that it taught jurists 
how to argue legally. Its chief function was thus less to establish a system of 
legal rules than to provide jurists everywhere with a fund of argumentation on 
which to draw when dealing with local law – “jus proprium” – or enacted 
law. Bellomo sums up:
“Even if the binding point of reference was a rule of jus proprium (royal prerogative, 
municipal, etc,) or a term in a contract, the judge or lawyer could not ignore the 
generally accepted meaning of the technical terms that he found in the law or 
notarial document. In other words, he could not ignore the jus commune, which 
had determined the meaning of these terms and which designated what Gaius called 
the variae causarum figurae – the legal figurae, which were the heritage and wealth of 
every jurist. It was immaterial whether the content of the norms or contractual 
terms tallied with jus commune rules, and it was irrelevant whether the jus commune
as the applicable positive law ranked first or last among the legal sources. What 
counted was only the figurae that embodied the jus commune, the principles and their 
underlying values.
Associated with the conception and knowledge of the figurae was the conviction 
that they were eternal and non-modifiable, since they embodied a system of values 
and supreme, absolute principles. This provided a standard of value, a presentation 
model, and a means of reaching agreement that surpassed the arbitrariness and 
randomness of jus proprium. The jus commune in its objective and meta-historical 
nature thus also served to protect the interests of jurists and their profession. It was 
immaterial whether they were aware of this, or whether they acted out of conviction 
grounded in reason or out of naive, unthinking trust in the universality of jus 
commune.”108
In his treatment of law in European history,109 Paolo Grossi provides an 
excellent description of jus commune. He begins with the particularities of 
its emergence:
“Legal experts developed this law, people at home in the law: judges, notaries, 
advocates, but especially scholars and professors teaching at universities throughout 
Europe. Deeply involved in the concrete practice of the law, they served rulers as 
legal advisers; appeared in court as barristers or counsel to the bench; successfully 
107 Wesel (1997) 121.
108 Wesel (1997) 159.
109 Grossi (2010).
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exercised the professions of solicitor and notary. The law grew out of a complex 
dialogue with both the requirements of their age and the antique Roman texts.”110
Also important was that the jus commune could operate as a uniform voice of 
the legal community:
“It was law that presented itself as the uniform voice of the legal community, as the 
mouthpiece of a class of experts who were endeavouring to erect a great legal edifice, 
a law free of the state, which was to prevail throughout the later Middle Ages. The 
great Italian legal historian Francesco Calasso rightly spoke of ‘common law as an 
intellectual fact’.”111
Above all, however, the jus commune was essentially law without borders, 
law – we could say – with a globalization gene:
“This law knew no borders, just like science, which addresses the universal and to 
which artificial political barriers are anathema. This is shown by the great migrations 
of teachers and students, moving from one university to the next as cultural pilgrims 
and citizens of a republic of letters in which no-one felt himself to be a foreigner. 
This law created the legal unity of Europe and had a universal orientation, which 
alone enjoyed scholarly legitimacy. One of many instructive examples is offered by 
the main representative of the commentator school, Bartolus de Saxoferrato, an 
Italian jurist in the first half of the fourteenth century. At one point in his Com-
mentarii, for the most part notes on lectures that record lively dialogues with stu-
dents, Bartolus supplemented his text with reference to a German scholar who on a 
particular morning had presented the views of a university professor from Orléans. 
The small lecture hall at the University of Perugia where Bartolus taught was not 
sealed off from the outside world by the walls of the central Italian city but was at 
the centre of an intellectual network that spanned Italy, Germany, and France and was 
located geographically at the centre of the entire civilized world.”112
In sum, we note that the jus commune was a legal regime disseminated 
communicatively, which consisted essentially in a legal idea and a methodo-
logical regime rather than constituting a closed system of legal rules, and 
which was therefore suitable for application wherever legal experts were at 
work. However, the globalization gene of the jus commune – and this is the 
inevitable actor perspective – could develop a global effect only because 
there was a class of jurists able to exert their interpretive sway over this 
jurists’ law to establish its position in politics and society.
Now to our second example.
110 Grossi (2010) 58.
111 Grossi (2010) 59.
112 Grossi (2010) 59.
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II. Religious communities as important communication
communities in the history of ideas
1. The history of religion as a history of ideas
To take the religious community as an example of a communication com-
munity important in intellectual history can be justified on the undeniable 
grounds that religious thinking plays a key role in the history of political 
thought. For this reason, such names as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and 
Marsilius of Padua have their place in every ancestral portrait gallery of the 
political history of ideas.113 At this point, however, we are concerned not 
with these great thinkers but with political thought as theological thought 
and with the role of religious language as a language of politics.
In his recent history of political thought, Otfried Höffe114 offers provides 
an admirable introduction to the topic. We begin with his assessment of the 
role of Christianity in the political history of ideas as a revolutionary force:
“With Christianity, a new intellectual and social force entered political thought. … 
Whereas Plato had connected political thinking with just about all the fields of his 
philosophy, Aristotle and Cicero limited themselves to interlocking politics with 
ethics and a philosophically demanding rhetoric. … Although the outstanding 
thinker of the early period, St. Augustine, went along with this, the continuity 
was interrupted by a discontinuity with revolutionary implications. Political 
thought was profoundly, essentially charged with religion. Mere politics, coupled 
at best with ethics and rhetoric, had lost its rights. Permeated to the core by religion, 
genuinely political thinking transmuted into political theology and theological 
politics.”115
As the introductory remarks in this book on the role of the language of law 
would lead us to expect, this “new intellectual and social force” employed a 
new language and new concepts, as Höffe explains:
“Augustine’s propositions are without a doubt both innovative and provocative, and 
both radically so. Innovative is the focal topic of the second part, fundamentally new
vis-à-vis the philosophical tradition: a civitas dei, a city of God, with its just as 
fundamentally new concepts and arguments. No less provocative is the lack of interest 
113 See, for example, Llanque (2016) 24ff. on “Augustinus von Hippo und Marsilius von 
Padua: Glaube, Kirche und Politik im Mittelalter”.
114 Höffe (2016).
115 Höffe (2016) 92.
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in usual political thought. Political philosophy is displaced by political theology. 
However, what was meant was not the Roman, ‘heathen’ theology of the state-
controlled cult of the gods totally rejected by Augustine in Books VI to VII. Augus-
tine’s city of God is not political thinking as political theology but rather political 
theology instead of political philosophy.”116
If, as we feel, there is something to Höffe’s assessment of the innovative and 
radical nature of the Christian gospel, this brings two aspects into focus: first, 
the question of how and by whom this good news was told and how it was 
institutionally “managed.”
2. Religious communities as narrative communities
One thing they the monotheistic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
have in common is that they clearly cannot manage without a founding 
story, a foundational narrative: religious communities can with good reason 
be described as narrative communities in which a particular narrative form – 
the so-called revelation narrative – plays a key role. What such revelation 
narratives are and what function they have can be illustrated by two partic-
ularly apt examples:
* Revelation as inspiration or “sending down” – the case of the Koran
According to the usual account, the word of God was revealed only orally by 
the Archangel Gabriel to the Prophet, and by the Prophet to the faithful. In 
his introduction to the Koran, Hartmut Bonzin gives us an excellent idea of 
how this revelation is to be imagined and what it means for understanding 
the Koran.
“Sura 20; 114 brings us closer to the process of revelation:
And do not be hasty with the Koran before its inspiration to you is concluded.
From this we learn that first an inspiration or revelation is given Mohammed by 
God, which is then recited by the Prophet. This ‘recitation’ of the revealed text is 
called Koran (Quran, Qur'an). And to describe the process of revelation which 
precedes this recitation, two main concepts are used, namely ‘inspiration’ (wahy) 
and ‘sending or coming downd’ (tanzíl).”117
116 Höffe (2016) 107.
117 Bobzin (2007) 19.
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The revelation story of Islam thus describes a multi-stage process; the first 
recitation is ascribed to the Archangel Gabriel, the second, based on this first, 
is made by the Prophet Mohammed; in all, according to Bolzin, “Koran” 
thus means four different things:
– The recitation of a revelation text to Mohammed himself
– The public recitation of this text by Mohammed
– The text itself that is recited
– The totality of the texts to be recited, i. e., the Koran as book.118
* God’s revelation of the Ten Commandments as surely the most 
impressive legislative act in legal history
How God revealed the Ten Commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai has 
been portrayed over and over again, and we all remember the pictures from 
bible class, if not from Cecile B. DeMille’s “The Ten Commandments.” “The 
revelation on Mount Sinai,” comments Graf, “is a primal scene in the reli-
gious narratives of monotheism, a constellation of inexhaustible abundance 
of meaning. No Jew and no Christian would not immediately associate the 
Ten Commandments with the idea of biblical law.” And then the act of 
legislation itself, a religious representation whose suggestive power could 
hardly be more intensive:
“Yahwe’s Sinai theophany is accompanied by fearsome natural signals of divine 
transcendence: thunder, lightening, dense clouds, mighty trumpeting, quakes, 
smoke, and fire. In ancient European emblematics, smoke and fire were symbols 
of transience, ephemerality, of the self-consumung, the unobtainable. By contrast, 
the law of the eternal God written in stone had an aura of eternal validity, immutability, 
which should govern all dimensions of human conduct.”119
But it is not only a matter of being impressed; we want to understand what 
was special about this law revealed and made by God. As Matthias Köck-
ert120 has shown, this can best be achieved by comparing the revelation of 
the Ten Commandments with the conferring of legislative power on King 
Hammurapi by the sun god Shamash:
118 Bobzin (2007) 20.
119 Graf (2006) 44.
120 Köckert (2007).
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“Before Shamash to the left stands the king, recognizable from his bowl-like cap. It 
is doubtless Hammurapi. But Shamash presents him not with the collection of laws 
but with ring and sceptre, the insignia of power and dominion. In relation to the 
laws set out below, the relief depicts the king as lawmaker under divine commission. 
Contravention of the legal order enacted by the king was therefore also an offence 
against the commissioning divinity, even though gods in the ancient Orient were 
merely the guardians of the law and not lawmakers …
Lawmaking in the Ancient Orient was prerogative of the king. For this reason, king-
ship and lawmaking were closely associated. However, through the mediation of the 
king, the law also had a religious foundation, for the monarchy was – if not of 
divine origin or nature – always kingship by the grace of God.”121
It was quite a different matter with the revelation of the Ten Command-
ments; in this case, lawmaking power was not conferred: it was the lawmaker 
God122 Himself who enacted the law. Köckert notes:
“How very differently the Old Testament tells of the imparting of the Decalogue 
and the laws. Although it depicts Moses in kingly guise: he alone may approach 
God, he is representative of the people, intermediary for God’s will, military leader, 
and many other things, but not a lawmaker. Unlike King Hammurapi, Moses receives 
not insignia of power from the hands of God but the Tables of the Law, which not Moses 
but God Himself has written on the tablets with his finger. Whatever laws Moses 
wrote after receiving the Decalogue, such as the Book of the Covenant etc., he had 
first received from God. Although the laws in themselves do not indicate the author-
ship of God, and even the Decalogue presents itself only at the beginning as the 
word of God, in the context of the framing narrative they are all styled as statements 
of God. In the Old Testament, God himself authorizes law and justice in lieu of the 
king.”123
Before turning to religious communities as institutionalized loci of religious and 
of legal communication, it is well worth taking a look at the narrative 
foundations of another governance collective, the modern constitutional 
state. In considering this parallel world, what Otto Depenheuer and Chris-
tian Waldhoff have to say on the subject is helpful.
* The narrative foundations of the modern constitutional state
Otto Depenheuer set out recently in “search of the narrated state.”124 He has 
identified various “state narratives.” As examples he cites the idea of the “Holy 
Roman Empire” and the associated notion of “translatio imperii” – and 
121 Köckert (2007) 23 f.
122 See Graf (2006) 36.
123 Graf (2006) 24.
124 Depenheuer (ed.) (2011) 7–34.
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competition between state narratives in which states take part as narrative 
communities; the relevant passage is worth quoting not least because it is 
tempting to replace the term “state” by that of “religion”:
“There is competition between state narratives. States that vouch for a dream and 
represent hope for people have much more attractive narratives than others that 
close themselves off from the outside world in a narrative. The state that can tell the 
better story is courted and self-confident. The unavoidable and disagreeable flip side 
of this narrative creation of particular identity is exclusion of the Other: whoever 
does not understand the stories, who cannot or does not wish to apply the narratives 
to himself does not belong to the narrative community. This can give rise to exagger-
ations, delusions and aversion vis à vis ‘others’,− the ‘barbarians’, ‘foreigners’, ‘out-
casts’, ‘enemies’−, as history shows over and over again. Such absolutization, how-
ever, is neither an historically necessary nor logically inevitable consequence of these 
narratives. One can love one’s own narration while respecting others and gaining 
enrichment from them. This is also life-serving because everyone is caught in a 
network of stories: all narratives passing judgement on inclusion and exclusion 
are therefore always relative; each refers to only one of many narrated communities: 
that of a country, a region, a city, a religion, a party, a firm, etc.There is not only one, 
big story; the present reality is shaped by the reality of a plurality of narratives. The 
abuse of a narrative, which can never be excluded, therefore does not speak against 
it, and certainly not against the inevitability of narratives. ‘Abusus non tollit usum’, 
[‘Abuse does not take away use’] say the Digest, and this should not be seriously 
disputed with regard to the narratives of the state, either.”125
The quite remarkable parallels between religious revelation narratives and 
the foundational narratives of constitutional states is stressed by Christian 
Waldhoff, writing about “The Foundational Narrative of the Constitution as 
Idea of the State.” Concluding our consideration of religious communities as 
narrative community, we cite him as follows:
“As we shall see, the constituent power thrives on the notion that the new consti-
tution as idea of the state to come is born in full facticity through the revolutionary 
act, the ‘supreme accomplishment’ of constitutional theory ….
Literally spelling out this idea and transporting it into time is the real objective 
of constitution-making. The constituent power thus becomes the foundational narrative 
of the later constitutional state, the myth of the nation. This narrative − as Napoleon 
demonstrates with the confidence of a sleepwalker − is not a historical account but a 
novel. Making a constitution is, furthermore, one of those ‘conditional beginnings’ 
of which Thomas Mann writes, ‘that constitute the primal origin of the special 
tradition of a given community, ethic entity, or religious family in a practical and 
actual sense (Mann 1969, p. 9) and thus bring the eternal search for ever more 
distant origins in infinite regression to an end. This could well explain the kinship 
125 Depenheuer (ed.) (2011) 26.
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with aesthetic categories; it is more a matter of fathoming sensory perception than 
juridical rationality. The sets the theory of constituent power in stark contrast to the 
prosaic full positivity of constitutional law. Napoleon again: once the novel of 
revolution is over, the task is to govern, not to philosophize.”126
3. The institution “Church” as an important communication space
in the history of ideas
The sociology of space and communication science tell us three things about 
the nature of communication spaces: first, that a container-like understand-
ing of communication spaces is inadequate; second, that communication 
itself has a space-generating function; and, third, that different social groups 
can be understood as different communication spaces.127 The first point 
obviously requires no further discussion. The second – the space-generating 
function of communication – also seems perfectly plausible on condition 
that there is a certain density of communication. Thomas Wetzstein argues 
in this vein in writing about the contribution the papacy made to the 
development of new communication spaces:
“A ‘communication space’ is to be understood as a space defined by longer-term 
exchange relations. The term ‘communication space’ has only recently been taken up 
by historiography … With reference, mostly in studies on the early modern period, 
to ‘a dense network of informal relationship matrices and communications contacts’ 
(Keller 2004). And the motto ‘Communication and Space’ for the 45th Biennial 
Meeting of German Historians in Kiel in 2004 indicated that the science of history 
had opened up a new field of research, albeit without devoting too much attention 
to the significance of this compound concept.
That German medieval studies, in particular, are only now gradually coming to 
focus on large historical spaces again is perhaps due to the risk of political exploi-
tation. In light of twentieth-century debates on the ‘West’ and a European Union 
still thirsting after historical identity, the temptation to use spatial categories for 
political purposes is by no means a phenomenon from the distant past. Be that as it 
may, there can be no doubt about the importance of historical communication 
spaces, especially in investigating transfer and homogenization processes. The elev-
enth and twelfth centuries, in particular, are seen by historians as a phase of inten-
sive exchanges and concentration processes.”128
126 Waldhoff (2011) 62.
127 As representative of the sociology of space, see Löw (2001); for communications science, 
Jarren (1987).
128 Wetzstein (2008).
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The third point – social groups as communication spaces – invites an argu-
mentation chain from religious communities as governance collectives to 
religious communities as institutionalized collectives and then to religious 
communities as loci of institutionalized communication. We end up with 
“Church” as locus and space of institutionalized communication.
This connection between institution and communication seems to have been 
wantonly neglected by media-centric communication science; in our view 
institutions are also communication spaces, and the institution “Church” is an 
excellent example of this. Our view is confirmed by Helmut Schelsky, who 
has gone into the question “Can permanent reflection be institutionalized?” 
Institutions, he claims, are not only loci of communication but, as the 
example of churches shows, also entities needful of communication:
“The step to knowledge of developing institutional forms for religious faith based 
on the permanent reflection of interiority is now no longer all that difficult to take. 
It is clearly a matter of the production and communication, steered organizationally 
by the temporal outside world, of permanently reflected subjectivity in the religious 
field, which in consciousness is reduced to trivially banal commonplace. This seems 
to me to be the case for all social forms of present-day religious life, which is based 
on conversation and discussion, and thus on the conscious meeting of individual 
subjectivities, as form of organization and communication.The fundamental institu-
tional requirement of this form of faith appears to be that ‘people talk to one 
another’. This conversation principle underlies all modern attempts to achieve the 
socially effective animation of faith, reconversion, or safeguarding of religious exis-
tence. What is at issue are not only ‘structurally pure’ institutions of this sort like the 
Protestant academies, the churches and ‘Katholikentage’, church industrial work, 
youth work, etc.: ‘discursive partnership’ is increasingly becoming the normal form 
per se of religious church activity, both within the inner life of the community – the 
oratory becomes an assembly room – and in the overall societal presentation of the 
churches, apparently reducing the importance of older forms of religious commu-
nication – ritual, scripture readings, singing, even preaching.”129
The history of the papal creation of communication spaces shows that it 
makes sense to regard the institution “Church” as an important such space in 
the history of ideas. As a rule, the rise of the papacy is recorded as institu-
tional history, describing how this organizational model gained the upper 
hand over other institutional options such as conciliarism. As Thomas Wetz-
stein shows, the growing importance of the papacy can be described from 
129 Schelsky (1957).
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the perspective sociology of space and communication theory, yielding inter-
esting insights.
The first is that the strengthen of the papal office was accompanied by a 
“novel claim to space penetration”:
“Although the horizon of the Roman bishops had briefly broadened under Nicolas I 
(858–867) and again in the tenth century with activities in Spain, Scandinavia, and 
Eastern Europe, it was a quite new development in the history of the papacy when 
the vicarius Petri in the person of Leo IX not only laid theoretical claim to the 
leadership of Christendom but also pursued the practical implementation of his 
reform demands by seeking to impose a completely new relationship with space. 
Also for the successors of the pope Emperor Henry III had placed on St. Peter’s 
throne, this novel claim to space penetration was a prototypical innovation whose 
causes are to be found not only in a new conception of the papal office, but also in 
the ‘de-Romanization’ of the papacy itself through the appointment of non-Roman 
bishops and in the example of the episcopal visitation.”130
Whereas ecclesiastical legal history often describes important pontiffs as 
“judicial popes” because they pursued the judicialization of the Church, from 
a communication science point of view it might also be appropriate to speak 
of popes who made their mark through their high communication potential. 
As Wetzstein points out:
“Particularly under Gregory VII (1073–1085), the new relationship of the popes to 
space took on a new quality (1073–1085) Not only is his correspondence permeated, 
as it were, by a programmatic postulate of spatial domination: his address book 
listed rulers and prelates in Germany, Italy, France, England, and the three Spanish 
empires, along with the kings of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the Duke of 
Poland, the kings of Russia, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, and Dalmatia, the Emperor 
in Constantinople, rulers in Ireland and even in Islamic Mauritania. Recent research 
on papal records shows that in document production, the papacy began as early as 
the pontificate of Leo IX to overtake the Holy Roman Emperor as competing, space-
dominant authority. Over a period of five years (1154–1159), for instance, the 
chancellery of Frederic I issued 148 documents, whereas over the same period Pope 
Hadrian IV produced no fewer than 1000.
Above all in critical situations – already during the Investiture dispute, but 
particularly in the context of schisms – the popes began to implement their newly 
won communicative potential in intensive public relations work, often with the 
support of wide personal networks. Alexander III, in particular, was well aware of 
the effectiveness of this tool when, after the controversial election of 1159, he sought 
systematically to inundate Western Christendom with electoral propaganda, finally 
130 Wetzstein (2008) 60.
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– with the aid of two centralized orders with a communicative potential at least 
equal to that of the papacy – emerging as victor from the ‘war of propaganda’….”131
We conclude this point with Thomas Wetzstein’s summary of the history of 
the papacy as communication history:
“To return to the initial question of the contribution the papacy made to expanding 
the communication spaces of Latin Christendom, there can be no doubt about the 
impressive achievement of the popes since Leo IX – even though the twelfth century 
offered institutions that in no way lagged behind the papacy in their spatial impact: 
universities with far-reaching personal networks often maintained by correspond-
ence, and the new, centralized orders of the Cistercians and Premonstrensians with 
general chapters almost revolutionary in communication history.
The communications techniques of the papacy demonstrated a striking develop-
ment in keeping with a general trend in Latin European communication history: in 
propagating their reform programme, Leo IX and many of his successors quite 
clearly took the communicative habits of a face-to-face society into account when 
they placed great value on personal contact through travel, synodical activities, and 
the attachment of external functional elites to their persons. The twelfth century saw 
a gradually break with such communicative practices, as the written word gained 
increasing importance in organizing ‘rule from afar’. The Fourth Lateran Council 
with its impressive list of participants can be seen as marking the end of this era, 
opening the door on a new epoch of papal communicative praxis. Although, until 
well into the fifteenth century, the papacy was unable to carry out its reforms or 
collect financial resources without sending out representatives, from the twelfth 
century onwards it displayed more and more decided characteristics of governance 
based on the written word.”132
After these observations and findings on intellectual fields, fields of knowl-
edge, and legal spaces as communication spaces, we turn to the popular 
subject of the history of ideas and knowledge as histoire croisée or entangled 
history.
131 Wetzstein (2008) 61 f.
132 Wetzstein (2008) 73–74.
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Chapter Three
The History of Ideas and Knowledge as Entangled History
As the founder of the history of ideas in America in the 1940s Arthur O. 
Lovejoy rightly stressed, “Ideas are the most migratory things in the 
world.”133 With this in mind, I presented some thoughts on the mobility 
of the rule of law principle under the heading “Can the Rule of Law Travel?” 
at a 2012 workshop at the Erfurt Max Weber Center.134 Given the incon-
testable wanderlust of ideas, writing a history of ideas as entangled history is 
an increasingly popular approach – witness Martin Mulsow’s “Ideenge-
schichte als Verflechtungsgeschichte. Impulse für eine Global Intellectual 
History”135 and the introductory essay by the editors Samuel Moyn and 
Andrew Sartori in “Global Intellectual History”.136
Certain reflections and examples of our own could prove helpful at this 
stage. Before presenting them, however, we shall attempt to place the 
“entangled history” approach to a global history of ideas and knowledge 
in a somewhat more general context as a contribution to understanding 
the history of ideas as entangled history.
A. Globalization history as entangled history:
the need for systematic entanglement research
Two books I published in 2014 and 2015 discussed the history of global-
ization from two different, rather unusual perspectives. I first examined what 
governance structures and governance actors can be regarded as characteristic of 
the globalization process – globalization as a history of governance137 – and, 
second, I sought to depict the history of globalization as essentially a history 
of communication,138 since globalizing communication has been the chief 
factor leading to the shrinking of the world and the “death of distance.” 
133 Lovejoy (1940) 4.
134 Schuppert, G. F. (2012a).
135 Mulsow (2015).
136 Moyn / Sartori (eds.) (2013) 3–32.
137 Schuppert, G. F. (2014).
138 Schuppert, G. F. (2015).
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From the standpoint of governance research139 and of communication sci-
ence, entanglement structures were in clear evidence almost everywhere.
The first book was therefore given the title “Entangled Statehood” (“Ver-
flochtene Staatlichkeit”) and focused on the following five entanglement 
regimes:140
 Statehood entrepreneurs, such as the East India Company as pioneers in globalization
 Empires and networks as entanglement structures typical of globalization
 The state in the entangled world of finance – between the Rothschilds and the 
International Monetary Fund
 The partnership practised between State and Church; and
 The history of globalization as missionary history – the triad of commerce, civi-
lizational sense of mission, and Christian missionaryship
The second publication, which addresses the phenomenon of globalization 
from the point of view of communication history, deals not only with 
entanglement structures but focuses more strongly on specific globalization 
actors, as they can be called. Seven are particularly typical and interesting:
 The postal entrepreneurs Thurn and Taxis
 The operators of news and press agencies as communication entrepreneurs of the 
“Victorian Internet”
 Siemens as a communications and infrastructure company
 The Reformation as a communication event and Luther as media star
 The inhabitants of the “blogosphere”
 The members of the Republic of Letters, and
 Human rights activists
These rich pickings invite us to outline what we could call entanglement 
research, which would have to be pursued as a multi-disciplinary project. In 
what follows we make a start with a list of five fields that any entanglement 
research worthy of the name would have to address. The list shows which 
discipline could assume “responsibility” for the given field of study.
139 See the overview in Schuppert, G. F. (2015) 371–469.
140 Schuppert, G. F. (2014) 356ff.
72 Part One
* To begin with, entanglement structures and entanglement actors need to 
be identified. Although they are difficult to keep apart – as governance 
studies show, actors operate within the structures that frame their 
action141 – it is analytically useful to treat structures and actors sepa-
rately while keeping their interrelatedness in mind. And this is how we 
shall proceed, looking first at some typical entanglement structures 
and then at particularly “conspicuous” entanglement actors.
* Our second concern is to examine the causes of entanglement and also 
whether we are dealing with institutional pathologies rather than insti-
tutional responses to certain processes and problems not or scarcely 
amenable to handling without entanglement. One interesting example 
is the so-called European composite administration,142 an informational, 
decision-making, and monitoring network that is to be understood as 
an answer to the institutional structure of the European Union. From a 
still more general perspective, the investigation of governance struc-
tures in multi-level systems – so-called “multilevel governance”143 – 
has to seen as entanglement research: “The focal subject matter of 
political-science analysis [of multilevel governance] is the causes, 
forms, and consequences of entanglement.”
* Third and last, entanglement research would have to capture the diver-
sity of existing entanglement forms and attempt to systematize them in 
some way; I have, very provisionally, identified four types of entangle-
ment structure typical of globalization:
– Entanglement structures between the state and commerce: from the privileged trad-
ing companies to the symbiotic relationship between state and multinational cor-
porations
– Entanglement structures between the state and religion: from alliance between 
throne and altar to military chaplaincies and the division of labour in meaning 
production.
– Entanglement structures beyond national statehood: from transnational network 
cooperation to fraying statehood144 as an applied case of entangling statehood.
– Imperial entanglement structures: from “informal empire” to “indirect rule.”145
141 Mayntz (2005).
142 See Schmidt-Assmann / Schöndorf-Haubold (eds.) (2005).
143 Greater detail in Benz (ed.) (2004) 125–146.
144 Genschel / Zangl (2007).
145 Greater detail in Osterhammel (2003).
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* Fourthly, entanglement research would have to examine the intended 
and, above all, the unintended consequences of entangled political deci-
sion-making processes. In this connection, the reader is referred to the 
now classical study by Fritz W. Scharpf on the so-called political inter-
dependence trap,146 in which he convincingly traces the phenomenon 
of the European butter mountain back to the entanglement structures 
of European governance, which favour status-quo decisions, prevent 
dramatic surges of reform,147 and generally enable a policy of block-
ade.
* Fifth – which brings us to the second part – entanglement research has 
to investigate whether there is a dynamic between the entangled parts and 
what this dynamic is. What actually happens there? What is trans-
ported and exchanged through the entangled channels?
The European Union is a highly instructive example. The EU governance 
system is characterized by, among other things, performance competition
between member states. Arthur Benz describes the functional logic involved:
“In the EU, governance by performance competition takes place under the heading 
‘open method of coordination’ above all in the fields of economic, employment, social, 
and environmental policy. At the European level the commission defines goals and 
standards to guide member states and leaves it to them to implement them by the 
means of their choice. Benchmarking by member-state experts and the commission 
provides the incentive for member states to meet these goals and standards. The 
publication of best practices aims to trigger learning processes and public critique of 
bad practices is intended to prompt the states involved to adapt their policy to meet 
European standards.”148
“Benchmarking” and “open method of coordination” (OMC) involve not 
only confrontation with and exchanges between different political styles and 
administrative cultures but also a meeting of different notions of the public 
good and political ideas. These are extremely communication-intensive pro-
cesses, which justifies speaking of “governance as communication.”149
146 Scharpf (1985).
147 See Schuppert, G. F. (2008a).
148 Scharpf (1985) 107.
149 Schuppert, G. F. (2007a).
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We now take a closer look at typical entanglement structures and entan-
glement actors.
B. Communication-intensive networks as a prime instance
of entanglement structures: two historical examples
The network concept is a fine example of entanglement structure. Despite its 
ambivalence, this successful concept cannot be avoided.150 Jürgen Oster-
hammel shows this: while expressing his scepticism about the concept 
(“the network is a both graphic and deceptive metaphor”), he stresses how 
useful it is: “The network metaphor is particularly useful because it permits 
the notion of a multitude of contact points and nodes.”151
The metaphor is useful, and therefore so successful, because – as Andreas 
Wald and Dorothea Jansen rightly stress – networks are “application-neu-
tral.”152 Its all-round usefulness explains why the network concept is to be 
found in so many contexts. It can be used as an analytical tool in micro-
political history; Wolfgang Reinhard does so in his study on “The Nose of 
Cleopatra” (“Die Nase der Kleopatra”).153 He has this to say about the 
ubiquity of the metaphor:
“Networks are an omnipresent historico-anthropological phenomenon, just as con-
vincingly demonstrated by the old Chinese variant Guanxi and its adaptation to the 
present as by a network-theoretical interpretation of St. Paul’s first letter to the 
Coninthians.154 But its importance was recognized only when it was promoted to 
a form of societalization of the information world of our age. The connection with the 
growing importance of the Internet is obvious. Since 1990, ‘network’ has become an 
absolute concept that no scientific or non-scientific publication can now do with-
out.155
However, closer examination of the ‘nodes’, ‘edges’, and overall form of net-
works shows how very much networks are modified by historical and cultural 
environmental influences. Once again, the given political culture as the quintessence 
of political praxis plays an important role. Basically, a role of societal power leads to 
a better position in networks, for power is the raw material of micropolitics. But 
150 See Jansen / Schubert (eds.) (1995).
151 Osterhammel (2009) 1010.
152 Jansen / Wald (2007) 188.
153 Reinhard (2011).
154 Gold et al. (eds.) (2002); Chow (1992).
155 Schüttpelz (2007).
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because political power roles have changed historically, membership of parties or 
associations, of the Free Masons or the Rotary Club now play a far greater role than 
kinship or regional origins, which in premodernity were micropolitically more 
important. Accordingly, the importance of ‘connections’ arising from a common 
education, place of work, and membership has increased in the modern age.156 It 
should also be remembered that the Internet opens up quite new possibilities for 
micropolitics owing to its network character.”157
However, network can also be understood as a concept typical of global-
ization158 that explains the spread of globalizing capitalism, as Sven Beckert 
shows in his study of the cotton trade empire under the heading “Informa-
tion flow and trust”:
“Although the cotton empires did not manage to integrate the growers, the most 
important characteristic of this first modern processing industry was its globality. 
This globalization needed globalizers, people who recognized the opportunities offered 
by the new order and who persuaded others, not least their governments, to take 
collective action. The most important globalizers were not the often very local-
minded planters or factory owners but … the merchants, who were specialized in 
establishing networks linking up producers, manufacturers, and consumers.
Developing such global networks required courage and vision. When in 1854 
Johannes Niederer applied for a position with the Swiss trading firm Gebrüder 
Volkart, he offered to sound out the market opportunities in Batavia, Australia, 
Macassar, Mindanao, Japan, China, Rangoon, Ceylon, and Cape Town. Such globe-
trotter merchants ‘ruled over industry’. Indeed, manufacturers and planters regu-
larly complained about the power of these traders, and many merchants looked 
down on factory owners as provincials and gamblers. To become powerful actors in 
the cotton empire and to conduct this trade profitably, the Rathbones, Barings, 
Lecesnes, Wätjens, Rallis, and others established close-knit networks in which informa-
tion, finance, and merchandise could reliably flow.”159
And the network concept is extremely useful in analysing governance struc-
tures beyond the nation state, as I have done with respect to transnational 
administrative networks.160
Two other examples are particularly instructive from the history of ideas 
perspective, namely the closely related phenomena of the so-called Republic 
of Letters and the network of the Enlightenment.
156 Emrich et al. (1996); Döscher (2005); Karsten / Thiessen (eds.) (2006).
157 Reinhard (2011) 638–639.
158 As I have done in Schuppert, G. F. (2014), chapter 2: “Globalisierung als ‘institution 
building’ – Imperien und Netzwerke als globalisierungstypische Verflechtungsstrukturen”.
159 Beckert (2014) 217–218.
160 Schuppert, G. F. (2013b).
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I. The Gelehrtenrepublik / Republic of Letters / République des Lettres
as communication network
The Republic of Letters should not be overlooked in this study, for it oper-
ated through and was fuelled by networked communication.
“Republic of Letters has to be conceived of as part of the Scholarly Culture in the 
Early Modern Age, primarily under the aspects of its links to community, in general 
of communications, i. e. institutions, ideas and their diffusion, production / recep-
tion / distribution of texts, nature and history of text genres – but always in the 
analytical context of communication: of its participants, centres, channels, instru-
ments, media. We should be aware of the fact that analyzing Scholarly Culture 
under the leading aspect of Republic of Letters means to accept an implicit bias 
of its analysis towards communication.”161
The name of this virtual republic is essentially a self-description of a specific 
scholarly culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, held together by 
communication:
“Republic of Letters, more than nobilitas litteraria, is a metaphorical manner of speech, a 
façon de parler used to characterize this kind of communication among scholars, 
i. e. the internal communication within the (status-bound or status-transcending?) 
community of scholars, under the aspect of its conditions and state as well as, and 
more so, of the claims and norms the scholarly community should conform to, that 
is under the aspect of communication as it should be. Thus, Republic of Letters thema-
tizes scholarly communications with respect to normative expectations, to definitions 
of limits, e. g. of tolerance, of room for criticism etc. […] As a subject of historical 
research, Republic of Letters does not assume its proper, specific contour until it is 
conceived of as the self-concept, the self-description of (a representative part of) early 
modern scholarly communication, or to put it more precisely: of scholarly culture 
under the specific aspect of its communications.”162
With Anthony Graften we must ask, “If this state had no maps, no admin-
istrative officials, and no borders, how do we know it existed at all?”163 Any 
answer to this question calls for a visit to the republic to gain better acquaint-
ance with its characteristics.
In his Sketch Map of a Lost Continent, Grafton describes this imaginary 
country as follows:
161 Jaumann (2011) 12.
162 Jaumann (2011) 13ff.
163 Grafton (2009) 8.
Global History as a Global History of Ideas 77
“This essay offers a historical traveler’s report on a strange imaginary land, one that 
had few of the distinctive marks by which we usually identify a state. It did have a 
distinctive name: Respublica literarum, the Republic of Letters. Its citizens agreed 
that they owed it loyalty, and almost all of them spoke its two languages – Latin, 
which remained the language of all scholars from 1500 to 1650 or so, and still 
played a prominent role thereafter, and French, which gradually replaced it in most 
periodicals and almost all salons. But it had no borders, no government, no capital. 
In a world of sharp and well-defined social hierarchies – a world in which men and 
women wore formal costumes that graphically revealed their rank and occupation – 
its citizens insisted that all of them were equal, and that any special fame that one of 
them might enjoy had been earned by his or her own efforts. As one observer put it 
in 1699, ‘The Republic of Letters is of very ancient origin […] It embraces the whole 
world and is composed of all nationalities, all social classes, all ages and both sexes 
… All languages, ancient as well as modern, are spoken.The arts are joined to letters, 
and artisans also have their place in it … Praise and honor are awarded by popular 
acclaim’ … The Republic of Letters imagined itself as Europe’s first egalitarian 
society, even if it did not always enact these high ideals in the grubby reality of 
its intellectual and professional practices.”164
Particularly interesting, of course, is the question of how citizenship of this 
virtual republic was to be gained. According to Anthony Grafton, it was 
quite simple: required were good language skills, a certain social behaviour, 
and a letter of recommendation from a senior scholar:
“The citizens of the Republic carried no passports, but they could recognize one 
another by certain marks. Not wealth, of course; then as now, scholar did not rhyme 
with dollar. But they looked for learning, for humanity, for generosity, and they 
rewarded those who possessed these qualities. Any young man, and more than a few 
young women, could pay the price of admission. Just master Latin – and, ideally, 
Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic; become proficient at what now seem the unconnected 
skills of mathematics and astronomy, history and geography, physics and music; turn 
up at the door of any recognized scholar from John Locke in London to Giambat-
tista Vico in Naples, bearing a letter from a senior scholar, and greet your host in 
acceptable Latin or French – and you were assured of everything a learned man or 
woman could want: a warm and civilized welcome, a cup of chocolate (or, later, 
coffee); and an hour or two of ceremonious conversation on the latest editions of 
the classics and the most recent sightings of the rings of Saturn.”165
The architecture of this republic thus consisted of a network of mutual 
correspondence: “The strands of long-term correspondence formed a capil-
lary system along which information could travel from papal Rome to Cal-
164 Grafton (2009) 1 f.
165 Grafton (2009) 8.
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vinist strongholds in the north, and vice versa – so long as both had inhab-
itants, as they did, who wished to communicate.”166
Interestingly, Anthony Grafton draws clear parallels between the Republic 
of Letters he describes and the present-day information and knowledge 
society. They are evident not only in the common problem of “information 
overload,”167 but also in the incessant transfer of information and ideas, which 
calls to mind the bloggers of today:
“Trade had become global again in the fifteenth century. Now information also 
joined the global flow, as Huguenots in exile in Berlin and Potsdam informed 
the European world about recent science and scholarship in French. Kircher, 
admired and envied in Rome, drew information from fellow Jesuits around the 
world as he charted the underground movements of rivers and lava flows and the 
ancient migrations of peoples. Vico, isolated but well-informed Catholic, southern 
Naples, used Dutch journals published in Latin as his primary sources for the new 
theories of Spinoza and Locke. Like the blogs that have accelerated the movement 
of facts and ideas in recent years, the new journals and publishing houses had a 
profoundly unsettling effect on political and social authorities. The Republic of 
Letters stood, in the first instance, for a kind of intellectual market – one in which 
values depended, in theory at least, not on a writer’s rank but on the quality of his or 
her work.”168
II. The Enlightenment as a process of transnational coproduction
of knowledge
I have long been a friend of the notion that what we call statehood is not 
produced exclusively by the state but is also co-produced in collaboration 
between the state and other actors. This could explain why we find Sebastian 
Conrad’s comment particularly interesting that the so-called Enlightenment 
– a second and somewhat later Republic of Letters – can be seen as a process 
of global co-production.169 In the Enlightenment, inseparably associated 
with the name of Immanuel Kant, he sees above all an answer to the grow-
ing global processes of entanglement:
166 Grafton (2009) 9.
167 Rosenberg, D. (2003).
168 Grafton (2009).
169 Conrad (2012).
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“The production of knowledge in the late eighteenth century was structurally 
embedded in larger global contexts, and much of the debate about Enlightenment 
in Europe can be understood as a response to the challenges of global integration. The 
non-European world was always present in eighteenth-century intellectual discus-
sions. No contemporary genre was more popular and more influential than the 
travelogue. Accounts of the Hurons in North America, of the Polynesian Omai 
who was taken to England by Captain Cook in 1774, and of the Mandarins at 
the Chinese court reached a broad readership and found their way into popular 
culture. Most direct was the impact of the idealization of the reign of the Qing 
emperors Kangxi (1661–1722) and Qianlong (1736–1795); China was posited as the 
incarnation of an enlightened and meritocratic society – and instrumentalized for 
criticisms of absolutist rule in Europe.
But the appropriation of the world was not confined to its function as a mirror. 
In many ways, central elements of the cultural transformations that are customarily 
summarized as ‘Enlightenment’ need to be understood as a reaction to the global 
entanglements of the times. The expansion of Europe’s horizons that had begun in 
the Age of Discovery and culminated in the voyages of James Cook and Louis de 
Bougainville resulted in the incorporation of the ‘world’ into European systems of 
knowledge. In particular, the emergence of the modern sciences can be seen as an 
attempt to come to terms with global realities. Further examples include the discussions 
about the character of humanity following the interventions of Bartolomé de las 
Casas; the idea of the law of nations and an international world order as proposed 
by Hugo Grotius; the ethnological and geographical explorations of the globe; the 
comparative study of language and religion; the theories of free trade and the 
civilizing effects of commerce; and the notions of race, on the one hand, and 
cosmopolitanism, on the other. The perception of an increasingly interlinked globe 
posed a cognitive challenge that was gradually met by reorganizing knowledge and the 
order of the disciplines.”170
Conrad avoids a Eurocentric view of what we are accustomed to calling the 
Enlightenment, instead stressing the global perspective and the trend 
towards global thinking that entered the world of ideas and knowledge with 
the Enlightenment:
“The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, however, was not the intellectual 
monopoly of Europeans. It needs to be understood as a result of the transnational co-
production of knowledge by many contributors around the world. This is not to deny that 
particular debates were also deeply embedded in European traditions, and were 
shaped by specific situations in places such as Edinburgh, Halle, and Naples. But 
the intellectual dynamic as well as the revolutionary impact of the transformation of 
the late eighteenth century was very much energized by global conditions.
Moreover, the Enlightenment was not confined to its Atlantic moment in the 
eighteenth century; it had a much longer course. This was a history not so much of 
170 Conrad (2012) 1009 f.
80 Part One
its diffusion as of its permanent reinvention. Groups and social milieus that pressed 
for social and cultural change invoked the authority of the Enlightenment while 
fusing it with other traditions. In the process, what was seen as the core of the 
Enlightenment changed profoundly, both because of the creative merging of ele-
ments from a variety of cultural backgrounds, and because these ideas were pro-
posed in geopolitical contexts that differed greatly from eighteenth-century Europe. 
Increasingly, Enlightenment was employed as a concept that allowed historical actors to 
think globally and to position their communities on a world stage.”171
C. Two types of entanglement actor at work: “state nomads” or
“empire agents” and “go-betweens in a brokered world”
When different cultures encounter one another, meeting spaces develop that 
Mary Louise Pratt calls “contact zones.”172 These zones173 are home to spe-
cific entanglement actors that play an important role in the circulation of 
ideas and concepts. We conclude this first part with a look at this interesting 
species:
I. State nomads and empire agents
In her fascinating book “The Secret War,” Eva Horn174 addresses, among 
other things, the imperial thirst for knowledge. She comes across a type of 
actor Thomas Richards175 has labelled “state nomad.” Writing about the 
British Empire, Horn has this to say:176
“The British Empire was a power structure rooted in the administration and control 
of an immense and extremely heterogeneous space. As Thomas Richards has argued, 
it took a specific regime of knowledge to guarantee its spatial coherence, an ‘impe-
rial archive’ designed to collect, store, and classify information from all parts of the 
world. ‘They surveyed and they mapped. They took censuses, produces statistics. … 
In fact they often could do little other than collect and collate information, for any 
exact civil control, of the kind possible in England, was out of question. The Empire 
was too far away …’.177 Pursuing the ideal of a unified and complete representation 
171 Conrad (2012) 1026.
172 Pratt (1992).
173 Greater detail in Smith, V. (2013).
174 Horn (2013).
175 Richards (1993).
176 Richards (1993) 164–165.
177 Richards (1993) 3.
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of the world, the imperial thirst for knowledge arose from its specific spatial structure: 
and empire spanning the globe with Britain as its undisputed political, economic, 
and military center that nonetheless had to nurture and facilitate a certain amount 
of ‘local’ self-organization to maintain control over such a vast domain. Local 
features in colonial territories had to be harmonized with imperial centralization 
– that is, remote control and self-control had to be coordinated.The Victorian colonial 
will to knowledge is a will to power grounded in control over space. Geography and 
hydrography, institutionalized in the Royal Geogrphical Society (founded in 1830), are 
the basis for the administration and military control of the colonial territory. As 
such they are not simply areas of knowledge among others but the royal disciplines 
of colonialism. ‘State nomads’, that is, world travelers, explorers, cartographers, and 
the empire’s more or less amateurish secret agents, are the actual heroes of this kind 
of spatial power: ‘nineteenth-century geography was the continuation of politics by 
other means’.”178
But in addition to the state nomad, there is another type of actor, whom Eva 
Horn calls the “empire agent.” She cites “Kim” from Rudyard Kipling’s 
famous novel179 as an example. About the function of the empire agent, 
which she also refers to as a cultural chameleon, she remarks:
“… Kipling’s novel depicts in singular clarity a transformation of imperialism from 
the reliance on ethnocide, enslavement, or unfettered exploitation, that is, from the 
direct use of violence, to the skilled management of information – and of intelli-
gence, for that matter. … However, colonial intelligence as the accumulation of 
knowledge pertaining to the control of colonial territory is already encumbered by 
problems of communication and interpretation. Hence there is an urgent need for 
multilingual agents familiar with the many cultural codes, laws, and taboos of an 
extremely heterogeneous society such as India. In other words, the political and 
military reconnaissance of colonial space involves more than scouting and spying 
missions to explore the terrain and eavesdrop on the enemy; it also requires cultural 
fluency and social acumen. In short, it depends on ‘local knowledge’. As the British 
had been forced to learn during the Indian uprising of 1857, they could not secure 
their rule if they disregarded local codes and customs.”180
II. Government by go-betweens in a brokered world
In “The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence 1770–1820, 
“the editors Simon Schaffer / Lissa Roberts / Kapil Raj and James Delbourgo 
178 Richards (1993) 17.
179 Kipling (1987).
180 Horn (2013) 182.
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write expressis verbis of “government by go-betweens,”181 making these 
mediators into key governance actors. In effect, this is a concept transfer 
from the world of literature to the world of “global intellectual history.” In 
literature, the ‘go-between’ is the intermediary who “through swift and will-
ing services as postillon d’amour joins lovers separated from one another by 
a plethora of moral and social barriers, but who remains in ignorance of the 
delicate substance and purposes of his actions.”182 This is the concept as we 
know it exemplified by the classic novel by L. P. Hartley.183 Now – in global 
intellectual history – he no longer operates as postillion d’amour but as 
intermediary and interpreter between different cultures: “The go-between 
in this sense is thus not just a passer-by or a simple agent of cross-cultural 
diffusion, but someone who articulates relationships between disparate 
worlds of cultures by being able to translate between them.”184
Kapi Raj takes us somewhat deeper in the world of “go-betweens” in this 
study on “Mapping Knowledge Go-Betweens in Calcutta, 1770–1820,”185
where he shows that all merchants, whether 14th century Arabs or officers 
of the East India Company had to rely on the services of intermediaries if 
they were to trade successfully with the locals. “Knowledge go-betweens” of 
wide-ranging provenance were therefore indispensable.
“In the circumstances, it is not difficult to perceive that go-betweens were indispen-
sable to ensure passage between the varied languages, customs and accounting 
techniques of the merchants and those of local communities of producers and 
suppliers. They were designated by special appellations, such as dallãl in Arabic, 
but often looked upon with contempt and suspicion, referred to variously as ‘arro-
gant, rebellious and audacious’ or ‘shameless, bold, cunning, debauched [and] liars.’
Nonetheless, they constituted an obligatory passage point for all transactions and, 
already in the 14th century, Arab merchants were advised to use the services of such 
factotums, as the following extract from an Arabic trader’s manual emphasizes: ‘The 
merchant who arrives in a locality unknown to him must also carefully arrange in 
advance to secure a reliable representative, a safe lodging house, and whatever 
besides is necessary, so that he is not taken in by a slow payer or a cheat.’ In addition 
to translators, interpreters, moneychangers, bankers and moneylenders, the regional 
trade network was predicated upon specific maritime knowledge and skills. Pilots, 
181 Schaffer et al. (eds.) (2000) xi ff.
182 Breidecker (2008) 14.
183 Hartley (2000).
184 Schaffer et al. (eds.) (2000) xiv.
185 Raj (2000).
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navigators and theorists of navigation helped guide ships around maritime Asia and 
East Africa, thus forming yet another intermediary profession.”186
The colonial powers, in particular, starting with the Portuguese, learned by 
bitter experience that fruitful exchanges between themselves and “civil soci-
eties” could not be organized without the assistances of professionalized go-
betweens:
“At the turn of the sixteenth century, west Europeans thus entered a highly organ-
ized and complex economic network in the Indian Ocean with well-established 
trade conventions, of which they had some notion through various travel accounts 
and reports. But over which they lacked mastery. For a start, the Portuguese – the 
first west European power to enter the region – had to rely on the services of 
different local Muslim pilots to direct them up the Swahili coast and then to 
Calicut, their final destination. And when, after initially carrying out armed attacks 
on local powers, merchants and populations, they finally embarked on establishing 
an empire in the region, based on fortified littoral colonial settlements, private 
trade, and political and commercial treaties with regional polities, their interaction 
with the various communities and political authorities concerned was rendered 
possible only through the mediation of professional go-betweens with specific literary, 
technical, juridical, administrative and financial skills. The pattern set by the Portu-
guese in the 16th century was to continue into the following centuries and formed 
the basis of subsequent European interaction and maritime settlements in the Indi-
an Ocean.
In the context of the relationship between maritime Asia and western Europe, 
we can distinguish at least five major functional types of intermediaries – the inter-
preter-translator, the merchant-banker, the comprador or procurer, the legal repre-
sentative or attorney, and the knowledge broker. In the South Asian context, each of 
these types could be composed of Asians, North Africans or Europeans, missionaries 
or footloose strangers, men or women.”187
186 Raj (2000) 107.
187 Raj (2000) 108.
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Part Two
Three Key Functions of Law and its Language
in a Global History of Ideas
The first part of this book was about what Pocock has called the “languages 
of politics” in which the nature of the good and just order of a community is 
spoken and written about. The key questions were what legitimizes admit-
ting the language of law to the concert of these languages, and whether its 
voice should be marginal or central.
In tackling these questions, we propose distinguishing between five func-
tions of the language of law:
* The language of law as the language of discourses on the legitimacy of political 
authority
* The language of law as the language of political change
* The language of law as the language of rights
* The language of law as the language of justice, and
* The language of law as the language of a new global order
In the second part, we focus on two aspects of the capabilities of law and its 
specific language as a language of politics. First, we ask what the language of 
law does particularly well in comparison with other “languages of politics”, 
and second why the language of law can consequently deal a particularly 
“good hand” in discourses on the order of the polity.
We present the indulgent reader with three key functions of law and its 
language in examining these questions.
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Chapter One
First and Foremost: The Abstraction and Transformation
Functions of Law and its Language
A. Two examples of the abstraction functions of the language of law
I. The “invention” of the legal person
In “Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind”,1 Yuval Noah Harari cites the 
French automotive firm Peugeot, founded in 1896, as an example of what 
this momentous invention is all about.
“… Armand Peugeot, who had inherited from his parents a metalworking shop that 
produced springs, saws and bicycles, decided to go into the automobile business. To 
that end, he set up a limited liability company. He named the company after 
himself, but it was independent of him. If one of the cars broke down, the buyer 
could sue Peugeot, but not Armand Peugeot. If the company borrowed millions of 
francs and then went bust, Armand Peugeot did not owe its creditors a single franc. 
The loan, after all, had been given to Peugeot, the company, not to Armand Peu-
geot, the Homo sapiens. Armand Peugeot died in 1915. Peugeot, the company, is 
still alive and well.”2
Harari seeks to explains that the firm Peugeot as an object of juridical 
attribution can be kept apart from the natural person Armand Peugeot by 
a ‘legal conjuring trick’ – which, in a certain sense, it is:
“Peugeot is a figment of our collective imagination. It can’t be pointed at; it is not a 
physical object. … But it exists as a ‘legal fiction’. …
In the case of Peugeot SA the crucial story was the French legal code, as written 
by the French parliament. According to the French legislators, if a certified lawyer 
followed all the proper liturgy and rituals, wrote all the required spells and oaths on 
a wonderfully decorated piece of paper, and affixed his ornate signature to the 
bottom of the document, then hocus pocus – a new company was incorporated. 
Once the lawyer had performed all the right rituals and pronounced all the neces-
sary spells and oaths, millions of upright French citizens behaved as if the Peugeot 
company really existed.”3
1 Harari (2015).
2 Harari (2015) 45.
3 Harari (2015) 43, 46.
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If this account is a little to colourful and the role of the lawyer as shaman4
somewhat overdrawn, Jürgen Kocka provides a more sober description.5 He 
sees the invention of the limited liability company or corporation as playing 
a decisive role in the development of capitalism. The founding of the “Ver-
eenigde Oostindische Compagnie” (VOC) in 1602 provides a good illustra-
tion of the innovative nature of this institution:
“Trade enterprises had already existed, but through the sixteenth century primarily 
as partnerships that brought together a small number of merchants working and 
keeping accounts relatively independently. The VOC, however, came into being as a 
public corporation. Its impressive capital of 6.45 million guilders was raised by 219 
shareholders, each with limited liability. They regularly received dividends (18 per-
cent on average annually) but had little influence on the management of the com-
pany. The VOC stayed together until 1799, while its shareholders changed. They could 
do this because they could trade their shares on the newly emerging stock 
exchanges. The management of the company lay in the hands of directors. They 
ran the extensive, vertically integrated organization and its many branch offices 
(especially in Asia) out of Amsterdam with the aid of an ingenious system of 
committees, a systemic reporting system, and a central office that soon employed 
a staff of 350 salaried employees.The company operated the purchase, transport, and 
sale of a variety of goods. But it also expanded selectively to become a manufactur-
ing company by incorporating, for example, saltpetre works and silk-spinning plants 
in India. In all these respects, the VOC seemed unusually modern.”6
But the public corporation, which experienced a veritable boom during the 
industrial revolution in the form of the limited liability company, was not 
only modern: it was also – a condition for the spread of ideas and knowledge – 
adapted to the political needs of the time:
“The huge capital requirements and complexity of services to be performed are not 
the only factors explaining the emergence of this unique organization. The Dutch 
East India Company also fit in with the political needs of government in this era, 
since business, politics, and military force were most intimately mixed, and inten-
sive competition between states often brought to a standstill competition between 
enterprises within one and the same country. The VOC was formed as an alliance of 
merchants and trading companies from all the provinces of the Netherlands under 
pressure from the government, as a pooling of resources in international competi-
tion with an anti-Spanish, and then soon also an anti-English, thrust. Much the 
same can be said of other trading companies of the time, such as the much smaller 
4 Harari (2015) 41, pos. 478: “The principle difference between them and tribal shamans is 
that modern lawyers tell far stranger tales.”
5 Kocka (2016).
6 Kocka (2016) 50.
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English East India Company, which existed between 1600 and 1858, but also the 
Dutch West-India Company and comparable establishments, for example in Scan-
dinavian countries.”7
However, the consequences that the abstraction function of depersonalized 
economic actors in the form of limited liability companies and public 
limited companies had for the history of ideas were far outdone by the 
invention of the state as a legal person and thus as a form of depersonalized 
government. Ernst Forsthoff has described the juridification of the state and 
depersonalization of power this implies:
“This theory goes back to a book review published by the Göttingen historian 
Albrecht in the ‘Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen’ in 1837. It has recently attracted 
much attention among constitutional lawyers. And rightly so: classifying the state as 
a legal person was the most momentous intellectual attack on the monarchical 
constitution. The monarch, in whose person the state had hitherto been embodied 
was converted into an institution of the legal person ‘state,’ with which he could no 
longer be equated. His sovereign rights were transformed into integrated powers defined 
by the constitution and thus also limited. … The rapid spread of this theory is to be 
explained by the intention prevailing in constitutional law on the threshold of rule-
of-law constitutionalism, which triumphed in the Prussian constitution of 1850. 
This intention was juridification of the state, transformation of governing relations 
between the state and the individual into legal relations – that were as bilateral as 
possible. The service that the theory of the state as legal person rendered towards 
realizing this intention was outstanding. This theory underpinned a specific con-
ception of the rule of law.”8
The same direction – the depersonalization of power through the function-
alization of the ruling person into an agent of the abstract entity “state” – 
had already been indicated by the reason of state concept in the political 
philosophy of early modern times; Herfried Münkler comments on this 
topos in relation to the institution of the state:
“Reason of state has a double function for those who cite it – first, it allows decisions to 
be made and action taken in breach of legal norms and moral bounds, while 
rigorously subordinating such decisions and action to an objectivizable interest of 
the state not only as orientation but also as the later measure and touchstone of 
efficiency. As Reinhard Kreuz has shown,9 the reason of state is born when the 
purposes of power, or to be more precise, of the state, begin to constrain the 
arbitrary personal rule of power holders and to transform them successively into agents: 
7 Kocka (2016) 51.
8 Forsthoff (1971b) 13 f.
9 Kreuz (1978) 199.
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‘While the reason of state allows the prince to be “worse” than subjects ought to be, 
it also requires him to be “better” than the ruling individual, swayed by his passions 
and therefore needful of strict control, actually is.” The prince, who at first glance 
appears to gain from the transformation, is etatized until he is finally no more than 
an executive institution of the reason of state, the first servant of the state, to quote 
Frederick the Great. The reason of state is thus – also – a milestone on the road to 
the depersonalization of power.”10
II. The reception of Roman law as acquisition of a new language
The reception of Roman law has received a great deal of attention11 – also 
from the present author.12 This is not the place to revisit this subject. What 
we will do briefly at this point is to recall13 the special quality of Roman law
that made it especially suitable for reception. Experts appear to agree that 
this quality lies in what the particular “conceptual strength” of Roman law, 
which permits a high degree of abstraction. Uwe Wesels notes: “In civil law, 
the Romans created the global pattern of a law that is founded on private 
property and free will. In this form it spread throughout Europe in the Late 
Middle Ages after Justinian’s codification had come to Northern Italy in the 
eleventh century. It has accordingly become the basis of our law, not only 
our civil law but, with its abstract conceptuality also of our criminal law and 
administrative law, and even of our constitutional law.”14
Peter G. Stein takes a similar view in “Roman Law in European His-
tory”:15
“Within the borders of the Holy Roman Empire, reference to Roman sources could 
be explained on the grounds that it was imperial law, but it was justified not for its 
formal authority but for its technical superiority over every possible rival. Unlike the 
canon law, however, no court applied just Roman law. The Church courts applied 
canon law to such matters as marriage and personal status; the courts of feudal lords 
applied feudal law to questions of landholding; the traditional community courts 
10 Münkler (1987) 168.
11 See Wieacker (1967).
12 Schuppert, G. F. (2003) 95ff: “Frühneuzeitliche Staatsbildung und die Bedeutung der 
Rezeption des römischen Rechts.”
13 See also my treatment of the “jus commune” as communicatively generated and diffused 
universalist legal thought, in this volume p. 59.
14 Wesel (1997) 156.
15 Stein (1999).
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applied the local customary law to claims for compensation for wrongdoing. What 
the civil law supplied was a conceptual framework, a set of principles of interpre-
tation that constituted a kind of universal grammar of law, to which recourse could 
be made whenever it was needed.”16
This description of Roman law as a universal grammar of law brings us 
without much of a detour to the legal historian Christoph H. F. Meyer, 
who, fully in line with our argument, describes the reception of Roman 
law as the acquisition of a new language:
“In the history of scholarship, widely differing reasons for this success have been 
mooted, for instance the quality of Roman law as ratio scripta, its claim to be imperial 
law, or its scientific presentation. In what follows, no explanation of the ‘miracle of 
Bologna’ is offered, or any answer to the question what the acquisition of Roman 
legal knowledge brought substantively, that is, in innovation from an institutional 
or dogmatic historical point of view. The point of departure is rather the question of 
what was new, what use was made of it, and how it spread. The focus is first on the 
stations of a particular way of juridification, which in the twelfth century led from 
Northern Italy to far reaches of the Occident. Characteristic of this process was work 
on written law, the acquisition and recording of knowledge from ancient texts of 
Roman law, and effort to use the resulting knowledge for contemporary concerns.
Looking, however, at the spread of this juridification strategy, things look different: 
quite new agreement was to be reached on what (secular) law ought to be. The 
communicative side of the process is thus also involved, which in some respects recalls the 
imparting of a new language. A language of law that possesses a vast vocabulary of 
norms and concepts together with a learned grammar that sets the rules for deon-
tological statements. The metaphor helps perhaps to better understand not only the 
general phenomenon but also the remarkable diffusion processes. For the success of 
the new language of law lay in the first place in successful communication and only 
secondly in norm enforcement. Whoever accepted the new idiom, answered in it, 
placed himself on the same legal and deontological footing as his interlocutor. Even 
partial success was effective, for instance if someone had only an incomplete mastery 
of the new language or wished to make only selective use of it.”17
With respect to this analogy between law and language, Meyer refers the reader 
to the famous work by Rudolf Jhering published in 1852, “Geist des römi-
schen Rechts” (The Spirit of Roman Law”); we quote a brief passage on the 
alphabet of law:
“Allow me to use another analogy, namely, to liken the systematic or logical struc-
ture of law to an alphabet. The relationship between a case-centred legal code and law 
reduced to its logical form is the same as that between written Chinese and our written 
16 Stein (1999) 61.
17 Meyer, C. (2010) 312 f.
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language. For every concept the Chinese have a special sign; a lifetime hardly suffices 
to learn them all, and for each new concept its sign has to be determined. We, by 
contrast, have a small alphabet that allows us to reduce each word to its constituent 
parts and assemble it: easy to learn and dependable. The case-centred legal code thus 
contains a great many signs for particular, individual cases; a law reduced to its 
logical elements, however, offers us an alphabet of law that allows us to decipher 
and depict even the most unusual word formations of life.”18
These two passages confirm our conviction that learning the law is really not 
about learning certain legal norms, the content of law (which is naturally 
also useful; such proficiency is required up to the usual final law examina-
tions) but about learning a certain method of thinking, whose mastery allows 
the lawyer to communicate with colleagues in the same language.
B. Two examples of the transformation functions of law and
its language
I. Transformation of power into authority:
the “invention” of public office
In early modern state building, the institution of “office” plays a key role 
because it accomplishes two things. First – like the “reason of state” – it 
depersonalizes power: the person is replaced by a function, a job title, and it is 
this office concept that abstracts from the person. The abstraction function is 
accompanied by a transformation function – transformation in so far as public 
office transforms power into government, since office vests the holder with 
power.
* From a historical point of view the Church played a leading role in achiev-
ing abstraction from the person. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the 
Church was the “sole coherently organized institution”19 left, and it con-
tinued to function well not least because it had adopted the organiza-
tional principles of the Empire:
“The Church took over the administrative subdivisions of the late Roman Empire as 
its own, which involved the acceptance of a whole range of concepts, such as the 
18 Jhering (1926).
19 Blockmans (1997) 115.
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territorial nature of authority, the hierarchy of official competences and functions and, 
more fundamental still, the concept of office itself. These were all abstract ideas which 
the Germanic and Slavic peoples had not yet reached by the tenth century. … The 
maintenance of hierarchically arranged and well-defined territorial offices was of 
such importance because in the period from the fifth to the eleventh century the 
mass migrations of peoples had blurred all ideas of frontiers. Among the Germans, 
and even more among the equestrian hordes who overran central Europe and the 
Balkans, power was linked to individuals and not to specific territories.”20
Wim Blockmans describes the central role that the concept of office played 
in the organizational and functional model of the Church:
“The Church also took over from the late empire the concept of exemptions, which 
the senatorial class of large landowners had deployed to protect their patrimonies 
from taxation by the state. Pleading its otherworldly mission, the Church claimed 
immunity for its property and sacrosanctity from worldly judges for its servants. By 
doing so it created for later ages its role as a special order, the First Estate. Apart 
from its separate legal status, this also rested on education and consecration. These 
two components added to the interpretation of the concept of office, which the 
Church took over from the Romans. As an abstract concept this consisted of a well-
defined sum of qualifications which the holder needed to satisfy, and powers which 
he might or might not exercise. The role of an office-holder is strictly defined, and 
quite separate from the individual filling it. The criteria he has to satisfy, the proce-
dure for appointment and, where necessary, for dismissal from his office if he 
exceeds his powers or neglects his duties all exist quite separately from the individ-
uals who have to fill the roles. This kind of abstract thought was wholly alien to the 
Germans and Slavs; their vision was a direct one of individuals who by virtue of the 
trust placed in them were given extensive but vaguely defined opportunities for 
exercising power. Some were able to develop and expand their power. Dismissal was 
barely thinkable without a bloody conflict with those challenging them.”21
* But public office is not only a successful model transferred from a tradi-
tional bureaucratic hierarchical institution – the Church – to a new type 
of bureaucratic hierarchical institution – the early modern territorial 
state. And the exercise of power through office is not only an institutional 
backbone of bureaucratic administration in the sense of Max Weber: 
public office is more than a mere organisational-sociology category. Public 
office transports the regime of power into the world of law, turns power 
into authority by institutionalizing it. Whether this justifies the claim that 
20 Blockmans (1997) 115.
21 Blockmans (1997) 115 f.
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public office “ennobles” rule22 is another matter. The decisive function of 
public office is its catalytic effect: as a catalyst, office translates power into 
responsibility,23 converts the power of command into the right to com-
mand, makes forced obedience into obligatory obedience.24 Office con-
veys entitlement to power, a transformation function that, as Ralf Dreier has 
shown, means not only the limitation but also the legitimation of social 
power:
“Fundamental is … the notion of limitation. The understanding of rule as office 
implies its interpretation as service; i. e., as entrusted power to be exercised with respon-
sibility. For practical purposes, however, everything depends on whom this respon-
sibility is owed to and what legal form it takes. If we draw a simple distinction 
between natural and conferred rule, the latter is typically defined in terms of 
accountability towards those subject to rule. By contrast, ‘natural’ rule characteristi-
cally sees limitation only as moral accountability to a higher authority, namely God, 
and does not consider itself subject to institutional control by the governed. This 
also shows the importance of the notion of office as a legitimation category. The same 
moral and (or) legal norms that constitute rule as service also justify its existence. No 
proof is needed that this legitimation function of the office concept, i. e., its inter-
pretation as entitlement to power, has been more effective historically than the 
limitation principle. But the one should not be forgotten because of the other.”25
II. Law as congealed politics: the transformation function of
constitutional law
One of the key functions of constitutions identified by Rudolf Smend26 is 
integration: “Among the essential achievements of the modern constitution-
al state is its considerable integrative force. It can provide divergent political 
forces common legal ground on which conflicts can be peacefully resolved 
in accordance with set rules of the game. The condition is consensus to place 
greater value on the constitutional order than on any substantive decision.”27
This function of a constitution to codify the consensus on certain funda-
mental values and political procedures prevailing at the time of its enactment 
22 See Gneist (1879) 15, cited with approval by Krüger (1964) 270.
23 See Isensee (1987), § 57, r. 10.
24 Schluchter (1985) 146.
25 Dreier, R. (1972) 130 f.
26 Smend (1994) 119–276.
27 Pauly / Sielinger (1999) 83.
Three Key Functions of Law and its Language in a Global History of Ideas 93
significantly eases the burden on the political process, because the rules of 
the constitution are no longer an issue but a premise of politics:
“The written form given to the consensus dissociates it from any subjective inter-
pretation by the parties involved and lends it verifiable certainty. Enrichment with 
legal normative force divorces it from the historical will of the authors and lends it 
validity over time. In that it comprises rules, it is divorced from the purposes for 
which it was drawn up and can find application in later implementation.
This involves substantial achievements. Binding written form reduces the possi-
bility of later dissension about the content of the consensus. When opinions differ, 
rules laid down by the constitution make it easier to establish how the state is 
required to act in specific cases. The permanence consensus gains from legal validity 
relieves politics from the need to find it in each and every case. If decisions had 
constantly to be made on the basis of competing proposals, such a procedure would 
bring immeasurable costs. The political decision-making process depends on being 
spared incessant discussion on finding consensus. The constitution provides this 
relief because its rules are no longer a political issue but a premise for politics.”28
On closer inspection, the high normative ranking of constitutional provi-
sions deprives politics of decision-making autonomy that accrues inversely to the 
domain of law – and hence in effect to constitutional courts as the guardians 
of the constitution. Dieter Grimm explains this functional interplay of polit-
ical and legal effects:
“Legal norms are plurifunctional. The lawyer tends to absolutize the dispute settle-
ment function. Systems theory, in contrast, stress the disburdening function of 
norms. Through lawmaking, issues are withdrawn from decision and rendered binding.
Legal rules thus reduce the decisional load by setting a frame for decision-making 
authorities. They operate henceforth as meaning-constituting premises and no lon-
ger as topics of decision. Legal rules can perform this function on various levels: so 
that only a principle is taken out of dispute while its elaboration is left open 
politically; so that its elaboration is also settled while it remains to be applied in 
the individual case. The scope for action narrows from stage to stage. The reduction 
function is also performed by constitutional provisions that are not directly appli-
cable. To this extent they are more than mere ‘proposals’, as Burdeau posits.29 That 
they still require specification and development says nothing about their normative 
nature but does indicate the level of reduction: their addressee is primarily (not 
exclusively) the lawmaker.”30
28 Grimm (1990) 22 f.
29 Burdeau (1962) 398.
30 Grimm (1972) 489 ff.
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Chapter Two
The Institutionalization Functions of Law: The Language of Law
as the Language of Order and Conflict Resolution
A. The language of law as a language of order
The guarantee of legal certainty as the “idée directrice” of law
Certainty and law have been closely related from the very outset: “Securitas” 
in the sense of a guarantee that obligations will be met is already to be found 
in Roman law …. In the personalized governance relations of the Middle 
Ages, too, securitas is the focus of the oath of fealty and urban defence 
leagues.”31 The term legal certainty has long been used to describe this close 
relationship between certainty and law, notably with respect to its most 
important aspects certainty of expectation, certainty of meaning, and certainty 
of compliance.
Certainty of expectation and of meaning constitute what amounts to an 
“idée directrice of law.” “Together with justice and purposiveness”, according to 
Andreas von Arnauld,32 “legal certainty is a fundamental element in the idea 
of law. In all more or less developed legal systems, legal certainty is an idée 
directrice of law; every reasonably well-developed legal system will create 
institutions seeking to realize the demand for knowable, reliable, and pre-
dictable law.”
If, as perhaps needful in the more general context of this discussion, we 
wish to operate not so much with the concept of legal certainty, of certainty 
as to the law, with its connotations of state law – which is, moreover per-
ceived by most people solely as a legal concept – we can with Andreas 
Anter33 opt for the broader concept of certainty of order (Ordnungssicherheit) 
to place greater emphasis on production of the public good “certainty as 
order”. The two concepts, legal certainty and the certainty of order, although 
not identical, do largely overlap; and it is this functional perspective that is of 
interest for our purposes:
31 Arnauld (2006) 76.
32 Arnauld (2006) 691.
33 Anter (2004).
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“Under the conditions and prerequisites of legal-rational governance, however, law 
is an essential, if not decisive factor for the certainty of order. Law plays a decisive 
role because its function is ultimately to guarantee certainty. This notion culminates 
in the idea and practice of the modern rule of law, whose legitimacy is based 
primarily on the guarantee of ‘legal certainty.’ The concept of legal certainty points 
to the elementary function of law to provide order. Legal certainty can also be under-
stood as certainty of order and vice versa. In both cases one knows where one stands and 
what one can expect. Although the two concepts are closely related, they are by no 
means synonymous, since certainty of order is the somewhat more comprehensive 
of the two.”34
According to Anter, orders have at their disposition a special form of capital 
offering members or subjects a specific type of certainty, which can be called 
certainty of order, a concept that Heinrich Popitz describes as follows: “Peo-
ple enjoy certainty of order if they have certain knowledge about what they 
and others may and must do; if they can gain certainty that all parties 
involved will also, with some reliability, really behave as expected of them. 
… In short, people have to know where they stand.”35
Thus, if the certainty of order is based on the justified expectation of 
certain consequences of action, we could with Hermann Heller36 propose 
the following simple equation: “order is predictability”, an equation that also 
implies that predictability does not necessarily have to be based on state law; 
it can be provided by private governance or by non-state regulatory regimes.
Turning to certainty of compliance, he points to the mandate of the 
constitutional state not only to provide a legal system that guarantees cer-
tainty of expectation but also to put it into effect if trust is not to be 
disappointed. This aspect of law enforcement is therefore an essential element 
of the rule-of-law principle; Markus Möstl:
“The mandate to enforce the law is in many regards immanent in the principle of the 
rule of law. On the one hand, it follows from the fundamental rule-of-law mandate 
to preserve and safeguard the public peace and legal certainty. Both historically and 
dogmatically, keeping the peace through legal order is among the original and constit-
utive properties of the rule of law. However, the public peace and certainty as to the 
law (legal certainty in the broader sense of the term) presuppose that the legal order 
of the state, which is to provide this peace and certainty, not only exists but is 
actually efficacious, which in turn requires the legal order to be sufficiently efficient 
34 Anter (2004) 105.
35 Popitz (1992) 35.
36 Heller (1927).
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and actually enforced. The efficacy and enforcement of the law are therefore a permanent 
demand of a state governed by the rule of law. But even if – second – the focus is less on 
peace than on freedom as a conceptual cornerstone of the rule of law, the result is 
no different: if the essential property of the rule of law is to ensure lawful freedom 
and self-determination through the law, this presupposes that lawfulness and the 
law are actually realized and enforced, not only in relation to the state as freedom 
from unlawful coercion but also in relation to third parties as security against 
unlawful encroachment; for only the all-round enforcement of the law produces 
the state of lawful freedom that the rule of law seeks to guarantee.”37
However, since we are concerned not only with the legal point of view, we 
now cite an author – political scientist, governance scholar, and institutional 
theoretician in one – who stresses the key importance of chiefly formal but also 
informal rules for the stability of the political system and its institutional 
structure:
“Institutions are permanent regulatory systems recognized in a society. Their pur-
pose is to steer individual behaviour and to coordinate it with the behaviour of 
other institutions in order to enable collective action. In the constant flow of events, 
institutions also ensure order, orientation, coordination, and stability, thus easing 
the persistent pressure on actors to justify themselves and make decisions. …
The stability of institutions depends above all on formal rules. However, the 
governance, orientation, and coordination effects of institutions also depend on 
how actors in the institution interpret and apply the rules. Furthermore, the reality 
of institutions also includes informal rules and social norms, so-called ‘standard 
operation procedures,’ the routines, decisional styles, and normative self-descrip-
tions of organized reality that collaborating actors have agreed on.”38
However, the extent to which the language of law is a language of order is 
particularly evident in the production and guarantee of order and stability 
through rule-boundedness. It is rule-boundedness and the consequent 
repeatability of courses of action that lead to their institutionalized concen-
tration. This process of creating institutions from ritual also holds, in partic-
ularly strong measure, for law, as the numerous studies show on the impor-
tance of legal rituals, notably in early and medieval legal history.39 Later in 
this book, we will be looking more closely at the importance of ritual 
knowledge as a particularly striking example of so-called ‘rule knowledge’.
37 Möstl (2002) 65.
38 Benz (2004) 19–20.
39 See Kannowski (2002); Ebel (1975); Sellert (1997). In particular on the history of the 
oath, see Esders (ed.) (2007) 55–77; Esders (2009).
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B. The language of law as a language of conflict resolution
I. Political culture as conflict culture
1. Conflicts as sources of social change
Obviously, conflict is ubiquitous in modern societies,40 we have conse-
quently to learn how to deal with it: “It is an axiom of the modern political 
and social sciences that conflict is inherent in all known societies. However, 
societies differ in how that handle it.”41 How conflicts are dealt with can be 
described (as I have done42) as the conflict culture of a polity and as part of 
its political culture.
It is also agreed that there is nothing pathological about conflict: if peace-
fully resolved,43 it has, from a sociological point of view, a positive capacity 
to further the social change society needs.44 Conflict is socially productive: 
within itself it develops the elements of its own limitation and regulation. It 
builds not only on an existing wealth of common interests but also creates 
new norms and rules and modifies old ones. From this point of view, con-
flict can be regarded as a source of social change.”45
If the social function of conflict is thus positive rather than negative, it 
must obviously be tackled and somehow regulated. Ralf Dahrendorf comes to 
the following conclusion:
“The attitude towards conflicts that, unlike repression and ‘solution’, promises 
success because it takes account of social realities, I shall call the regulation of conflicts. 
The regulation of social conflicts is the decisive tool for reducing the violence of 
almost all types of conflict. Conflicts do not disappear through regulation; they do 
not even necessarily become less intensive; but to the extent that they can be 
successfully regulated they become controllable and their creative force is put to 
the service of the gradual development of social structures.”46
40 On the many types and fields of conflict see Meyer, B. (ed.) (1997).
41 Bürzer et al. (1996) 15.
42 Schuppert, G. F. (2008b) 465–598: “Drittes Kapitel: Politische Kultur als Konfliktkultur.”
43 On the basic decision between “peaceful or unpeaceful” see, from the historical perspec-
tive, Wesel (1985).
44 Coser (1965).
45 Nollmann (1997) 20.
46 Dahrendorf (1961) 227.
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However, conflicts can be successfully regulated only if conflicts are recog-
nized by all those concerned to be justified and useful, if the aim is not their 
final elimination, and if conflicts manifest themselves in organized conflict 
parties. Only then does the next step make sense: that the parties agree on 
specific ‘rules of the game’ for settling their differences; but it must be seen 
in the context of the other preconditions. ‘Rules of the game’, framework 
agreements, constitutions, statutes, and so forth can operate as such only 
if they do not advantage or disadvantage any party from the outset, if they 
limit themselves to formal aspects of the dispute and if they presuppose the 
binding channelling of all differences.”47
It should, however, be added that, where rules of the game, constitutions, or 
statutes are involved, the legal system comes into play, whose task it is to 
provide such rules of conflict processing. This brings us to an old favourite of 
mine, the ‘providing’ function of law.
2. The providing function of law
We have long spoken of the providing function of law, initially in relation 
to the task of state and administrative law to provide all the forms of action 
and organization required for effective, citizen-friendly administrative action 
subject to discipline by the rule of law.48 It is not only a matter of admin-
istration but also of conflict parties being provided with the rules and institu-
tional arrangements required for propitious conflict processing. An impor-
tant effect of the providing function of law is to make the individual, that is 
in principle everyone, capable of conflict:
“Legal norms enhance the riskability of conflicts. They create better prospects for 
‘noes’ by producing adversarial institutions. A farmer can face a dispute about the 
use of a service road with confidence if the relevant right of use is entered in the land 
register. Even an impecunious student can oblige his landlord to repair a washbasin 
if such repairs are covered by the tenancy agreement. For his part, the landlord as 
owner can serve notice on the student as tenant if he can plausibly demonstrate that 
he needs the premises for personal use. However one judges the justice of legally 
normativized relations – there can be no doubt that the law enhances conflict 
47 Dahrendorf (1961) 228.
48 Schuppert, G. F. (1993).
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competence.49 The initiation of conflicts through legal norms backed by physical 
force succeeds because force is withheld from society and reserved to the state but 
then made available for non-state purposes through legal mediatization. Force as a 
means of conflict resolution is barracked, legally re-specified and, finally, socially 
redistributed. Under no circumstances is a landlord permitted to evict tenants him-
self, even if notice has been correctly served and the period of notice observed. He 
has to apply for eviction to the competent authority – only then is, if need be, 
forceable eviction legalized.”50
This second step – the withdrawal of force – presupposes that the legal order 
of the state is prepared to make conflicts communicable and resolvable:
“More possibilities will not prevent many conflicts from occurring but can lend 
tolerable form to them. The typically modern combination of political monopoli-
zation, legal specification, and societal redistribution of force acts in this direction. 
The outdifferentiation of the rule of law follows on from here. Law clears the path, so 
to speak, by which reproduced contradictions can work their way towards processing. Paths 
are provided by which contradictions are easier to communicate. Contradictions 
become effectively operative because their immanent indeterminacy can be made 
determinable by the law always looming on the horizon.”51
II. The need for a “modus vivendi” and “modus procedendi”
for normative conflicts – formulated in the language of law
Growing cultural, especially religious plurality in modern societies raises the 
increasingly urgent problem of how to deal with often conflicting diversity – 
a problem we have addressed under the heading “governance of diversity.”52
More and more people apparently see the practical solution to such norma-
tive conflicts in proceduralization and institutionalization – in the search for a 
“modus vivendi” and “modus procedendi” to defuse conflict.53 The language 
of law is not only available for formulating this arrangement, it is probably 
also indispensable for the purpose.
A particularly apt historical example is the so-called Religious Peace of 
Augsburg of 1555, which sought to deal adequately with the confessional 
49 See Luhmann (1995) 397 ff.
50 Nollmann (1997) 176 f.
51 Nollmann (1997) 178 f.
52 Schuppert, G. F. (2017b).
53 See especially Willems (2012b); Willems (2012a).
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schism that had led to dissolution of the universal ecclesiastical and secular 
unity in medieval Christianitas and the development of the confessional 
state.54 A brief glance at how this peace accord worked is therefore à propos:
It should be noted that the Augsburg Peace did not bring religious peace; 
it was unable to do so because it did not resolve the religious crisis: “The 
crisis of faith was not resolved: the Religious Peace did not bring religious 
peace; it could not, and did not even seek to do so. Spiritual agreement and 
consensus in faith were not achieved, and the aim had been precisely to 
avoid any forced unity of faith and law in the Empire.”55
Martin Heckel concludes, that “… the Religious Peace of 1555 established 
an order of political peace and legally guaranteed coexistence between the two 
confessional power blocs”;56 it was therefore an order of peaceful coexis-
tence. Heckel:
“This order of peaceful coexistence was thus both secular and political in nature: it 
henceforth gave both confessions the same imperial protection and legal recogni-
tion; it guaranteed their political existence, internal spiritual self-determination, and 
the external freedom of development for confession and church organization. It also 
guaranteed that each could lay absolute claim to identity with the true Church of 
Christ and hence to being the sole true confession and that the two could engage in 
spiritual combat. In the Tridentine ordinances and in both early and later Protestant 
confessionals, this spiritual repudiation and dissociation were then emphatically 
proclaimed. But the legal freedom of spiritual self-realization and dispute was 
hedged in and contained secularly by the manifold distributive, protective, and 
barrier norms of imperial church law, which were intended to prevent the spiritual 
blaze from enveloping and razing the secular structure of the empire.”57
This order of coexistence was the outcome of arduous negotiations and took 
the legal form of a contract: “The Religious Peace laid the foundations for 
the further development of the Empire in peace and freedom amidst the 
raging European religious struggles. In both practice and theory, it had 
gained the status of a constitutional basic contract and – law. It had two 
aspects: first, it was an agreement between estates, between the head of the 
Empire and the estates of the Empire (like every imperial ‘recess’ or reso-
54 Important on this subject: Reinhard (1977); Reinhard (1995).
55 Heckel (2001) 45.
56 Heckel (2001).
57 Heckel (2001) 46.
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lution) and a confessional agreement between the Catholic and Protestant 
parties. It effected the decisive merging of estate / federalist dualism and 
confessional dualism, which had a lasting impact on the development of 
religion and the spiritual life, on the conflict between monarchy and estates, 
unitary statehood and on federalism and particularism in Germany.”58
Marin Heckels shows that we are dealing with a professionally managed 
conflict culture, with a mode of conflict resolution that, although it did not 
eliminate the substantive conflict, did consistently juridify and proceduralize
it – in the language of law.
58 Heckel (2001) 49–50.
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Chapter Three
Law as a Sphere of Resonance
In pursuing and modifying our examination of law as a dynamic system,59
we now turn to law as a sphere of resonance, which Hartmut Rosa has 
addressed in his inspiring book (in June 2018 the English translation was 
forthcoming) “Resonance – A Sociology of the Relationship to the World” 
(in press: Cambridge UK, Polity Press).60
A. What is resonance and what does the answer teach us about our topic?
Our point of departure is Rosa’s thesis that resonance is not, for example, an 
emotional state, but a relationship mode.61 For our topic of law and its 
language, this means that the focus is on the relationship between the 
dynamic societal and political reality and the legal system (and its language) 
and whether it can be considered a resonance relationship. Rosa suggests 
that this is indeed the case.
He explains that resonance occurs only if the resonant (or natural) fre-
quency of a body is excited by the oscillation of another:
“Even at this acoustic physical level it can thus be said that when two bodies are in a 
resonant relationship each speaks with a ‘voice of its own’. The oscillation of two 
bodies in a resonant relationship can in turn lead to mutual amplification … 
Resonant relationships can also develop in a process of mutual adaptive movements, 
which can be understood as responsive oscillation … The essential idea is that the two 
entities in the relationship affect one another in an oscillatory medium (or resonant 
space) in such a way that they respond to one another while each speaking with its 
own voice, i. e. ‘resounding.’”62
Having established that resonance consists in mutual reaction between two 
entities, the important complementary concept of axes of resonance needs to 
be introduced. Rosa identifies two types: horizontal axes of resonance such as 
family, friendship, and politics, and vertical axes of resonance such as religion, 
nature, art, and history. It is thus not only a matter of the relation of the 
59 Schuppert, G. F. (2016a).
60 Rosa (2016).
61 Rosa (2016) 288.
62 Rosa (2016) 282.
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individual subject to the world, but also of collective spheres of resonance, such 
as democracy as an – ideally – self-determined order of the social:
“The great promise of democracy … is essentially that the structures and institutions 
of public life can be changed in and through the medium of democratic politics and 
its representatives, the rulers, placed in a responsive relation to the subjects. Because 
and to the extent that – taking up a basic constitutive idea of modernity – human 
beings can themselves determine the social, political, and economic order in which 
they live and act and can so (democratically) shape society, they can experience this 
order as a responsive and reactive sphere of resonance and make it their own.”63
Thus Hartmut Rosa. All we have to do now is to translate this for the field of 
law, which presents no major difficulties.
If we substitute ‘politics’ or rather ‘democratically self-made political 
order’ by ‘democratically self-made legal order,’ we are dealing in law with 
a collective sphere of resonance, which can be experienced as and made one’s 
own. If we also assume that there is a resonant relationship between dynamic 
societal and political developments and the legal system in which the two 
entities articulate themselves independently, we have to substitute Rosa’s 
concept of ‘voice’ by that of ‘language’, bringing us to the language of law
in which the collective sphere of resonance of law responds to the surround-
ing world.
However, this response in the language of law is, it is important to note, 
not to be understood as an echo in the natural-science sense of the word but 
as the language peculiar to the legal system, which still has to be articulated – 
in the institutionally formed political process by which “law” is produced. 
The successful novelist Juli Zeh, herself a doctor at law,64 has described this 
process:
“Legislative competence is part of state authority. In the democratic system, the 
authority of the state emanates from the people. Legal authority accordingly also 
emanates from the people and is delegated by them to representative institutions. In 
parliamentary legislative procedure, the concerns of interest groups are deliberated 
until a distribution of forces is attained that enables a majority decision to be 
reached. On the one hand, such a procedure is highly accommodating to societal 
developments and the interests they produce. On the other, it is phlegmatic and 
protracted. This is one of the key paradoxes of lawmaking in the modern democratic 
state. A complex society marked by ever faster change requires law that assimilates 
dynamic impulses and translates them into action at a pace amenable to develop-
63 Rosa (2016) 364–365.
64 Zeh (2012); see the favourable review by Kilian (2014) 285 f.
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ment while reflecting the democratic balance of interests. And it should avoid the 
unwieldy, wishy-washy outcomes that precipitate compromise brings. This is three 
wishes in one. The conservational nature of a system of rules resistant to change is 
therefore not the primary obstacle to dynamic law; It is the democratic idea itself, 
which requires the plural crystallization of opinions and their representation in the 
legislature.”65
We now turn in more detail to the resonant relationship between the 
dynamic world and the legal system responding in its specific language. 
First, we look at selected types of state and “their” law. Second, we examine 
whether a “successful” legal system and its language not only reacts to the 
external world but helps shape it as a “language of politics.” Third, we 
venture into the worlds of law to examine the autonomy of these nomoi 
and their order – the nomos of the nomoi.66
B. Types of state and “their” law
Taking up our own preliminary reflections on the subject,67 we identify 
various types of state, as well as typical regulatory structures and regulatory 
regimes. The aim is to show how the legal system and – as an element 
thereof – jurisprudence reacts to societal and political change in the sense 
of a sphere of resonance; and not only – technically and instrumentally – by 
providing the necessary forms of action and regulation but also by creating new 
concepts and new methods, thus affecting its subject – government and admin-
istration. We consider two examples of this interactive relationship between 
societal reality and responding jurisprudence, the “manager” of the language 
of law.68 The first state is that of industrial society.
65 Zeh (2006) 123–138, here 127–128.
66 See Seinecke (2015) 262, 273.
67 See above all: Schuppert, G. F. (2001).
68 On the relationship between law and language and in particular the “crisis of law as crisis 
of language,” see Forsthoff (1971a).
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I. The state of industrial society and the existential responsibility
of the state as ordering idea of the modern administrative state
1. The development of the interventionist state in response
to societal and political modernization
The history of German administration and administrative history in the late 
nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth century shows this to 
have been a period of societal, legal, and administrative modernization,69
which set in with the industrial revolution70 and entered a phase of acceler-
ation between 1880 and 1930: “In the history of society, these decades were 
marked by industrialization and urbanization, by the dissolution of tradi-
tional, estate-based milieus and by the political rise of the labour movement. 
These … factors were also important determinants of political development 
in Germany at the turn of the century. With the “great turn” in Bismarck’s 
domestic, economic, and social policy after the end of his alliance with the 
liberals, a period of massive statization began in Germany. Many social fields 
become subject to sovereign regulation and control by the state.71
To describe the role of the state in the face of these modernization pro-
cesses, the term interventionist state has often been used,72 playing a role that, 
as Michael Stolleis stresses, the state could not avoid:
“In a very broad sense, every modern state is interventionist because lawmaking and 
enforcement and the administrative regulation of individual cases incessantly con-
strains, induces, or inhibits societal processes, so that we can meaningfully speak of 
the ‘interventionist state’ only when legal influence reaches a certain level of density 
and systematization. The changes must therefore be ‘structural and qualitative … 
And not merely a quantitative inflation of functions already in place‘. For legal and 
constitutional history, it is decisive whether, from a certain point in time, industrial 
society urgently needed constant state intervention in the form of new legislation 
because it was no longer a self-supporting construction. As soon as this point was 
reached, the state had to intervene if it was to maintain its double role as guarantor 
of the rules of the game and as player; it intervened not from a position of strength 
but from one of weakness. Where intervention was to take place was increasingly 
determined in consultation between the politico-administrative system and societal 
groups. This had far-reaching consequences, not least in the style of legislation and 
69 Greater detail in Schnabel (1949) 101 ff.
70 See Maetschke et al. (eds.) (2013).
71 Meinel (2011) 108.
72 On the concept and the problems it poses, see Gall (1978) 562 ff.; Stolleis (1989).
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the administration of justice, political will-formation, and, ultimately in the attri-
bution of sovereignty.The question, debated since the end of the nineteenth century, 
of whether the epoch of (internal) sovereignty was coming to an end, had its origins 
in this complex.”73
We now turn from the interventionist state and its interventionist law74 to 
the question of how jurisprudence reacted to this far-reaching moderniza-
tion. In the role of ‘resonant actor’, one of the major figures in the admin-
istrative law of the period, Ernst Forsthoff, formulated better than anyone 
the answer of administrative jurisprudence. As we shall see with regard to 
the Enlightenment and natural law, there are authoritative resonant places
and resonant persons in a sphere of resonance like law.
2. Ernst Forsthoff and the “discovery” of responsibility for providing
services of general interest as an objective of the modern
administrative state
Unlike natural scientists, jurists are generally said to invent and discover 
nothing. This may well be so, but there are exceptions. One is Ernst For-
sthoff, who in his seminal work on the administration as service provider75
responded to the modernization processes of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, a period Jürgen Osterhammel has knowledgeably 
described and analysed under the heading “The Transformation of the 
World.”76 Reading Forsthoff – preferably also through Florian Meinel’s spec-
tacles in his ground-breaking dissertation “The Jurist in Industrial Soci-
ety”77 – does indeed leave one with an impression of resonant oscillations,
concentrating conceptually towards the provision of services of general inter-
est as a notion of order in the modern administrative state. Methodologi-
cally, Forsthoff sets out from a sociological finding: that individuals are 
increasingly dependent on services provided by the state, since the life space 
73 Stolleis (1989) 135 f.
74 According to Puhle (1973). Three structural and qualitative changes are characteristic of 
law in the interventionist state: 1. The sharp rise in the need for regulation in industrial 
society; 2. The ‘seizure of power’ by public law and administrative law as growth sector; 
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they can manage autonomously is continuously shrinking: “Forsthoff’s 
methodological programme goes far beyond the ultimately banal postulate 
that the juristic discourse has to take ‘social realities’ into account. He 
wanted to rethink the ordering structures of law from the perspective of 
social realities in order to adapt juristic forms to a changed reality from within, to 
conceptualize this changed reality in legal-dogmatic terms. For Forsthoff, all 
juristic endeavours to capture reality were solely in the interest of this dia-
lectical return to legal concepts.”78
Summing up Forsthoff’s analysis, Florian Meinel explains how we are to 
understand this dependence of this individual on the state as service pro-
vider:79
“Forsthoff illustrates his hypothesis with the graphic distinction between ‘effective’ 
and the ‘controlled’ life space.80 In agrarian society and still in the bourgeois age, 
people from the classes that shaped political life lived in an environment they could 
‘regard as their own’: ‘The farm, the field belonging to them, the house they lived 
in;’ that is to say, their life basis was assured by property rights: their ‘controlled life 
space’. The goods of the controlled life space could ensure ‘a comparatively secure 
living’, because in their subjective sphere people could dispose freely over them.
With the transition to a modern economy and a way of life rooted in the division 
of labour, people had to range far beyond the life space they controlled in order to 
provide themselves with the necessities of life. Forsthoff calls the sphere in which 
people move but which does not ‘belong’ to them personally their ‘effective life 
space.’ We could also speak of socialized or social life space. The necessities of life 
that people can avail themselves of in their effective life space differ from those 
available in their own life space in that they are typically not the product of people’s 
own work but of a specialized production process based on the division of labour. 
… As Forsthoff puts it, citing Max Weber, people have to ‘appropriate’ them. … 
Where ‘smooth appropriation’ through the free circulation of goods no longer 
functions, the state itself takes over distribution. Individuals then depend essentially 
on the complex administrative system and its services. They use public transport and 
communication facilities, purchase gas and energy, use public health services and 
social security institutions. The state does not, of course, provide all such services 
itself. But it becomes the omnipresent guarantor of ‘appropriation’. In Enst Jünger’s 
Der Arbeiter we read that ‘nine tenths of everything the modern human being has 
would immediately become worthless if they were to be abstracted from the exis-
tence of the state’.”81
78 Meinel (2011) 133.
79 Meinel (2011) 154–155.
80 The following brief quotes are all from Forsthoff (1938).
81 Jünger (1981) 292.
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Because of these processes, the administrative authorities gain enormous 
power potential, which, following Michel Foucault, is nowadays generally 
referred to as “organic power” or Giorgio Agamben as sovereign power over 
“naked life”.82
“Already under the sway of liberal ideas and constitutional orders, the state had 
experienced an extraordinary growth in power. It gained control over the essential 
prerequisites for the life of the individual to a degree surely quite alien to the 
absolute police state. This absolute police state could supervise professional life, 
rebuke Kant, censure Schiller, and prohibit the spread of deterministic theories; it 
could certainly determine the very details of how people ought to live. But it was far 
from exercising the same responsibility for ensuring that life was possible at all as 
does the state today.”83
Meinel outlines just how comprehensively the administrative authorities as 
service providers affect the realities of life for every individual:
“For Forsthoff, this power over the basics of life manifested itself not only in the 
form of direct or indirect public services with regard to which the administrative 
authorities acted chiefly as providers of services of general interest. … In a 1950 lecture, 
he stated: ‘The provision of essential public services is thus no longer only a matter 
of satisfying community needs at the local level. It means rather the organization of 
large economic and social spaces.’84 In the first place, this certainly includes public 
utility services, infrastructure management, and public health, hence soft power 
through benefits of all sorts (‘the carer also rules!’85). But, for Forsthoff, services 
of general interest included developmental administration in the broadest sense – 
not concerned with individual intervention in subjective rights: economic planning; 
managing the labour market; spatial planning; influencing the population ideolog-
ically through propaganda and the mass media; ‘harnessing and steering the emo-
tional energies of the modern masses’.86 And the whole field of psychological (and 
some day genetic) influence and prevention, which the state cannot forgo, not least 
because, presiding over industrial society, it is obliged to generate growth and must there-
fore ensure that the population can optimally serve the industrial employment 
regime.”87
One last sociological observation important for the conception of adminis-
trative law and the functional logic of the modern administrative state: the 
82 See Foucault (1978–79); Agamben (1995).
83 Forsthoff (1938) 8.
84 Forsthoff (1950) 6.
85 Forsthoff (1964) 65.
86 Forsthoff (1942) 69.
87 Meinel (2011) 164–165.
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replacement of the ideal of equality held high by the liberal state governed 
by the rule of law by concentration on the differing needs of various social 
groups:
“The ideal of civil liberty was at the same time an ideal of civil equality, and society 
based on equality before the law was the ‘object’ of administrative action. … This 
notion, too, was incompatible with the provision of services of general interest. If 
the separation of society and the state is eliminated and hence – from the point of 
view of the state – the nature of society as a unitary object, the formal basis for 
societal equality is also lost. In modern administration, eligibility is based … not on 
civil equality but on inequality among social groups. Social groups depend in 
various ways on the state machinery for service provision, distribution, and legal-
ization and for this very reason have to act collectively in order to effectively assert 
their claims of access vis-à-vis the state. The provision of services of general interest 
thus cancels out the status of civil equality. The fundamental normative category is 
not the citizen but the ‘beneficiary’, whose existence is registered in terms of entitle-
ment: as consumer or as entrepreneur, as country or city dweller, as traffic partic-
ipant, as tenant, patient, worker, employee, and so on. The state as provider of 
services of general interest is no longer the state of a given society but a state of 
social groups.”88
So much for the resonant actor Ernst Forsthoff’s analysis and responses.89
II. The preventive state and “its” preventive security law
Rereading my 2001 essay on regulated self-regulation, which addresses the 
relationship between the preventive state and its security law in some 
depth,90 I was struck by how, in concept formation and semantic shifts, 
the authors cited capture a development whose functional logic has become 
fully apparent only through the scourge of terrorism since 9/11. We cast only 
a brief glance at this development, not only flanked but also exacerbated by 
abandonment of the classical concept of ‘warding off danger’ in favour of 
suppressing it by ‘ensuring security’.91
88 Meinel (2011) 169.
89 See Badura (1966); Badura (1967).
90 Schuppert, G. F. (2001) 210 ff.
91 On the failure of the proportionality principle to develop a disciplinary effect in crime 
prevention see Schuppert, G. F. (1996).
110 Part Two
III. The concept and workings of the preventive state
The preventive state92 undertakes to prevent dangers, not to ward them off. 
Dieter Grimm: “In contrast to a state that sees itself primarily as a repressive 
authority, and which can accordingly wait for socially detrimental events to occur 
before reacting, a prevention-oriented state has to detect potential crises at the 
very onset and try to nip them in the bud.The state comes into play not only when 
concrete danger threatens but already when abstract risks are identified.”93
Particularly interesting is how the preventive state comes into action, 
what tools and procedures it uses. Grimm has this to say about the liberal 
repressive state governed by the rule of law: “State repression finds expres-
sion in intervention against manifest disturbance of a legally established 
normal state of affairs with the aim of restoring this state of affairs. It thus 
acts reactively and selectively. … Preventive action by the state, in contrast, 
takes the form of avoiding undesirable developments and events. It is there-
fore prospective and comprehensive.”94
This is precisely the point. The prospective and comprehensive preventive 
state has been provided with an appropriate toolbox in the form of the 
Prevention of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs and Other Manifestations of 
Organized Crime Act (OrgKG) and the later Fight against Crime Act (Verbr-
BekG). These acts legalize precisely what the preventive state has to rely on: 
the preventive and comprehensive fight against crime.
* The preventive state as a security state
In analogy to ‘welfare state’, a term that stresses the provision of social 
security and the establishment of social justice as key functions of the state 
in industrial society, we can call the preventive state a ‘security state’ to stress 
the central function of the state in providing security through evolving 
security law and through administration adequate to the task. Indeed, chang-
ing terminology manifestly indicates shifts in the sense of a functional change 
in administration and administrative law in the field of “providing security 
and order.”95 This can be outlined under two headings:
92 Grimm (1986) 38–54; also published in Grimm (1991); see also Denninger (1988).
93 Grimm (1991) 198.
94 Grimm (1991) 199.
95 On the provision of security and order within the structure of state responsibilities see the 
typology of Rose, R. (1975); see also Schuppert, G. F. (1980).
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* The provision of security by the state as a basic right
There has been broad consensus that the provision of security is a central 
function of the state and that the basic duty of the citizen to renounce force 
corresponds to the state monopoly of the use of force and the state’s duty to 
enforce the law. Gusy rightly comments: “Today, security is recognized as a 
task of the state. It covers not only sanctioning breaches of the law that have 
already occurred but also putting a stop to ongoing attacks against the legal 
order and warding off future attacks.This makes the enforcement of the legal 
order a public good. In the risk society, security is a public good.”96
Recent discussion has emphasized the constitutional rank of security as a 
task of the state. For Volkmar Götz, the constitutional-law quality of the 
“internal security” mandate of the state is an expression of the “constitu-
tional-law dimension of demands on the state.”97 Josef Isensee writes of a “basic 
right to security”.98
In brief, this terminology provides “flanking conceptual protection” for 
the natural logical tendency of the preventive state to go beyond the con-
straints on police action that the traditional concept of danger imposes and, 
in the name of countering risks, to progressively waive the domesticizing 
impact of the proportionality principle.
* From police law to security law
This title of Christoph Gusy’s99 Bielefeld inaugural lecture captures the 
functional change in law following the advent of the preventive state as 
security state. The substantive shift came on tiptoe in the guise of a termino-
logical change with the inexorable career of the concept “internal security”. 
Whereas Götz’s entry in the “Manual of German Constitutional Law” 
(Drews / Wacke / Vogel / Martens: “Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts”) 
would once perhaps have appeared under the headword “Gefahrenabwehr” 
(“averting danger”)100 it is now to be found under “Innere Sicherheit” 
(“internal security”). This concept not only dedifferentiates branches of 
security, bringing them together under a general heading but, as Götz him-
96 Gusy (1994) 192.
97 Götz (1988) 1007 f.
98 Isensee (1983).
99 Gusy (1994).
100 Drews et al. (1986).
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self puts it, it expresses a demand on the state lending argumentative weight 
to a policy for combating crime that presents itself as a security package. 
Under the heading “internal security – promise and real possibility; Alfred 
Dietel rightly remarks:
“The concept ‘internal security’ has become a subject in its own right. As political 
promise, ‘internal security’ has more positive connotations than the more juristically 
neutral term ‘public security’. A political capacity to act and determination are 
better signalled by measures to improve ‘internal security’ because this can always 
give the impression that major and important matters are at issue.”101
“Security law”, the matching concept to “internal security” as a task of the 
state therefore goes beyond classical police law. This development merely 
obeys the logic of the preventive state. It is therefore not a question of 
halting this logic but of not allowing the logic of substantive demands on 
the state to blur the distinction between police and justice, repression and 
prevention, police service and intelligence service, etc. In this field, jurispru-
dence faces a new challenge in finding a balance that both works and secures 
freedom.
Security is a state that, under the modern conditions of the risk society increasingly 
reaches beyond the domain of police and traditional police law. If, in establishing 
and maintaining security, the state and the police are only two factors among many, 
the interests that have to be taken into legal account, too, become more numerous 
and more complex.This is where security law begins. It is, however, also evident that 
the real problems that present themselves are less and less accessible from the beaten 
paths of police-law dogmatics. Many questions arise off the beaten track, but, so far, 
few answers have been found. In this regard jurisprudence is almost everywhere in 
its infancy.”102
Here too, as we shall see, the function of the legal system and legal science is 
clearly to react to changes in the actual state of affairs not only by echoing 
them but also by addressing them and by amplifying them through linguis-
tic change – so-called semantic shifts103 – and thus responsively impacting 
reality.
101 Dietel (1987) 57.
102 Gusy (1994) 207–208.
103 On changes in statehood reflected by “semantic shifts” see Schuppert, G. F. (2010) 116 ff.
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C. From the private law of the constitution
to the constitution of private law:
the necessary correspondence between the conceptual
models of jurisprudence and social and economic conditions
I. The necessary correspondence between law and social reality
or why legal concepts can not only age but also lose their function
In 1960, one of the giants of German jurisprudence, Franz Wieacker,104
addressed the German Association of Jurists on the occasion of its cente-
nary,105 an institution whose task it is to periodically check the ‘reality 
adequacy’ of the law in place and, where needful, to recommend reforms. 
We could thus speak of an institutionalized attempt to ensure the resonance 
capacity of the legal system and its jurisprudence through a sort of constant 
monitoring.
Wieacker paid tribute to the founding of association, which took place 
against the backdrop of a “fraternity of jurists” determined to reform the 
legal order through national codification:
“Since the professors of law, the high judges, the leading attorneys, and the experts 
from the ministries of justice and legislation were of one mind, idea and reality, 
theory and practice, legal policy, and application of the law came ever closer in the 
manner characteristic of the heyday of a legal culture.
This favourable constellation at the hour of birth of the German Association of 
Jurists was no accident. It was grounded in the intellectual, political, and economic 
actuality of civil jurisprudence at that time. Public prestige for scholarly jurispru-
dence is possible only if it is able to express vital demands of the society of its time; the 
curious interaction between intellectual and social forces then sets in that is one of the 
existential conditions of law. For this reason, determining the ‘social model’ of 
codification (attempted elsewhere106) is a precondition for understanding the func-
tions, victories, and decline of the great legal codes.”107
Because of this necessary interdependence between the legal order and society, it is 
not only likely but normal for a certain conceptualization of law to age 
when this correspondence between law and societal reality erodes: “If there 
104 Wieacker’s best-known work, which now enjoys canonical status, is “A History of Private 





really is interdependence between the spirit of a legal order and the structure 
of its society – what we call the ‘social model’ – there will also have to be 
structural shifts in modern economic society supplanting the classical dog-
matic context of general private law by once marginal areas. In short, clas-
sical private law started to age because the free, pioneering society of the 
nineteenth century, whose social and economic conditions were reflected in 
its dogmatics, no longer exists.”108
Writing on the constitutionalization of private law as a development 
process Felix Maultzsch109 argues in similar vein. He comments on the 
drifting apart of the classical civil law model prior to the introduction of 
the Civil Code and the reality of the modern administrative state:
“This system with its cornerstones of civil equality, and freedom of contract and 
property provided a formally oriented framework that was also binding on law-
makers and therefore constitutional to the extent that any legal-policy / purposive 
reshaping of private-law conditions did not lie within its competence. Against this 
backdrop, basic rights, too, could only offer defence against state interference. 
Extending their application to relations between private persons would have run 
counter to the fundamental parameters of the nineteenth century legal structures. 
However, there were already signs that this conception of civil law was on the wane, 
witness the growing discussion on the social function of private law. It was Otto 
Gierke who famously proposed that a ‘drop of socialist oil’ should be infused into 
the coming Civil Code.110 In his view, civil law ought not to persist in a purely 
liberal basic attitude but embrace higher, social objectives if it wished to survive in 
the emerging modern administrative state and industrial society.”111
A third author should be cited on the correspondence between legal and 
social orders: from a systems theoretical perspective legal, Dan Wielsch 
points to the need for societal adequacy of law, which requires at least that 
the order be adequately complex:
“In minimalistic intent, we translate the concept as adequate complexity. In a broad 
sense, this means that the law has institutions at its disposal that are compatible with 
the levels of abstraction demanded by society. The necessary categorial reductions of 
law should not be allowed to hinder an increase in societal complexity but, on the 
contrary, enable it. What is necessary are selectors that, despite a high level of 
societal complexity, enable relatively simple decisions to be made without these 
108 Wieacker (1960) 6.
109 Maultzsch (2012).
110 Gierke (1889) 3.
111 Maultzsch (2012) 1041–1042.
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decisions reducing societal complexity through their binding effect.112 This is also 
likely to be true for the implementation of collectively defined control plans 
entrusted and credited to law, such as are generated in and through the political 
system. The focus in law – at least historically – has been on providing and securing 
the (systemic and societal) complexity provoked by the individual seeking to realize 
plans of his own. One example is the figure of subjective property law, with whose 
aid social relations can be unravelled, spheres of interest separated and rendered 
variable independently of one another.”113
Just how a lack of correspondence between legal and social order can plunge 
a legal model – so-called private law society114 – into crisis and force it to give 
way to a different understanding of law is shown by the shift from private 
law as constitution to the constitution of private law.
II. From private law as constitution to the constitution of private law
The development process is described by Dan Wielsh in an essay on “Basic 
Rights as Justificatory Rules in Private Law.”115 He begins by outlining the 
ambitious self-conception of a civil jurisprudence as a societal order:116
“However, the self-awareness of this society that defines itself as civil cannot be fully 
explained in terms of the liberation of individuals from the estate-based, feudal 
order so that they now stand atomized vis-à-vis the state they themselves have 
authorized. It can be understood only if a further assumption is taken into account: 
that society has at its disposal ‘institutions with the innate capability to coordinate 
and thus directly steer and influence the plans and actions of free, autonomous peo-
ple117 in such a way that society is able in itself to attain prosperity and justice. Only 
because civil society has at its disposal a non-hierarchical ordering mechanism in 
the shape of the free transaction economy and competition can it emancipate itself 
from substantive provisions pertaining to the public good in the state and limit 
itself to enabling free self-determination. The overall societal and constitutional 
policy status of this regulatory process arises only from the link between private 
law and this ordering process, from its relationship with an economic system that 
provides market access, that leaves the beneficial use of resources and participation 
in the work process to the free decision of economic operators, and which knows 
112 Luhmann (1970) 175–202.
113 Wielsch (2001) 36.
114 See Riesenhuber (ed.) 2007.
115 Wielsch (2013).
116 Wielsch (2013) 721–722.
117 Böhm (1966) 88 (highlighting in original).
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only one legal basis for the resulting system of communication and cooperation: 
private law.”118
In brief, this means: “Private law is raised to the status of a societal order and 
the – decentralized – ‘steering’ of a society is entrusted to free and autono-
mously planning individuals.”119
According to Wielsch, however, private law cannot satisfy the macro-
societal regulatory demands made of it, chiefly for methodological reasons:
“Adoption of the constitutional-law promise of equal freedom through private law 
lends this law macro-societal status. This alone explains and justifies the nineteenth 
century notion of the priority of private law over constitutional law. Methodolog-
ically, however, private law is inadequately equipped for the task. The public-law 
perspective on subjective rights and private-law institutions adopted by ordoliberal 
legal theory remains marginal. The prevailing view is that of an ‘unpolitical’ private 
law whose task it is to establish a bilateral balance of interests. … Because the 
prevailing methodological understanding lacks any sense for a constitutional view 
of subjective rights and private autonomy, the societal function that private law has 
assumed is not adequately perceived. … On the other hand, … law fails to honour 
its own promise of equal freedom because it ignores the actual preconditions for 
claiming civil liberties. It is a hallmark of formal liberal law that it throws no light 
on its own functional conditions.”120
With the enactment of the Basic Law and, in particular, with the rulings of 
the Federal Constitutional Court that define this basic order, the sceptre has 
passed to constitutional law. Wielsch notes:121
“The promise of equal freedom passes from the private-law constitution and private 
law to the democratic constitution and the basic rights, albeit without competition 
losing its quality as an institution under constitutional law. Basic rights assume a 
socially constitutive function, but in so doing can build on the regulatory function 
of social institutions and private law.
The precondition is that basic rights – as well as the political system – are also 
binding on society itself. For this purpose, their dogmatic interpretation as bans on 
interference, requiring the state to refrain from action, does not suffice. Basic rights 
must be able to change society. This is achieved if they are understood as precepts for 
shaping the law that are implemented by the branches of government (legislature, 
executive, and judicature) within the specific framework of their functions and 
responsibilities. What decisively sets the course is that constitutional jurisdiction 
also qualifies basic rights as objective fundamental norms that present decisions on 
118 Mestmäcker (2007) 41.
119 Wielsch (2013) 722.
120 Wielsch (2013) 728 f.
121 Wielsch (2013) 731 f.
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values for all areas of simple law.122 Over and beyond the interpretation of individ-
ual basic norms, the basic law catalogue as a whole is treated as an objective order 
and system of values.”123
In brief, the establishment of the necessary correspondence between the legal 
and social orders is primarily a task for the – reflexive – legal order124 itself. 
This can require law to develop suitable methods for adequately discharging 
its controlling function;125 but, as we have seen, it can also prove necessary 
to change the relationship between entire fields of law, as has been done 
with probably irrevocable effect by the constitutionalization of the whole 
legal order.126
D. The multiple life worlds of the law: the helpful perspective of
legal pluralism
I. The societies of law
In his seminal work on the law of legal pluralism,127 Ralf Seinecke posits 
that all communities tend to give themselves regulatory regimes of their 
own: “Every society, community, or association finds (at least theoretically) 
the normative force to establish its own law. Communities themselves rec-
ognize their given order as law. This insight has been formulated under 
wide-ranging epistemological conditions; nevertheless, all legal theoreticians 
of ‘societal law’ in the modern age have faced the same difficulty: the ‘Mali-
nowski problem’, i. e., the distinction between law and other social 
norms.”128
This is exactly what we mean when, in the “language of governance”, we 
say that every governance collective tends to organize itself as a regulatory 
122 First: BVerfGE 6, 55 (72) – Income splitting: Article 6 I of the Basic Law is not only an 
institutional guarantee but a fundamental norm (Grundsatznorm), “that is to say, a bind-
ing decision on values for private and public law pertaining to the entire field of marriage 
and family.”
123 A year later, BVerfGE 7, 198 (205) – Lüth.
124 See the reflections of the present author in: Schuppert, G. F. (2016a).
125 See Schuppert, G. F. (2017c).
126 See Schuppert, G. F. / Bumke (2000).
127 Seinecke (2015).
128 Seinecke (2015) 157.
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collective in order to stabilize itself internally and differentiate itself from the 
environment;129 it is another question whether – as a second step – we speak 
of law or reserve this honorific for state-made law. If, as we suggest,130 we 
operate with a broad concept of law, we will doubtless end up with a broad 
concept of legal pluralism, which Seinecke “provisionally” defines as follows:
“Legal pluralism covers all legal or social constellations, circumstances, and situa-
tions in which various types of legal rules, legal orders, or legal sources can be 
subscribed to from a normative, descriptive, or world-view perspective.This plurality 
of law can be described politically, sociologically, or juristically, as well as historically 
narrated. It concerns individual subjects, small communities, entire societies, social 
fields, and communicative social systems alike. To the extent that this normative 
diversity is understood to be juristic, legal pluralism is always a critical normative 
concept. In every legal pluralism, the word law constitutes an episteme or weltan-
schauung in its own right, thus structuring the normative, political, and social 
perception of the world.
In brief, legal pluralism means all socio-legal constellations in which different 
sorts of legal rules, legal principles, legal orders, legal sources, legal history, and legal 
views interact or collide and which can be distinguished from one another in 
normative, descriptive, empirical, or world-view terms.”131
We are thus dealing with different worlds of law, which – and this is the 
essential point – reflect different views of the world in the sense of Rosa’s 
sphere of resonance, a phenomenon we shall be looking at in brief in con-
cluding this second part.
II. Communities of law and their specific world-views
With the help of Ralf Seinecke, we can best understand what is meant by 
citing two legal pluralists. A number of general remarks will then conclude 
this section.
* The first author is Robert Cover from the world of Jewish law, where no 
clearly marked boundary is drawn between life-world and law. He 
employs the metaphor of a bridge:
129 In extenso in Schuppert, G. F. (2016b) 63 ff.
130 Schuppert, G. F. (2016b) 251–291.
131 Seinecke (2015) 8.
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“Law … is a bridge in normative space connecting … the ‘world-that-is’ … with our 
projections of alternative ‘worlds-that-might-be’ …. In this theory, law is neither to 
be wholly identified with the understanding of the present state of affairs nor with 
the imagined alternatives. It is the bridge – the committed social behavior which 
constitutes the way a group of people will attempt to get from here to there. Law 
connects ‘reality’ to alternity constituting a new reality with a bridge built out of 
committed social behavior. Thus, visions of the future are more or less strongly 
determinative of the bridge which is ‘law’ depending upon the commitment and 
social organization of the people who hold them.”132
Seinecke notes that, for Cover, law is always “embedded law,” embedded in 
the life-world of the given community:133
“This conception of law runs contrary to classical concepts. It refers not to institu-
tionalized coercion, not to a ruling state, not to good old justice, not to community 
recognition and not to a communicative code. Cover has a quite different law in 
mind. The question ‘What is law?’ takes on a quite different meaning for him. Cover 
embeds the law of a community in its life-world. Law constitutes the world in 
which we live, our nomos:
‘We inhabit a nomos – a normative universe. We constantly create and maintain a 
world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void. … No set of 
legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and 
give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scrip-
ture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law 
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we 
live.’”134
We add a further comment by Seinecke, in which he speaks of the sounding 
board of law:
“Cover strongly attacks the project of legal positivism. He confronts the notion of 
functional or instrumental law with the eternal stories from the world of law and 
justice. They still resonate against the sounding board of law to disclose the deficient 
perspective of juristic positivism. Cover deliberately describes his law not in an 
analytic study: he presents it in a story of its own. In this narrative, law draws its 
strength not only from normative postulates but also from the history and myths of 
law. Cover understands the two elements law and narrative as “inseparable”: every 
rule needs history and fate, beginning and end, explanation and goal. Similarly, 
every narrative relies on a normative standpoint. It needs the moral of the story.”135
132 Cover (1993) 176–203, here 176.
133 Seinecke (2015) 263.
134 Cover (1983) 4.
135 Seinecke (2015) 265.
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* The second author to be considered is the legal pluralist Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos, whom we have already mentioned in the first part of this 
book. Seinecke sums up his world-view legal pluralism:
“This link between law and life world also shapes the political and postmodern legal 
pluralism of Boaventura de Sousa Santos.136 As in Jewish law, he combines the 
topoi of law and life, knowledge and action, theory and practice; of emancipation 
and politics, of truth and activism. This political law is part of many worlds and is to 
be found in all “structural spaces” of the world. The law of the household, work, 
community, market, state, and world together form the interlegal space of law. But 
Santos does not limit his legal pluralism to legal orders in the modern sense of the 
term. He associates it closely with the world-view demands and perspectives of 
international leftwing politics. For law as a “map of misreading” always provides 
information about the truth of the world – who deserves law and who has no right 
to it.”137
* We bring the second part of this book to an end with the apt concluding 
remarks of Ralf Seinecke:
“Legal pluralism is characterized by the diversity of perspectives. It lacks an imperial 
nomos that establishes the sovereignty and dominance of a first legal order. Only 
thus can legal pluralism guarantee a space of their own to the alternative ways of life 
and life-worlds of law. For this reason, the nomos of legal pluralism is fundamen-
tally controversial: interaction between legal orders brings together the various 
alternative legal orders with their bridges to other world-orders in a nomos of legal 
pluralism, and hence introduces chaos into the order of law – legal pluralism is 
pictured as a nomos of nomoi.
In legal pluralism, different legal and world orders are superimposed. While 
interaction at the level of law can in one sense still be contained by a certain order 
of law, it gets out of control in the nomoi of legal orders. For legal pluralism lacks a 
prevailing and sovereign perspective. In the nomos of legal pluralism, no primary 
law dominates. The concept of legal pluralism encompasses first, second, third, 
many legal orders without bringing them under the control of any one order. In 
the nomos of legal pluralism, the disorder of orders prevails. For this reason, legal 
pluralism is the nomos of nomoi.”138
136 See, above all, de Sousa Santos (1987).
137 Seinecke (2015) 299.
138 Seinecke (2015) 373.
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Part Three
Legal Concepts and Legal Regimes in a Global 
History of Ideas
In examining the role of various legal concepts and regimes, we shall con-
sider four equipped with a marked globalization gene that predestines them 
to play a major part in the global history of ideas. Each concept or regime is 
to be understood only in the given context:
* Worldwide Enlightenment and universal natural law
* The history of international law as a political history of ideas
* The invention of human rights
* The dynamics of rule-of-law principles
We begin with the Enlightenment and “its” natural law. The Age of the 
Enlightenment is not only an interesting epoch in the history of ideas: a 
somewhat more comprehensive consideration of this period can also throw 
light on the legal concept and regime of natural law, notably with respect to 
the Enlightenment in the history of communication, institutions, and 
power. These three aspects also prove fruitful in examining natural law as 
a “language of politics.”
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Chapter One
Worldwide Enlightenment and Universal Natural Law
The particularly interesting legal concept of natural law can be understood 
only against the backdrop of the Enlightenment – a key epoch in the history 
of ideas.1 A closer look at this phenomenon is therefore called for.2 To avoid 
drowning in the ocean of literature on the subject, we limit our analysis to 
five disciplinary approaches:
* The Enlightenment as global history
* The Enlightenment as history of communication and media
* The Enlightenment as history of institutions
* The Enlightenment as the history of power
* The Enlightenment as legal history, namely the history of natural law
We begin with the history of the Enlightenment as global history.
A. The Enlightenment as global history
The Enlightenment clearly had a worldwide impact. Wolfgang Hardtwig 
divides his book on the Enlightenment and its impact on the world into 
three parts. The first deals with Germany, the second with Europe and the 
third with the USA, China, and the Ottoman Empire.3 However, this terri-
torializing approach misses the most important point, namely the globality 
of the Enlightenment as a worldwide communicative exchange of ideas and 
knowledge.
Steffen Martus describes an occurrence in 1721 that illustrates what is 
meant. The enlightener Christian Wolff – who held a chair in mathematics 
at the University of Halle, but also taught agronomy, metaphysics, ethics, 
and politics – held a lecture on the political wisdom of the Chinese:
“Wolff snubbed his theological audience at a solemn meeting of the Prorektorat in 
July 1721 when he globalized the claim of philosophy to validity. Only at first glance 
was the subject he had chosen – the ‘practical philosophy of the Chinese’ – exotic 
and remote: by that time Europeans were already well acquainted with China. Since 
1 See Haakonssen (2012).
2 For a useful overview see Stollberg-Rilinger (2016); a comprehensive and pleasurable 
read is provided by Martus (2015).
3 Hardtwig (ed.) (2010).
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the Jesuit mission in the sixteenth century, the Middle Kingdom had been a chal-
lenge to Christian thought.”4
Since European enlighteners were bothered above all by the high cultural 
level of China, which, as travellers reported, managed “without an extensive 
religious, metaphysical superstructure, relying solely on the secular wisdom 
of Confucianism,”5 there was lively interest in the teachings of Confucius, 
which – as Martus recounts – were soon known throughout Europe:
“The Latin translation of Confucian writings, which the Jesuit missionary Philippe 
Couplet had published in 1687 under the title Confusius Sinarum Philosophus and 
dedicated to Louis XIV, was read everywhere in Europe. … In 1711, the Belgian 
Jesuit François Noël brought back from his twenty years in China an extended and 
amended translation of Confucian writings (Sinesis Imperii libri classici sex). Wolff
reviewed this edition for, among other publications, the Leipzig Acta Eruditorium
and the Jesuit Journal de Trévaux. Chinese philosophy clearly had something to say to 
all Christian confessions. The fact that Wolff read Noël and initially did not know 
Couplet’s edition was not without consequences. One of his main arguments was 
that the Chinese had no concept of God at all and therefore could not be branded as 
atheists, as ‘deniers of God’. The older edition by Couplet, however, placed the 
greatest value on the fact that the Chinese had originally known and honoured 
the true Deity. This was one of the Jesuit strategies to defuse the problem of how 
such an advanced civilization could manage without Christianity: the Chinese were 
really Christians but simply didn’t realize it.”6
Sebastian Conrad has examined the “Enlightenment without frontiers”7 in 
great depth and intensity.8 He sees the Enlightenment also and primarily 
as a response to the global challenges that European expansion inevitably 
engendered.9 In his view, the resulting globalization affected the global mar-
ket of knowledge more than that of ideas. The Enlightenment mindset is 
hence “world making:”
“In many regards, key elements of the intellectual sea change of the Enlightenment 
can be understood as reaction to the broadening of Europe’s horizons. It began with 
the ‘discovery’ of the New World and came to a climax in the late eighteenth 
century with the maritime exploration of the Pacific through the voyages of James 
Cook and Louis-Antoine de Bougainville. Many of the key categories for the devel-
4 Martus (2015) 265.
5 Martus (2015)
6 Martus (2015) 266.
7 This is the title of the second part of Martus’s (2015) work, 263–462.
8 Conrad / Osterhammel (eds.) (2016) 412–626.
9 Reinhard (2016).
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opment of modern sciences were systematically addressed in awareness of growing 
global interconnectivity and in terms of assimilating the ‘world’ into the European 
repertoire of knowledge.”10
Conrad sees the modern human sciences as playing a central role in this “world 
making”:
“The modern human sciences, in particular, were a medium for ordering the global 
reality of the age. Other examples are debates on the nature of ‘man’ beginning with 
Bartolomé de las Casas and later in fascination with the ‘noble savages’ of North 
America or the Pacific; the work done on international law and the international 
order since Hugo Grotius – his Mare liberum was a chapter in a legal opinion written 
for the Dutch East India Company; the ethnological and geographical survey of the 
globe in the course of the major voyages of discovery; comparative linguistics and 
religious studies; theories of free trade and its civilisational impact; the concept of 
race and debates on mono- or polygenesis (Are humans all descended from one race, 
or does humanity have more than one origin?); discussions on the concept of 
cosmopolitanism; and, finally the dichotomy of civilization and barbarism, and 
the discovery of a progressing and progressive time regime. The spatial expansion 
of Europe posed a cognitive challenge that triggered a fundamental reorganization 
of knowledge and the ordering of scholarly disciplines.”11
Although a lot more could be said about the Enlightenment as global his-
tory, this brief glance must suffice to show what is meant and to demonstrate 
that a global history of ideas and knowledge would have to be written above 
all as entangled history.
B. The Enlightenment as a history of institutions
My study of “political culture” includes a chapter entitled “political culture 
as institutional culture,”12 positing that every epoch produces characteristic 
institutions:13 in the Middle Ages, for instance, the feudal system as a mode 
of personal rule; in early modern times the territorial state with its bureau-
cratic administration; in early financial capitalism the East India trading 
companies; and in the nineteenth century the institution of local self-govern-
ment.
10 Conrad / Osterhammel (eds.) (2016) 483.
11 Conrad / Osterhammel (eds.) (2016).
12 Conrad / Osterhammel (eds.) (2016) 343ff.
13 Schuppert, G. F. (2008b).
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The same applies for the Age of the Enlightenment with its universities 
as new state institutions, its academies of the sciences, and innumerable 
salons, societies, and fraternal organizations. We begin with the Berlin 
Academy of the Sciences. The universities are an interesting case as part 
of the modernization programme of the territorial state. We shall take a 
brief look at them:
I. Functional diversity of the typical Enlightenment institution
university
Earlier in this book, the Gelehrtenrepublik, Republic of Letters, or Répub-
lique des lettres has been discussed as a virtual republic with networklike 
structures.14 But the institution of the university increasingly became a 
welcome and necessary institutionalized rallying point for this republic. This 
function changed the nature of the university. We look first to the university 
as locus of institutional power:
“Although scholars inhabited a relatively halcyon republic and had none of the 
trappings of a sovereign state: no territory, no tax system, no administration, no 
diplomatic representation, no standing army, they used institutionalized power in 
the form of the university, settled themselves into state structures, and made 
common cause with their courtly patrons. The university was thus the most important 
locus where the Republic of Letters took shape as governance structure. There were other 
institutions, too: high schools, academies, libraries, societies, salons; and there 
were many forms of private scholarship, as well as various professions with a 
learned background, whose representatives pursued scholarly interests more or less 
casually. However, the university remained a beloved and hated, willingly despised, 
and almost obligatory organization through which almost all enlighteners 
passed.”15
In simplified, ‘from-to’ terms, the evolution of the university can be 
described in its development from Medieval corporation to the “early mod-
ern university in the context of territorialization and state formation”:16
“The history of the early modern university is marked by emancipation from 
the ecclesiastical-religious environment and embedding in the early modern 
14 Part One, Chapter 3 of this book, B. I.
15 Schuppert, G. F. (2008b) 94.
16 See Füssel (2006) 63.
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territorial state. Early modernity has thus been described as the “territorial 
age” (Moraw) of the university. Initially, the Reformation brought a massive 
drop in enrolment. Only with the reform of Wittenberg University, which 
provided a broad model for other Protestant universities, did the situation 
return to normal. The decoupling of educational elites from the ecclesiastical 
sphere of influence was accompanied by a shift from a “clerically determined 
‘strangers university’ to a politically integrated ‘family university’.”17 The 
decline in the proportion of clerics on the teaching staff and the abolition 
of celibacy for professors were necessary preconditions for the formation of 
such an educational oligarchy.”18
The function and development of the early modern university can per-
haps be best explicated by looking at a particular place and person. Steffen 
Martus has chosen the reformational University of Halle and its founding 
vice-chancellor Christian Thomasius. The epochal figure of Thomasius, like 
all enlighteners a “highly gifted copywriter and strategist in self-marketing”19
gives concrete shape, as it were, to the Enlightenment.
Thomasius pursued a policy of alliance between court and university, and 
demanded that students be taught social, communicative, and moral skills.
“The Enlightenment was to grow out of the alliance between court and university, 
politics and scholarship.
The accord between the two worlds provided ‘useful and pleasant’ training. The 
university was to teach the basic knowledge and skills needed for autonomous 
learning. The learned bookworm was replaced by the worldly-wise man of the 
new age, who feared no international competition and availed himself of the state 
machinery of government and civil service. This was how Thomasius – like his 
contemporary Christian Weide – defined a ‘political’ concept of scholarship that 
valued sophistication, astuteness, and practical experience, which stressed judge-
ment and the faculty of critical thought (‘iudicium’) over the preservation and 
administration of knowledge (‘memoria’), and which cleared away barriers to useful 
scholarly knowledge.”20
In the pursuit of his goals, Thomasius was none too gentle and beat the 
drum for himself and his projects. Steffen Martus describes this “Enlighten-
ment style”:
17 See Asche (1998).
18 Füssel (2006) 63–64.
19 Martus (2015) 98.
20 Martus (2015) 98–99.
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“Christian Thomasius’s combative Enlightenment led historians to posit a historical 
schism, making Halle the first university of the Enlightenment. Before Halle, dark-
ness or at best twilight had prevailed; with Halle, the light of reason began to shine. 
Where scholasticism had once tyrannized philosophy, wisdom now ruled with the 
gentle hand of better arguments; before Halle, authority and sectarianization had 
stifled thought; the new university cleared the path for reason and critique.
Christian Thomasius varied this message. In 1696, for example, he declared with 
biblical pathos: ‘All my teachings seek only to convince scholars and students of 
how prevailing scholarship is full of tripe and hogwash, and how this can be dis-
posed of.’ Thomasius clearly did not lack self-confidence. In the name of the Enlight-
enment he succeeded not only in making his opponent look bad but also like 
reactionary die-hards.”21
II. The language of jurisprudence as increasingly important
language of politics in the early modern principality
In his seminal study on rank, ritual, and conflict in the early modern uni-
versity, Marian Füssel22 describes not only the struggle of scholars to gain 
appropriate rank in a society still based on estates, but also the university as a 
communicative microcosm23 marked by bitter contests for rank and repu-
tation within the institutional governance structure “university.” One ele-
ment in this battle for first place in the university hierarchy24 was the dispute 
between faculties on which could claim first place for itself. While theology 
was accustomed to being regarded as the meaning-giving lead discipline, the 
jurists gained increasing favour with rulers as the holders of useful knowl-
edge on governance and administration. Marian Füssel describes this shift of 
power within universities:
“… the ruler needed above all legally trained civil servants to develop territorial 
statehood. The law faculty was often better endowed than others, evidencing the 
growing influence of the ruling prince. The conversion of the jurist into court 
official was part of the development of a bureaucratic administrative apparatus 
whose immediate social consequence was the differentiation of a court-centred civil 
21 Martus (2015) 97.
22 Füssel (2006).
23 Füssel (2006) 3: On the “communication space university”, in which symbolic praxis plays 
a key role.
24 Füssel (2006) 2: “The struggle for the church pew, rank in processions, or seating ar-
rangements at university festivities was less a matter of ‘vanity fair’ than an essential 
element in the social existence of homo hierarchicus.”
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service hierarchy, a process that led, for example in sixteenth century Bavaria, to 
numerous precedence conflicts between ‘Hofrat’ and ‘Kammerrat’. Until the end of 
the seventeenth century, noble birth and academic qualifications were apparently 
treated as ‘functional equivalents’, as the example of Württemberg shows. The 
‘dynamization of the social order’ then also depended less on a strong economic 
middle class than on the increasing bureaucratization of the princely state.”25
This is, so to speak, the common reading. We choose to dig a little deeper, 
with the aid of Rudolf Sichweh’s impressive study on the early modern state 
and the European university.26 In three steps, he offers interesting comments 
on the general topic of a global history of ideas and knowledge in the 
language of law.
He starts by outlining the development of juristic activity from the role of 
clerical jurist to what could be called “all-round” jurists of great utility in 
shaping the emerging early modern state:
“Increasingly important fields of activity such as advocacy and the administration of 
justice play a role, which distinguished themselves more and more from ecclesias-
tical and state administration. The new role of the jurist was, however, not yet 
professional in the modern sense of having a frame of reference in the legal system 
as a functional system differentiated out in society. It is defined rather in close 
relation to two key determinants: estate structures and the emergence of the early 
modern state, which remained relevant until the progressive differentiation of the 
legal system in the nineteenth century produced a new type of juristic profession, 
which, while monopolizing responsibilities in the legal system, could no longer 
claim importance in society as a whole comparable to that of early modern jurists.”27
Second, Stichweh shows that the language of legal science and the jurists 
who engage in it was regarded as a language for speaking of the body politic, and 
thus as a “language of politics”:
“In describing the importance of early modern legal studies and early modern jurists 
for society as a whole, contemporaries frequently posited a direct connection 
between knowledge of the law and the polity that was independent of any specific 
legal subject matter. In a certain regard, legal knowledge functioned as knowledge 
of a class of texts: texts about the body politic. The prevailing conviction in early 
modernity of the central importance of the ancient languages, embodied in classical 
and imitable texts, very probably facilitated and plausibilized the reception of the 
ancient legal texts. This link between rhetoric, texts, knowledge of law that was also 
open to other types of text, and direct reference to the polity is clearly expressed in a 
25 Füssel (2006) 67–68.
26 Stichweh (1991).
27 Stichweh (1991) 352.
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paraphrasing comment by Wilfried Prest on Thomas Elyot’s ‘The Boke Named the 
Govenor’ from 1531. ‘Elyot maintained that the classical Roman jurisprudent, 
exemplified by Cicero, Quintilian, Servus Sulpitius and Tacitus – gentlemen whose 
learning was not confined to the law and whose involvement with the law was under-
taken as a part of public duty […]’.28 In this sense, knowledge of the law is a 
specialization (in the polity) that is no specialization.”29
This is the critical point, namely the “generalist nature of juristic competence,”30
which makes the species of jurists into all-rounders and thus indispensable to 
the early modern state as a governance type.31
For an estates-based society, however, it was also indispensable to integrate 
jurists, to fit them into the estates system. Stichweh argues, thirdly, that the 
holders of legal knowledge were under obligation to the polity on account of 
this knowledge:
“Knowledge of the law in early modernity … either generates standing (for com-
moner jurists) or validates status (for the nobility). The link between achieving or 
validating status and law is also about the legitimation of status. Obtaining social 
position through legal knowledge is a legitimate aspiration because, by assuming 
this position, one also assumes the obligations to the polity inherent in legal knowl-
edge.”32
So much on the multifunctionality of university, notably legal training in 
the early modern territorial state.
C. Enlightenment as the history of power
In his global history of the Enlightenment, Sebastian Conrad warned against 
any, necessarily vain, attempt to find a clear and all-embracing definition of 
the phenomenon Enlightenment. One should instead look to see who uses 
the concept and to what end:33
“It is more interesting to ask what historical actors did with the concept and what 
their interest was in referring to it. One should not mistake “Enlightenment” for an 
analytic category. It was primarily a concept one could point to in order to assert 
28 Prest (1984) 315.
29 Stichweh (1991) 353.
30 Stichweh (1991) 356.
31 On the governance perspective for the analysis of different governance regimes, see 
Esders / Schuppert, G. F. (2015).
32 Stichweh (1991) 354.
33 Conrad (2016) 478.
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claims or legitimate demands. ‘Scholars ought not to search feverishly for a still 
better definition’, was the suggestion of Frederick Cooper with reference to the 
‘modernity’ concept. ‘They ought rather to listen to what is said in the world. For 
our purposes, this would mean, that when speaking of the Enlightenment, scholars 
ought to ask how the concept is used and why’.”34
We are happy to follow this advice and explore from this perspective why 
princely rulers such as the Elector Frederick III founded universities to dis-
seminate the teachings of the Enlightenment and natural law. Steffen Mar-
tus offers a highly plausible explanation for such “top-down Enlightenment”:
“It was increasingly about setting landmarks. Court and university, politics and 
scholarship cooperated to give the principality an interesting image. For the new 
policy for attaining enlightenment, attractiveness was a decisive factor: the ‘subject’ 
was to be made an inviting status, not one submitted to by order. So how could the 
country be made so attractive that people would willingly bow to the rule of a 
monarch? In early modernity and especially during the Enlightenment, the author-
ities found an answer to such questions in the university. It was expected to ‘enhance 
the political power of the territorial state’.35 With universities, rulers pursued confes-
sional politics; they used them for prestige purposes, and had their subjects trained 
to become functionaries. Universities served as elements in projects that reached far 
beyond the lecture hall. This was true of Halle and of the fourteen other universities 
founded between 1648 (Bamberg) and 1786 (Bonn).”36
The university was thus “part of a whole reform package,”37 and the inau-
gural festivities upon the founding of the University of Halle were designed 
to demonstrate the alliance between politics and scholarship:
“It was a state ceremony, staging the university as a symbol of the governmental 
competence of Frederic III – thus the name; thus the link with the elector’s birthday; 
thus the highly symbolic ceremony in Halle, which was located in the virtual centre 
of the scattered territories of the principality. Even the weather played along: during 
the night it rained repeatedly, but in the morning when the elector had his first 
appearance, the heavens had ‘cleared up again’ and ‘stayed clear until the end of the 
projected ceremony’. The heavens sent signs of the times.”38
This brings our brief survey of the Enlightenment to an end, so that we can 
now turn to the interesting topic of “natural law as a ‘language of politics’.”
34 Cooper (ed.) (2005) 115.
35 Martus (2015) quoted here Kittsteiner (2010) 322.
36 Martus (2015) 110–111.
37 Martus (2015) 111.
38 Martus (2015) 113.
132 Part Three
D. The Enlightenment as legal history: the epochal importance
of natural law
So-called natural law can be looked at under two epistemological headings: 
the multifunctionality of natural law in the process of the early modern 
Enlightenment, and especially whether the language of natural law can 
and ought to be understood as a language of politics. But these issues can 
be discussed only if we have some idea about what natural law actually is.
I. What exactly is natural law?
Perhaps the best approach to this question is to look for common ground 
among the various natural law theories. In her study of natural law theories, 
Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger39 has found such commonalities, which are usu-
ally not seen as such. She identifies first a common method and second 
shared key concepts.
On the common methodological basis of natural law theories, she notes:
“The major systematic natural law theories come from the seventeenth century, 
from Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, and Samuel 
Pufendorf. They revolutionized juridical and political thought and supplanted the 
traditional practical philosophy of the Aristotelian tradition. Like the natural scien-
tists of the seventeenth century, natural law theoreticians were intent on leaving the 
tangle of authorities behind them and determining the immutable regularities of 
human co-existence with the aid of a precise method. To achieve cognitive certainty 
in the field of practical philosophy, i e., ethics, economics, and politics, theoreticians 
therefore emulated the ‘geometrical’, analytic-deductive method of the natural sciences: 
they reduce the polity, as it were, to its smallest components in order to reassemble it 
systematically. Setting out from certain premises about the ‘nature of man’, they 
claimed that a binding system of norms could be derived by cogent logic through 
methodologically regulated reasoning”40
Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has this to say about interaction between key 
concepts of natural law, the state of nature and contract:
“Of central importance were … first the fiction of a state of nature and second the 
legal figure of the contract. Unlike all earlier natural law theories, the point of 
departure was the individual, completely unconnected human being in a fictive 
‘state of nature’, and the question was how in this situation rights and duties could 
39 Stollberg-Rilinger (2016) 204ff.
40 Stollberg-Rilinger (2016) 204.
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be grounded at all. In this state of original freedom from all ties, no bond connect-
ing people and engaging them mutually was found other than free contractual 
agreement. All forms of lawful community – from marriage to family and the state, 
the societas civilis – were thus attributed to the voluntary (whether explicit or tacit) 
conclusion of a contract by all individuals. One hence abstracted from all historical 
power relations in order to reestablish them on the basis of the will of the individ-
ual. On the assumption of unfettered freedom of contract of the individual in a state 
of nature, every form of exercising power, from slavery to absolute monarchy could 
be justified – by asserting that subjects, serfs, and slaves had voluntarily (explicitly or 
tacitly) submitted to the rule of their lords. But on this basis, every form of rule can 
just as well be called into question – by arguing that the rights of the individual in a 
state of nature are fundamentally inalienable and that the founding of the state can 
serve only to preserve these rights.”41
This shows that the contract argument can be used both to legitimate and to 
criticize power relations. But before taking a closer look at this multifunc-
tionality, this Janus-facedness of natural law, we consider what one of the 
greatest experts on the subject, Knud Haakonssen, has to say about “the 
unifying ideas of early modern natural law – taken as a whole”:
“First, there was the idea of a basic rule of law of nature that, if followed, will relate 
individuals to the natural world and to each other in some sort of community. There 
was also consistently reference to some sort of divinity, but this varied so much that 
neither the divine character in question nor the human relationship thereto can be 
captured in one simple formulation to cover all.
Secondly, it was proposed that this natural law could be comprehended by our 
natural cognitive powers – often called reason – as distinct from revelation. What 
humanity could understand in this way was the point or rationale of the natural 
law, (but by no means all natural lawyers thought that this sufficed to make the law 
a prescriptive or obligatory norm).
Thirdly, it was a shared idea that this understanding arose from a common 
human appreciation of our condition in the world, provided we abstract from all 
specific attempts to live by the law of nature. In other words, if we consider our-
selves to be in a state of nature. Integral to this procedure was that, considered as 
purely natural beings, we were thought to be in some sense equal.
Fourthly, the means of living by the law of nature and thus relating to each other 
in common – or, in the process-language generally used, the means of getting out of 
the pure state of nature – were contracts, in some sense of this troublesome term.
Fifthly, once communities, especially political communities, exist, their rules, 
especially civil laws, replace the law of nature.”42
41 Stollberg-Rilinger (2016) 204–205.
42 Haakonssen (2012) 52–53.
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Having gained some idea about what natural law and natural law thought is, 
we now turn to its multifunctionality and double-facedness.
II. The multifunctionality and two faces of natural law
The first author to be cited on this point is Steffen Martus. Although he has 
little to say about natural law in his fascinating book on the Enlightenment, 
he does offer a very cogent description of its multifunctionality and of its 
two faces.
“Natural law combined concepts of legal policy with forward-looking propositions. 
It cultivated the scholarly ideal of the mathematical method, witness René Des-
cartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Baruch Spinoza. It formulated answers to the ‘religious 
crises of Europe’, by providing a profane basis for society embracing people of all 
faiths. And it drew on absolutist visions of government. Its cognitive business 
included fundamental reflection on human nature and speculation about the his-
torical origins and development of the human species Above all, however, natural 
law provided very pragmatic recommendations on everyday conduct.
The first step was made by the Legal Enlightenment, which separated sacred from 
profane interests: what was of advantage for life after death was not to be recom-
mended without further ado for life on earth. The second step taken by the Legal 
Enlightenment was to draw a distinction between law and morality. These two 
distinctions had a purpose, namely, to bring notions and fantasies of the right 
and good life down to a level compatible with humanity, to reduce theological, 
political, and legal impositions – and at the same time make access to religion, 
morality, politics, and law more effective.”43
In “Early Modern Natural Law Theories”44 Knud Haakonssen provides a 
formidable and convincing overview of the functions of natural law. He 
identifies the following three main functions of natural law in early mod-
ernity:
* A new legitimation basis for political authority
“Above all else, the ever deepening territorialisation of political authority demanded 
a source of political legitimacy that was independent of the metaphysically based 
hierarchy of authority in the universal Church. This was the root cause of the 
institutionalisation of natural law that took place first in Protestant countries. There 
had of course been an intensive cultivation of natural law in the institutions of the 
43 Martus (2015) 74–75.
44 Haakonssen (2016).
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Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, and this continued to be the case also after the 
Reformation. However, scholastic natural law was philosophically embedded in a 
religious metaphysics that was anathema to much – though by no means all – 
Protestant natural law. And, more importantly, scholastic natural law was academ-
ically and institutionally part of the traditional philosophy curriculum and of theol-
ogy (eventually moral theology). Protestant natural law was made an independent 
discipline through the establishment of professorial chairs devoted to the subject, 
and a great deal of the history of early modern natural law is concerned with the 
conflicts over the control of the subject through these positions. Within the uni-
versities it was a triangular contest between philosophy, law and theology, while exter-
nally it was a matter of the influence of political and religious authorities. In short, 
natural law had functions within a wide spectrum of contexts, ranging from the 
geo-political and pan-European to domestic politics and institution building, and 
this lent the subject an indisputable identity as an historical phenomenon of con-
siderable importance.”45
We will be coming back to this important function of natural law as a 
concept of political authority legitimation.
* Grounding a civic ethics
“As a course in the ‘lower’ philosophical faculty, natural law had a basic pedagogical 
task, namely, to instruct young men in elementary social ideas, a kind of pre-modern 
‘civics’. This accounts for the fact that we find natural law ideas in all kinds of 
intellectual endeavor in the Enlightenment, for so to speak everyone who had even 
the rudiments of advanced education would have been exposed to it in some form. 
In the hands of the ‘higher’ faculty of law (and in some cases still theology) and in 
university consistoria it was a distinct legal doctrine and hence a juridical resource 
separate from the multitude of domestic laws. But first of all natural law was 
politically important by supplying a systematic theory of social and political life. These 
functions as a civic ethics, a legal doctrine and juridical reserve power and a socio-
political theory were not, however, united by one particular philosophical theory. To 
the contrary, the intellectual rationale for how to fulfil the functions was an object 
of intense contestation. The institutional and functional identity of early modern 
natural law must not mislead us to believe that it was also an intellectually coherent 
movement or school. It was not, for there were a multitude of theoretical endeav-
ours going on within the institutional set-up. In fact, natural law in this period may 
usefully be characterized as ‘a clearing house … for a wide array of theological, 
jurisprudential and philosophical disciplines’.”46
45 Haakonssen (2016) 77.
46 Haakonssen (2016) 78.
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In addition to this multidisciplinarity of natural law, a third function needs 
to be stressed, namely that it can be used a distinctive language in different 
contexts:
* Natural law as a “distinctive language” to be used in different contexts
“In sum, early modern natural law was first of all an academic discipline institu-
tionalised for political reasons to discharge social, juridical and political functions. It 
commanded a distinctive language, a literary style or genre, a canon of defining 
works, and it had a clear conception of its own history as something new and in 
that sense modern. … The challenge is to understand why more or less everyone at 
the time, irrespective of philosophical or confessional standpoint, thought that 
something new and distinctively modern had been introduced that was worth fight-
ing over from quite different points of view and for widely different purposes. The 
scholarly confusion over this theoretical and practical pluralism has been increased by 
the fact that some of the main natural law thinkers in our period were not philosophers in 
anything like the modern sense of the term.”47
According to Knud Haakonssen, the multidisciplinarity and multifunction-
ality of natural law is particularly well illustrated by Hugo Grotius:
“Considered in a philosophical light Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) has often been seen 
as an epigone, if not simply a plagiarist, of leading scholastic natural lawyers. 
However, if we take up the task not of tracing original formulations of, or contri-
butions to ideas considered trans-historically but of understanding what Grotius was 
trying to do in his time and place with whatever ideas he had available, then his 
historical standing becomes intelligible. In this respect, Grotius must be acknowl-
edged as the defining initiator of modern natural law, for that was how he was 
viewed during most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was not a 
philosopher, nor did he claim to be one. He was primarily a humanist scholar, a 
lawyer and legal and political advisor, and his basic consideration in his writings was 
how to make cases for individuals, whether natural persons maintaining rights of 
private belief against religious authority or corporate persons, such as the Dutch 
East-India Company, asserting rights to the open sea. Of course Grotius also pre-
sented philosophical ideas, but these were materials for the making of arguments, 
not building blocks for scholastic and similar philosophical constructions.”48
It is a short step from “distinctive language” to the language of natural law as 
a “language of politics.”
47 Haakonssen (2016) 79.
48 Haakonssen (2016) 80.
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III. The language of natural law as a language of politics
It is obvious that the language of early modern natural law functioned as a 
language of politics, but because this is a very important point, as we shall 
demonstrate this under three headings:
* The language of natural law as the language of legal policy
Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has shown that natural law could be used both to 
justify and criticize law. On natural law as method for justifying law she has this 
to say:
“Whatever sort of reforms were demanded in the eighteenth century – whether 
designed to strengthen central authority or to permit general participation therein – 
they had to be justified and legitimated in a new way. The traditional sorts of 
legitimation were no longer suitable because they pleaded either divine lawmaking 
or time immemorial or consensus of the estates. Now, however, what was at issue 
was to create something new in opposition to the old; possibly against resistance 
from the privileged. A new authority was therefore needed to legitimate interven-
tion in extant law. The new method of justifying law that made this possible was 
modern natural law or the law of reason. Essentially it did two things: it responded 
to the confessional schism and the loss of the Christian world order and placed the 
norms of human co-existence on a new theoretical basis independent of competing 
religious claims to truth. Second, it reacted to the new needs for political action (in 
whoever’s interest) and offered a new legitimation basis for such action. Natural law 
was a method of justifying law; it cannot be pinned down to specific substantive
positions. Indeed, it could be used both to legitimate absolute power and to estab-
lish universal human rights.”49
Our author comments on the critical potential of natural law in providing a 
yardstick for extant law:
“Natural law theories thus provided a method both for justifying law and for 
criticizing existing law. Fundamental, modern, and new was that it provided a 
standard competing with the conventional, religious-traditional legitimation of 
power and legal relations. The People as a sum of individuals, not old-established, 
estate-based corporations and office holders were now regarded as the source of 
governmental authority, as the original sovereign. The critical potential this concept 
offered could be used for two opposing purposes: in the interest of unified state 
authority against noble privileges, or in the interest of the individual citizen against 
the authority of the state; in brief, it was a very flexible tool in the struggle about 
what law was.”50
49 Stollberg-Rilinger (2016) 203.
50 Stollberg-Rilinger (2016) 207.
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Michael Stolleis sets a somewhat different accent in discussing the driving 
force of early modern natural law in legal policy, identifying four key function 
of natural law:
“The natural law of early modernity performed four essential functions: it supplied 
the key provisions of emerging international law, which, as Europe expanded in 
Asia and America, needed a new rational conceptual apparatus applicable for ‘all 
humanity’. It constituted a rational legal theory (broadly independent of Roman 
law) and thus provided a critical yardstick for labyrinthine extant law. It prepared 
the national codifications absolutism sought by promoting the development of 
general legal concepts and designing an (abstract) order. Finally, it supported the 
establishment of a neutral legal basis on which the feuding religious parties of ‘Old 
Europe’ could meet while factoring out the issue of truth, an early form of later 
tolerance and protection of the freedom of religion as a basic right.”51
* The political fungibility of natural law: harmonious political developments 
and shifts of emphasis
In his major history of public law in Germany, Michael Stolleis identifies four 
phases in the development of natural law, each of which he attributes to specific 
authors:
“1. The natural law of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries integrated into 
the theological context of late medieval scholasticism (J. Oldendorp, F. Vitoria, 
F. Vasquez, B. de Ayala, F. Suarez, P. Ramus, J. Althusius, H. Grotius); 2. The ‘clas-
sical’ natural law systems or state constructions largely emancipated from moral 
theology developed more geometrico (Hobbes, Spinoza, Pufendorf, Wolff); 3. The 
natural law theories of the High Enlightenment, in which the moral and legal 
regulatory systems (honestum, decorum, iustum) are separated from the sake of indi-
vidual freedom of action and which deploy natural law chiefly as systematic-critical 
benchmark vis-à-vis antiquated legal states of affairs (Thomaisus, Wolff); and 4. The 
liberal and individualistic natural law systems emerging in the aftermath of the 
Revolution, whose demands for fundamental rights and the separation of powers 
constituted a transition to the catalogue of German early constitutionalism from 
1800.”52
According to Stolleis, political developments match these four phases:
“Natural law systems respond to the times; their full significance is to be understood 
only from the double perspective of the link between individual thought and his-
torico-situational dependence. The veil of abstract phrasing conceals passionately 
experienced practical problems. In the age of the wars of religion, early absolutism, 
and the imperialist ventures of the Spanish, Dutch, and English to acquire colonial 
51 Stolleis (2014) 148.
52 Stolleis (1988) 269.
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empires, natural law could achieve three things: it provided an interconfessional 
theoretical level at which the religious conflict could be neutralized by elaborating 
universally binding legal bases. It offered an opportunity to give timelessly valid 
form to the political pressure of the princely state and to support the estates-based 
state in the struggle against absolutism through the natural-law grounding of inter-
national and estate sovereignty. And, finally, drawing on the ancient dualism of jus 
naturale et gentium and jus civile, natural law transcending all nations and positive 
international law brought forth jointly by the nations could be developed to regu-
late and attenuated war.”53
He describes the political embeddedness of phases two to four in the develop-
ment of natural law as follows:
“In the second phase, which coincided with ‘high’ absolutism, the estate-based state 
suffered defeat or was at least rolled back; the religious question had become less 
urgent and the European states had agreed on procedures for limiting conflict. All 
efforts now concentrated on internally enforcing the state’s monopoly of force and 
preventing revolutions, civil wars, and local uprisings, on rationally constructing the 
machinery of government, notably through legislation, and on subjugating the 
remaining intermediary powers in a united territorial entity.
In the third phase, in which state, society, and individual begin to differentiate, 
in which religiousness and happiness take an individualistic turn towards the ‘pri-
vate’, natural law offers protective arguments against tutelage by Church and state, it 
limits state interference by abolishing ‘irrational’ proceedings, offences, and punish-
ments; i e., it also has a practical and reformatory impact on the constituent society 
through ‘enlightened’ state lawmaking.
Finally, in the fourth phase, the always inherent revolutionary components in 
natural law developed when, in the late eighteenth century, it supported critique of 
the Ancien Régime. By demonstrating that estate-based restrictions and discrimi-
nation run counter to ‘natural rights’, it justified changes to the status quo; it 
becomes the ‘natural law of the revolutionary’ who evoked the inalienable right 
to protection against human oppression in legal form.”54
* Natural law as political theory: changes in the political thrust of natural law
As we have seen, natural law is multifunctional and highly fungible from a 
political point of view: in brief, “there is scarcely any philosophical or polit-
ical standpoint that has not been justified by natural law in the course of the 
centuries.”55 Despite the seemingly arbitrary deployment of the “all-purpose 
weapon natural law,” it is nevertheless useful to clarify the political thrust of 
natural law, as Diethelm Klippel has done in his seminal study on the 
53 Stolleis (1988) 269–270.
54 Stolleis (1988) 270.
55 Klippel (1987) 267.
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political importance of German natural law in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries.56
As far as natural law in early modernity is concerned – associated with the 
names Pufendorf, Thomasius, and Wolff – he and many others posit that 
natural law operated as a political theory of absolutism:
“… older German natural law … is ruler’s law and a tool for stabilizing monarchic 
absolutism. Pronouncing on the relationship between ruler and subject, the subfield 
of natural law ius publicum universale opts clearly in favour of the ruler: ‘Regere 
Rempublicam Principibus prorium;quare et ius publicum universale Principibus prop-
rium’.57 This is the case for many natural law theories. The subject in the state, 
for instance, unlike man in a state of nature (and thus also the ruler) is described 
not in terms of libertas but of subiectio. He is due at most factual freedom. The 
turning point from libertas naturalis to obedience by the subject is the social con-
tract, which cannot always be understood as an ‘emancipatory category’ but is used 
in masterly fashion, especially by older German natural law, to justify absolutism. 
This is achieved with the figure of the ‘tacit social contract’. The patientia or taci-
turnitas of subjects is taken to mean their consent to the conclusion and the terms of 
the contract, up to and including unbounded power for the ruler. Thus, natural law 
systems not only fail to run counter to absolutism but use the contract model to 
shield and enforce it theoretically.”58
Similarly, Michael Stolleis has this to say under the heading “natural law and 
absolutism”:
“The theory of natural law in the phase of the power struggle between the absolute 
monarchical state and its opponents (estates, nobility, and cities) performed an 
essentially practical function of promoting the concentration of state authority in 
the hands of an individual. Because it was able to show that the succession God-
ruler-paterfamilias corresponded to the natural hierarchy of the patriarchy and that 
the vesting of sovereign rights in one person best served the need of the weak 
individual for protection, natural law proved a suitable tool for justifying and 
securing princely rule. Since it went beyond extant positive law, it served especially 
to modernize the legal order. Owing to its symmetry and external calculability, it 
could be used to smooth down or eliminate medieval legal conditions. To impose 
itself, the emerging territorial state needed to abolish a multiplicity of traditional 
special rights. Rights were now no longer to be granted to an individual or to 
individual special-right communities as privilegium but to be enforced as objective 
norms applicable for all. Variously structured special-right groups were gradually 
superseded by the unitary body of subjects; the modern use of the word suiectus
(subject) marked the demand to this effect clearly enough. The associated concen-
56 Klippel (1987).
57 Fritsch (1734) 5.
58 Klippel (1987) 271.
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tration of power was at the same time the precondition for unitary legislation that at 
least aspired to equality among subjects. The hope that the traditional addition of 
special rights could be replaced by uniformes leges59 encouraged the codification 
efforts of the eighteenth century inspired by natural law.”60
Stolleis sums up the function of the language of natural law as a language of 
politics in relation to absolutism: “Natural law has therefore served both to 
establish and to juridify the modern state intent on uniformity and the 
rational pursuit of ends. Both absolutism and its opponents in the estates, 
the cities, and the confessions helped themselves to its tools, legitimizing 
and criticizing government each on the basis of what, from their particular 
perspective, constituted “natural law.” Neither ideology nor the critique of 
ideology could do without the evocative topos “nature.”61
Only from about 1790, as Klippel shows, did a distinct, truly radical 
change occur in the political thrust of natural law: towards liberal political 
theory:62
“A glance at the natural law theory literature quickly reveals the change in direction: 
the focus is on ‘humanity’, the personal nature of the human being, which is an end 
in itself and a basis for copious catalogues of human rights.They include, albeit with 
differing frequency, almost all such rights that have become an integral part of 
liberal political theory, especially since the American Bill of Rights and the French 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, such as the freedom to engage in a 
trade or industry, property, freedom of opinion and the press, and the freedom of 
religion. Furthermore, these rights are understood as directed against the state and 
feed into an incipient conceptual separation of state and civil society.
These demands would have come to nothing had natural law not changed its 
frame of reference. The older conception of any form of pre-state state of nature was 
therefore abandoned. ‘To be exact, the true state of nature, i e., the condition appro-
priate to the nature of man, is none other than the state.’63 Consequently, natural 
law now formulated its demands – notably the catalogues of human rights – no 
longer for the state of nature in the sense of older theory and hence for sovereign 
rulers and their families, but for every human being and for realization in the state. 
If we regard the essence of man in the state – immutable in all conditions – as a state 
of nature, we (and what more do we want) arrive at natural and proven rights that 
59 Ickstatt (1747) 792.
60 Stolleis (1988) 276–277.
61 Stolleis (1988) 277.
62 Klippel (1987) 273–274.
63 Schaumann (1792) 149.
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are subject to no change or contradiction and which can and must be a valid norm 
for all courts and a reliable touchstone for all proposed rights and demands’.”64
If, as Klippel shows at length, natural law carved out its political riverbed in 
the late eighteenth century, this does not invalidate our finding that the 
language of natural law has always operated as a language of politics. On 
the contrary, this is demonstrated particularly clearly by the so-called renais-
sance of natural-law thinking after the collapse of the Nazi regime, a phase of 
German history in which – as the post-1945 literature shows65 – was to 
enable a political re-orientation evoking natural law.
Before bringing our reflections on Enlightenment and natural law to a 
close and embarking on an excursus on the global history of knowledge in 
the eighteenth century, we shall take a brief look at the link between natural 
law and globalization – still under the guidance of Michael Stolleis.66
IV. Natural law as a phenomenon concomitant with globalization?
In an essay on “Naturgesetz und Naturrecht,” Michael Stolleis posits that the 
first wave of globalization promoted the development of universal natural 
law. As he (and we67) understand it, the period concerned in the discovery of 
the world in the fifteenth century:68
“If by globalization we mean a special expansion of communication and commodity 
flows around the world and a specific perception of world society as ‘a whole’, this 
development begins in human history in 1492. The circumnavigation of the globe 
and the discovery of America by the Portuguese and Spanish in the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries enormously broadened experience of the world, and were very 
likely the necessary run-up to the ‘Copernican revolution’ of 1543. The earth was 
now definitively grasped as a spherical planet in orbit around the sun, which could 
be circumnavigated, explored, and taken possession of. As everyone knows, this took 
place during the centuries of European expansion from the sixteenth to the nine-
teenth century.”69
64 Klippel (1987).
65 See, for example, the collections of essays by Maihofer (ed.) (1966).
66 Stolleis (1988).
67 Schuppert, G. F. (2014).
68 Stolleis (1988) 140.
69 Reinhard (1983, 1985, 1988, 1990); Fisch (1984).
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This exploration, surveying, and appropriation of the world, he claims, saw 
the birth of universal natural law in the form of international law claiming 
universal validity.
“The entire process, I posit, was the essential driving force for the development of a 
universal natural law. Since the earth had now become finite and accessible through 
the circumnavigation of Africa to the east and the crossing of the Atlantic to the 
west, the leap could now be made from geographical unity to universal legal unity. 
The heyday of the School of Salamanca, for example with the relecciones De Indis
and De iure belli by Francisco de Vitoria, the writings of Hugo Grotius ‘Mare 
liberum, sive de iure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana commercia dissertatio’ 
(1609) and ‘De iure belli ac pacis’ (1625), John Selden’s ‘Mare clausum seu de 
dominio maris’ (1635) are patently shaped by the expansive activities of the great 
colonial nations. Now that the western European monarchies found themselves in 
competition with one another in their forays on the high seas and in strategically 
important trading posts, they needed an international legal basis. Even though 
emerging international law developed at an early date as a special area of natural 
law, both were generally applicable. They were to apply for Christians and heathens, 
and if not for all heathens then at least for those who lived in advanced civilizations 
and with whom, from the European point of view, one could negotiate ‘on equal 
terms’. In this sense, traditional ius gentium developed into law inter gentes.”70
However, Stolleis goes still further, speculating on the role of universal 
natural law in current globalization:
“If one of the essential causes of the rise of natural law in early modern times was 
the first wave of globalization, how does it stand with second-wave, present-day 
globalization? Since the nineteenth century, it encompasses all means of communi-
cation and transport and at the turn of the twentieth to the twenty-first century it 
has expanded into a factually global society. There is intensive discussion in modern 
international law about whether this will lead to constitutionalization of the new 
world order. The universal catalogue of human rights (perhaps also modified from 
culture to culture), emerging international criminal law, and worldwide networks 
of transnational law and non-state law all point in this direction. The law that holds 
together or overarches this new ‘multinormativity’ would have to be a new natural 
law. A ‘natural law without God’, nurtured by the thinking of early modernity, 
modernized for modern world society, held together by consensus, what else? Even 
the Roman law notion that natural law applies equally to humans, animals on the 
face of the earth, birds in the air, and everything that swims in water (D. 1,1,3) 
could, in the light of ecological dangers come back into favour.”71
70 Stolleis (1988) 141.
71 Stolleis (1988) 148–149.
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Chapter Two
The Language of International Law as a Language of Politics
Before considering a number of paradigmatic cases to demonstrate that the 
language of international law72 provides innumerable examples of use as a 
language of politics, we take an overall look at the central role that language 
plays in the discourses of international law, at who uses it and how as a 
“language of politics.”
A. Some particularities of the language of international law
I. The key role of language in a legal regime between ideas and facts
The deontological order proposed by international law has always been 
suspected of fragility because a central enforcement authority73 is lacking 
and pure political power prevails because, “in individual cases,” dominant 
states tend to exploit international law when it serves their political objec-
tives while ignoring it or interpreting it to suit their purposes when it runs 
counter to their interests.74
With Martti Koskenniemi one could say that international law is at home 
in two worlds: the world of ideas – so that the history of international law 
would also have to be written as a political history of ideas75 – and the world 
of power – so that the history of international law would have to be pre-
sented as a history of power.76,77 In “From Apology to Utopia,” Koskenniemi 
describes how international law sits on the fence:
72 Both “Völkerrecht” (literally “law of nations”) and “internationales Recht” translate as 
“international law,” the more current term in German being “Völkerrecht.”
73 On the key importance of different norm enforcement regimes see Schuppert, G. F.
(2016b) Chapter 4: “From the Plurality of Normative Orders to the Plurality of Norm 
Enforcement Regimes: Jurisdictional Communities and their Specific Jurisdictional Cul-
tures,” 188–250.
74 Outstanding among the critics of international law are protagonists of the “rational 
choice” approach; see, for instance, Goldsmith / Posner (2003).
75 See Grewe (1984).
76 On history as the history of power see Mann (1994, 2001).
77 Deitelhoff / Zürn (2016).
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“According to one view, international law is a set of ideas, manifested in the form of 
rules. This is followed by an epistemology according to which to know international 
law objectively is to grasp those rules in their authenticity. State behaviour, will or 
interest are sociological facts which may have had an effect on the law but which are 
external to its present content. To concentrate on facts is both an epistemological 
error (as it fails to notice that facts appear through conceptual apparatuses) and loses 
the law’s normativity, its capacity of being opposed to naked power.
According to another view, international law is a fact. This is accompanied by an 
epistemology according to which rules are only ‘transcendental nonsense’. To make 
sense of them, they must be referred back to the (social, biological, economic, 
power-based etc.) facts (needs, interests) to which they give more or less adequate 
expression. To stare at the abstract formulations of rules is doctrinal subjectivism. A 
concrete study of law needs to relate rules to their social context.”78
However, we would not be taken in by a fruitless dichotomy if ideas and 
facts were played off against one another. We fully agree with Koskenniemi 
that we perceive and order the world of facts with the help of ideas and 
conceptual schemes, so that, armed with a “cognitive map,”79 we can find 
some sort of orientation: “… [O]ur perception of facts is always conditioned 
by conceptual schemes which have already organized the world in some 
intelligible fashion … all knowledge about facts is interpreting knowledge, 
… the ‘real world cannot be grasped in its purity but only in its reflection in 
a conceptual scheme. These conceptual schemes – social theories, scientific 
paradigms, assumptions, psychological predispositions etc. – ‘fabricate’ what 
we feel as neutral facts.”80
Language now comes into play, for with its help we structure the infinity 
of random facts.
“The most obvious conceptual scheme which controls our perception is language. 
As Roland Barthes points out, reality is divided by language, not by itself.81 Con-
trary to the common-sensical view, language does not reflect the world but inter-
prets it, carves it up, makes sense of the amorphous mass of things and events in it. 
In this sense, facts are constructed as they are perceived though language. Just as 
language is conventional, so is the world it mediates. There is no necessary, ‘objec-
tive’ reason why some aspects of the world are categorized while some are not. The 
feeling of sense and relevance which we relate to the world is not the reason but the 
effect of language. … [T]here is no such pure observation of international reality as 
78 Koskenniemi (2005) 520.
79 See Rosa (1999).
80 Koskenniemi (2005) 524–525.
81 Barthes (1983).
146 Part Three
law-as-fact lawyers assume. In some way or other, our conventional ways of speaking 
about international relations and international law seem to determine what we can 
believe to take place in international life.”82
Such concepts include not only ‘the State’ but also ‘contract’, ‘intervention’, 
and ‘owner’:
“… [L]egal terms such as ‘owner’, ‘contract’, ‘corporation’ or ‘intervention’, ‘treaty’, 
‘government’ appear not to mirror social reality but constitute what can be seen in 
it. It is simply impossible to think of a political balance of power, for example, 
without having internalized a legal-formal concept of the State and some idea of 
binding contract whereby alliances can be formed. Though it would be incorrect to 
say that the 19th century system of Great Power primacy was legal construction, its 
functioning presupposed legally formulated agreement on European matters and 
the principal method of maintaining the system – collective intervention – was a 
legal construction. Similarly, when American and Soviet leaders meet today, the 
context of their discussion is structured and the choices delimited by the goal of 
reaching legally formulated agreement.”83
If this is indeed the case, jurists – in all fields and not only in international 
law – must be able above all to handle language. Years of legal socialization 
have convinced the author that it is not a matter of amassing legal knowl-
edge (even though this has its uses) but of mastering legal argument, that is 
to say, learning what is called “legal reasoning.” Not only a certain vocabulary 
must be mastered but also the grammar of a language. A lawyer proficient in 
the language of law in this sense can argue for and against any issue. This has 
earned the profession the reputation of perverting the course of justice; in 
fact the capability is proof of competence in the law. In the epilogue to 
“From Apology to Utopia,” Martti Koskenniemi comments:
“[This book] seeks to articulate the competence of native language-speakers of inter-
national law. It starts from the uncontroversial assumption that international law is 
not just some haphazard collection of rules and principles. Instead, it is about their 
use in the context of legal work. The standard view that international law is a 
‘common language’ transcending political and cultural differences grasps something 
of this intuition. So do accounts of the experience that even in the midst of political 
conflict, international lawyers are able to engage in professional conversation in 
which none of the participants’ competence is put to question by the fact that they 
support opposite positions. On the contrary, lawyers may even recognize that their 
ability to use rules in contrasting ways is a key aspect of their competence – reflected in 
popular caricatures of lawyers as professional cynics. Whatever our view about the 
82 Koskenniemi (2005) 525.
83 Koskenniemi (2005) 526.
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moral status of the profession, however, that status is not an aspect of a person’s 
quality as a ‘native language-speaker of international law’. Or to put this in another 
vocabulary, international law is not necessarily representative of what is ‘good’ in 
this world. This is why the linguistic analogy seems so tempting. Native language-
speakers of, say, Finnish, are also able to support contrasting political agendas with-
out the question of the genuineness of their linguistic competence ever arising. From 
Apology to Utopia seeks, however, to go beyond metaphor. Instead of examining 
international law like a language it treats it as a language. This is not as exotic as 
it may seem. No more is involved than taking seriously the views that, whatever else 
international law might be, at least it is how international lawyers argue, that how they 
argue can be explained in terms of their specific ‘competence’ and that this can be 
articulated in a limited number of rules that constitute the ‘grammar’ – the system of 
production of good legal arguments.”84
If language is so important for the resonance capacity of actors in the world 
of law, we must sit up and take notice when language usage changes 
whether suddenly or gradually. We now turn to this question.
II. The importance and function of “semantic shifts”
in the field of international law
Martti Koskenniemi is an author particularly interested in the vocabularies 
of international law discourses, and who accordingly registers every change 
in language usage. In “Legitimacy, Rights, and Ideology”85 he identifies what 
we have called “semantic shifts,” even discovering a new language, the “lan-
guage of legitimacy.”
We turn first to “change of vocabularies”:
“‘We need to treat our normative concepts less as statements about the world than as 
tools and weapons of ideological debate.’86 As Quentin Skinner has shown us, 
tracing the lineaments of the change of political concepts works from ideological 
description to critique. When vocabularies – especially normative vocabularies – 
change, at issue is also a shift in the way the social world is being understood: some 
ways of describing the world begin to seem passé or inappropriate, old positive 
words transform into names for negative stereotypes. Terms such as ‘manliness’ or 
‘virtue’ that we remember from nineteenth century politics and the classical tradi-
tion, for example, have turned into negative or ironic markers, carrying fragments of 
meaning from past vocabularies that make them inappropriate for use in contem-
porary politics. Such changes are not only about political correctness. They reflect 
84 Koskenniemi (2005) 567–568.
85 Koskenniemi (2003).
86 Skinner (2002) 177.
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transformations in seeing the social world, highlighting some of its aspects, downplay-
ing others. As critique, conceptual study draws attention to the blindspots and 
biases of such markers, and of those that have replaced them, thus enquiring into 
the way language enacts politics.”87
Such a change in language usage occurred after the Cold War.
“The transformations in the international world that are customarily addressed as 
‘end of the Cold War’ have likewise occasioned a shift in diplomatic and academic 
vocabularies: the languages of political realism that used to describe the international 
world in terms of the use of power to advance (State) interests have been supple-
mented and, in part, replaced by a normative vocabulary proposing what Skinner 
would call a ‘rhetorical redescription’ of the international world through normative 
expressions such as ‘accountability’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, ‘rule of law’ and so 
on. Examined through the simple realist / idealist dichotomy, this shift might be 
seen to describe the transformation since 1989 as a return to the application of 
domestic categories to international affairs, advocated by the liberal legal cosmopo-
litanism that emerged in Europe in the 1870’s and was institutionalized in and 
around the League of Nations. That would, however, suggest that the change would 
be, as it were, backwards, and perpetuate the simplistic view that international 
politics is ‘essentially’ about a more or less mindless to-and-fro between periods 
of heightened (‘idealistic’) awareness of the importance of ‘law’ and ‘morality’ 
and periods in which everyone’s attention is focused (‘realistically’) on ‘power’ 
and ‘interests’.”88
But there are not only cycles of language usage focused on ideas or on power 
politics, but also the arrival of a new language on the stage of world politics, 
which Koskenniemi calls the “language of legitimacy.”
“The new normative language seeks to transcend the idealism / realism dichotomy 
by accommodating realist criticism. Instead of ‘international law’ or ‘international 
morality’ it uses the language of ‘legitimacy’ to grasp at the political momentum. An 
examination of that vocabulary – of which ‘human rights’ forms an inextricable part 
– may thus open a window on the nature of today’s international political change. 
Unlike realist fixation on states and power, or the idealist moorings on international 
law and morality, ‘legitimacy’ possesses an elusiveness well adapted to the realities of 
a fluid, complex and globalizing world. Containing (unlike law) no commitment to 
particular institutional forms and (unlike morality) no implication of transcenden-
tal standards, as well as unburdened by the negative connotations linked to words 
such as ‘legalism’ and ‘moralism’ the notion of ‘legitimacy’redescribes the international 
world in terms of categories whose beneficiality seems self-evident: lawfulness, fun-
damental values and human rights. It does this as an exercise neither in law nor 
87 Koskenniemi (2003) 349.
88 Koskenniemi (2003) 349–350.
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political philosophy but in terms of an empirically oriented social science that 
connects popular attitudes with institutional decision-making, being itself a part 
of the latter.”89
Interestingly, this new language also changes relations between academic dis-
ciplines:
“The conceptual shift also marks a move in the play of authority between academic 
disciplines. The vocabulary of legitimacy pushes lawyers, political philosophers and 
realist international relations scholars all to the margin: their antics become part of 
the world left behind by the transformations that only become visible if articulated 
by the mélange of empirical sociology, psychology, and liberal political theory that is 
now offered by the language of legitimacy, conveniently transgressing the boundary 
between observation of and participation in politics.”90
III. Power politics as “semantic imperialism”
That legal norms need to be interpreted because they take linguistic form is 
almost a truism and requires no further comment. Nor is there any disput-
ing that those entitled to deliver binding interpretations of the legal concepts 
contained in a text are vested with considerable interpretative authority. As 
Andreas Kulick has recently shown,91 the “vagueness and ambiguity” of legal 
texts has considerable political potential:
“Vagueness and Ambiguity in (international) law possesses an inherently political 
potential. [I]f we enter the interpretation of a text with certain preconceptions, 
looking at it through the lens of our societal, cultural, etc. situated-ness, we inevi-
tably will adapt the meaning to our world view as meaning exists only within our 
‘horizon’ – which is also shaped by our political conception of the world. In many 
instances this may happen inadvertently, i e. non-strategically, but the political 
potential of Vagueness and Ambiguity may also be used deliberately, i e. strategically. 
This is not a new insight. As Martti Koskenniemi reminds us, it is not so much the 
fact that a meaning can often be twisted in several different directions but rather 
that classical legal thought has shrouded such subjectivity in a language and 
demeanour of objectivity that makes interpretation such a powerful tool.92 Vague-
ness and Ambiguity are the fuel on which this engine runs. Just look at the highly 
89 Koskenniemi (2003) 350–351.
90 Koskenniemi (2003) 351.
91 Kulick (2017).
92 See Koskenniemi (2004) 197, 199: “[T]he objective of the contestants is to make their 
partial view of that meaning appear as the total view, their preferences seem like the 
universal preference.”
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vague notion of ‘self-determination’ in international law employed as a means for 
Russia to justify Crimea’s secession from Ukraine93 and incorporation into the 
Russian Federation.”94
If this is the case, it would be an obvious a move to build a defined measure 
of vagueness and ambiguity into a legal text – such as a contract – from the 
outset. Inspired by Andreas Kulick, we could thus speak of the strategic 
production of vagueness:
“VaA are being produced constantly. The lessons learned from hermeneutics and 
linguistics tell us that literally any use of language may produce VaA. Hence, any 
treaty, resolution, judgement, etc. may potentially produce VaA. What needs to be 
distinguished for the purposes of this study, however, is inadvertent [sic] from 
deliberate VaA production, i e. strategic from non-strategic VaA production. Non-strate-
gic VaA production is the most common occurrence, e. g. the definition of a term in 
a United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) resolution laying out sanctions against 
a recalcitrant state. The sanctions regime is supposed to be highly specific in order to 
avoid loopholes as well as targeting the wrong industries or persons. If, for example, 
the definition of ‘chemical weapons’ remains ambiguous or even vague, this may 
seriously undermine the effect of the sanction.
On the other hand, the same resolution, at least in the intention of some of its 
drafters, may deliberately remain vague and / or ambiguous in order to (a) reach a 
consensus among the required majority of the Security Council members, …; and 
(b) at the same time allow for as much leeway of interpretation that some members 
may pursue a goal that other members sought to prevent, while not going beyond 
what the language of the resolution permits.”95
What Kulick calls “constructive ambiguity” can be regarded as one form of 
the strategic production of vagueness:96
“In this final section, I will investigate a specific strategy in the practice of the 
creation of international norms in relation to Vagueness and Ambiguity production 
and reception, the so-called ‘constructive ambiguity’. In the context of international 
negotiations on the adoption of treaties, resolutions, etc., ‘constructive ambiguity’ 
describes the phenomenon of negotiators deliberately – i. e. usually deliberately on 
all sides of the negotiation table – inserting terms and phrases into the respective 
document that blur the meaning of the text in order to build consensus by getting 
all sides to commit to a final document that allows for everybody to ascribe it a 
93 See address by the President of the Russian Federation of 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
news/6889.
94 Kulick (2017) 14.
95 Kulick (2017) 7.
96 Kulick (2017) 18–19.
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meaning suitable for his or her purposes. Differently put, ‘Constructive ambiguity 
attempts to fashion agreement where there is none’.”97
As Carl Schmitt would have put it, the benefits offered by a strategy of 
working with “dilatory formulatory compromises”98 are obvious. Andreas 
Kulick:
“What are the benefits of this strategy? The problems entailing ambiguity (or vague-
ness) are obvious and potentially disastrous: imagine, e. g., an armistice treaty that 
does not clearly define the front lines or a peace treaty that leaves vague the con-
ditions to be fulfilled by either party in order to permanently withdraw military 
personnel from occupied land. ‘Constructive ambiguity’ push[es] fundamental dis-
agreement from the drafting stage to the implementation stage’.99 which with 
respect to peace agreements may result in the opposite, i. e. war.
On the other hand, often – and particularly if the question of war and peace is at 
stake – reaching an agreement is better than none at all, whatever its flaws. In this 
vein, Vagueness and Ambiguity represent the solution to negotiation deadlock. 
Further, constructive ambiguity or vagueness make it possible for both sides to 
claim victory at the negotiation table without having to determine the victor in 
actual military confrontation. …
Furthermore,Vagueness and Ambiguity mean flexibility, which is a valuable asset 
with regard to agreements that require a long period of implementation or in any 
case with ‘constitutional’ treaties that are supposed to establish a long-term frame-
work. The more precise the language chosen the more specific it has to get and the 
more it is prone to loopholes or to leaving out the regulation of entire sets of issues 
that the contracting parties may not have been able to anticipate at the time of the 
conclusion of the agreement.”100
If vagueness and ambiguity are not only particularly frequent in interna-
tional law but are also produced with strategic intent, and if those entitled to 
interpret indeterminate concepts needful of definition gain considerable 
interpretative authority in the process, hegemonic powers will obviously 
use their political ascendancy to practice what we could call “semantic 
imperialism,” for example unilaterally defining “terrorism” or “war” in the 
context of “war on terror” against the facts. With such practices, the hegem-
onic power ultimately excludes itself from the legal discourse community, a 
consequence that Martti Koskenniemi describes as follows:
97 Bell (2008) 166.
98 Schmitt (1996).
99 Bell (2008) 166.
100 Kulick (2017) 19.
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“Unlike claims of privilege or interest, claims of law constitute the claimants as 
members of a legal, and thus also a political community. Engaging in legal dis-
course, persons recognize each other as carriers of rights and duties who are entitled 
to benefits from or owe obligation to each other not because of charity or interest 
but because such rights or duties belong to every member of the community in that 
position. In law, benefits and burdens that belong to particular individuals or groups 
are universalized by reference to membership rules. What otherwise would be a 
mere private violation, a wrong done to me, a violation of my interest, is transformed 
by law into a violation against everyone in my position, a matter of concern for the 
political community itself. One of the striking aspects of the worldwide condem-
nation of aspects of the American-led ‘war against terrorism’ is precisely the recourse 
to law. Guantánamo and the war against Iraq were not just wrong, they were 
‘illegal’. The point of such a claim lies in its implicit suggestion that at issue are 
not merely specific wrongs done to some Afghani or Iraqi individuals but to every-
one in their position – and most people are able to imagine themselves in such a 
position. Through law, the special scandal of American action may be articulated in 
terms of its universal nature, its being directed against the international political 
community itself. This is also the sense of the frequent claim that the action appears 
‘imperial’. It denies any need for the United States to take a distance from its own 
cultural preferences and to articulate its claims in the (legal) language of the com-
munity. It is a solipsism that resigns to the impulse of feeling threatened by ‘terro-
rists’ and those that ‘harbour’ them, believing they may be attacked or killed wher-
ever and whenever it suits the empire.The action is informed only by American laws 
and values that exclude those who are not recognized by those laws or share those 
values – with them, there is neither political community nor political contestation: 
they are ‘outlaws’ against whom whatever measures may be taken.”101
B. The language of international law as a language of justification
I. The history of international law as a history of justificatory narratives
Wilhelm G. Grewe’s standard work on the epochs of the history of interna-
tional law102 reads like a history of justificatory narratives. There are two 
prime examples that foster this impression. The first is the struggle for legit-
imate “sovereignty of the sea,” the second is the justification of colonialism 
thinly veiled as “mission civilisatrice et religieuse.”103
101 Koskenniemi (2005) 21–22.
102 Grewe (1984).
103 See also my own reflections on globalization as “mission civilisatrice et religieuse” in: 
Schuppert, G. F. (2014), Chapter 4, 262–353.
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Quite rightly, Grewe describes the historical importance of the civilisation 
concept in international law as embodying an attempt “to place the global 
political supremacy and colonizational function of the white race on a new 
legitimation basis corresponding to the changed conditions of the world in 
the nineteenth century.”104 In the very first issue of the “Archiv des öffen-
tlichen Rechts” founded in 1885 – long the most prestigious public-law 
journal – F. von Martitz gave expression to this justificatory narrative on 
the occasion of the Berlin Congo Conference:
“European governments, together with the North American Union, cognizant that 
dominion over the world belongs to the civilized nations and that leadership in 
modern world politics is in the hands of an aristocracy of nations, have taken the 
decisive step of bestowing on the last part of the inhabited earth, hitherto a mere 
geographical concept, the political organization under the protection of which 
human history unfolds. It is their intention to add to the European system of states, 
joined in the course of this century by an American and an Asian one, an African 
system. For this purpose they have availed themselves of the perfected forms and 
means that modern international law has provided for the peaceful solution of tasks 
that lie beyond the power and force of the single state; accordingly disposing by 
treaty over the vast territories of Central Africa; reconfirming the legal principle that 
areas in which savages and half-savages live are to be regarded and treated not as state 
territories but, in mutual relations between the civilized, as res nullius under inter-
national law.”105
Grew speaks of “proud words.” Anyone who has read David van Reybrouck’s 
history of the Congo,106 describing the cruel consequences of the “holy 
trinity” of state interests, commerce, and Church practices in the Congo 
will, however, be tempted to speak rather of cynical rhetoric.
If, in composing and enforcing a justificatory narrative, international law 
is, as Grewe rightly stresses, always concerned to place state actions – con-
quest of foreign territory, entering foreign merchant ships or whatever – on 
the most convincingly legitimate footing possible, it is not surprising that the 
cadence of international law’s “language of justification” frequently echoes the 
related “language of legitimacy”, which Christian Reus-Smit describes as fol-
lows:
“We use the language of legitimacy in a wide range of social situations. We describe it 
as legitimate for parents to ask after their child’s progress at school, and legitimate 
104 Grewe (1984) 532–533.
105 Martitz (1885) 16 f., quoted here from Grewe (1984) 533.
106 van Reybrouck (2012).
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for a tradesperson to ask for payment after work is done. In these contexts, the 
language of legitimacy is employed to describe not just the capacity to act, but the 
right or entitlement to act. Mark Suchman captures this when he defines legitimacy 
as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions’.107 It is in the political realm, though, that the original 
meaning of the term lies, deriving as it does from the quintessential politico-legal 
term ‘legislate’. Here legitimacy is generally taken to mean the right to rule, or the 
right to govern.108 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines ‘to rule’ as to be ‘in 
control’ and ‘right’ as ‘justification, fair claim, being entitled to privilege or immunity, 
thing one is entitled to’. In the political arena, broadly conceived, legitimacy thus 
refers to an entitlement to control, which generally means an entitlement to issue 
authoritative commands that require compliance from those subject to them. An 
actor can be said to command legitimacy, therefore, when its decisions and actions 
(and I would contend identities and interests) are socially sanctioned.”109
We turn to another author who, like Grewe and others,110 has addressed the 
problem of periodizing the history of international law. In “A History of 
International Law Histories,” Martti Koskenniemi111 presents an important 
example of the historical application of international-law justificatory narra-
tives: the “ideologies of empire”:112
“‘International law and empire’ has now become perhaps the most popular item of 
international law history. When Jörg Fisch wrote Die europäische Expansion und das 
Völkerrecht in 1984, he was still a path-breaker – even as the overwhelming Anglo-
centrism of the field has left this basic work relatively unread.113 The burgeoning 
literature on the empire that is being produced today remains predominantly 
focused on the British world-system.114 Recent writing on European penetration 
in North America and the Southern hemisphere has focused on the dispossession of 
the native populations. Regarding the Spanish empire, the works by Luciano Pereña 
remain largely unknown outside Spain. Though not completely free of imperial 
apologetics, they are, alongside the 29 volumes of the Corpus Hispanorum de Pace 
(CHP) edited by Pereña, an invaluable (though again, little known) source of mate-
rials. In Italy, Luigi Nuzzo has thrown a post-colonial eye on the legal languages of 
107 Suchman (1995).
108 Coicaud (2002).
109 Reus-Smit (2007) 157ff.
110 A useful, compact treatment of the history of international law is provided by Neff
(2014).
111 Koskenniemi (2012).
112 Koskenniemi (2012) 964–965.
113 Fisch (1984).
114 See, for example, Sylvest (2008); Armitage (2000); MacMillan (2006).
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colonization and conquest115 and new works by Gozzi and Augusti deal with the 
encounter of non-European world with European law.116 In Germany, older and 
newer historical writing covers especially the law and morality of the Spanish con-
quest, with emphasis often on the writings of the Spanish theologians. But Ger-
many’s own colonial period (1880–1991) is still largely untreated from the perspec-
tive of international legal history. Finally, much of the political and economic 
history of empire, including novel works in ‘world history’ is full of legal implica-
tions, though rarely treated in a systematic fashion. This applies to accounts of the 
‘ideologies’ of empire as well as on the legal practices sustaining imperial admin-
istration.”117
At this point we turn to a somewhat more general examination of the 
function of justificatory narratives.
II. The function of justificatory narratives
Wherever justificatory narratives are under discussion, Rainer Forst will 
inevitably be mentioned as an author who has extensively and intensively 
investigated the function of such narratives.118 He shows that the function of 
justificatory narratives is to establish ruling authority and that the narratives 
are embedded in specific historical situations:119
“‘Normative orders’ are grounded in basal justifications and serve to justify social 
rules, norms, and institutions; they substantiate pretensions to power and a specific 
distribution of goods and life opportunities. A normative order is hence to be seen 
as a justificatory order: it both presupposes and generates justifications. Orders of this 
sort are embedded in justificatory narratives that develop in historical situations and 
are passed down and modified over longer periods of time. We therefore use the 
concept as a heuristic device to combine the normative dimension of justification 
intent on rational persuasion with the dimension of societally effective justification 
found convincing and practised by the parties involved and constituted by their 
experience and expectations. We consider justificatory narratives to be forms of 
embodied rationality. In them images, sectional narratives, rituals, facts, and myths 
are concentrated into efficacious overall narratives lending meaning to an order. 
Normative orders framed in narratives – especially those that are religious in nature 
(divine rights versus natural rights), that go back to political achievements like 
revolutions or victories (e. g., in wars of liberation), or to the processing of past 
115 Nuzzo (2004).
116 Gozzi / Manzini (eds.) (2008); Augusti (2009).
117 See particularly Pagden (1995); Benton (2002).
118 See, for example, Forst (1984); Forst (2007).
119 Forst (2013).
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collective injustice (e. g., crimes against humanity in the twentieth century) – have 
particularly strong binding force and authority; they gain historical importance, as 
well as emotional identificatory force. Historical experience with the breach of civi-
lization caused by the Shoah, for example, determines the context of the recent 
conception of human dignity and human rights. Memories of the many struggles 
against the colonial dominance of the Europeans enhances sensitivity towards one’s 
own right to cultural and religious identities and ways of life.”120
As Martin Seel has shown, however, it is always about a “context of justifi-
cation,” about being in the right or in the wrong:
“Whereas narratives generally place factual or fictive courses of events at various 
levels of complexity in a both causal and motivational context, whether transparent 
or opaque, justificatory narratives do more. They heighten not only what is narrated
but also the act of narration. They explain or question how right or just action in given 
situations has been, how much justice or injustice has been done to those actively or 
passively involved. How they narrate (their choice of words, how they start and 
finish, how they stress some events and ignore others, how they ponder over or hasten 
through the course of events and use many other stylistic devices) throws specific 
light on what they narrate that is in one way or another evaluative. They thus 
articulate and modify – and occasionally transform – the perspective from which 
the normative reasons for individual and collective action that count most for the 
narrators or narrative authorities are to be drawn. Justificatory narratives already 
achieve this in everyday life – but all the more so in the form of big theological, 
historical, and political narratives up to and including myth and art.”121
We now cast a brief look at the most important justificatory narratives in 
international law.
III. Two examples of justificatory narratives in international law
1. In search of legal title for violent Spanish expansion
in South and Central America
In his work on European expansion and international law,122 Jörg Fisch 
deals with the theories of the Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, 
whom many regard as the real father of international law:123 “For both 
the sixteenth century and beyond, the teachings of the Dominican Francisco 
120 Forst (2013) 13–14.
121 Seel (2013) 47–48.
122 Fisch (1984).
123 See the instructive article by Koskenniemi (2014).
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de Vitoria are by far the most important. He repeatedly addressed the rele-
vant issues. In 1539 he presented his views comprehensively and systemati-
cally in the lecture De Indis – On the American Indians. The entire later 
discussion in the sixteenth century can be seen as a commentary or debate 
on this lecture. And for later centuries, too, Vitoria provided almost all the 
points of discussion.”124
Vitoria is concerned with finding an appropriate justificatory narrative for 
Spanish expansion policy in South and Central America. He starts by defin-
ing and decisively rejecting seven conceivable titles of rule.
“(1.) The emperor was not master of the world by natural law, divine law, or human 
law. In his capacity as emperor he could therefore not dispose over the land of the 
American Indians. …
(2.) Neither was the pope secular ruler of the entire world, and could therefore not 
award land in America, and if the ‘barbarians’ refused to recognize the pope’s 
temporal dominion over them he was not empowered to wage just war on them. …
The thrust of his argument was clear: Christian, ecclesiastical pretensions to 
world rule often vesting at least spiritual power over unbelievers in the pope were 
rejected; the power of the Church was limited to Christendom.
(3.) Nor was there any legitimate title by right of discovery. Although ownerless land 
belonged to whoever occupied it, and the Spanish had been the first to discover and 
take possession of the American territories, America was not ownerless but 
inhabited by peoples with true public and private dominion. …
(4.) Refusal to convert to Christianity is no just ground for war. The barbarians were 
not obliged by a simple statement or announcement to believe where there are no 
miraculous signs or other reasons. Otherwise they would have to believe the Sar-
acens, too, were they to appear in the New World. No-one can be forced to believe. 
Unbelief is not injustice towards Christians and therefore gives them no right to 
conduct a just war, which can always be seen only as punishment for injustice 
suffered. …
(5.) Nor do the sins of Indians against natural law, e. g., incest or cannibalism, 
provide Christians with a reason for just war. Although these are undoubtedly 
the gravest of sins, the pope had no jurisdiction over unbelievers. This was all the 
more true for the Spanish kings, whose power over the American Indians had been 
delegated to them by the pope. …
124 Fisch (1984) 212.
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(6.) The argument that the Indians had freely chosen the Spanish king to rule over 
them also gave no legitimate title in this regard. For this choice was made in fear and 
ignorance, factors which vitiated any freedom of election.
(7.) Nor could the Spanish claim that God had made them His instrument for 
punishing the sins of the ‘barbarians’. It was very doubtful whether this was the 
case, and even if it were so, it could not justify the action taken by the Spanish.”125
Vitoria’s positions with regard to legitimate rights to rule are less clear. The first 
of these legal titles that Vitoria considered legitimate belongs firmly to 
international law and has primarily to do with free trade:
“The point of departure for the first legitimate title is the natural community and 
society of all humans. From this Vitoria derives a comprehensive right to freedom of 
movement and establishment, which may be restricted only if citizens of the host 
country suffer injustice at the hands of the foreigners. There is also a corresponding 
right to trade freely. No state may forbid its citizens to trade with the citizens of 
other states. Rights granted to some foreigners, for instance in mining, must also be 
equally available to all others. Finally, the children of immigrants must be granted 
citizenship in the host country. If the Indians refuse to grant the Spanish these 
rights, they may be obliged to do so by force, if need be by war.”126
The other legitimate titles are all religious in nature and justify a special right of 
proselytization. They include the following:127
“(2.) …
(3.) If any barbarians are converted to Christ, and their princes try to call them back 
to their idolatry by force or fear, the Spaniards may on these grounds wage ware on 
them. …
(4.) If a good proportion of the barbarians is converted to Christ, the pope might 
remove their infidel masters and give them a Christian prince if this is expedient for 
the preservation of the Christian faith. …
(5.) The Spanish are entitled to take action against the tyranny of barbarian rulers 
and their tyrannical laws. This covers above all cannibalism and human sacrifice, 
regardless of whether the victims wish to be liberated or not. …
(6.) If the ‘barbarians’ decided to accept the king of Spain as their prince by genu-
inely free choice, this might be a legitimate title, which could also be defended by 
force.”
125 Fisch (1984) 213 f.
126 Fisch (1984) 216.
127 Fisch (1984) 219.
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Vitoria’s indecisive attitude is interesting towards the question of whether 
the Spanish crown could lay claim to special civilizational rights on the 
grounds of the mental incapacity of American Indians:
“(8.) Finally, Vitoria raises a question that he does not venture to answer. Some 
claimed, he wrote, that the American Indians are ‘so close to being mad, that they 
are unsuited to setting up or administering a commonwealth’. If this were the case, 
the Spanish would be bound to take charge of them as if they were simply children 
or animals in their own interest in order to civilize them. Vitoria made not attempt 
to decide whether this was really the case. Over and above the special title of 
tyrannical rule, he does not reject special civilizational rights but doubts whether 
their justification, namely the uncivilized state of American Indian society, could be 
substantiated. Overall, however, this title played little part in his argumentation. 
Other late scholastics generally gave even less space to it. They relied on religious, 
not on civilizational special rights.”128
2. The “civilization and progress” project as a justificatory narrative
We return to the triad of commerce, civilizational expansion, and the Chris-
tian mission because the early phase of globalization, which is often equated 
with the onset of colonization, displays a tangle of strategies for justifying 
European expansion. According to Ernst Bloch, writing about travel, research, 
and discovery as components of cultural globalization,129 the geographical 
utopias “El Dorado and Eden” are almost inextricable. Those who sailed the 
seven seas were in quest of both “plunder and miracles.”130
Writing about the exploration of Central Africa under the heading Travel, 
Exploration, and Occupation,131 Johannes Fabian cites a report by Joseph 
Thomson (1881) on an expedition commissioned by the Royal Geographical 
Society:
„A few years ago, when Europe was stirred by the striking adventures of some of our 
later travellers, Livingston, Stanley, and Cameron, and united, with royalty at its 
head to form an International Association for the opening of Africa, a general belief 
arose that at last a new era of hope for the Dark Continent had been ushered in. 
Anticipations of civilizing centres dotted over the length and breadth of its vast area, 
were held by the most sanguine. Few corners were to be left unveiled. Everything 
128 Fisch (1984) 222.
129 Bloch (1959) 873ff.
130 Bloch (1959) 874 f.
131 Fabian (2000).
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that was good and great in Europe was to be transplanted to African soil, and under 
the nurturing care of International pioneers to be reared and developed. Travellers 
and other scientific men were to receive every assistance. Trade was to be introduced 
and developed; and of course Christianity, of whatever creed, was to be fostered and 
encouraged.
What has really been the result? Some years have passed, and as yet we have only 
the sublimely ridiculous spectacle of united Europe knocking its head idiotically 
against a wall, betraying an utter inability to grapple with the difficulties of the case, 
and making itself the laughing-stock to the benighted negroes whom it undertook 
to enlighten.”132
Niall Ferguson133 addresses the triad of commerce, spread of civilization, 
and Christian mission with particularly intensity. On the civilizational mis-
sion as ‘not-for-profit rationale for expanding British influence’ he has this to 
say:
“For two hundred years the Empire had engaged in trade, warfare and colonization. 
It had exported British goods, capital and people. Now, however, it aspired to export 
British culture. Africans might be backward and superstitious, but to this new 
generation of British Evangelicals, they also seemed capable of being ‘civilized’. 
As Macaulay put it, the time had come to ‘spread over (Africa’s) gloomy surface 
light, liberty and civilization’. Spreading the word of God and thereby saving the 
souls of the benighted heathen was a new, not-for-profit rationale for expanding 
British influence. It was to be the defining mission of the century’s most successful 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).”134
These most successful NGOs of the century were the innumerable mission 
societies, which can be described as a particularly interesting species of actor 
in religious globalization;135 they have been an important element is what 
we would now call the “voluntary sector,”136 which played a key role in the 
“mission civilisatrice et religieuse”:
“Like the non-governmental aid organizations of today, Victorian missionaries 
believed they knew what was best for Africa. Their goal was not so much coloniza-
tion as ‘civilization’: introducing a way of life that was first and foremost Christian, 
but was also distinctly North European in its reverence for industry and abstinence. 
The man who came to embody this new ethos of empire was David Livingstone. For 
Livingstone, commerce and colonization – the original foundations of the Empire – 
132 Fabian (2000) 23.
133 Ferguson (2003).
134 Ferguson (2003) 119 f.
135 Greater detail in Schuppert, G. F. (2014) 339ff.
136 See also, with further references, Schuppert, G. F. (1995c).
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were necessary, but not sufficient. In essence, he and thousands of missionaries like 
him wanted the Empire to be born again.
This was not a government project, but the work of what we today would call 
the voluntary sector. But the Victorian aid agencies’ good intentions would have 
unforeseen, and sometimes bloody, consequences.”137
So far so good. We turn now to a field where justificatory narratives played a 
vital role during early globalization.
IV. The struggle for command of the sea in the guise
of competition between sectional justificatory narratives
In Wilhelm G. Grewe’s account of epochs in the history of international law, 
it is at first glance astonishing how much space he devotes to the “legal order 
of the seas.” In all six parts the he addresses the maritime law problems 
specific to the given epoch. Listing the headings in chronological order 
provides a brief history of the international law of the sea:138
* The legal order of the seas: dominium maris – maritime dominion of the littoral 
powers
* The legal order of the seas: mare liberum versus mare clausum – the legal title to 
maritime dominion
* The legal order of the seas: the rights of neutral states in war as “liberté des mers”
* The legal order of the seas: freedom of the seas under British maritime dominion
* The legal order of the seas: the extinction of neutral rights in war
* The legal order of the seas: common heritage – the sea as common heritage of 
humankind
These headings alone show that a distinction must be made between the law 
of terra firma and the law of the sea and that “sovereignty of the sea” was a 
particularly contentious issue in the long history of European expansion. The 
vastness of the oceans is home not only to countless species of fish but also to 
the numerous justificatory narratives with which powers vying for command 
of the sea have armed themselves.
Before considering the most interesting of such narratives, we examine 
what makes the sea so fascinating to specialists in international law.
137 Ferguson (2003) 114.
138 Grewe (1984) 157ff., 300ff., 471ff., 647ff., 740ff., 801ff.
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1. Why seas are so fascinating
* State sovereignty and freedom of the seas
This was the title of an essay Carl Schmitt published in 1943 on the “struggle 
for reorganization of the newly discovered world.”139 For Schmitt, sailing the 
oceans and the discovery of hitherto unknown continents led to the out-
break of a “planetary spatial revolution,” which necessarily produced polarized 
the concepts land and sea:
“The struggle for the oceans set in with great force already in the mid-sixteenth 
century when the French, Dutch, and English took up arms against the monopoly 
over the sea claimed by the Spanish and Portuguese. Opposing spatial concepts for 
land and sea developed, poles apart between closure and openness. Firm land 
become state territory while the sea remained free, i. e., free from the state, not part 
of state territory. The astonishing dualism of European international law of recent 
centuries took shape. The usual, unselective term “international law” is incorrect 
and misleading, since in reality we have two parallel, unrelated systems of interna-
tional law. A Europecentric world order arose, but immediately broke down into 
land and sea. The land was divided into the territorially closed state territories of 
sovereign states while the sea remained free from the state. What does this mean for 
an international law regulating relations between states whose overarching concept 
of order is the state? The sea knows no boundaries, becomes a single, unitary space 
regardless of geographical location and propinquity, supposedly ‘free’ to all states 
without exception for the purposes of both peaceful trade and waging war.”140
This freedom of the sea from state control had originally, that is to say, before 
the founding of the major maritime empires, also meant that it was unregu-
lated. In “The Nomos of the Earth”141 Schmitt comments:
“Originally, before the birth of great sea powers, the axiom ‘freedom of the sea’ 
meant something very simple,That the sea was a zone free for booty. Here, the pirate 
could ply his wicked trade with a clear conscience. … On the open sea, there were 
no limits, no boundaries, no consecrated sites, no sacred orientations, no law, and 
no property. … On the sea there was no law.
Only when the great sea empires, maritime nations or, to use a Greek expression, 
thalassocracies, arose was security and order established on the sea.”142
Be that as it may; whether the sea is an originally law-free zone or – to be 
more accurate – a sparsely regulated zone, it was to become a zone of 
139 Schmitt (1943).
140 Schmitt (1943) 86.
141 Schmitt (2006).
142 Schmitt (2006) 43 f.
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competing legal claims at the latest with the advent of the sea-born empires 
competing for trade monopolies.
* World empires and oceans
This is the title of the third volume of the series on the “History of the 
World”143 brought out byAkira Iriye and Jürgen Osterhammel. This volume, 
edited by Wolfgang Reinhard, is concerned not only with world empires, 
their rise and fall144 – the usual topic of historians – but explicitly with the 
oceans as spaces of historical interest. The contribution by Stephan Coner-
mann addresses the history of the Indian Ocean,145 and Wolfgang Reinhard, 
writing about an Atlantic world146 classified primarily in terms of seafaring 
nations competing for trade monopolies, identifies the following:
* the Spanish Atlantic147
* the Portuguese Atlantic148
* the Dutch Atlantic149
* the Jewish Atlantic150
* the African Atlantic151 and
* the French and British Atlantic152
Wolfgang Reinhard explains the clearly burgeoning interest of historians in 
the oceans:
“Long before the ‘spatial turn’ in the social sciences and humanities, Fernand 
Braudel had in 1949 discussed the Mediterranean as historical space, identifying 
lasting geohistorical structures and long temporal waves of socio-economic 
cycles.153 His influence proved so great that practically every larger stretch of sea 
143 See six volumes of “Geschichte der Welt”: Gehrke (ed.) (2017); Kafadar (ed.) (2014); 
Reinhard (ed.) (2014); Conrad / Osterhammel (eds.) (2016); Rosenberg, E. (ed.) (2014); 
Iriye (ed.) (2013).
144 See also, with further references, Schuppert, G. F. (2014) Chapter 2: “Imperien und Netz-
werke als globalisierungstypische Governancestrukturen”, 101ff.
145 Conermann (2014).
146 Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 670–831.
147 Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 778ff.
148 Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 789ff.
149 Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 792ff.
150 Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 795ff.
151 Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 796ff.
152 Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 809ff.
153 Braudel (1992).
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is now likely to have found its historian. Several volumes of a new series Seas in 
History have appeared.154 Why the maritime perspective is successful is meanwhile 
clear. The ‘spatial turn’ having taught us to see space as a communication medium, the 
seas prove particularly interesting from this point of view. Lacking a stable human 
population and because of their remoteness from regulation, the seas lack the 
surplus qualitative ‘tenacity’ that enables places and countries to resist reduction 
to communication. Chapter three is therefore concerned not only with the Indian 
subcontinent but also with ‘the world of the Indian Ocean’, with East Africa, the 
Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and its littoral countries, and to the East at least the Gulf 
of Bengal.The final chapter addresses the ‘Atlantic world’, the communication space 
forming and formed by the inhabitants of three continents. However, in both cases, 
Braudel’s socio-economic perspective is broadened to include cultural history, and 
the human capacity for action he so misprized is once again taken seriously.”155
In similar vein Stephan Conermann writes about the Indian Ocean:
“Long before the fourteenth century, sailors, merchants, pious men, and migrants 
crossed the Indian Ocean in search of merchandise, new territories, and land for 
settling. Over the centuries, these constant activities transformed the Indian Ocean 
into an interactional space covered by many networks. The prime focus was on com-
merce, especially the transport, purchase, and sale of goods over great distances. But 
trade also included the exchange of knowledge, forms of faith, and values. The Indian 
Ocean thus developed into a complex field for economic, social, and political action 
directly or indirectly linked to the whole of Europe, Africa, and Asia.
The history of South Asia and the Indian Ocean can thus still best be understood 
as economic history. Other analytic approaches are of course conceivable, for instance 
environmental history in the framework of ‘travelling concepts’ or against the back-
drop of migration, mobility, or conflicts. But so far, no substantial studies of this sort 
have addressed the region. We shall therefore concentrate on trade.”156
Our concern, however, is not economic history and the oceans – Wolfgang 
Reinhard’s key concepts – as contact zones, communication and interac-
tional spaces, but the history of power as legal history and the role justificatory 
narratives play in this context.
154 See Kirby / Hinkkannen (2000); Freeman (2010); Pearson (2003).
155 Introduction: Reinhard (ed.) (2014) 36.
156 Conermann (2014) 505.
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2. The sea as a space of competing legal claims
If, in principle, the sea was open to all nations for local and long-distance 
trade157 and they predictably got in each others’ way, the “high seas” were 
more or less predestined to be an arena for transnational conflicts. Since dis-
putes were about economically vital rights of use and monopolies, they 
obviously had to be fought out in the language of law. Writing about the “curse 
of the oceans,” Michael Kempe comments:158
“If we look at European relations in the Atlantic against the backdrop of the vicious 
circle of piracy, reprisal voyages, and the fight against piracy, it is obvious that the 
newly discovered maritime zones were by no means outside the law or subject only 
to the law of the jungle. Arguments always took legal form, accusations were always 
formulated as legal complaints. Although the sea was always a contentious issue at 
international law, it was not without law; it was a space of divergent legal claims. For 
one sovereign power, the letter of marque and the letter of reprisal served as legal 
remedies in the extraterritorial pursuit of economic, political, and also religious 
interests, as spatial extension of these interests beyond its own territory – up to 
the shores of newly discovered lands and continents. For another, the legal right 
to treat all voyages it did not approve as acts of piracy served to enforce claims to 
dominion and monopolies over maritime areas outside Europe. The ‘politicization 
of the oceanic space’159 between America and Europe took place primarily in 
juridical guise. The sea thus became a space of opposing legal strategies covering 
it like vectors – not as a mere receptacle of such strategies but as a vector field shaped 
by them. However, such an understanding of the law was purely instrumental on all 
sides, making the high seas an arena for transnational conflict in which contra-
dictory, mutually exclusive legal postulates met, competed, and collided. In the 
course of their discovery by the Europeans, the seas spanning the globe thus became 
a legal space of fragmented globality and global fragmentation,160 which sharpened 
awareness of the need to create an international order.”161
157 See Nagel, J. (2007).
158 Kempe (2010).
159 See Mancke (1999).
160 In similar vein: Benton (2003).
161 Kempe (2010) 71.
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3. Two justificatory narratives at work
* Mare liberum versus mare clausum
This fundamental politico-conceptual dispute brought the established mar-
itime empires, above all Spain and Portugal into conflict with nations aspir-
ing to this status, notably the Netherlands. The conflict was not fought out 
in open naval battles but, as Carl Schmitt puts it, in a “hundred-year book 
war,”162 in which many renowned authors participated.163 “However, one 
should not allow the concrete significance of the publications to be sub-
merged in the plethora of titles with such catchwords as “freedom” or 
“exclusiveness” of the sea. Vitoria had in mind the freedom of overseas 
missions and propagation of the Catholic faith; others thought only in terms 
of breaking the Spanish and Portuguese monopolies on overseas trade; still 
others thought in terms of regional or local disputes about European ports 
or the question of fisheries …”.164
So it was really a war of expert opinions with probably the most famous 
expert in legal history, Hugo Grotius, on the one side, who in an opinion for 
the Dutch East India Company (VOC) pleaded for the freedom of the seas in 
the interest of this “statehood entrepreneur”165 and John Selden, from 
whom the English crown had commissioned a report published under the 
heading “Mare clausum,” but which never achieved the explosive force of 
Grotius’ paper.166 So much has been written about this167 that we can 
forego the role of war correspondent.
Instead, we leave the floor to Michael Kempe, who is quite clear that 
abstract legal principles were not the issue but purely and simply the pro-
motion of trade interests – the language of international law as a language of 
politics : “The noble dictum ‘freedom of the seas’ should not obscure the fact 
that international law was practised not primarily in pursuit of some interna-
tional legal ideal but to enforce trade interests. Northern Europeans were 
intent on undermining the trade monopoly of the Iberian powers overseas 
162 Schmitt (2006) 178 f.
163 An overview of the authors involved is provided by Kempe (2010) 96–97.
164 Schmitt (2006) 179.
165 On what we have called statehood entrepreneurs as globalization pioneers, see 
Schuppert, G. F. (2014) 36ff.
166 Schmitt (1943) 151–152.
167 See, for example, Klee (1946).
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in order to develop their own monopolies. The call for freedom of trade and 
navigation fell silent as soon as these countries had themselves gained the 
status of maritime trading powers.”168
The trade interests at issue were trade monopolies and the states involved 
were well advised to mutually respect the monopolistic situation:
“Despite all rhetoric to the contrary, both Southern and Northern Europeans fun-
damentally agreed on the monopolistic nature of trade with their own colonies or 
overseas partners. When the principle of freedom of the seas began to impose itself 
in state practice and in international-law theory in the late seventeenth century,169
for international relations at sea – dominated by the Europeans – this meant in 
concrete terms the mutual recognition of each others’ monopoly claims. Above all 
non-European countries, not being “full subjects” of international law were 
excluded from this closed circle of staked out spheres of interest. Disregarding what 
really lay behind the slogan, the tenet that ships on the high seas were inviolable, 
deriving from the principle of ‘freedom of the seas’, became the key precept of 
international navigation.”170
The only actors to trouble the waters were the pirates.
* Piracy as effective other-ascription
Pirates as miscreants disrupting trade had to be combated and it was there-
fore legitimate to confiscate their ships and booty. In this, all important 
seafaring nations were agreed. The vital question – as today with the concept 
of terrorism – was who was entitled to define piracy or, to be more precise, 
who sought to claim this right in an act of “semantic imperialism.” Quite 
rightly, Michael Kempe therefore describes the concept of pirate as one of 
other-ascription: “Significant from the viewpoint of international law were 
above all the denunciations of many inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula or 
the Malay Archipelago as pirates and robbers under the mantle of British 
imperialism in the course of the nineteenth century. This shows particularly 
clearly what appellations such as ‘freebooter’, ‘buccaneer’, and ‘pirate’ always 
amounted to, namely terms of other-ascription to delegitimize the action 
and violence of the opponent and hence to justify one’s own, for instance 
with such self-descriptions as ‘pirate hunter’ or ‘maritime police’.”171
168 Kempe (2010) 97.
169 Greater detail in Graf Vitzthum (ed.) (2006) 1–61.
170 Kempe (2010) 98.
171 Kempe (2010) 21.
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In the contest for control of sea routes, piracy thus became a reproach all 
parties levelled at one another, leading to the resourceful device of providing 
one’s own people with so-called “lettres de marque” or powers of reprisal to 
protect them against accusations of piracy.172 On the logic of what could be 
called a “blame game,” Michael Kempe comments:
“Meanwhile, the Spanish and Portuguese treated all seafarers who entered their 
sphere of influence as ‘piratas’ or – which was the same for them – ‘corsarios’, 
regardless of whether they carried any sort of official document or not. What for 
the one was regular seizure was for the other merely piracy. This shows what ‘pirate’ 
or ‘freebooter’ had always been: terms of other-ascription. With all sides perma-
nently accusing each other of piracy while adhering to the legal device of reprisal or 
marque to justify their own use of violence, all parties accepted that there was a 
difference between lawful and unlawful forms of appropriation. With the aid of 
letters of marque and reprisal, this distinction was also transferred to the sea as unity 
of the difference between right and wrong. The slowly dawning awareness of mar-
itime spaces of hitherto unknown dimensions did nothing to change this. By pro-
vided seafarers entering distant worlds with such licences, the legal practices of 
European waters were extended to maritime regions outside Europe, as well.”173
How the piracy issue could be instrumentalized in the context of legitimiz-
ing the conduct of the opponent is clearly illustrated by England’s strategy to 
use it to legitimate worldwide jurisdictional claims. Kempe comments on this 
variety of the language of international law as a language of justification:
“… The international piracy question pointed to the lack of a superior authority as a 
fundamental dilemma for legal relations between equal sovereign powers. Even the 
top English admiralty judges were forced to admit that disputes such as that about 
the Scottish privateer mentioned could never be decided unequivocally ‘because 
here is no third Power that can give a Law that shall be decisive or binding between 
two independent Princes’.174 The international piracy problem thus drew attention 
to a basic problem concerning legal relations between sovereign power that has 
remained virulent to this day.
Jenkins used the universality of criminal law pertaining to piracy to advance 
universal claims for English admiralty jurisdiction. Not only were the immediate 
coastal waters of the kingdom subject to the sovereignty of the English crown. In 
order to protect the public peace, the freedom and safety of navigation throughout 
the world, the king had, by virtue of his ‘imperial crown’, the authority and right to 
prosecute piracy and other crimes at sea. This right extended to the remote coasts of 
the Atlantic, into the hidden nooks of the Mediterranean, and to every part of the 
172 Greater detail in Kempe (2010) 46ff.
173 Kempe (2010) 46.
174 Quoted from Kempe (2010) 177.
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Pacific and every other sea, ‘even in the remotest corners of the world’. In keeping 
with the universality principle, Jenkins admitted, all other nations also had this legal 
right. As the admiralty judge knew all too well, this meant that international con-
flicts in dealing with privateering and piracy were pre-programmed. But he also 
knew that England as a proud sea power could afford to claim such authority in the 
hope that, with the help of universal piracy law, the English crown could further 
extend its claims to power and dominion.”175
V. Dominion over justificatory narratives as truly hegemonic power
When embarking on our exploration of the language of international law, 
we had mentioned the phenomenon of “semantic imperialism.” Defining it 
in somewhat modified and simplistic form, we could say the “the hegemon 
is whoever possesses interpretative authority over justificatory narratives.”
Writing about the concept of justificatory narrative, Rainer Forst 
describes the connection between power and the binding determination 
of the content of justificatory narratives:
“To have power means to influence, determine, occupy, or even close the space of 
other subjects’ reasons and justifications – and the degree to which this is done is 
important. It can take place in isolated cases – through a good speech or a deception 
– but it can also have its place in a societal structure that is based on certain 
justifications or consolidated justificatory narratives. Accordingly, a justificatory 
order is always a power order, which says nothing about either the justification or 
the constellation of power. Justifications can be imposed or freely shared, and there 
are many modes between these poles. Power thus always unfolds in the communi-
cation space, but this does not mean that it is well grounded. It is always discursive 
in nature, and the struggle for power is the struggle for the possibility of structuring 
or even controlling the justification resources of others.”176
Instead of “semantic imperialism” we could also speak of narrative power
and, as the following quotation suggests, of the international legal order as a 
justificatory order:
“Justificatory narratives unfold normative power to the extent that they throw a 
certain light on the political and social world; the past, present, and future; on 
reality and ideals, connecting individuals with a collectivity and forming an accep-
ted justificatory order. This normative power or force says nothing about the nor-
mative quality of the justifications proferred and the historical correctness of the 
narratives; they can also be ideological in nature. But in this case, too, the force of a 
175 Kempe (2010) 177–178.
176 Forst (1984) 22–23.
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narrative feeds not only on the collective perception of its cogency but on the 
acceptance of the superordinate principles and values that express the justifications 
generated. The power of a justificatory narrative arises from its historical exercise of 
power and its normative acceptance: power is the ability to bind.”177
C. The history of international relations as a history of juridification
For the past some ninety years, the jurisprudential discipline of international 
law has been flanked by “international relations”178 (IR), a subdiscipline of 
political science. A brief glance at the subject suggests that the history of 
international relations can be addressed as a history of juridification. This is 
to our purpose, since we wish to show that the language of law also plays an 
important role on such eminently political terrain as international relations.
I. Four stages in the juridification of international politics
Martin List and Bernhard Zangl note four surges in the juridification of inter-
national politics,179 which are also reflected in developments in the language 
of law, notably international law.
* The first stage: recognition as formally equal legal regimes
“The modern international system of states was normatively construed in categories 
of international law as an initially minimal order under public law that, at the latest 
from the seventeenth century, was to become more than a material power structure. 
This could be described as the first stage in the juridification of the modern system 
of states – initially limited to Europe. This legal order is more than a mere fact of 
power because states recognize one another as formally equal. This self-description of 
states as elements in a system of mutual recognition is, as it were, a whole new ball 
game: the language game of international law.”180
177 Forst (1984) 24.
178 Spindler / Schieder (eds.) (2006) 9, date the emergence of international relations as a 
subdiscipline of political science from 1919, the year in which the first professorships were 
established.
179 List / Zangl (2003).
180 List / Zangl (2003) 365.
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* The second stage: the universalization of international law
“Naturally, recognition of formal equality is not the same as factual equality. The 
inferior party ignores factually superior power only at the peril of punishment – in 
the last resort – of demise. However, willingness to recognize the other is a sovereign 
decision. Nevertheless, recognition among states still depends decisively on factual 
power considerations (for instance, on the power actually exercised in a given area). 
No state is easily admitted to the language game of international law. The universal-
ization of international law, too, followed on the factual increase in the importance 
of non-European powers and on their formal recognition, lastly in the major round 
of decolonization in the second half of the twentieth century. The outcome was the 
division of the world into some 190 sovereign states and thus the universalization of 
international law under the UN Charter.”181
* The third stage: from the law of coexistence to the law of cooperation
“Among the specific aspects of constituting the modern system of states in the 
categories of international law was its indispensable relationship with morality. 
The pretensions of the law to validity ultimately draw on extra-legal, ethical 
grounds. The language game of law has its own rules for determining validity, but 
the law as a whole lives not only from this formal validity – legality – decided by its 
own rules, but by reference to ultimately extra-legal legitimacy. Of course, the out-
differentiation of law as a language game of its own concomitant with modernity 
should not be ignored. Legal argument is a different exercise from arguing in 
ethical-moral terms. And law, including valid international law is not in every 
specific case ethically correct. Law, notably international law, tends rather to react 
to the plurality of diverging values shaped by morality and religion by providing 
rules for coexistence, which can be converted only very cautiously and slowly into 
rules of cooperation on the basis of common interests, and, even more prudently, on 
the basis of common values.”182
* The fourth stage: institutional consolidation of juridification processes
“The impressive proliferation of international agreements alone would scarcely 
justify speaking of a fourth stage of international juridification. Current literature 
– in both jurisprudence and political science – on international juridification pro-
cesses therefore focuses not so much on the quantitative increase in international 
treaties and the legal norms they lay down: it tends rather to stress the qualitative 
developments that have occurred since the 1980s. These new developments can be 
understood as a fourth stage on international juridification. They are marked by the 
institutional intensification of the juridification process, which supports the language 
game of international law through appropriate procedures.
181 List / Zangl (2003) 366.
182 List / Zangl (2003) 367.
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According to the literature, current developments therefore consist less in 
international law producing new substantive (primary) rules than in setting 
new sorts of procedural (secondary) rules. The international law infrastruc-
ture has accordingly advanced considerably through agreed procedures for 
making, implementing, applying, and enforcing law.”183
II. From war and peace to cooperation on questions of political order
Under this heading, Nicole Deitelhoff and Michael Zürn in their recent 
“Textbook on International Relations”184 address the development of theo-
ries of international relations as a sequence of three paradigms:
“The beginnings of the IR Galaxy were … superimposed by the question of war and 
peace and by the question of how wars can be prevented. These questions drive all 
‘paradigms’ in the sense of IR theory. Ultimately, a changing world political situa-
tion cancelled out the peace paradigm, and specific theoretical problems were sup-
planted by a cooperation paradigm addressing addressed the conditions under 
which states cooperate, what it involves, and what the consequences are … The 
cooperation paradigm finally weakened as – in the view of scholars – anarchy 
became less pronounced in the international system. An essential condition for this 
was the enormous institutional dynamic that developed after the end of confronta-
tion between the blocs. Already since the 1980s, the intensity of exchanges between 
societies had increased and with it the pressure of problems, requiring more and 
different international institutions. Not only has the number of international insti-
tutions risen tremendously since the 1990s; their form has also changed. They have 
intervened more and more drastically in national societies, also without the direct 
consent of the states involved. With these changes, the cooperative approaches, 
which had concentrated primarily on the act of cooperation, had less and less 
weight. Instead, a systemic perspective came to the fore that analysed the interplay 
between particular regulatory arrangements and institutions in terms of global gov-
ernance. This placed the international system as political order centre stage, focusing 
on the structure of this order, on authority, and on rule, as well as resistance … The 
order paradigm, as Google Ngram Viewer data show, has been the dominant para-
digm for some time in the German-speaking IR galaxy, but this development is also 
apparent in the English-speaking galaxy, which, owing to the predominance of the 
USA in world politics, has traditionally focused strongly on realistic theories.”185
183 List / Zangl (2003) 371.
184 Deitelhoff / Zürn (2016).
185 Deitelhoff / Zürn (2016) 294–295.
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This sequence of three paradigms – the peace paradigm, the cooperation 
paradigm, and the order paradigm – can be read not only as a sequence of 
bodies of theory but also as a sequence of growing juridification in international 
politics. From this point of view, the so-called cooperation paradigm is 
merely an abbreviation for cooperative structures needed to realize cooperative 
gains, that is to say, the necessary provision of – as governance studies puts it 
– appropriate regulatory structures and regulatory regimes.186 And the order 
paradigm, which Nicole Deitelhoff and Michael Zürn rightly translate by 
“global governance,” is clearly a paradigm to be expressed in the language 
of law.
This is apparent if one takes a somewhat closer look at what is really 
meant by “global governance.” Like the present author,187 Deitelhoff and Zürn 
understand governance not as a primarily normative concept in the sense of 
“good global governance” but as an “analytical construct that encompasses 
the overall arrangement of different forms of control at various levels of 
decision-making.”188 As the passage points out, it is about regulatory arrange-
ments of all sorts – a particularly useful insight for anyone like ourselves who 
propagates an understanding of jurisprudence as a science of regulation:189
“Governance in this second sense means the totality of collective regulatory arrange-
ments addressing a particular problem or a particular societal state of affairs, and 
which are justified by reference to the collective interests of the group affected. Thus 
‘governance’ refers not to isolated rules, such as the imposition of customs duties 
but to the sum of rules pertaining to a matter, such as international trade policy, and 
their interaction. It covers both the content of regulation and the norms that deter-
mine the coming into being and enforcement of the regulatory content. The prob-
lems and matters concerned – the second element of the definition – can be, for 
example climate issues, trade relations, financial relations, or human rights. But 
they could also be collisions between such regulatory arrangements or questions of 
secondary rules.”190
Interestingly, however, this analytic approach, too – which we consider to be 
the right one – cannot quite manage without normative grounding: global 
186 On governance as governance in and through regulatory structures see Schuppert, G. F.
(ed.) (2005) 371–469.
187 See Schuppert, G. F. (2011a).
188 Deitelhoff / Zürn (2016) 204.
189 Schuppert, G. F. (2019).
190 Deitelhoff / Zürn (2016) 205.
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governance, as the following passage shows, speaks not only in the language 
of analytical analysis but also in the language of justification;
“Third, we can speak of governance only if the actors involved assert that it is their 
intention to promote the common interest of a collectivity or, even more strongly, the 
common good of society. The postulated goal must therefore be to deal with a societal 
problem through regulation. What is explicitly at issue is the justification of action, 
not necessarily the actual motivation behind it. Global governance as an overall 
arrangement accordingly includes all rules for the regulation of societal relations 
whose justification is oriented on fundamental social values and which have trans-
national effects, regardless of whether such rules achieve or block attainment of the 
postulated goals, and quite regardless of whether they are hierarchically organized or 
have arisen in a context without a superior, central authority.”191
We bring this section to an end with a passage in which our authors point 
once again to the lasting dynamics in the development of global governance 
structures, identifying five stages or levels of international politics that 
clearly cannot be described without recourse to the regulation concept.
“Apart from quantitative growth and spread, the second measure of dynamism is a 
new quality of international and transnational institutions establishing authority 
through all stages of political developments. In political science, the stages of polit-
ical development are often described in terms of the political cycle model. In simple 
terms, five stages can be distinguished at the international level: making decisions 
on rules – supervising compliance with them – arbitrating disputes on compliance – 
enforcing rules – assessing results and thus setting agendas.”192
191 Deitelhoff / Zürn (2016) 205.
192 Deitelhoff / Zürn (2016) 211.
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Chapter Three
The Language of Human Rights as a Language of Politics
A. Human rights as the political creed of modernity
No-one will deny that there are many facets to the idea of human rights.193
This idea, however, has, above all, been one thing: a political project seeking 
in all historical contexts to change the world. The language of human rights 
is primarily a language of political change.194
We call three authors to the witness box to testify on the symbiotic relation-
ship between law and politics conveyed by the concept of human rights. The 
first is Ben Golder. He describes human rights as grounding and restricting 
politics, as the political credo of modernity: “Human rights in this very familiar 
guise represent the preeminent universalist political credo of late modernity: 
idealist, foundationalist, metaphysical, irreducible to calculation. Indeed to 
call them a political credo is not quite to do them justice – human rights, 
according to this reckoning, are both pre- and supra-political, providing the 
moral foundation and limits to politics itself.”195
Our second witness is Makau Wa Mutua, who, writing about the sym-
biotic relationship between politics and human rights, rightly points out 
that we are well advised not to take the often unpolitical rhetoric of many 
human rights actors at face value: “Since the Second World War, interna-
tional human rights law has become one of the most pre-eminent doctrines 
of our time. Diverse groups from sexual minorities to environmentalists now 
invoke the power of human rights language. But this universal reliance on the 
language of human rights has failed to create agreement on the scope and 
content of the human rights corpus. Debates rage over its cultural relevance, 
ideological and political orientation, and thematic incompleteness. What 
these debates obscure is the fact that the human rights corpus is a political 
ideology, although its major authors present it as non-ideological.”196
The third author is Samuel Moyn, who begins his impressive book on the 
history of human rights as follows:
193 See the overview in Mutua (2000).
194 On the political history of ideas in a “language of political change” see the introduction to 
this book, 1–31.
195 Golder (2016) 684–685.
196 Mutua (2000) 149.
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“When people hear the phrase ‘human rights’, they think of the highest moral precepts and 
political ideals. And they are right to do so. They have in mind a familiar set of 
indispensable liberal freedoms, and sometimes more expansive principles of social 
protection. But they also mean something more. The phrase implies an agenda for 
improving the world, and bringing about a new one in which the dignity of each 
individual will enjoy secure international protection. It is a recognizably utopian 
program: for the political standards it champions and the emotional passion it 
inspires, this program draws on the image of a place that has not yet been called 
into being. It promises to penetrate the impregnability of state borders, slowly 
replacing them with the authority of international law. It prides itself on offering 
victims the world over the possibility of a better life. It pledges to do so by working 
in alliance with states when possible, but naming and shaming them when they 
violate the most basic norms. Human rights in this sense have come to define the 
most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities – state and 
interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”197
This passage stresses what is characteristic of the human rights project: first, it 
is a utopian project that goes beyond “pure” politics, calling to mind a favour-
ite book, Ernst Bloch’s “The Principle of Hope.”198 Second, it is a genuinely 
political project because inspired by the will “to improve the world.” And, 
third, it is consequently a project intended to be realized, driven by a dynamic 
almost impossible to check, which is accordingly a thorn in the flesh of 
politics.
B. The idea of human rights at the interface between
ethics, politics, and law
I. The life of the human rights concept in overlapping normative worlds
In the realm of administrative organizational law, some organizations or 
institutional arrangements are often found to be at home in two normative 
worlds, private law (most frequently) and public law. In the age of the 
“cooperative state” and “private-public partnerships,”199 there is hence a 
trend towards hybridizing administrative structures,200 which has led to the 
creation of hybrid types of organization, half enterprise, half public author-
197 Moyn (2012) 1.
198 Bloch (1959).
199 See Schuppert, G. F. (2011b).
200 See Schuppert, G. F. (2012b).
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ity.201 A prime example in Germany is the defunct “Treuhandanstalt” – the 
federal trustee agency that administered the property of the former German 
Democratic Republic – for historical reasons a cross between government 
agency and liquidation management – which led a life between different 
jurisdictions: company law (in its capacity as “controlling enterprise”) and 
public law (as “Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts – “institution under public 
law”).202 But human rights are not about life in various jurisdictions but 
about life in various normative worlds. With the aid of three authors we cast 
a brief glance at this special situatedness of the human rights project. Writ-
ing about modern human rights as a task for Christians and Muslims, 
Heiner Bielefeldt rightly places the human-rights understanding of freedom 
at the “focus of ethics, politics, and law”:
“However wrong it would be to monopolize human rights as a simple progress 
ideology of the modern age, it would be just as wrong and one-sided to treat it only 
as a sort of emergency brake against a general ‘decline narrative’ of modernity. In 
modern crises of traditional, ethical consensus grounded directly in religion and of 
traditional legal institutions, a new conceptualization of freedom has asserted itself. 
With hitherto unheard of conviction, the moral subject position of the human 
being, his / her responsibility and self-determinacy has been made the focus of ethics, 
politics, and law. This modern view of freedom has also become definitive for human 
rights. Human rights differ from premodern conceptions of law essentially in their 
pursuit of politico-legal recognition for equal freedom and participation for the 
individual. The guiding human-rights principle of equal, solidary freedom finds 
exemplary expression in Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’”203
In similar vein, our second author Winfried Brugger has this to say about the 
position of human rights between morality, law, and politics under the 
heading “positivity and suprapositivity of human rights”:
“The demands of human rights express protest against conditions and modes of 
action that those affected regard as political and social oppression. The acts criticized 
can often be attributed to state-made laws and regulations adopted by political 
201 On this phenomenon of hybrid organizational forms in the modern administrative state, 
see Schuppert, G. F. (2000), recital 120ff.
202 See my contribution to “Treuhandanstalt”: Schuppert, G. F. (1992).
203 Bielefeldt (1996).
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majorities or dominant minorities. Nor can it be excluded that political power 
holders have acted in line with prevailing social morality.204 For minorities who 
feel they are oppressed, this means that, if their situation cannot be improved within 
the framework of the social and political system, they will have to assert and justify 
their demands for justice at levels of argument that go beyond enacted and enforced 
law and prevailing positive social morality. The demands of human rights operate at 
this level. Human rights claim to be ‘law of the law’, ‘higher’, ‘pre-state’, ‘natural’ 
law of the individual or humanity as such, a normative yardstick against which 
extant positive law is to be measured. Such higher law can clearly not be validated 
by state legislation or by social acceptance: its validity needs to be derived from 
bodies of norms of enlightened, critical morality.”205
If human rights are grounded above all in enlightened, critical morality, this 
does not mean that they are not part and parcel of the world of law and 
politics. As far as the world of law is concerned, Brugger206 comments:
“[Human rights] always have a tendency towards juridification. The champions of 
human rights want to see them incorporated into the existing legal system (or if 
this is not possible into a new legal system) and integrated under constitutional law 
so that political rule can be transformed from a coercive system into a true ‘Rechts-
Ordnung’ – a true order of law and rights.207 As the ‘basis of freedom, justice, and 
204 An example illustrates this. After the drafting of the American constitution in 1787, dis-
crimination against people of colour in the United States was long endorsed by both 
enacted law and prevailing social morality. The United State Supreme Court described 
the position in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 f. (1857) as follows: 
Afro-Americans “were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings 
… They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and 
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so 
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the 
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and 
sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise or traffic, whenever a profit could be 
made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the 
white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought 
of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in 
society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of 
public policy, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.”
205 Brugger (1989) 559.
206 Brugger (1989) 559–560.
207 This was fully evident in the American Revolution. The colonists had long sought to 
combat certain interventions and discrimination by the Crown, evoking traditional Eng-
lish rights. When this proved to be of no avail, they necessarily fell back on a “higher” law 
than the positive English law in force, namely on innate, natural, inalienable human 
rights – which they claimed the Crown had violated. See the impressive Declaration of 
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peace in the world’ human rights are intended to prevent injustice, so that people 
are not obliged to rise against tyranny and oppression as the last resort.”208
As far as belonging to the world of politics is concerned, Bruggers shows that 
it is ultimately impossible to make a fine distinction between morality, law, 
and politics in the field of human rights. They are inseparably interwoven:
“There is … no naive anti-politics attitude underlying the human rights issue. Human 
rights thinking recognizes that political disputation is justified and necessary not 
only between competing interests but also between different conceptions of justice. 
It is not by chance that the guarantee of democratic participatory rights is a vital line 
of development in the history of human rights. However, human rights thinking 
also posits limiting the legitimation of political decision-making through state 
authority, even by majority decision. Political decisions can find greater or less 
acceptance, generating different degrees of consensus and dissent. From the perspec-
tive of basic and human rights, this produces an important substantive and ulti-
mately institutional distinction: decisions are made in every polity that the parties 
affected, whether they agree with them or not, can no longer accept as having been 
reached in keeping with the relevant criteria for justice and legitimacy but must 
consider unacceptable, unjust, and arbitrary. There would then be no more contentious 
legal cases that could be sufficiently legitimated by majority decision. Prima facie 
they would them be indisputable cases of injustice, to be prevented wherever pos-
sible. To dispel any suspicion of a violation of justice, political (and in the given case, 
democratic) legitimation is then not enough. To secure justice and realize the com-
mon good in such cases, political power would have to be subject to substantive 
limitation through suitable precautions and more thoroughgoing examination of 
the public interests driving state intervention, above all the separation of powers, the 
entrenchment of fundamental rights, and their safeguarding by constitutional 
courts.”209
Our third author in Wolfgang Schluchter, who shall have the last word on 
the subject:
“The legal principles of human rights bridge the gap between the ethic of responsi-
bility and positive law. … They are a ‘component’ of both ethics and law. … From 
the point of view of ethics, they are legal to the extent that they mean an institu-
tional guarantee; and from the perspective of law they are ethical to the extent that 
they are inalienable and therefore vested with supra-empirical dignity …”.210
Independence on 1776, which enumerates and deplores the “long train of abuses and 
usurpations,” the “absolute despotism,” and the “absolute tyranny” of the Crown.
208 Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also Article 1 (2) of the 
Basic Law.
209 Brugger (1989) 560–561.
210 Schluchter (1979) 155.
180 Part Three
As interim appraisal we offer an observation and two conclusions. The obser-
vation is concerned with the parallelism of the human rights concept and 
notions about justice and the common good. The duty of all state power to 
further the common good is – as we have seen in the case of human rights – 
both supra-positive guiding principle and legal concept,211 as Bardo Fass-
bender shows:
“The notions of ‘common good’, ‘common weal’, ‘public interest’, and ‘public spirit’ 
born in antiquity have in modern times become politico-social guiding concepts – 
precisely by virtue of their substantive vagueness, their shifting meaning, the changes 
in their orientational function, and finally because of the various political options 
associated with them’.212 Over the past two decades, the conceptuality of the com-
mon good has gained new momentum in political theory and social philosophy – 
against the backdrop of the state losing its long defended monopoly as guardian, 
interpreter, and enforcement agent of the common good, while a pronounced 
societal pluralism has made agreement increasingly difficult on a universally bind-
ing, substantive exposition of the common good as identity-forming definition of 
the characteristics of the ‘polity’. … The common good is also a legal concept. Peter 
Häberle has even spoken of ‘jurisprudence as a science of the common good’.213 … 
In the legal order of the Federal Republic of Germany, the ‘common good’ or 
‘public interest’ serve to justify authority under public law and – limiting funda-
mental rights and imposing obligations – as legal title and basic rule for resolving 
disputes where interests collide (principally in relations between the individual and 
the state, but also between different statutory bodies).”214
The first conclusion is that the human rights project would not be beneficial 
were the triad of morality, law, and politics to be dissolved, leaving only one 
of the three to carry the load. This could be a real danger if reliance were to 
be placed solely on juridification of the human rights idea,215 virtually “filing it 
away.” Without constant input from morality and ethics it would not only 
lose its bridging function: the language of human rights would surely lose its 
211 On this use of the common good as “value-related formula” on the one hand and legal 
yardstick on the other, see Stolleis (1987) col. 1061.
212 See Münkler / Bluhm (eds.) (2001) 9.
213 See Häberle (1976) 292.
214 Fassbender (2003) 1.
215 As per 13 November 2014, the two most important agreements, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have been ratified by 168 and 162 states respectively 
(overview in the United Nations Treaty Collection 2014). This has induced me to speak of 
the enforcement of human rights as a “juridified revolution” (See Schuppert, G. F. (2015) 
247ff.)
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force as a “language of political change.” If this is the case, our second 
conclusion must be that the language of human rights has to be a multilingual 
language, which can enter the debate on the good and just order of a society 
as a language of morality, law, and politics. Only then can the human rights 
project successfully bridge ethics, law and politics.
II. The standard-setting force of human rights
In the face of unacceptable rules of positive law, as Winfried Brugger has 
shown, “an opposing ‘higher’, ‘pre-state’, ‘natural’ law of the individual or 
humanity as such” is needed as a “normative yardstick.”216 The search for such 
a supra-positive standard is particularly incontestable when – as under the 
Nazi regime – “unacceptable laws” claimed validity as positive state-made 
law and were accordingly implemented, or should one rather say “executed.” 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, this search for touchstones in coming 
to terms with Nazi injustice after the Second World War led to a renaissance 
of natural law. Under the heading “Natural Law or Legal Positivism,”217 a 
collection of essays edited by Werner Maihofer addresses the subject.218 But 
this natural law renaissance was short-lived, producing a subjective “criterion 
gap” in the country, which not only encouraged receptiveness towards 
human rights but also resulted in their being incorporated in the constitu-
tion, the “Basic Law.”
As Samuel Moyn has described at length,219 the triumphant progress of 
human rights as normative yardstick began with the “Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights” in 1948 – slowly at first, but picking up speed from the 
1970s. Every form of political rule in the world was now inexorably meas-
ured against the yardstick of human rights. We can therefore speak of the 
standard-setting force of human rights.
Dieter Gosewinkel has discussed this standard-setting force of the lan-
guage of human rights in a recent publication on citizenship in Europe in 
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the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.220 He notes the “breakthrough of a 
political movement for human rights,” also substantially borne by interna-
tional organizations such as the “International Labour Organization” (ILO):
“The instrumentalization of human rights in the turmoil of the Cold War and their 
violation in the state-building process in decolonized regions did not prevent the 
new universal legal standards from attaining independent status as an effective 
global measure of equality and justice, and in the 1950s and 1960s, to win a great 
deal of support in Europe, notably on the anti-imperialist left. This involved highly 
heterogeneous motives and tendencies. For example, the protest of the European 
and American left against the Vietnam War and the Russell Tribunals of the 1960s 
cited the violations of human rights laid down in international treaties and codifi-
cations. The cultural upheaval, symbolized as international event by 1968, brought 
forth new social movements. They justified their demands, more radical than those 
of the established movements, on grounds of new human rights standards, whose 
universalism was above state-made law and, so to speak, put this law under ‘top-
down’ political pressure for change.”221
He has this to say on the rise of human rights as guiding political idea in the 
United States of the 1970s:
“All these phenomena, which in the late sixties and early seventies consolidated into 
an international human rights discourse and a global politics of human rights, 
displayed strong differences – up to and including manifest contradictions – with 
respect to strength, motivation, and geographical orientation. But they also shared 
characteristics that proved decisive for the rise of human rights politics in the 
decades that followed: evocation of legal standards that ranked both legally and 
morally above the state and put pressure on the state, the claim of global validity for 
these standards and the transnational organization of the enforcement of human-
rights norms.”222
In Europe, too, human rights unfolded their full force only in the seventies:
“However, it was only in the 1970s that they became an effective political weapon in 
Europe in the struggle for individual rights, which gradually began to change 
political systems themselves. This had been preceded by two United Nations human 
rights covenants concluded in 1966 on civil and political rights and on economic, 
social and cultural rights. The Soviet Union had joined in 1973 and Poland in 1977. 
But the political dynamite developed only in the mid-1970s through a particular 
constellation in which an intergovernmental agreement on human rights standards 
had been taken up by civil-society groupings and used effectively in opposing their 
own governments. In Helsinki in 1975, the Conference for Security and Coopera-
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tion (CSCE) concluded an agreement between 35 European countries with a highly 
contested agreement on human rights at its heart.”223
Taking the example of Poland, Gosewinkel discusses the impact of the “Hel-
sinki effect” on political practice:
“When – after the opposition movement had invoked the constitution – the Polish 
government in 1976 envisaged an amendment to confirm the ‘unwavering and fra-
ternal ties with the Soviet Union’, the dissident movement, which was rapidly winning 
support in society,veered to international law: it now argued that every constitutional 
amendment should be in keeping with the CSCE agreement. The opposition to the 
communist regime had thus established a new legal hierarchy: national guarantees of 
civil rights in the constitutions of socialist countries had to meet the international 
standard of human rights and were subject to corresponding scrutiny.”224
So much on the standard-setting force of human rights.
C. The idea and history of human rights reflected
in three major narratives
I. The narrative of Paul Gordon Lauren: the triad of visions,
visionaries, and dramatic events
Writing about “visions seen”225 in his history of human rights, Lauren 
describes the idea of human rights as one of the most influential visions 
of our time:
“Among all … visions, perhaps none have had impact across the globe more pro-
found than those of international human rights advocates. Thoughtful and insight-
ful visionaries in many different times and diverse locations have seen in their 
mind’s eye a world in which all people might enjoy certain basic and inherent 
rights simply by virtue of being human. They have viewed these rights or funda-
mental claims by persons to obtain just treatment as stemming from nature itself 
and thus inherited by all men, women, and children on earth as members born into 
the same human family entitled to be accorded worth and dignity. Moreover, with 
this premise they have envisioned a world without borders or other distinctions that 
divide people from one another in gender, race, caste or class, religion, political 
belief, ethnicity, or nationality. Such visions of human rights have contributed to the 
long struggle for the worth and dignity of the human person throughout history. 
More recently, they have heavily shaped the entire discussion about the meaning of 
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modern politics and society around the world, and in the process provided perhaps 
the most revolutionary concept of our own time.”226
However, changing the world requires not only visions but also a type of actor
that Lauren call a visionary:
“The evolution of international human rights, … has required in the first instance 
people serving as visionaries. There must be thoughtful men and women not only 
capable of imagining possibilities beyond existing experience themselves, but also of 
conveying these visions to others.They may do this through their teachings, as in the 
messages of the prophets Isaiah and Muhammed, the parables of Jesus, the instruc-
tions of Kong Qiu, or the lessons of Siddhartha Gautama and Chaitanya. They may 
achieve this through other forms of communication that infuse dreams such as the 
speeches of Cicero or Franklin Roosevelt, the poetry of Sultan Farrukh Hablul 
Matin or Ziya Gokalp, the letters of Abigail Adams, the manifestos of Karl Marx, 
the journals of Hideko Fukuda, the pamphlets of H. G. Wells, the decisions of the 
judges presiding over the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the encyc-
licals of Pope John XXIII, or the songs of the civil rights movement such as ‘We 
Shall Overcome’. These visionaries may transmit their ideas to others by means of 
lengthy treatises such as the published writings of Bartholomé de Las Casas, John 
Locke, Mary Wollstonecraft, or Kang Youwei. Or, they may convey visions through 
resolutions or proclamations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”227
Interesting in this passage is not only the list of visionaries from Muhammad 
to Pope John XXIII but also the catalogue of media visionaries have used to 
spread their message, with particular stress on “manifestos, resolutions and 
proclamations.” The declaration could be described as a specific form of the 
language of human rights, if not the specific form of this language.
Paul Gordon Lauren sees a third necessary element apart from visions and 
visionaries as “conditions for change”: “events of consequence”,228 by which 
he means historical events generally described as revolutions: “One of the 
reasons why these cause-and-effect relationships occur is that events such as 
revolutions and wars destroy existing structures of authority, privilege, and 
vested interests, thus making change possible. Violence and upheaval – 
whether they occur in Europa, North America, Latin America, Asia, Africa, 
the Middle East, or islands of the Pacific – result in a transformation of 
established institutions of control.”229
So much for the first narrative.
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II. The narrative of Lynn Hunt: reading novels and declaring rights
1. Reading novels
In this chapter we have already made acquaintance with Lynn Hunt’s 
“Inventing Human Rights”230 when explaining human rights not only as 
a reaction to the experience of injustice but also as a consequence of people’s 
growing awareness of their own autonomy. Hunt points out that autonomy 
and empathy belong together, and that it is empathy that comes into play 
when reading novels; not just any sort, but the “epistolary novels” so popular 
in the eighteenth century. This literary genre invited the reader, especially the 
female reader, to identify with the correspondents and to share their joys and 
sorrows:
“Novels made the point that all people are fundamentally similar because of their 
inner feelings, and many novels showcased in particular the desire for autonomy. In 
this way, reading novels created a sense of equality and empathy through passionate 
involvement in the narrative. Can it be coincidental that the three greatest novels of 
psychological identification of the eighteenth century – Richardson’s Pamela (1740) 
and Clarissa (1747–48) and Rousseau’s Julie (17619 – were all published in the 
period that immediately preceded the appearance of the concept of ‘the rights of 
man’?”231
Hunt’s argument is convincing. Our brief look at the history of globalization 
as communication history has shown, more or less in passing, that the eight-
eenth century was the century of correspondence,232 not primarily business 
correspondence, but that between people with ties of friendship who used 
letters as a medium for the free expression of feelings and sensibility:
“The eighteenth century was the golden age of friendship and therefore it was the 
golden age of the letter. The enthusiasm of friendship could be given free and 
uninhibited expression in letters; the letter could be called ‘the bulletin of sensibility 
and friendship’; lively correspondence was the criterion of friendship. … The crav-
ing for friendship necessarily entailed a craving for letters. ‘Let us rather exchange 
amicable letters’, Luise Gottsched wrote to a friend. ‘This is and remains our most 
delightful occupation for as long as we must be apart’. To write to friends was ‘the 
most agreeable, enjoyable occupation’ and one knew no greater ‘pleasure’ than to 
receive letters from friends. With what jubilation they are greeted! They are awaited 
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‘like the Messiah! With what yearning they are awaited! – ‘I languish, my dearest 
friend’, wrote Nicolai to Merck, ‘for a letter from you’.”233
If letters were thus the form of expression for feelings and sensibility, the 
epistolary novel, according to Lynn Hunt, was the appropriate medium for 
engendering awareness of one’s own interiority, communicable to others.
“By its very form, then, the epistolary novel was able to demonstrate that selfhood 
depended on qualities of ‘interiority’ (having an inner core), for the characters 
express their inner feelings in their letters. In addition, the epistolary novel showed 
that all selves had this interiority (many of the characters write), and consequently 
that all selves were in some sense equal because all were alike in their possession of 
interiority. The exchange of letters turns the servant girl Pamela, for example, into 
a model of proud autonomy and individuality rather than a stereotype of the down-
trodden. Like Pamela, Clarissa and Julie come to stand for individuality itself. Read-
ers become more aware of their own and every other individual’s capacity for 
interiority.”234
2. Declaring rights
Just as letters and novels in epistolary form were the appropriate medium in 
the eighteenth century for gaining awareness of one’s own personality, “dec-
larations” seemed to be the obvious medium for communicating that one 
had become aware of one’s own rights, of rights rooted in one’s own person. 
This was the case with the declaration of the American colonies in which 
they expressed their political will to free themselves from the British Crown 
in the language of a “declaration of rights”:
“The events of 1774–76 thus temporarily fused particularistic and universalistic 
thinking about rights in the insurgent colonies. In response to Great Britain, the 
colonists could cite their already existing rights as British subjects and at the same 
time claim the universal right as equal men. Yet, since the latter in effect abrogated 
the former, as the Americans moved more decisively toward independence they felt 
the need to declare their rights as part of the transition from a state of nature back into civil 
government – or from a state of subjection to George III forward into a new repub-
lican polity. Universalistic rights would never have been declared in the American 
colonies without the revolutionary moment created by the resistance to British 
authority. Although everyone did not agree on the importance of declaring rights 
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or on the content of the rights to be declared, independence opened the door to the 
declaration of rights.”235
This “rights talk”, as Lynn Hunt calls it, spread like an epidemic: “Despite its 
critics, rights talk was gathering momentum after the 1760s. ‘Natural rights’, 
now supplemented by ‘the rights of mankind’, ‘the rights of humanity’, and 
‘the rights of man’, became common currency. Its political potential vastly 
enhanced by the American conflicts of the 1760s and 1770s, talk of universal 
rights shifted back across the Atlantic to Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, 
and France.”236
The most important destination of this “travelling rights talk” was natu-
rally France, where the “language of rights” finally imposed itself:
“The American precedents became all the more compelling as the French entered a 
state of constitutional emergency. In 1788, facing a bankruptcy caused in large 
measure by French participation in the American War of Independence, Louis 
XVI agreed to convoke the Estates-General, which had last met in 1614. As elections 
of delegates began, declaratory rumbles could already be heard. In January 1789, 
Jefferson’s friend Lafayette prepared a draft declaration and in the weeks that fol-
lowed Condorcet quietly formulated his own. The king had asked the clergy (the 
Frist Estate), the nobles (the Second Estate), and ordinary people (the Third Estate) 
not only to elect delegates but also to write up lists of their grievances. A number of 
the lists drawn up in February, March, and April 1798 referred to ‘the inalienable 
rights of man’, ‘the imprescriptible rights of free men’, ‘the rights and the dignity of 
man and the citizen’, or ‘the rights of enlightened and free men’, but ‘rights of man’ 
predominated. The language of rights was now diffusion rapidly in the atmosphere of 
growing crisis.”237
This spreading “language of rights”, as Hunt shows, had an internal logic, 
what we could call a logic of ongoing expansion, embracing first religious 
minorities, then slaves, and finally women, as well. Hunt therefore speaks of 
the “bulldozer force of the revolutionary logic of rights”.238
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III. The narrative of Samuel Moyn: a political history of
the reception of human rights
In “The Last Utopia,”239 Samuel Moyn presents a quite different narrative 
from those of Lauren and Hunt. For him the real story of human rights after 
decades of political insignificance begins with their “explosion” in the 1970s. 
It is worthwhile considering this story, albeit in much abbreviated form, 
because it shows what a key role certain actors play in the diffusion of ideas, 
whether we call them in general terms “transfer agents” or specifically 
“human rights activists.” Moyn highlights three such “diffusion agents.”
* Social movements and NGOs
The role of NGOs in promoting human rights has been described ad nause-
am.240 We limit ourselves to Moyn’s comments on the role of social move-
ments:
“Most of all, social movements adopted human rights as a slogan for the first time. As the 
1970s continued, the identification of such causes as human rights struggles snow-
balled, continuing across the world throughout the decade (indeed through the 
present). This serial amplification occurred even as states negotiated the Helsinki 
Final Act, signed in 1975, that inadvertently provided a new forum for North 
Atlantic rights activists. And then came 1977, a year of shocking and altogether 
unpredictable prominence of human rights. One of the most fascinating lessons of 
the period is how little known were the Universal Declaration and the project of 
international human rights when it began, and how these earlier ‘sources’ were 
discovered only after the movements that claimed them got going.”241
* The prominent role of Amnesty International
Samuel Moyn is clearly fascinated by the pioneering role of Amnesty Inter-
national (AI). He has this to say about the organization’s modus operandi:
“Indeed almost alone, Amnesty International invented grassroots human rights advo-
cacy, and through it drove public awareness of human rights generally. Its contri-
bution would reach its highest visibility when it received the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1977, the breakthrough year for human rights as a whole, though it began its work 
years earlier. Unlike the earlier NGOs that invoked human rights occasionally or 
often, AI opened itself to mass participation through its framework of local chap-
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ters, each acting in support of specific, personalized victims of persecution. And 
unlike the earliest human rights groups, it did not take the UN to be the primary 
locale of advocacy. Skirting the reform of international governance, it sought a 
direct and public connection with suffering, through lighting candles in a show 
of solidarity and writing letters to governments pleading for mercy and release. 
These practical innovations depended in equal parts on a brilliant reading of the 
fortunes of idealism in the postwar world and a profound understanding of the impor-
tance of symbolic gestures.”242
One particularly successful method employed by Amnesty International has 
been the collection and dissemination of information about unacceptable 
conditions and practices:
“Amnesty International’s novel methods of information gathering went in the 1970s 
far beyond its original methods of forming adoption groups to write pleas for 
individual release. And these methods were also critical to how it came to be 
(and, soon enough, were copied by other organizations). Even before the very early 
translation of dissident texts provided by AI’s London-based research bureau, the 
organization had begun to focus its attention on torture in the later 1960s. It 
pioneered the gathering of information about depredations under Greek military 
rule from 1967–1974. Providentially, in 1972 the organization opened a Campaign 
against Torture, published a global analysis of the problem, and initiated a petition 
drive (the first signatory being Joan Baez, who opened it at an April 1973 concert). 
Seán MacBride, for his contribution to the campaign, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1974, thereby raising the profile of human rights and broadcasting the very idea that 
social movements could coalesce around them. After the political coups in Chile 
and Uruguay, Amnesty International and other NGOs were active in gathering 
information and raising consciousness about infractions in those two countries. 
The information they gathered was spread most notably at the United Nations 
and in Washington, D.C., where AI opened an office in 1976. Such activities promp-
ted some of the first analyses of AI’s campaigns for wider publics, both in the 
academy and at large.”243
* Jimmy Carter Superstar
Samuel Moyn identifies President Jimmy Carter as an absolute star in the 
popularization of the human rights idea. “Coming out of nowhere,” he was 
the right man with his deep-rooted morality in the right place and at the 
right time to spread the message of human rights: “In the right place at the 
242 Moyn (2012) 129–130.
243 Moyn (2012) 147–148.
190 Part Three
right time, Carter moved ‘human rights’ from grassroot mobilization to the 
center of global rhetoric.”244
Jimmy Carter’s inaugural address on 20 January 1977, which focused on 
commitment to the message of human rights, dramatically enhanced the 
standing of the human rights idea. This is particularly worth noting, because, 
as the phenomenon of American “civil religion” shows,245 each newly elec-
ted president of the United States quite deliberately takes the opportunity of 
the inaugural address to stress the unity of the profoundly American civil 
religion and the policy he intends to pursue. Jimmy Carter did just this:
“The year of human rights, 1977, began with Carter’s January 20 inauguration, 
which put ‘human rights’ in front of the viewing public for the first time in 
American history. This year of breakthrough would culminate in Amnesty Interna-
tional’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10. Carter’s inaugural address 
on January 20 made ‘human rights’ a publicly acknowledged buzzword. ‘Because we 
are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere’, Carter 
announced on the Capitol steps. ‘Our commitment to human rights must be abso-
lute’. The symbolic novelty and resonance of the phrase in Carter’s policy is what 
mattered most of all, since he embedded it for the first time in popular conscious-
ness and ordinary language. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. once called on the ‘future his-
torian’ to ‘trace the internal discussions … that culminated in the striking words of 
the inaugural address’. No one, however, yet knows exactly how they got there. But 
soon after, the term was being interpreted as ‘almost a theological point for Carter. 
He can’t stamp out sin, but he keeps on praying’.”246
But that was not all: in a speech at a ceremony at Notre Dame University, 
Jimmy Carter even declared human rights to be the basis for the future foreign 
policy of the United States:
“But by spring, Carter gave a programmatic address at Notre Dame’s commence-
ment, laying out a full-scale foreign policy philosophy based on human rights, while 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance offered some specifics at the University of Georgia 
Law School. Even as Carter’s subordinates ‘groped’ to define policy, American elites 
embarked on an extended discussion of human rights, from their historical origins, 
to their contemporary meaning, to their case-by-case implications. The issue had 
become relevant and even ‘chic’, Roberta Cohen, executive director of the Interna-
tional League (who would shortly join the Carter human rights bureau), told the 
New York Times. ‘For years we were preachers, cockeyed idealists, or busybodies and 
now we are respectable. … Everybody wants to get into human rights. That’s fine, 
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but what happens if they get bored?’ This upsurge in interest could not compare to 
that of the 1940s, when even the highest officials did not use the language of human 
rights (except Winston Churchill once out of office), and internationalists were 
concerned with the UN alone. In the 1970s, by contrast, popular mobilization 
and then Carter’s interest kicked off a much larger and more public discussion that 
continues in the present.”247
So much to the narrative of Samuel Moyn.
IV. What the three narratives teach us
All three narratives deal with the “big idea” of human rights, an idea that is 
so influential that Marcus Llanque in his history of political ideas has no 
hesitation in calling present times the “age of human rights.”248 This idea of 
human rights has gone through a long juridification process, and now finds 
expression largely in the language of law, to be precise, in the language of law 
as a language of politics. Despite the depressing stories of growing violations 
of human rights in the most recent Report of Amnesty International,249 it 
can be said that the human rights idea has now imposed itself.250
This, however, is only one side of the coin. As the book titles “Visions 
Seen” and “The Last Utopia” suggest, the idea of human rights cannot be 
fully juridified. It can remain effective only if it keeps its visionary and 
utopian roots and continues to draw inspiration from them. If these roots 
are severed with the stamp “dealt with” as in the human rights conventions, 
the triad of morality, law, and politics would crumble. The human rights 
idea would lose its specific role as a morally grounded normative yardstick of 
politics. In attaining the goal of improving the world it would accordingly 
still be necessary to read novels and declare rights.
As “rights talk” pertinently indicates, the global dissemination of the the 
human rights idea has always been an ongoing communication process.251 To 
succeed, talking about rights has always needed more than a globally com-
prehensible language. As a result, globalization of the human rights message 
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necessarily poses a permanent translation problem.252 As far as the problem 
of a common language is concerned, Samuel Moyn rightly stresses that the 
language of human rights – which also became the language of dissidence in 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc and of resistance against Latin Amer-
ican military dictatorships – could became a a “lingua franca”: “It was the 
decision of a sector of the Latin American left to resist the regional repres-
sion in human rights terms that helped make the fortune of the concept in 
that region and beyond. As in the Soviet Union before, it also mattered that 
the language proved to be highly coalitional and ecumenical in providing a 
lingua franca for diverse voices.”253 And it is convincing that Moyn so 
strongly emphasizes the importance of Jimmy Carter as a human rights 
activist. Not in his role as successfully human rights politician but as a 
president of the United States who spoke the language of human rights – 
as “plain language.” Marcus Lanque is therefore quite right to regard it as an 
essential function of human rights to provide a common language spanning 
cultural boundaries:
“One can really make politics with human rights and not only set political goals.254
This points to greater potential for interpreting human rights than the assumption 
of hegemonic liberalism will have us believe. The human rights idea had already 
embarked on different paths in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
declaration is based not only on a liberal-individualistic understanding of law but 
also takes account of social and political contexts. It was therefore no systemic 
inconsistency when in the course of decolonization the collective dimension of 
human rights was more strongly stressed, along with the self-determination of 
nations, sovereignty over natural resources, and the protection of indigenous peo-
ples. Humanity, too, can be addressed as a subject of rights, rights to collective goods 
such as biodiversity, nature, water, the sea, and the atmosphere. Human rights thus 
provide a language at least for conceptualizing basal conflicts across all cultural 
differences, hence paving the way to universal communication and cooperation.”255
If this is the case, it is only logical to follow Florian Hoffmann256 in under-
standing the discursive nature of human rights as the key aspect. Ben Golder 
summarizes the argument as follows, bringing us back to the parallels with 
the concept of the common good:
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“… for Hoffmann it is precisely this discursive character of human rights (human 
rights ‘talk’) that ‘secures’ their democratic open-endedness and incipient plurality. 
… Neither the ‘objective’ discursive meanings of human rights nor their unofficial 
‘subjective’ articulations by individual speakers can ever finally be determined or 
delimited, and for him the very meaning of human rights only emerges fleetingly 
and from time to time when different discourses and subjective understandings of 
human rights encounter, affect and modify each other in ‘a dynamic process of 
mutual feedback loops’. For Hoffmann, this ‘pragmatic perspective aims to com-
prehend human rights discourse, not in terms of what it could be, or ought to be, 
but in terms of what it arguably is, namely a plural, polycentric, and ultimately 
indeterminate discourse amenable to use by nearly everybody everywhere’, which is 
consequently ‘beyond the control of those creating them, and is ultimately uncer-
tain. There is no single correct signification and thus use of human rights’.”257
In other words, if a global history of ideas and knowledge is to be written, 
the career of the language of human rights as a “language of rights” and a 
“language of political change” would be an essential element in the project. 
This being the case, we conclude this chapter with a glance at the various 
ways in which the language of human rights has been used in various 
historical contexts and by various actors.
D. The language of human rights as the language of politics at work
I. The myth of a “pure” history of ideas
Writing about human rights between politics and religion, Wolfgang Rein-
hard reflects on an aspect that naturally captures our attention: the history of 
ideas and human rights. He posits that there are no free-floating, ready-to-
use ideas: they are always born and used in an interest-driven context:
“Pallas Athene, the combative goddess of wisdom, is believed to have emerged fully 
armed from the head of Zeus. Thus the Greek myth. Ideas are similarly considered 
to emerge ready-to-use from the brains of geniuses. Thus the myth espoused by the 
history of ideas. When demythologized, the process looks more modest and more 
complex. Often enough, a genius merely formulates a long overdue concept. 
Although a cultural repository of thought provides the raw material for new ideas, 
these ideas first have to be formulated as they come into being. Often enough, what 
is new about them is that they establish and conceptualize hitherto incommunica-
ble, perhaps even inconceivable states of affairs, even though with hindsight we can 
identify their beginnings and roots in the history of ideas. The new is produced by 
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certain interests under certain underlying conditions, often enough by the need to 
legitimate the outcome of a development in a changing or in an unchanged environ-
ment.”258
This need to legitimate certain developments brings us to our next topic.
II. Two notable contexts of application for the language
of human rights
1. The language of human rights as a language of legitimacy
There is no disputing that the protection of human rights is of crucial 
importance for the legitimacy of the secular state. Winfried Brugger:
“Throughout history, the question of [the legitimation of political power] has found 
a variety of answers. From antiquity until well into the Middle Ages, power relations 
were mostly based on descent and tradition. This traditional justification of govern-
mental power was flanked by religious justification, which until well into modern 
times was an essential support for secular and spiritual rule in the Western hemi-
sphere, and in some non-Western cultures such as Islam is still so today. In the 
modern age, however, a third line of justification for the state has come to the fore, 
which, from a global point of view, must now be considered dominant. Only a state 
that respects human rights can count on acceptance by its citizens and describe itself 
as a state governed by the rule of law.
The 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen states this 
succinctly in Article 2: ‘The goal of any political association is the conservation of 
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man’, and in Article 16: ‘Any society in 
which the guarantee of rights is not assured, nor the separation of powers deter-
mined, has no Constitution.’
Developments over the past 200 years can thus be summed up as follows: the 
justification of the modern state depends essentially (if not exclusively) on respect 
for human rights.”259
Although it is not fully clear what finally moved the deputies of the French 
National Assembly to draft the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen, they were obviously aware that the special revolutionary situation 
called for a fundamentally different basis for the legitimacy of political power
than in the past:
258 Reinhard (2014) 313.
259 Brugger (1989) 538–539.
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“The Assembly finally voted on August 4 to draw up a declaration of rights without 
duties. No one then or since has adequately explained how opinion finally shifted in 
favor of drafting such a declaration, in large part because the deputies were so busy 
confronting day-to-day issues that they did not grasp the larger import of each of 
their decisions. As a result, their letters and even later memoirs proved tantalizingly 
vague about the shifting tides of opinion. We do know that the majority had come 
to believe that an entirely new groundwork was required. The rights of man provided 
the principles for an alternative vision of government. As the Americans had before 
them, the French declared rights as part of a growing rupture with established 
authority. Deputy Rabaut Saint-Etienne remarked on the parallel on August 18: 
‘like the Americans, we want to regenerate ourselves, and therefore the declaration 
of rights is essentially necessary’.”260
With regard to the function of human rights as fundamentally new legitima-
tion concept for state power, Hunt adds:
“In one document, therefore, the French deputies tried to encapsulate both legal 
protections of individual rights and a new grounds for governmental legitimacy. Sov-
ereignty rested exclusively in the nation (Article 3), and ‘society’ had the right to 
hold every public agent accountable (Article 15). No mention was made of the king, 
French tradition, history or custom or the Catholic Church. Rights were declared 
‘in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being’, but however ‘sacred’, 
they were not traced back to that supernatural origin. Jefferson had felt the need to 
assert that all men were ‘endowed by their Creator’ with rights; the French deduced 
the rights from the entirely secular sources of nature, reason, and society. During the 
debates, Mathieu de Montmorency had affirmed that ‘the rights of man in society 
are eternal’ and ‘no sanction is needed to recognize them’. The challenge to the old 
order in Europe could not have been more forthright.”261
2. The llanguage of human rights as the language of justification
As far as the language of law as a language of justification is concerned, we 
have become well acquainted with this phenomenon in connection with the 
language of international law. The language of human rights as – to quote 
Bardo Fassbender – key element of the common good under international 
law262 – is clearly well suited for deployment in political controversies and 
conflicts, as the following examples show.
260 Hunt (2007) 130.
261 Hunt (2007) 132.
262 Fassbender (2003) 1ff.
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* The suitability of the language of human rights as an element in political 
justificatory rhetoric.
Samuel Moyn offers numerous examples of this suitability in his book on the 
history of human rights.263 The first example concerns justification of the 
entry of the United States into the Second World War particularly its 
involvement in the struggle against Nazi Germany. The authoritative 
grounds were stated by Roosevelt and Churchill in the so-called Atlantic 
Charter. Moyn has this to say:
“The declaration proclaimed the Allies, convinced that complete victory over their 
enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and 
to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands’. 
Human rights began first of all as a war slogan, to justify why the Allies had to be ‘now 
engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate 
the world’. But no one could have said what the slogan implied.”264
The “justificatory language”265 of human rights, as our second example 
shows, proved extremely useful in justifying the founding of the United 
Nations, for which good reasons had be found in the light of the failure 
of the League of Nations: “To the extent that [the American international-
ists] remained in the negotiations, human rights and other idealistic formu-
lations reflected a need for public acceptance and legitimacy, as part of the 
rhetorical drive to distinguish the organization from prior instances of great 
power balance. It was a narrow portal to offer morality to enter the world, 
and a far cry from a utopian multilateralism based on human rights.”266
Now to the third example: the language of human rights has played a 
crucial role in the political rhetoric of anti-communism and anti-totalitarian-
ism. Samuel Moyn:
“By the later 1930s, however, a dominant understanding began to crystallize in this 
prewar struggle over the phrase’s implications: it came to be antitotalitarian, a mean-
ing codified most clearly by the most prominent world figure ever to use the phrase 
before FDR [Frank Delano Roosevelt, G.F.S.], Pope Pius XI, in largely neglected 
references dating from 1973. ‘Man, as a person’, Pius declared in Mit brennender 
263 Moyn (2012).
264 Moyn (2012) 49.
265 Concept in Moyn (2012) 57.
266 Moyn (2012) 59.
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Sorge, his famous encyclical decrying the fate of religion under the Nazis, ‘possesses 
rights that he holds from God and which must remain, with regard to the collec-
tivity, beyond the reach of anything that would tend to deny them, to abolish them, 
are to neglect them’. The pope was on his own journey, having discovered only in 
these years that the ‘totalitarian’ regimes were hostile to Christianity, after a period 
of judicious waiting and alliance seeking.”267
This example is important because, especially after the Second World War, 
the Christianization of human rights was to be observed.268 Writing about 
modern human rights as a task for Christians and Muslims, Heiner Biele-
feldt269 describes how, in the light of the success of the human rights idea, 
both Christianity and Islam have sought to claim this idea for themselves as 
home grown.
Very prominent was naturally the omnipresent anti-communist thrust of 
the language of human rights. Samuel Moyn comments:
“Then, by 1947–48 and the crystallization of the Cold War, the West succeeded in 
capturing the language of human rights for the crusade against the Soviet Union; the 
language’s main promoters ended up being conservatives on the European conti-
nent. Having failed to carve out a new option in the mid-1940s, human rights 
proved soon after to be just another way of arguing for one side in the Cold War 
struggle.270 … human rights became almost immediately associated with anticom-
munism. Besides an international controversy around discrimination against South 
Asians in South Africa, the two major cause célèbres in which human rights were 
invoked at the United Nations and in international fora generally were anticommun-
ist in spirit. In one, the Soviet Union was criticized on human rights grounds for 
prohibiting women who were Soviet citizens from migrating to join their foreign 
husbands abroad; the second, and most visible of all, revolved around the intern-
ment and trial of Cardinal József Mindszenty, The Primate of Hungary, in 
1948–1949, and related abuses of Christians in Eastern Europe like the house arrest 
of Cardinal Josef Beran in Czechoslovakia – both campaigns occurring so quickly 
after the Universal Declaration as to help define its bearing.”271
267 Moyn (2012) 50.
268 Moyn (2012) 74ff.
269 Bielefeldt (1996).
270 Moyn (2012) 45.
271 Moyn (2012) 71.
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* The invention of responsibility to protect
On this prominent justification,272 Andreas Rödder273 has this to say, under 
the heading “between human rights imperialism and indifference: responsi-
bility to protect and humanitarian intervention”:
“The sovereignty of states and universal human rights have repeatedly been evoked 
as basis and ideals for the international order, especially after 1990 – and have often 
been at odds. The concept of responsibility to protect,274 formulated in 2005 by the 
United Nations and adopted by 192 countries, provided a theoretical loophole. If a 
state failed to meet its responsibility to protect its population, the protection of 
people against serious violations of human rights justified armed intervention from 
outside and against the sovereignty of the state in question.”275
We now make a sweeping turn to the “dynamics of the rule of law.”
272 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (https://www.globalr2p.org/) summa-
rizes this responsibility to protect by sovereign states as follows:
The R2P Concept
The Responsibility to Protect – known as R2P – refers to the obligation of states toward 
their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other large-scale 
atrocities. This new international norm sets forth that:
* The primary responsibility to populations from human-made catastrophe lies with the
state itself.
* When a state fails to meet that responsibility, either through incapacity or ill-will, then
the responsibility to protect shifts to the international community.
* This responsibility must be exercised by diplomatic, legal, and other peaceful measures
and, as a last resort, through military force.
These principles in a 2011 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty and were endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document paragraphs 138 and 139.
273 Rödder (2015).
274 See Cohen (2012).
275 Rödder (2015) 346.
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Chapter Four
The Language of the Rule of Law as an Integral Part
of the Language of the Political History of Ideas
In concluding the third part of this book, we examine the role of the 
language of the rule of law276 in the history of political ideas. The aim is 
not to give a detailed description of what are generally considered the ele-
ments of the rule of law277 nor to decline the functions of rule-of-law 
principles.278 We have already looked at them briefly under the heading 
“legal certainty as the “idée directrice” of law”279 and in connection with 
the “invention of public office,”280 so important for the rule of law. Nor will 
various conceptualizations be weighed up, notably whether a “thinner con-
ception” that addresses the formal virtues of the rule of law is to be preferred 
over a “thicker conception” that firmly posits human rights as a crucial 
component thereof.281 A great deal has been written about all these aspects 
(not least by the present author) and the state of discussion is relatively easy 
to access.282
Our approach is a different one. Certain key topoi of the political history 
of ideas are addressed to discover whether and, if so, how intensively these 
central topics in the history of political ideas have been discussed in the 
language of the rule of law or – to include the potential of the language 
of law – could or ought to be discussed.
The first concept to consider is the legitimacy of political authority.
276 Although there are differences between “Rechtsstaatlichkeit” and “rule of law,” they do 
not warrant treatment as separate concepts.
277 See, for example, the treatment of the “essential elements of the rule of law principle” in: 
Benda (1995); on the components of the “rule of law” see Tamanaha (2007).
278 See Schuppert, G. F. (2007d).
279 Part Two, Chapter Two of this volume.
280 Part Two, Chapter One of this volume.
281 In detail, see Schuppert, G. F. (2009).
282 On the various conceptualizations of the rule of law see Schuppert, G. F. (2008b) 
683–745.
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A. Legitimate authority: authority based on and limited by law
The legitimacy of authority has always been a central topic in the political 
history of ideas and philosophy of the state.283 Under the conditions of 
globalization and transnationalization, it has experienced an impressive ren-
aissance;284 Michael Zürn has spoken of the role of political science as a science 
of legitimation.285 As we have seen in the preceding section on the language 
of human rights, invoking law and its protection has always been among the 
most important resources for legitimizing the authority of the state. Jean 
Bodin took the view that only sovereign power exercised in accordance with 
the law and limited by the law could claim to differ from the practices of 
robbers or pirates.286 Arther Benz is probably right to assert “that limitation 
of state power by law and constitution is a fundamental precondition for 
legitimate, state authority.”287 But the relationship between power and the 
law, as we shall see, is somewhat more complicated.
I. The dialectical relationship between power and law:
law as the basis and limitation of power
According to Hermann Heller,288 law not only limits but also shapes power. 
This “fundamental insight into the power-shaping nature of law” means that 
the relationship between power and law must be seen as dialectical:
“As long as law and the volitional power of the state are addressed without consid-
ering dialectical aspects, neither the particularity of law nor that of the state can be 
properly understood, let alone the relationship between the two. Both the validity 
and the positivity of law are incomprehensible without correlative mapping of state 
and law. Law must be recognized as the necessary condition for the modern state, 
and the state as the necessary condition for modern law. Without the power-shaping 
character of law, there is neither normative legal validity nor state power; without 
the law-shaping character of state power there is neither legal positivity nor state. 
The relationship between state and law is possible neither as undiscriminating unity 
nor as unbridgeable contrariety.The relationship between law and state is therefore a 
283 Hofmann (2000).
284 See Nullmeier et al. (2010); Nullmeier et al. (eds.) (2012).
285 Zürn (2011a) 629.
286 Bodin (1961), I: 1–3, 128–132.
287 Benz (2006) 143.
288 Heller (1970).
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dialectical one, namely, a necessary relationship between separate spheres and inclu-
sion of each pole in its opposite (Cohn, Theorie der Dialektik, p. 52ff., 264 f., 
287).”289
Marin Kriele describes this dialectical relationship between power and law in 
similar vein: “Power derives from law, and the law derives from power. The 
two seemingly exclusive propositions are nevertheless both right. Institu-
tions of the state decide what the law is, but they decide by virtue of com-
petence assigned to them: the organizational norms that decide on the 
assignment of competence can also be amended, but only by the competent 
institutions and through the procedures provided for this purpose.”290
Using a somewhat different terminology, one can speak with Arthur Benz 
of a duality of legitimation and limitation, a relationship that has found its 
currently valid form in the idea of the constitutional state. According to Benz, 
the modern state developed as a legal order, as an institution that justifies 
and limits power. This duality of legitimation and limitation was based on 
the existence of law prescribed for the state,”291 namely by tradition or 
religion. Once tradition and religion were no longer able to justify law, 
the institution “state” logically needed to be reinvented:
“The legal order that constituted the state needed to be derived from sources other 
than tradition and religion. The history of ideas offers various approaches to solving 
this problem. What finally made the grade was the concept of the democratic 
constitutional state in which the tensions between law and state are integrated 
not abolished.”292
To sum up, the language of law and its hard core, the rule-of-law principle, 
could with respect to the state be seen as two languages: a language of 
justification and a language of limitation. Arthur Benz’s conclusion is that 
these two languages come together in the language of constitutionalism.
289 Heller (1970) 191–192.
290 Kriele (1990) 23.
291 Benz (2006) 147.
292 Benz (2006) 147.
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II. The language of the rule-of-law constitution as a language of rules
and procedures
If the relationship between power and law is dialectical, the question is how 
this relationship actually “works,” how this interplay operates. The answer is 
in principle quite simple: certain rules are needed to organize these dialectical 
relations:
“The concept of law … points to specific characteristics of institutions and processes 
of institutional politics: if the state is institutionalized as a legal order, the political 
processes that constitute and change this order must also operate in accordance with 
rules and must not be subject to the arbitrariness of individuals or powerful groups. 
Democratic processes, too, must obey rules – by which the multitude of individual wills 
is transformed into a collective will. This raises the question of what rules apply for 
the political procedures by which the legal order of the state is established. What 
legitimates these rules and by what processes are they made and put into effect?”293
The task of providing theses indispensable procedural rules is given to the 
constitution – understood as both institution and process, and hence to a con-
stitutional language that as language of rules and procedures frames the 
political process and thus limits it:
“From a formal point of view, the modern state is an institution grounded in law. 
The law defines the functions and powers of the state, its authority. Assuming office 
in the state involves a limitation on the exercise of power, of power conferred under 
the rules of state institutions. Unlike societal organizations, the state is characterized 
by specific functions and competences: it alone is entitled to set universally valid and 
binding norms (lawmaking) and to enforce them by coercive means. But this does 
not vest it with boundless sovereignty. Both the content of the rules and the exercise 
of force are limited by law.294 This law goes back to procedures, which have in turn 
to be set and guaranteed by the state. The limitation of power by law therefore also 
requires power limited by law.”295
This view of the state as an institution296 that operates by defined rules and in 
defined organizational forms brings us to the next point.
293 Benz (2006) 144.
294 Benz (2008) 97–109.
295 Benz (2006) 152.
296 See Anter / Bleek (2013) 89ff.: “Der Staat als Institution.”
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B. The state: the organized unity of decision-making and action.
The language of organizational and procedural law
I. Statehood requires organization
In his constitutional law theory, which characteristically combines legal and 
sociological perspectives, Hermann Heller has coined a particularly apt and 
hence often quoted term to describe the particularity of the institution 
“state” as the “organized unity of decision-making and action”.297
This definition indicates that such unity does not appear out of the blue: 
it has to be organized. Heller’s key concepts are therefore organization and 
organize.
He has this to say about the state as organization:
“In fact, the entity ‘state’ exists as a neither ‘organic’ nor fictitious human action-
entity (Wirkungseinheit); it is a special type of organized action-entity. The law of 
organization is the most fundamental constitutive law of the state.298 Its unity is true 
unity in an operational structure whose existence in the form of human collabo-
ration is enabled by the action of special ‘organs’ consciously directed towards 
effective entity formation. Never … does the relative natural or cultural uniformity 
of the local inhabitants in itself produce the entity state. Ultimately, this is always 
and only to be understood as the outcome of conscious human action, of conscious 
entity formation, of organization.”299
Activity intent on building an organization is called organization, and can be 
described as follows:
“Organizing is an activity directed towards instigating and realizing such actions (and 
omissions) as are necessary for the present and constantly regenerated existence of an 
297 Heller (1970) 228ff.
298 Heller is referring here to his preceding reflections on – to use the language of gover-
nance theory – “institution building.” He notes (p. 88):
“All societal coexistence is ordered coexistence. In the merely factual, i. e., rule-driven regularities 
of societal action, too, societal orders find expression that lend consistency to human coexistence 
and the possibility of concerted collective collaboration. But it is still a big step from order to 
organization, from coherent societal conduct to relatively enduring unity of action …
Collective action in manifold centres of action is integrated only where the performance of the 
many is – possibly compulsorily – unified and uniformly put into effect through action con-
sciously directed towards the unity of action. This form of activity concerned with the mode and 
order of connecting and effectively upgrading performance can be called conscious entity building 
or organization.”
299 Heller (1970) 230.
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ordered structure for action (organization). From a phenomenological standpoint 
there are three mutually exacting ‘elements’ in every organization: societal action 
by a number of people in cooperation; whose collaboration 2. is regularly oriented 
on a rule-driven order, whose setting and safeguarding is in the hands of 3. special 
institutions. Every group capable of deciding and acting, every collective action-
entity is an organized action structure consciously constituted by institutions to 
achieve unity of decision and effect. The extent to which organized members are 
themselves also institutions depends on how cooperative or hierarchical the struc-
ture of the organization is. At any rate, every extensive organization, notably the 
state, is always based on the societal division of labour. The action structure we call 
‘state’ has autonomized itself above all by assigning particular governmental func-
tions to special institutions.”300
But the production of a collective capacity for decision-making and action 
requires not only a certain measure of institutional concentration301 but 
also, for purposes of institutional will-formation, certain procedural rules. 
Writing about premodern political procedures, Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger 
stresses the importance of procedural autonomy for the “formation of a body 
politic with a consistent will”:
“To distinguish between and explain various types of procedure, I propose (with 
reference to Luhmann) procedural autonomy as a criterion. The need for collective 
political action (for instance, warding off external enemies, dealing with public order 
problems, providing funding, etc.) can call for procedures to be developed that 
enable collective decision making and conflict management (in the language of 
early modernity: procedures for building a body politic with united purpose). If political 
procedures are to produce decisions accepted as binding by all those affected, and 
thus – even without the executive having any or only inadequate means of enforcing 
them – producing a collective capacity to act, if political procedures are to acquire 
such authority, they will require, among other things, a degree of structural 
autonomy from the (estates-based, hierarchical, corporative) environment.”302
A particularly instructive example of the connection between procedural law 
and institutionalization are the procedural rules for the election of bishops. 
On the importance of this for the institution “Church”, Andreas Thier 
remarks in his book on “Hierarchy and Autonomy”:303
300 Heller (1970) 231.
301 On state formation as the outcome of process on institutional agglomeration see Rokkan
(1975).
302 Stollberg-Rilinger (ed.) (2001) 9 f.
303 Thier (2011).
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“In late antiquity and the Middle Ages, hierarchical order and then institutional 
autonomy became the determining characteristics of institutional Church identity. 
This is particularly apparent with regard to rule-setting for the appointment of 
bishops. Hierarchical elements grew in importance as did the question of subject 
matter and reach of the autonomous decision-making powers of those involved. 
Decisive for these developments was the procedural manner in which bishops were 
appointed jointly by clergy, laymen, crown province bishops or metropolitans. 
Elaborated above all in the ecclesiology of Cyprian of Carthage, the notion of 
ordered procedure became the key guiding principle in conciliar and papal rule-
setting. In such transitions from ecclesiological concepts of order to concrete 
arrangements, enduring regulatory traditions developed, which, especially in the 
eleventh century, were to gain particular normative authority. As far as media are 
concerned, the precondition for this tradition formation was the embedding of 
ecclesiastical legal culture in the written word, notably in Church canon collections. 
These repositories of Church legal culture ensured that the rules passed down were 
available. They were to become important for the further development of normative 
knowledge in the Church.”304
He later adds:
“The gradual development of rules for filling leading positions in the Church was 
reflected in the institutional consolidation of the Church from about the first 
century and in the consequent development of a structure of ecclesiastical offices.”305
Pausing to take stock, we note that, as far as the state is concerned as 
decision-making and action entity, two types of law are involved whose 
importance is often underestimated: organizational law and the law of proce-
dure.306 It would be doing injustice to these two varieties of law to see them 
only from a practical, instrumental point of view, as elements in advanced 
administrative studies. Organizational and procedural law offer a great deal 
more. As we have seen, they are important control parameters in governmental 
and administrative action,307 and thus – in our terminology – two highly 
important languages of politics. We consider two examples.
304 Thier (2011) XI.
305 Thier (2011) 15.
306 From the public administration perspective on organization and procedure as control 
level of administrative action, see Schuppert, G. F. (2000) 544ff., 772ff.
307 For a detailed treatment of organizational law, see Schuppert, G. F. (2012b).
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II. Organizational and procedural law as manifestations of law
relevant to the history of ideas: two examples
1. The example of the separation of powers
The organizational principle of the separation of powers clearly has a fasci-
nation for exponents of constitutional law theory. It is treated at length in 
every “theory of the state”, perhaps not least because it offers an opportunity 
to honour one of the heroes of the political history of ideas, Charles de 
Secondat Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu.308 The “idée directrice” of 
the separation of powers principle is to prevent the abuse of power through an 
institutional arrangement of mutual constraints309 constituting a system of 
“checks and balances.”310 Roman Herzog, for example comments as follows 
on this broadly accepted understanding of separation of powers theory:
“… Since it first found literary expression in the eighteenth century, separation of 
powers theory has posited that the institutions of the limited power complex that 
results from the separation of powers ought not to encounter one another with 
indifference but check one another; i. e., impel each other to exercise power correctly 
and restrain one another from abusing power. If one is not prepared to accept that loyal 
holders of power do this in violation of the fundamental limits to their responsi-
bilities, it will be necessary to conceive of the separation of powers not as the 
assignment of responsibilities that leads to hermetic closure but as a system of 
mutually overlapping jurisdictions within which each power is tied to concurrent acts 
of will by different office holders. Historically, separation of powers theory has 
consequently never led to clean-cut divisions between different branches of govern-
ment but always to a more or less stable, extremely complicated system of mutually 
overlapping powers and participatory rights. To be exact, such overlap does not, as is 
often assumed, violate the principle: it necessarily arises from it in the pursuit of 
mutual constraint.”311
We do not really need to know more about the organizational principle of the 
separation of powers, nor to ascertain whether, in party-state democracy, we are 
perhaps dealing with interlocking or even entangled powers.312 Our sole con-
cern is to show that a principle of the law pertaining to the organization of the 
state has operated since the eighteenth century as a language of politics.
308 On Montesquieu’s separation of powers theory see Imboden (1959); Kägi (1961).
309 See Fleiner / Basta Fleiner (2004) 236ff.
310 Benz (2008) 151 f.
311 Herzog (1971) 229–230.
312 Herzog (1971) 235.
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2. The example of bureaucracy
Particularly from the perspective of the history of ideas, bureaucracy is espe-
cially interesting because – almost more than separation of powers theory – 
it reveals the close links between seemingly technico-institutional organiza-
tional arrangements and notions about the legitimacy of state power. Our 
concern is not the efficiency of bureaucratic administration or adding to 
the ever popular, trite criticism of bureaucracy so rife since Franz Kafka 
and Heimito von Doderer,313,314 but with bureaucracy as the embodiment 
of an – extremely successful315 – type of modern “domination.” Predictably 
and inevitably this places us in the company of Max Weber.
Weber identifies various types of domination defined in terms of legit-
imation basis. He distinguishes three pure types: charismatic, traditional, 
and the legal, rational domination characteristic of the modern state. The 
last is based on belief in the legality of the set order and the right of those 
called upon to exercise such power to issue commands. Weber’s basic the-
sis316 is that the last type of domination requires exercise of a specific type, 
namely administration that implements the set order and applies rules; that, 
being rule-bound, acts in accordance with learnable routines, which convey 
predictable and rational decision-making behaviour. This type of domination is 
called bureaucracy.
According to Maximilian Wallerath, the function ascribed to it was “to 
ensure the ousting of absolutist and feudal regimes by legal-rational gover-
nance structures. Personal, patriarchal power and subjective arbitrariness was 
to be replaced by rational rule on the basis of law and superior purposive-
ness.”317
The rule-boundedness that Max Weber repeatedly emphasises gives a 
hierarchically organized bureaucratic administration, as Horst Dreier point 
313 One of my favourite books deserves a mention here: Doderer (1951) [engl. transl. 
(2000)].
314 See Seibel (2016) 132ff.
315 On bureaucratic administration as model for success in modern administrative culture, 
see Schuppert, G. F. (2006).
316 Good accounts of Weberian bureaucracy in Albrow (1972) and in Mayntz (ed.) (1968) 
27ff.: Max Webers Idealtypus der Bürokratie und die Organisationssoziologie.
317 Wallerath (2000) 363.
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out,318 doubly grounding in constitutional law: as legal domination it is rooted 
in the rule-of-law principle and in the democracy principle as authority 
implementing democratically produced policy programmes cast in the form 
of enacted law.
“With regard to democracy, the binding nature of enacted law and checks on the 
executive branch are of crucial importance for politics. Bureaucratic administration 
is nothing other than an instrument for enforcing laws and programmes that have 
been produced by democratic procedures. No considerations other that compliance 
with the law should feed into decisions. Formality and the written form permit the 
lawfulness of administrative action to be examined and to correct unlawful deci-
sions. Hierarchical organization ensures the accountability of administrative author-
ities to parliament: the responsible minister must be able to rely on his instructions, 
for which he is accountable to parliament, being carried out by even by the lowest-
ranking officers in his department.”319
And this bureaucratic administration has not only been grounded in the rule 
of law and democracy but is also the key agent in dealing with societal 
modernization processes in society, as Lutz Raphael rightly stresses:
“Administrative authorities in the nineteenth century had to cope with unheard of 
acceleration in economic and social processes; indeed, at times the administration itself 
sought to trigger or accelerate this dynamic. The administrative state under the rule 
of law was a regulatory side effect of far-reaching social, cultural, and above all 
economic mobilization processes. Whatever labels are attached to these critical 
junctures in the development of European history – whether modernization, mod-
ernity, onset of the capitalist world order, or whatever – the services and functions of 
bureaucracy have always been an indispensable element of this transition, and are among 
the formative bases if our current world, however sceptical and suspicious one 
might be about their future.”320
In all, the example of bureaucracy shows that both the language of state 
organization and the language of administrative organization operate not 
primarily as the languages of a technico-instrumental organization theory 
but as languages of politics, as the political debates and disputes of the 
nineteenth century impressively demonstrate.
318 Dreier, H. (1991) 125ff.
319 Benz (2001) 131–132.
320 Raphael (2000) 12.
Legal Concepts and Legal Regimes in a Global History of Ideas 209
C. Justice through the rule of law? The idea of institutional justice
I. Buon governo e giustizia321
It is doubtless part and parcel of the political history of ideas and the phi-
losophy of the state that good government has above all to be just govern-
ment. For example, Philippe Mastronardi’s work on constitutional theory 
bears the revealing subtitle “general constitutional law as theory of the good 
and just state”;322 and Arthur Benz, writing on the state as legal order, notes 
that: “Even before the state appeared on the stage of history, political theo-
reticians had recognized that good government obtains only if it serves the 
common good and justice. Greek and Roman antiquity sought guarantees for 
good government in the constitutional order. By this they understood the 
division of responsibilities and governmental functions in the hope that this 
would either produce just holders of power or restrain the exercise of power 
and prevent it from going against the common good and justice. Constitu-
tional theory with its distinction between good and degenerate constitutions 
systematized the possibilities of separating governmental functions.”323
As this passage shows, there are basically two ways to ensure just rule: 
training power holders to become just ruler personalities or creating power 
structures that guarantee justice.
As far as justice personified in the just prince was concerned, it was 
thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that it could be fostered 
by “manuals on good government”,324 a widespread literary genre that went 
by the name of “Fürstenspiegel”.325 Foremost among the virtues of the 
Christian prince was justice, as Hans-Otto Mühleisen notes with reference 
to Erasmus of Rotterdam:
“The Christian prince can rightly claim that his subjects know and respect the law if 
he himself knows and obeys the laws of the Supreme Ruler Christ, i. e., if he 
321 As the knowledgeable reader will immediately recognize, this title refers to Lorenzetti’s 
famous Siennese allegory of good government, in which the figure of Giustizia plays a 
central role. For a comprehensive interpretation of the allegory see the superb book by 
Heyen (2013) 53ff.
322 Mastronardi (2007).
323 Benz (2006) 144–145.
324 Müller (1985) 594.
325 Greater detail in Skallweit (1957).
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commits himself to justice. As a Christian, the prince can propitiate God best 
through a caring attitude towards his people in government’. The cross is laid upon 
him, which from an Erasmian point of view is equivalent to justice: ‘If you do what 
is right; if you do violence to no man; if you sell no office and accept no bribe, even 
if your purse suffers harm. Be steadfast and take care above all that you gain the prize 
of justice’.”326
The mists of time have veiled this variant on securing the just exercise of 
power through personalization, despite Pierre Rosanvallon’s return to the 
literary tradition in a recent book.327 The notion of promoting justice 
through just institutions has gained more and more ground. Discussing 
current theories of justice, Bernd Ladwig notes:
“Whoever acts justly contributes directly or indirectly to just conditions. If everyone 
treated everyone with respect, the direct result would be a state of all-round mutual 
respect. If more people donate to OXFAM than before, the indirect result would 
probably be that more would be done to combat hunger in the world. Perhaps the 
most important thing, however, that anyone can do for justice is to support just 
institutions. Institutions are the focus of judgments about justice that seek its real-
ization. There are good reasons for this. Institutions and institutional orders play an 
essential role in whether and how justice imprints itself on our world. Modern 
philosophers and economists have therefore placed greater value on institutions 
and societal structures as opposed to individuals and their virtues. The expectations 
of justice have since weighed less heavily on the shoulders of the individual. Most 
theories of justice now focus not on the qualities of the individual but the properties 
of institutions.”328
This invites us to take a brief look at the idea of institutional justice.
II. The idea of institutional justice
Rainer Forst presents highly interesting thoughts on the idea of institutional 
justice329 in his consideration of transnational justice and democracy.330
First he joins us in rejecting the dominance of distributive justice, above all 
because it neglects the question of who makes decisions on distributing 
goods, by what procedures, and in what institutional contexts: “These recip-
ient-oriented perspectives centred on goods and distribution hide essential 
326 Mühleisen (1999).
327 Rosanvallon (2018).
328 Ladwig (2011) 47 f.
329 See, above all, Rawls (1979) and Höffe (2010).
330 Forst (2012).
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aspects of justice. First, the question of how the goods to be distributed 
come into being, and hence the question of production and its just organ-
ization. But still more important, the political question is disregarded of who 
decides on the structures of production and distribution and how – as if 
there were a vast distribution engine that only needs to be correctly pro-
grammed.”331
However, if the main concern is who, by what procedures, and in what 
institutional contexts decides the distribution of generally scarce goods, 
institutions need to be developed that can be expected to promote justice. 
Justitia is “a goddess created by humanity who comes into the world to 
banish arbitrariness; she is therefore present wherever arbitrariness prevails 
(or threatens). She therefore demands specific institutions – for instance, a legit-
imate legal situation in the place of the “natural state” of arbitrariness; but she 
cannot presuppose what she demands.”332
We agree with Forst that, from this point of view, justice is an institu-
tional virtue: “Justice is a relational, as well as an institutional virtue; it does 
not refer to all asymmetrical relations between human beings without dis-
crimination, but it does refer to those which exhibit forms of rule or dom-
ination and social arbitrariness – wither in contexts involving only sparse 
legal regulation or in thicker institutional contexts, within and beyond the 
state.”333
This is only a short step away from identifying two types of justice-related 
institutions: “It is also important to distinguish between institutions necessary 
for realizing justice and institutions or (more or less institutionalized) con-
ditions that make justice necessary and ‘promote’ it. We can call these 
practices promoting justice or requiring justice.”334
Modifying Forst’s terminology and with reference to the institutional 
economics work of Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Wein-
gast on the one hand 335 and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson on 
the other,336 we propose to speak of institutions inhibitive of justice – that 
331 Forst (2012) 31.
332 Forst (2012) 37.
333 Forst (2012) 38–39.
334 Forst (2012) 41.
335 North et al. (2009).
336 Acemoglu / Robinson (2013).
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favour arbitrariness – and institutions conducive to justice, drawing a distinc-
tion between these two types of institution.337
As regards justice, we now turn to the substance of the rule of law – a 
principle that is a pillar of our body politic.
III. The justice genes of the rule of law
When considering institutions conducive to justice, the institution of the 
rule of law cannot be left aside: it is regarded as a bulwark against injustice 
and arbitrariness. Michael Stolleis has this to say:338 “Throughout the First 
World War and the Weimar Republic, ‘Rechtsstaat’, ‘l’état de droit’, ‘rule of 
law’ stood for state action bounded by law and accountable to the courts, for 
an independent judiciary, and, in a broader sense, also for an incorruptible 
public service committed to the public good: all in all, for protection of the 
individual against arbitrariness”,339 We begin with this bulwark function of 
the rule of law.
1. Law and arbitrariness
Horst Dreier340 addresses the opposition between law and arbitrariness that 
Rainer Forst has described:
“Little seems to be so clear and undeniable as the irreconcilable opposition between 
law and arbitrariness; at any rate, if we take arbitrariness in the now current sense of 
the term to mean erratic, indiscriminate, high-handed action without apparent 
rational motivation or understandable grounds. The term wears, so to speak, reproval 
on its sleeve. Arbitrariness thus seems to be more or less the quintessence of flouting 
the notion of law and the central functions of every legal order. This explains such 
widespread assertions as ‘arbitrariness and law are in principle opposites’, or, even 
stronger, arbitrariness is the ‘counter-concept to justice’ or ‘blatant injustice’. And, 
indeed, where law is to serve as a conflict resolution tool, to guarantee expectational 
security, and to enable people to live together in freedom and equality, it can 
337 North et al. (2009), Acemoglu / Robinson (2013) explain the difference between these 
two types of institutions, taking the example of institutions with restricted access (inhib-
itive of justice) and institutions with unrestricted access (conducive to justice).
338 Stolleis (2012).
339 Stolleis (2012) 49.
340 Dreier, H. (2012).
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perform these fundamental tasks only if laws and their application are seen to 
further not arbitrariness but reliability and predictability, not to be playing a game 
of blind man’s buff.”341
The ideational value of law in relation to justice derives chiefly from the 
control function of law in modern societies:
“If, as a specific social technique, law is to steer human co-existence, arbitrariness has 
no place. In ‘The Concept of Law’, first published in 1961, H.L.A. Hart posits that 
universal, general and binding norms are at the very core of justice. It would be a 
contradiction in terms when setting norms to apply arbitrariness as a principle.”342
So far so good.
But this undoubted inclination of law towards justice tells us nothing 
about whether the institution of the rule of law deserves to be called con-
ducive to justice. A look at the institutional virtues of the rule of law will 
help justify the epithet.
2. The institutional virtues of the rule of law conducive to justice
In addressing the institutional virtues of the rule of law, we are referring to 
the rule of law that developed in the course of the nineteenth century as a 
“political programme”343 directed towards protecting civil liberties through 
the legal limitation and disciplining of state authority.344 In what follows, 
we are concerned not with a material concept of the rule of law – predominant 
after 1945 in response to the abuse of law under the Nazi regime – aiming to 
“produce a materially just legal state of affairs.”345 What is at issue is a rule of 
law not confined to formal guarantees – and which can therefore be dis-
missed as unpolitical – but an institution whose components – the separa-
tion of powers, an independent judiciary, lawful administration, and the 
guarantee of comprehensive legal protection – are committed to the material 
goal of a just order of the body politic, with an unassailable hard core346 that 
341 Dreier, H. (2012) 1–2.
342 Dreier, H. (2012) 2–3.
343 Stolleis (2012) 47.
344 Instructive on the civic rule of law programme: Raphael (2000) 26ff.
345 Böckenförde (1976) 65–92, here 81.
346 The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003, Gütersloh 2004, for instance, counts the 
following four elements as belonging to the basal architecture of the rule of law: 1. To 
what extent are the branches of government independent and interdependent? 2. Is there 
214 Part Three
enhances the chances of (as Höffe would have put it) things being just in the 
world.
It is therefore not about playing off the material rule of law against the 
formal rule of law but about assessing the intrinsic value of formal legal 
guarantees and ordered procedures and their contribution to realizing a just 
order of the state and society. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde describes the 
indivisible unity of the formal and material aspects of the institution of the 
rule of law:
“The call for the material rule of law overlooks or underestimates the intrinsic 
importance, the material intrinsic importance of formal legal guarantees and ordered 
procedures. It is precisely formal guarantees and procedures that shield and protect 
individual and societal freedom by warding off direct action against individuals or 
societal groups in the name of absolute enacted or believed material content or so-
called values; in this they prove to be institutions of freedom; they have little to do 
with formalism, let alone positivism. This dismantling of freedom by totalitarian 
regimes never begins with the exploitation of formal guarantees and procedures but 
always with them being disregarded in the name of a higher, material, and pre-
positive law, be it the ‘true religion’, the ‘homogeneous national community’ or the 
‘proletariat’. Only at the second stage, when the new law has been installed as a 
means of revolutionary change, does the positivism and legalism of totalitarian 
regimes arise.”347
To sum up, it is the institutional virtues of the rule of law that are directed 
towards enabling and promoting justice as an institutional virtue. We can 
therefore speak of the rule of law as an institution that promotes justice. This 
brings us to our next topic.
D. How much rule of law is there in good governance?348
A great deal. A glance at the elements generally considered to constitute the 
core of this worldwide, globally operative “guiding principle of state-
an independent judiciary? 3. Is the abuse of power by representatives legally or politically 
sanctioned? And 4. To what extent are civil liberties (human rights, judicial rights, anti-
discrimination laws, freedom of religion) in place and to what extent is violation action-
able?
347 Böckenförde (1976) 82–83.
348 With reference to Kötter (2013).
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hood”349 shows why this is so. Franz Nuscheler offers a catalogue of the 
most current good governance criteria:350
* “Establishment of functioning administrative structures and / or administrative 
reforms for improved management of the public sector;
* Accountability of the rulers to the ruled and their elected representatives;
* Transparent governmental and administrative action, especially in the use of 
financial resources, which also require independent auditing;
* The rule of law, i. e., the binding effect of law and institutionalized law enforce-
ment, which provide legal certainty for investors and safeguard property rights;
* And combating corruption.”
This catalogue alone shows that, almost without exception, the criteria listed 
come under the broad rubric of what we have called the “institutional virtues 
of the rule of law.” At the latest, however, the high rule-of-law content of good 
governance becomes fully clear when we consider “combating corruption”; 
after all, corruption is the paramount example of “bad governance.”351 This 
also explains why fighting corruption ranks so high on the agenda of expo-
nents of the good governance concept. It is therefore all the more worth 
noting that the distinguished Romanian corruption scholar Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi declares that only an “institutional approach” can succeed in the battle 
against corruption. In “Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment”352 she pro-
poses distinguishing between two fundamentally different “rules of the 
game” practised in a society: “particularism” and “universalism.” By “particu-
larism” she means a culture of privileges,353 whereas “universalism” de-
349 Dolzer (2004).
350 Nuscheler (2009) 13 f.
351 See Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) 86: “Political corruption poses a serious threat to democracy 
and its consolidation. One year after the widely acclaimed Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 
one could already buy, though not very cheaply, a seat in the Ukrainian parliament. The 
lack of success in curbing corruption, combined with ever more widespread discussion of 
the issue, renders voters extremely cynical and threatens to subvert public trust in emerg-
ing democracies.” On the phenomenon of “bad governance”, especially in developing 
countries, Moore, M. (2001).
352 Mungiu-Pippidi (2006).
353 Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) 88: “A culture of privilege reigns in societies based on particular-
ism, making unequal treatment the accepted norm in society. Individuals struggle to belong to
the privileged group rather than to change the rules of the game. … Influence, not money, 
is the main currency, and the benefits to an individual anywhere in the chain are hard to 
measure: Favors are distributed or denied as part of a customary exchange with rules of its 
own, sometimes not involving direct personal gain for the ‘gatekeeper’.”
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scribes an attitude prevailing in society “where equal treatment applies to 
everyone regardless of the group to which one belongs.”354 To behave “par-
ticularistically”, however – it should be realized – is in keeping with the 
“human nature” and is therefore so widespread:
“Particularism is not a social ‘malady’, as corruption is usually described, but rather 
a default, natural state, and therefore arises frequently. Social psychology provides 
considerable evidence that the nature of man is sectarian, and that social identity 
results from biased intergroup comparison and self-enhancing behaviour. Humans 
naturally favor their own family, clan, race, or ethnic group – what Edward C. 
Banfield355 called ‘amoral familism’. Treating the rest of the world fairly seems to 
be a matter of extensive social learning and sufficient resources. Societies which have 
travelled furthest from that natural state of affairs and have produced a state which 
treats everyone equally and fairly are exceptions and products of a long historical 
evolution. Such evolution should not be taken for granted; indeed, as James Q. 
Wilson356 argues, universalism and individualism, which spread in the West after 
the Enlightenment to become generally agreed norms, are neither natural nor 
necessarily and invariably good principles. To understand individual behavioural 
choice, an understanding of governance context is therefore indispensable, and 
anticorruption strategies created in disregard to this are predetermined to fail.”357
If this is the case, then fighting against corruption is not a problem of 
combating individual misconduct. What is needed is to change the “rules of 
the game” and thus – if sets of rules in the social-science sense are understood 
as institutions358 – to take an institutional approach:
“Corruption in society is therefore not conceptualized in this book as an aggregate 
of individual corruption. The non-corrupt countries at the top of Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) do not differ from countries 
on the bottom simply by the number of individuals engaged in corrupt acts, but 
by their institutions; in other words, by the rules of the game influencing power 
distribution and the shaping of the allocation of public resources. The countries 
at the top of the Control of Corruption scale managed to institutionalize open and 
nondiscriminative access at some point in their past, and so their institutions differ 
substantially from the ones at the bottom. … Many countries in the middle struggle 
between two worlds, for in them both universalistic and particularistic practices 
coexist, more or less competitively. … But regardless of how wide the variation 
might be, some sort of invisible threshold exists between a society where ethical 
354 Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) 88.
355 Banfield (1958).
356 Wilson, J. (1993).
357 Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) 23–24.
358 Good overview in Immergut / Jäger (2008).
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universalism is the norm and one where the norm is particularism – and one can 
predict fairly well what treatment and what share of public resources to expect from 
the state if one knows where one stands in the status ranks.”359
Given her “institutional approach”, it is not surprising that Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi has adopted the institutional economics distinction between insti-
tutions with and without restricted access, integrating it in the following over-
view360 of four different governance regimes. The table, which can be read as 
a scale of the rule-of-law content of various governance regimes, brings this 
section to a close.
359 Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) 23.
360 Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) 29.
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E. Rule of law promotion and rule of law control
as policy instruments
I. Panacea: the rule of law?
Promotion of the rule of law is among the favourite projects of the Western 
world, notably in the Federal Republic of Germany.361 The present author 
contributed to conceptualizing a major conference devoted to this subject, 
held in Berlin on 15th January 2009 under the heading “The Rule of Law – 
Patent Recipe for All the World? Promoting the Rule of Law in Foreign 
Policy”.362
The popularity of “rule of law promotion” has not declined, rather the 
opposite. In “Rule of Law Dynamics”,363 published in 2012, no fewer than 
five contributions are devoted to rule of law promotion:
* A Comparison of the Rule of Law Policies of Major Western Powers364
* Rule of Law Promotion through International Organization and NGOs365
* Civil Military Cooperation in Building the Rule of Law366
* Developing a Theoretical Framework for Evaluating Rule of Law Promotion in 
Developing Countries367 and
* Rule of Law Promotion after Conflict: Experimenting in the Kosovo Labora-
tory368
The array of rule of law activities, their intensity and financial scale have 
given occasion to speak of a “rule of law promotion industry.”369 Particularly 
interesting about the phenomenon370 is the interrelatedness of this actor 
constellation, since it clearly reveals the genuinely political nature of rule of 
law promotion. Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks have 
identified three groups of actor:
361 See – somewhat at random – Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (ed.) (2009); Federal Foreign 
Office (ed.) (2007).
362 Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (2009).
363 Zürn et al. (eds.) (2012).
364 Schimmelpfennig (2012) 111ff.
365 Heupel (2012) 133ff.
366 Röder (2012) 206ff.
367 Gillespie (2012) 233ff.
368 Zajac-Sannerholm (2012) 252ff.
369 See Carothers (ed.) (2006).
370 See “The Rule of Law Revival”, in: Schuppert, G. F. (2008b) 683ff.
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“The World Bank and multinational corporations want the rule of law, because the 
sanctity of private property and the enforcement of contracts are critical to modern 
conceptions of the free market. … Human rights advocates, though not typically allies 
of multinational corporations, business interests, or international financial institu-
tions, are similarly enthusiastic about the rule of law. … The human rights-oriented 
conception of the rule of law involves, at a minimum, due process, equality before 
the law, and judicial checks on executive power, for most human rights advocates 
regard these as essential prerequisites to the protection of substantive human rights. 
… Increasingly, international and national security experts also want to promote the 
rule of law, seeing it as a key aspect of preventing terrorism. Especially since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, military and intelligence analysts have drawn attention to the ways 
in which the absence of the rule of law can lead to instability and violence and 
create fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist organizations. …”371
The point to be made here is that the language of rule of law promotion in 
its most advanced form is a language of politics.
II. The new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law
The European Union sees itself not only as an economic community, a 
community of law, and a political community, but also as a community 
of values.372 This conception is expressed in Article 2 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon:
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democ-
racy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in 
a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.”
In order to maintain the cohesion of this community of values, Article 7 of 
the EUT introduces a special procedure to be applied if a Member State 
infringes fundamental principles. Since this is indeed bringing up the big 
guns, the definition of such infringement and the conceivable consequences 
are set out as follows (Article 7 paras. 1 and 3 of the EUT in excerpt):
“On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European 
Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of 
four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, 
may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the 
371 Stromseth et al. (2006) 58 f.
372 See Joas / Mandry (2005).
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values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council 
shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, 
acting in accordance with the same procedure.
Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting 
by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from 
the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting 
rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council.”
In March 2014, the Commission published a communication presenting a 
“framework to safeguard the rule of law in the European Union”:373
“Although it does not permit new types of legally binding measure, it does 
substantially strengthen the role of the Union in this field. The Communi-
cation establishes a pre-Article 7 procedure and thus introduces general and 
continuous monitoring. Such a framework to safeguard the rule of law is per 
se a new tool and also a major step in integration policy.”374
Three characteristics mark this genuinely political tool offered by the rule 
of law framework. Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis:
“The first characteristic is specific reference to the rule of law. It can therefore not be 
used to protect all the fundamental values listen in Article 2 TEU but only to uphold 
the – broadly defined – principle of the rule of law, that is regarded as the ‘founda-
tion of all values upon which the Union is based’.
A second characteristic of the rule of law framework is the assumption that the 
rule of law is upheld in Member States of the Union. Isolated cases of breaches of 
fundamental rights or miscarriages of justice are not sufficient grounds to activate 
the framework. It can be activated only in extreme situations that adversely affect 
‘the integrity, stability and proper functioning of the institutions and mechanisms 
established at national level to secure the rule of law’. The Commission terms such 
situations ‘systemic breakdown’.
A third characteristic is that, under the framework, the Commission assumes a 
stronger role in safeguarding the rule of law than is assigned to it under Article 7 
TEU: the framework is triggered solely by the Commission, and it makes all deci-
sions without the collaboration of other institutions. This does not prevent it from 
drawing on the expertise of other EU institutions and international organizations, 
such as the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.”375
373 Communication from European Commission (2014).
374 Bogdandy / Ioannidis (2014).
375 Bogdandy / Ioannidis (2014) 39.
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* Concluding remarks
Looking back over the reflections on the “language of the rule of law” 
presented in this chapter, it is clear that it is not only an important language 
of the political history of ideas but that has also shaped the latter since 
antiquity. This has not only been so with regard to the “obvious cases” of 
the legitimacy of political authority, good government as the just exercise of 
power, and equal application of the law; it also holds true for two more 
specific variants of the language of law: organizational law – viz “separation 
of powers” – and procedural law – viz rule-bound bureaucratic administra-
tion. Finally, the thoughts on the rule-of-law content of “good governance” 
and the EU Rule of Law Framework have shown that arguing in the “lan-




The Role of Key Legal Concepts
in a Global History of Ideas
The third part of this book addressed the role of various legal regimes and 
legal principles in a global history of ideas and knowledge: natural law, 
international law, human rights, and the rule of law. We turn now to the 
importance of key legal concepts in the global history of political ideas. Such 
a project necessarily requires a choice to be made from among the concepts 
that play a significant role in more than one discipline. We have opted for 
the following four:1




These are all concepts that play a crucial role not only in the home disci-
plines of the present author – constitutional law and theory of the state 
(Staatsrecht and Staatslehre) – but also in other academic disciplines such as 
political science, historiography (witness Reinhard’s “Geschichte der Staats-
gewalt”2), sociology, political philosophy, and public administration. How-
ever, since we are particularly interested in the role of the language of law, in 
discussing these four concepts we shall be focusing on how much legal 
content they have. Only then can we decide how important the language 
of law is in a global history of ideas and knowledge.
We begin our conceptual expedition with the concept of state.
1 A fifth would be property, but this concept is addressed in separate study, already com-
pleted in manuscript form, to be published under the title “Property – Intellectual and 
Social History of a Legal Institution” (“Eigentum – Ideen- und Sozialgeschichte eines 
Rechtsinstituts”).
2 Reinhard (1999).
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Chapter One
State authority
A good place to start finding out about the concept of state is to consult an 
encyclopedia of the state3 or politics,4 a manual of political philosophy and 
social philosophy,5 or the now standard work on the modern state by Arthur 
Benz.6 The information they offer is discouraging: there appears to be con-
sensus that it is difficult if not impossible to define the state. Arthur Benz 
quotes Raymond Boudon and Francois Bourricaud to the effect that “defin-
ing the state is an almost hopeless task”.7 With almost moving intensity, Josef 
Isensee, a leading German teacher of constitutional law, describes the inevi-
table “relativity of all concepts of the state”:
“What the state is cannot be reduced to a single concept or captured by a scholastic 
definition. This is in the nature of the subject: the complexity and spatio-temporal 
mutability of state phenomena. A concept can capture only one of countless aspects 
of ‘the state’. Consequently, all concepts of the state are necessarily relative, and 
many such concepts are accordingly needed. An approximative picture can emerge 
only from the multitude of aspects that come into view in circumnavigating the 
topic. The state as the subject matter of scholarly research requires both normative 
and empirical methods. It is addressed by many disciplines: legal, philosophical, 
historical, economic, political and other ‘social-scientific’ fields of study: all that 
traditionally constitute the → ‘Staatswissenschaften’ (‘sciences of the state’) in the 
broadest sense of the term. → Staatslehre (‘theory of the state).”8
Given these difficulties, various strategies can be considered. Christoph Möl-
ler suggests following the Anglo-American pattern of simply doing without a 
definition;9 or one could ask whether a concept of state is really necessary.10
3 In Germany, encyclopaedias of the state (Staatslexika) traditionally have a denominational 
orientation. Apart from the Catholic “Staatslexikon in fünf Bänden” by the Görres-
Gesellschaft (ed.) (1989), there is the Protestant “Evangelisches Staatslexikon” by Heun
et al. (eds.) (2006).
4 See, for example, Fuchs / Roller (2007).
5 Gosepath et al. (eds.) (2008).
6 Benz (2008).
7 Boudon / Bourricaud (1992) 540–549, here 540.
8 Isensee (1989) col. 134.
9 Möllers (2006).
10 Benz (2008) is convinced that it is necessary (6): “We need the concept of state to describe 
an institution of modern societies performing important services indispensable for the 
continued existence and quality of society. This is where a substantial part of politics takes 
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We are firmly convinced that such avoidance strategies are not the solution: 
the manifest, enduring role of the state as key governance actor11 makes it 
more necessary than ever to map out the contours of the concept.12 Our 
strategy is to circle the object “state” to gain a closer view from three differ-
ent angles – in the hope that the intersections will throw the “nature” of the 
state into relief, teaching us something about the role of the language of law 
in the process. The itinerary proceeds under three headings:
* Functions of the state and the role of law
* The state as form of rule and the role of law
* State semantics and the role of the language of law
A. Functions of the state and the role of law
In his key article on the state in the Görres Society dictionary, Josef Isensee 
lists six functional characteristics of the modern state (for which he reserves the 
term “state”).13
* The modern state as an entity of peace
* The modern state as a decision-making entity
* The modern state as an action entity
* The modern state as a legal entity
* The modern state as a power entity
* The modern state as a solidarity association
The following samples all show that these various entities cannot be 
described without the help of law and its language. This hold true in the 
first place for the modern state as peace entity: “The modern state … has 
brought peace to society, disarmed the citizenry, and replaced self-justice by 
place and will do so for the foreseeable future.” Unlike concepts such as government, 
administration, governance, etc., “state” captures the specific form of authority that has 
developed in modern society. The concept also helps us understand changes in politics 
and society. We may be experiencing a fundamental shift towards a system of rule that can 
be clearly distinguished from what we call the state. But it is perhaps not the form but 
only the content and procedures of state authority that are changing, which does not 
necessarily mean that the challenges facing government and administration are any less 
daunting.
11 See, in substantive agreement, Anter (2013) 17ff.; and Schuppert, G. F. (2013a) 29ff.
12 See Schuppert, G. F. (2018a).
13 Isensee (1989) col. 136.
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procedure … This obligation of the citizen to keep the peaceis the counterpart of 
the state’s monopoly of force.”14 Still more evident is the situation with the 
state as decision-making entity: “In accordance with a given division of powers 
and rules of procedure, the state deals with disputes that affect public welfare 
and whose settlement cannot be left to societal self-regulation.”15
We have already discussed the modern state as an action entity (Hermann 
Heller: Handlungs- und Wirkungseinheit) at some length: it is the law as 
organizational and procedural law that produces this entity and renders it 
viable. And the state as a legal entity requires no further comment. With 
regard to the state as a power entity, power, too, is organization through law: 
“The basis is the monopoly of legitimate physical violence (Max Weber). 
Only the state has the right to use coercion and to maintain organized 
coercive potential: police, army, administrative or judicial execution and 
enforcement. By virtue of these tools, it differs from non-state associations. 
Indeed, the means, not the ends constitute its particularity.”16 Finally, the 
state as a solidarity association is also constituted legally: “State solidarity is 
legally constituted and organized as a (territorial) body corporate, and thus 
as a legal person that lends the association legal identity regardless of shifting 
membership. Membership of the corporate association of the state, of the 
nation arises from citizenship.”17
In brief, the state as a viable actor is constituted by law, above all by 
organizational and procedural law. If we add what we have learned in dis-
cussing rule-of-law principles about the function of law in establishing and 
limiting power, we can join Arthur Benz in describing the “authority of the 
state under the rule of law” as follows:
“Sovereignty and the authority of the state as integral part of the institutional order 
of the state are limited by law. Only to the extent that they serve to realize the law 
are they considered legitimate power. This does nothing to lessen their coercive 
nature for those affected. But they find recognition only in conjunction with the 
structures of a democratic state under the rule of law. Their exercise is entrusted to 
special institutions of democratic lawmaking, bureaucratic administration, and the 
judiciary. The coercive power of the modern state is therefore necessarily tied to the 
form of enacted law and the structure of a democratic state under the rule of law.”18
14 Isensee (1989) col. 136.
15 Isensee (1989) col. 136.
16 Isensee (1989) col. 137.
17 Isensee (1989) col. 138.
18 Benz (2008) 133.
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B. The state as a form of authority and the role of law
According to Christoph Möllers, “The state is a central category in the West-
ern tradition for describing a highly aggregated system of authority distinct 
from others (→ Herrschaft). The concept combines institutional develop-
ment, political theory, and legal dogmatics in a mix often difficult to clar-
ify.”19 A look at what booming empire research calls imperial rule reveals that 
law plays a particularly important role in this mix. Jane Burbank and Fred-
erick Cooper have addressed the manifestations of imperial rule with partic-
ular intensity,20 examining what actually goes to make up the repertoire of 
imperial rule. As they show for the Roman and Chinese empires – their 
favourite examples – law is one of the most important elements in this 
repertoire.
Burbank and Cooper speak of the Roman Empire as a republic built on 
war and law,21 where we encounter law in three guises, first accompanying 
Roman (state)22 institution-building in developing the structures of repub-
lican governance:
“The radical move from kingship to republic was accompanied by measures 
designed to prevent a return to one-man rule. Personal authority in the republic 
was constrained by a strict term limit on magistracies, by the electoral power of the 
people’s assemblies, and by the authority of the senate – a council of serving or 
former magistrates and other men of high office. Underlying these institutions and 
giving them force was a commitment to legal procedures for defining and enforcing 
rules and for changing them. The historian Livy described Rome as ‘a free nation, 
governed by annually elected officers of state and subject not to the caprice of 
individual men, but to the overriding authority of the law’ (History of Rome).”23
Secondly, law acts as the unifying bond of the Roman Republic, constituting 
what Burbank and Cooper describe as an important element in the “seductive 
culture” of Rome:
“Law was part of this Roman civilization, both a means of governance and a support for 
the social order. … What was Roman about Roman law from republican times, and 
19 Möllers (2006) col. 2272.
20 Burbank / Cooper (2010).
21 Burbank / Cooper (2010) 44.
22 Whether we can speak of “state” rule in “ancient Rome” in connection with governance 
structures is a controversial subject among historians; see Wiemer (ed.) (2006); and 
Lundgren (ed.) (2014).
23 Burbank / Cooper (2010) 25 f.
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what became a powerful historical precedent, was professional interpretation, operat-
ing in a polity where the manner of making law was itself an ongoing and legit-
imate political concern. Rulers had issued laws in much earlier times; the Babylo-
nian king Hammurabi who ruled from 1792 to 1750 BCE had a law code inscribed 
in stone. The Greeks had laws and theories of the state and the good, but they did 
not create a legal profession. From the mid-second century BCE, just as the republic 
was expanding most aggressively in space and institutions, jurists appeared in Rome, 
drawing up legal documents, advising magistrates, litigants, and judges, and passing 
on their learning to their students.”24
What proved to be particularly important, however, was the granting of 
Roman citizenship as an element in the Roman expansion strategy:
“To govern outside their capital, Romans developed strategies that would enter the 
repertoires of later empire-builders. One of these was the enlargement of the sphere 
of Roman rights. … [Of] particular import for Rome’s future was that its citizenship 
came to be desired by non-Romans, and was preferable to substantive autonomy in 
allied cities or colonies. From 91 to 88 BCE, Rome’s Italian allies rebelled against 
their lack of full Roman rights and fought Rome to attain them. After much debate, 
the senate made the momentous decision to grant citizenship to all Latins. Extend-
ing citizenship became both a reward for service and a means to enlarge the realm of 
loyalty.”25
Burbank and Cooper describe this unifying function of Roman citizenship as 
follows:
“Citizenship, as we have seen, had been central to Roman politics from republican 
days, a means to draw loyal servitors into the empire’s regime of rights, a status so 
advantageous that Latins had fought for the privilege of becoming Romans in the 
first century BCE. The institution of citizenship was also connected to the most basic 
mechanism of imperial rule – military service, law, and, providing for them both, 
taxes. The emperor Caracalla’s enlargement of citizenship in 212 CE has been inter-
preted as a measure of necessity: if all free males in the empire were made citizens, 
they could be called to serve in the army, to submit compensation if they did not 
serve, and to pay inheritance taxes imposed on citizens. But Caracalla’s declaration 
focused on religious cohesion: with citizenship, the worship of Roman gods would 
be extended throughout the empire. An incorporating and unifying impulse was at 
the core of the new policy. Through military service, taxation, legal protections, and 
common deities, ten of millions of people – free men with their families – would be 
connected more directly to the empire’s projects and to a Roman way of life.”26
24 Burbank / Cooper (2010) 36.
25 Burbank / Cooper (2010) 30 f.
26 Burbank / Cooper (2010) 39.
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With regard to the Chinese Empire, Burbank and Cooper also delve deep into 
the “toolkit for Empire”, especially during the Qin dynasty in the third century 
BCE and the following Han dynasty. Over this period, what we would now 
call a regulatory and administrative state developed:
“If the Qin empire was to last, the emperor’s claim to universal power had to be 
recognized throughout his enlarged realm The empire was divided into command 
areas, and further into counties; these were administered by officials appointed from 
the center and subject to recall at any time. Three different officials – a governor, a 
military commander, and an imperial inspector – supervised each commandery. Qin 
governance by centrally appointed officials contrasts with Rome’s empowerment of 
local elites and senators to exploit distant territories on their own.”27
Burbank and Cooper describe this rule-bound civil service machinery:
“For the Han, unlike the Romans, a large and intricately organized body of officials 
was critical to imperial power. The tradition of learned advisors offered rewards and 
pitfalls both to ambitious councillors and to the emperor, who benefited from 
multiple sources of advice but could also succumb to flattery and intrigue. The 
capital city, with its dominating and off-bounds imperial palace, teemed with offi-
cials and their staffs and servants. Officials served on a scale of ranks – 18 in 23 BCE 
– with a sliding scale of remuneration. The Grand Tutor, three grand ministers (of 
finance, of works, and the commander in chief of the military), and nine lesser 
ministers, as well as a powerful secretariat, could influence, guide, or obstruct the 
emperor’s will. So, too, could the emperor’s family, including the emperor’s mother, 
whose powers were enhanced by the seclusion of the imperial court. These compet-
ing networks diversified the information, goals, and capacities of the centralized 
administration.
Government by officials was invigorated by meritocratic selection. The emperor 
recruited not from an aristocracy but from the sons of landowners, and in 124 BCE 
he created an imperial academy – some call it a university – to train them in 
techniques of rule, record keeping, and Confucian ideals. By 1 CE a hundred 
men a year were passing examinations by scholars and entering the bureaucracy. 
Young men from the provinces, usually nominated by officials, were brought to the 
capital to study and be evaluated. Candidates were placed in service throughout the 
empire; the most highly appreciated served in the capital.”28
To sum up: both the Roman and the Chinese Empires show how important 
law was as a pillar of the state repertoire of rule.29 Whereas the issues in 
27 Burbank / Cooper (2010) 48.
28 Burbank / Cooper (2010) 51.
29 See also our reflections on: Geschichte des modernen Staates als Geschichte des Rechts, 
in: Schuppert, G. F. (2003) 77ff.
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Rome were institution-building through law and the institution of citizen-
ship as a tool for the “governance of diversity”, in China the chief concern 
was the crucial importance of a professionalized body of officials – i. e., 
bureaucracy – for the efficient administration of a gigantic imperial space. 
We turn now from these old empires to the third variant of our unity 
strategy.
C. State semantics and the role of law
I. Jurists as strongly committed trustees of the concept of state
The search for a manageable definition of state will almost inevitably take us 
to the famous three elements theory of jurist Georg Jellinek,30 who posits 
that the architecture of the state comprises territory, nation, and authority:
“German jurists perfected the theory of the state, in 1837 declared the state to be a 
legal entity, and finally developed an authoritative definition of the state. The fol-
lowing features or claims accordingly characterize the modern state: 1. A state 
territory as exclusive area of authority, 2. A national people as sedentary association 
of persons with permanent membership, 3. A sovereign state authority, which 
means (a) internally a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence, (b) 
externally legal independence from other authorities. Strict unity of territory, peo-
ple, and authority are a sort of common denominator. There is only one state 
authority, and the constitutive people (Staatsvolk) composed of legal individuals 
speaks only one language.”31
Although there can be objections to Jellinek’s successful definition, the 
historian Wolfgang Reinhard, writing under the heading “modern state-
building – an infectious disease?” has not hesitated to use it as a working 
definition.32 And the very plausible thumbnail portrait of the modern state 
provided by Arthur Benz clearly betrays the influence of Jellinek’s three 
element theory. Benz’s “approach to the concept of state” reads as follows:
* “The modern state is a territorial state; its power extends over an area where it 
exercises exclusive supreme authority and is formally subject to no external 
influences.
30 Jellinek (1966).
31 Reinhard (1999) 16.
32 In: Reinhard / Müller-Luckner (eds.) (1999) VIII.
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* The state is the body of the citizens of its territory, which constitutes itself as 
national people (Staatsvolk) or political nation (Staatsbürgernation).
* The state is an organized decision-making and action entity (Heller [1934] 1983: 
259) of a society. It is empowered – as minimum competence – to make law and 
exercise legitimate coercion (monopoly of domination, Weber [1921] 1967: 29), 
and, moreover, it has the function of providing public goods and services – 
however defined in the political process.
* The state is grounded institutionally in the constitution, which provides the legal 
basis for its action.
* The political structure of the modern state is democracy: decisions by institutions 
of the state must derive from the will of the united people.
* The activities of the state include implementing the will of the people, deter-
mined in democratic procedures, through a governmental and administrative 
organization that has developed from the administrative staff of the absolute 
monarch. The form of organization designed to ensure predictability and con-
trollability is bureaucracy.”33
The dominance of jurists in developing and administering the concept of 
state is certainly to be explained by the fact that the discipline of jurispru-
dence has to operate more than any other with this concept. This is partic-
ularly apparent in the subdiscipline international law: “States constitute the 
international legal community as original and regular members. Interna-
tional law depends on defining the state. The status of a polity as a state 
decides whether it is recognized as a subject of international law and a 
member of the system of rights and obligations under international law. 
The ‘three elements’ the necessary and sufficient preconditions under inter-
national law are state territory, state people, state authority (Staatsgebiet, 
Staatsvolk, Staatsgewalt) (G. Jellinek).”34
But constitutional law, too, needs the state – as assignee of legal responsi-
bilities: “In law, ‘state’ refers to a normatively defined organizational form of 
sovereign power to which only certain rules of constitutional and interna-
tional law apply. To this extent, the concept describes a legal attribution 
construction, a legal subject to which certain actions can be attributed.35
However, the legal status of ‘state’ presupposes the existence of an order 
defined in terms of territory and personnel such as that expressed and 
33 Benz (2008) 38.
34 Isensee (1989) col. 135.
35 Kelsen (1993) 264 f.: Österreichische Staatsdenker.
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applied in Georg Jellinek’s three element theory (state authority, state terri-
tory, state people).”36
The concept of state is thus at home in the discipline of jurisprudence, 
and there are no signs of it being evicted.
German political science, by contrast, has expended much effort on avoid-
ing the concept of state, a strategy Arthur Benz explains as follows:
“In avoiding the concept of state, political science not only distanced itself from the 
older Staatslehre (theory of the state) but also reacted to the fact that, in modern 
societies, politics also takes place outside the state and that the boundaries between 
state and society are becoming increasingly blurred. Attention turned first to asso-
ciations that represent societal interests and seek to promote them in competition 
and cooperation with one another. Later one discovered the outsourcing of public 
sector functions to non-state organizations. … moreover, politics and the state are 
even farther apart for those who discover politics outside established institutions, 
‘beyond formal responsibilities and hierarchies’ and who accuse experts that ‘equate 
politics with the state, with the political system, with formal responsibilities and 
advertised political careers’ of misunderstanding the concept of politics.37 At any 
rate, there is no denying that, empirically, politics is not limited to the framework of 
the state. Changes in statehood – which some equate with the decline of the state 
– that clearly lead to state activities ‘fraying’ in the course of internationalization 
and privatization,38 seem to corroborate the view of those who deny the state 
concept its central importance in political science.”39
In actual fact, however, the concept of state is not only experiencing a 
renaissance in political science; empirical observation in recent years suggest 
it is in the best of health and shows no signs of expiring as predicted.40
36 Möllers (2008) 1272.
37 Beck (1993) 156.
38 Leibfried / Zürn (eds.) (2005) 17–27.
39 Leibfried / Zürn (eds.) (2005) 4–5.
40 See Vosskuhle et al. (eds.) (2013); see also Anter (2016), which, incidentally, strongly 
stresses the contribution of jurists to current state theory: “Among the authors who cur-
rently represent a realistic theory of the state are notably Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Josef 
Isensee, and Dieter Grimm. Interestingly, all three are jurists, albeit with a strong inclina-
tion towards the social sciences.”
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II. The meteoric career of the state concept in the guise of
the “reason of state”
There seems to be broad agreement that the real career of the state concept 
really took off only when it came to be linked with the ‘reason of state’ 
notion: “The origins of the concept [of state] appear to lie in the political 
prudential literature of early modern Italy … It served as a terminological 
means of differentiating between innerwordly political organization and 
transcendental claims to rightness, thus describing precisely the function 
of substantive autonomization of the political order from material demands 
on its content. However, the Italian authors tended to make topical rather 
than systemic use of the idea. The topos is the reason of state (Staatsräson, 
ragione dello stato, raison d`état) as a passpartout argument for enforcing 
order against moral or religious objections.”41
According to Herfried Münkler, reason of state is a “tendentious term used 
in the building of the early modern state, steering its internal consolidation 
and external expansion.”42 In similar vein, Paul-L. Weinacht speaks of the 
double thrust of reason of state: inwards and outwards:
“The advance of thinking in terms of the state that accompanied the transformation 
of overall conditions – grounded in estates and princely rule – in the absolute 
princely state (Fürstenstaat) is evident on a number of fronts: ‘ratio status’, the 
politico-juridical concept of the new princely regime, had many adversaries: within, 
the estates, without, the emperor and the empire; both within and without: the 
churches; and not least of all the concrete interests of external competitors and rivals 
(i. e., their reason of state). The reason of state had its profile sharpened by these 
conflicts: as legal doctrine of the absolute regime internally, as political doctrine of 
prudence (new politics) externally.”43
In parallel to the two chief aspects of the reason of state concepts – internal 
stabilization of rule and building an external carapace, the passage shows 
that reason of state also gained the quality of a legal concept. Herfried 
Münkler comments on this interdependence between the internal and exter-
nal aspects of the associated juridification of the reason of state:
“With the development of the European system of states, interest grew among kings 
and princes to centralize rule within their states … Central authorities tend above all 
41 Möllers (2008) 1271.
42 Münkler (1987) 169.
43 Weinacht (1975) 70–71.
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to concentrate legal and fiscal powers to enable the state to focus all its energy 
outwards in the event of political and military conflict. The question of the religious 
unity of the state is also important in this context, which – in conflict with the 
‘liberty’ of the estates – joins forces with the idea of the reason of state … What in 
Machiavelli and Guiccardini was justified only on grounds of utility, was in the 
confessional disputes in the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the 
seventeenth centuries legally underpinned by the evocation of emergency. Thomas 
Aquinas had already advanced the notion of ‘derogatio legis’ (derogation from the 
law) for purposes of ‘utilitas multorum’; this was supplemented by Seneca’s maxim: 
‘Necessitas omnen legem frangit’ – necessity breaks every law. This formula was 
taken over by Justus Lipsius (Politicorum libri sex, IV, 14; 1589) and Hippolithus a 
Lapide (Diss. de ratione status, Prol., Sect. V; 1640); Jean Bodin (République, IV, 3; 
1576) reworded it as: ‘Nulla igitur tam sancta lex est, quam non oporteat urgente 
necessitate mutari’ – no law is so sacrosanct that it cannot be changed in an emer-
gency. The reason of state idea thus begins to assume legal character.”44
The development of the reason of state concept has been described in similar 
vein by Michael Stolleis:
“The more territories formed themselves into ‘states’ by developing their own 
administration, educational facilities, and armies, the more plausible it seemed to 
assert their own ‘raison territoriale’. With the almost unconstrained sovereignty 
brought by the Peace of Westphalia, this fact also gained legal recognition. Not 
only the renaissance of the universities after the war but also the removal of this 
legal obstacle probably explain the broad wave of legal dissertations on the ‘ratio 
status’ from 1650 on. While setting external bounds to the reason of state of the 
given sovereign, these treatises also discussed the internal possibilities and limits of 
legitimation vis-à-vis the estates and subjects. The latter aspect is particularly impor-
tant; for the right of expropriation, contract termination, the levy of special taxes, 
and the revocation of old privileges and other special legal titles needed legal justi-
fication. It was supplied not only by the well established devices of necessitas, 
notturft, bonum commune and utilitas publica but also by the reason of state as a 
legal concept. The jurist Besold was clearly aware of this shift in categories: ‘Ratio 
politica, quam nunc vocant de Statu (olim aequitas & epieikeia) transgreditur legi-
bus, scripto vel voce promulgatae; literam, sed non sensum & finem’. This is the 
early, moderate level at which, although breaching the letter of the law, the reason 
of state fulfilled its ‘spirit’. Later, the reason of state was to change into a unilateral 
governmental legal title justifying interventions of all sorts, while its parallel limiting 
function weakened as absolutism consolidated.”45
44 Münkler (1985) 23ff., 27 f.
45 Stolleis (1990) 37ff., 68 f.
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These two passages lend support to Münkler’s definition, encompassing as it 
does the content and thrust of the reason of state. Summarizing early modern 
reason-of-state and arcana literature, he seeks to concentrate the central 
elements of the reason of state:
“The common denominator of all reason-of-state theories is the power to contravene 
traditional and positive law internally and the authority to terminate contracts 
externally; but in both cases with the objective interests of the state strictly in mind. 
The reason of state accordingly means rejecting all concepts of politics committed to 
universal norms and values, the triumph of the particular in the sphere of the 
political.”46
What is striking about this definition is that dealing with law constitutes the 
core of the reason of state – and of sovereignty. If the essence of sovereignty is 
the justification and institutionalization of the lawmaking monopoly, the core 
of the reason of state lies in the authority to contravene the law. This recalls 
the role of the language of international law as a language of justification 
discussed above in the context of international law.
III. A remarkable semantic shift: from state to statehood
If the “state” is not disappearing but is clearly more and more in its element 
in times of crisis – financial, monetary, European, or whatever – as an entity 
with an effective executive, this indicates that it is the concept of state that is 
in retreat.47 Over recent decades, the discussion on the state has revealed a 
conspicuous shift in usage from state to statehood. Talk is now almost only 
about statehood, not only in the two collaborative research centers “Chang-
ing Statehood” (“Staatlichkeit im Wandel”, University of Bremen, until 31/
12/2015) and “Governance in Spaces of Limited Statehood” (“Governance in 
Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit” FU Berlin until 31/12/2015), but in almost 
all more recent publications. Note what a student advisory service brochure 
at the University of Passau has to say about a study programme: “The bach-
elor’s programme ‘Governance and Public Policy – Staatswissenshaften’ is 
grounded in disciplines that classically address the relationship between the 
state, society, and the economy. This programme combines political science, 
46 Münkler (1987) 269.
47 On the inappropriateness of the retreat metaphor for the development of the modern 
state, see Schuppert, G. F. (1995b).
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historical, economic, philosophical, (international) law, and sociological 
aspects. ‘Statehood’ as the subject and focus of the programme encompasses both 
the nation-state perspective and the various forms of political activity 
(domestic, international, supranational), that are examined at multi-discipli-
nary and interdisciplinary levels.”
Since, in our experience, semantic shift is less a fashionable label than 
(like the shifts from third sector to civil society and from control to gover-
nance) an expression of more profound processes of change, or at least of a 
more or less radical change in perspective,48 this shift from state to statehood 
deserves our attention; there must be particular grounds for this change in 
terminology. Three can be identified:
* One decisive advantage of the statehood concept is that it imposes no catego-
rization and thus helps avoid unease about assessing the extent to which the EU 
has a state-like quality. Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Martin Große-Hüttmann com-
ment: “In this connection we speak explicitly of ‘statehood’ and not of ‘state’ 
because the concept of statehood is more open and adaptable from an analytical 
point of view … Especially in the debate on the state-like nature of the European 
Union there is a ‘wide conceptual mantel of statehood’,49 since the EU is a 
specific, historically contingent, institutionally and dynamically shifting form 
of a model for political order, which is not to be understood as a deficient or 
underdeveloped form of a ‘state’ on the model of OECD states.50
* Historians who are concerned with “statehood” in antiquity or the Middle 
Ages51 also appreciate the concept: it can, for example, prove helpful in answer-
ing the question of whether the governmental practices of the Roman Empire 
can be described as a “state”. Under the heading “statehood as analytic category”, 
Christoph Lundgreen explains: “Statehood should … first … be understood as 
ongoing process rather than state. Movement within this process should, second, 
not be coupled with the figure of thought of rise and fall or other teleological 
concepts but be treated analytically as weaker or more intensive statehood. If, 
moreover, political science sees varying statehood as characteristic of the present 
day and comparative history as typical of the nineteenth century, the strict 
“state /non-state” dichotomy ought to be abandoned in analysing antiquity, as 
well52 Writing about “statehood and political action in imperial Rome”, Hans-
Ulrich Wiemer remarks in similar vein: “Whenever it is a question of the action 
patterns and spaces of political actors, it is also question of what forms of state-
48 See Schuppert, G. F. (2018b).
49 Ref. Schuppert, G. F. (2010) 129.
50 Bieling / Grosse-Hüttmann (eds.) (2016) 11–30, here 15.
51 See Esders / Schuppert, G. F. (2015).
52 Lundgren (2014) 34–35.
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hood determine how they act … What is decisive is institutionalization, i. e., 
objectivization and stabilization, the performance of joint responsibilities, so 
that there are necessarily varying degrees of ‘statehood’.”53
* Governance studies, too, prefer to work with the concept of statehood, because it 
can capture entities – ‘étatique ou non étatique’ – that are either not states in the 
legal sense of the term or only partly or deficiently provide what is normally 
associated with the concept and expected of the modern, Western type of state. 
What the statehood concept thus permits is to enter the whole motley world of 
“varieties of statehood”, to study the various “configurations of statehood”,54 and 
not to limit oneself to the narrow perspective of statehood as defined by the 
OECD.
What does the semantic shift from state to statehood mean for the language of 
law? This massive change in language use can be understood as a call for 
jurisprudence to overcome its fixation on an essentialist and supposedly exactly 
defined concept of the state, which had developed in the course of the nine-
teenth century and encouraged the dominance of thinking in terms of the 
nation-state,55 by doing two things: first to address the state as a process56
and thus avoid having to write its history as a narrative of either rise or fall 
(the latter being the more popular option);57 and second to take up the 
analytical potential of classical “Staatswissenschaft”, (“science of the state”) 
and apply it anew under the conditions of Europeanization, transnationaliza-
tion, and globalization. In what could be called “Staatlichkeitswissenschaft” 
(“science of statehood”), the language of law would retain its legitimate place.
It will be no surprise that we now turn to the concept of sovereignty, 
generally considered the central characteristic of the modern state.
53 Wiemer (ed.) (2006) 1–2.
54 Zürcher (2005) 13–22.
55 On these isolation tendencies, see Glenn (2013).
56 Schuppert, G. F. (2010).
57 See my controversy with the Bremen Collaborative Research Centre “Staatlichkeit im Wandel” 
in my article, Schuppert, G. F. (2008c) with the response by Genschel / Leibfried (2008).
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Chapter Two
Sovereignty
A. The triad of state, reason of state, and sovereignty as basic chord
of the modern state
There is broad agreement that the concepts state, sovereignty, and reason of 
state are closely related and that it is the theories of sovereignty and reason of 
state that spelled out the developmental and functional logic of the emerg-
ing early modern state. That a state conceived of as sovereign – once it was in 
existence – would have to have the power to act in accordance with its 
“raison” has been plausibly argued by Joseph R. Strayer, who correctly 
stresses the functional link between recognizing sovereignty and accepting 
the orientation of state action on the reason of state:
“Recognition of the theory of the divine right of kings makes resistance a wrong and 
thus strengthens the state. For those sceptical about the divine right of kings, there 
was the theory that the state was indispensable for human welfare and that the 
concentration of power that we call sovereignty was essential for the continued 
existence of the state. People could not lead a decent life – according to Hobbes 
they could not live at all – unless they lived in a sovereign state and obeyed its 
commands. To weaken or destroy the state meant to threaten the future of the 
human race. A state was therefore empowered to take all conceivable steps to ensure 
its own survival, even if its action seemed unjust or cruel.”58
Michael Stolleis, too, writing about the idea of the sovereign state, mentions 
sovereignty and reason of state in one breath, as if they were identical twins:
“The theory of sovereignty is a consequence of the autonomization of politics in the 
sixteenth century. The politico-administrative apparatus was to be granted a monop-
oly of decision-making and the use of force, it was to be separate from rival societal 
powers and to control them. Acting in accordance with the reason of state, asserting 
the status of subject under international law, and eliminating (weakening) interme-
diary powers are aspects of the fundamental political needs of early modernity. They 
are responses to the gradual collapse of the structures of the medieval order, includ-
ing the feudal system; to the end of the dualistic overarching of Europe by Church 
and Empire; to schism and religious wars, and, not least, to fundamental changes in 
economic conditions with tremendous growth in financial requirements.”59
58 Strayer (1975) 99–100.
59 Stolleis (1996) 63ff., 82 f.
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A third voice in this chorus points out that the two theories or concepts 
marking the functional logic of the modern state are – a rather rare case – 
clearly associated with two names: Jean Bodin and Niccolo Macchiavelli, 
recognized as the godfathers of the modern state. Dieter Wyduckel com-
ments:
“The theories of reason of state and sovereignty that took shape in the course of the 
sixteenth century reveal an – often overestimated – change in the conception of law 
and state, reflecting not only the trend towards detheologization of the medieval 
view of the polity but also the notion of subordinating political rule to rational 
considerations. Whereas Niccolo Macchiavelli saw the reason of state as grounded in 
the necessity of state, Jean Bodin declared sovereignty to be the decisive criterion of 
the polity, defining it as supreme, legally unbounded power over citizens and sub-
jects (summe in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta potestas).”60
This should sufficiently indicate that the concept of sovereignty is crucial for 
all concern with the political history of ideas. We, however, are primarily 
interested in whether sovereignty is really a legal concept, a political concept, 
or both at the same time.
B. Sovereignty – legal concept, political concept, or both?
Sovereignty is undoubtedly a political concept, since it is about fundamental 
questions of institutionalized human sociation. Ulrich K. Preuß therefore 
sees it as a key concept of the political:
“There are basic concepts for understanding the social world that are so general that 
they develop varying but essentially identical meanings in wide ranging spheres of 
life. We speak of the individual, the human being, of contract, of power, or of 
country in describing very general social states of affairs. But if we instead of indi-
vidual we say citizen; instead of contract, alliance; instead of power, rule; instead of 
land, territory, we have entered the realm of the political. Concepts that are con-
stitutive for the sphere of the political and originally have meaning only in this 
sphere, I call key concepts of the political. Thus ‘citizen’ does not mean only human 
being, individual, or person, but the individual as member of a political community. 
The concept ‘alliance’ describes a contractual relationship in the sphere of the 
political; ‘territory’ is not simply a defined piece of the earth’s surface but a polit-
ico-geographical space. In this sense, I speak of sovereignty as a key concept of the 
political: it unfolds its meaning only in the context of the political. Indeed, we can 
60 Wyduckel (1979) 12–13.
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say that the modern concept of the political constitutes itself as an independent 
sphere of human associations only through the category of sovereignty.”61
But the concept of sovereignty is also without a doubt a legal concept. This is 
apparent not only when one looks at international law as a legal regime for 
relations between sovereign states but is also shown also by the fact that the 
heart of sovereignty is a set of rights. Thomas Fleiner and Lidija R. Basta 
Fleiner62 are our witnesses on the content of sovereignty:
“BODIN showed almost statesmanlike far-sightedness in discussing the attributes of 
sovereignty. What powers and competencies does a state or a prince have to have to 
be described as sovereign? Sovereignty includes above all the right to issue laws for 
every individual. This right includes the power to amend customary law and grant 
new privileges. ‘All the other attributes and rights of sovereignty are included in this 
power of making and unmaking law.’ BODIN, Book I, Chapter 10, p. 83). Among 
the other attributes of sovereignty BODIN lists are the right of making peace and 
war, of hearing appeals from the sentences of all courts whatsoever, of appointing 
and dismissing the great officers of state, of taxing, or granting privileges of exemp-
tion to all subjects, of appreciating or depreciating the value and weight of the 
coinage, of receiving oaths of fealty from subjects and liege-vassals alike.”63
If this is so, both political science and jurisprudence can legitimately claim 
the sovereignty concept for themselves – and they are at liberty to do so. The 
real charm of the concept, however, lies precisely in the fact that it cannot be 
neatly divided up between politics and law. As Dieter Grimm has noted, it is 
a “basic legalo-political concept”.64 Matthias Mahlmann remarks: “The concept 
of sovereignty is a basic concept of law and of politics.”65
We take a similar view, but add two justifications that clarify the matter. 
The first quote is from a dictionary entry on sovereignty by Peter Nieson, 
which sums up the indivisible link between the political and legal content of 
the concept: “Sovereignty means the capability to make collectively binding 
decisions autonomously for a number of persons. In the history of political 
thought, sovereignty is therefore primarily identified with the legislature as 
the supreme state authority. This underlines that sovereign power is exercised 
by means of positive law.”66 Although Matthias Mahlmann, too, primarily 
61 Preuss (2007) 313.
62 Fleiner / Basta Fleiner (2004).
63 Fleiner / Basta Fleiner (2004) 321.
64 Grimm (2007) 304–310.
65 Mahlmann (2007) 270.
66 Niesen (2008) 1205.
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stresses the eminently political importance of the sovereignty concept,67 in 
the same breath he emphasizes the crucial role of law in making the 
autonomy of political self-determination possible in the first place under 
the carapace of sovereignty: “Self-determination requires social organization, 
tempered in essence by institutions and law. The sovereignty of the organiza-
tional entity thus formed, traditionally a state, is in the political sphere the 
equivalent of the individual self-determination of the subject.”68
C. The political dimension of the sovereignty concept
The political dimension of the sovereignty concept becomes particularly 
clear when one considers the functions attributed to it. From this historical 
perspective two are especially prominent: to eliminate all intermediary 
claims to power and to establish a unitary power centre:
“The historical function of the sovereignty concept is to establish a power centre for 
binding decision-making and to emancipate it from all claims of supranational and 
subnational actors to participate in government. This also announced the modern 
autonomy of politics from other functional areas of society. However, the political 
system reserved to itself not only regulatory power over all other functional areas in 
society such as religion, science, and the economy – even if it did not necessarily 
intervene – it also switched the polycratic structures of the Middle Ages to a new, 
strictly hierarchical mode of control.”69
The second, just as important historical function was to overcome civil war-
like religious conflicts:
“‘Sovereignty’ was the answer, proposed in 1576 by Jean Bodin, to the crisis of the 
medieval order, which arose in the aftermath of the sixteenth century schism and 
which culminated in the religious civil wars. Bodin saw the only hope for peaceful 
co-existence between the confessions at loggerheads about religious truth was to 
create an institution raised above the warring parties that imposed an independent 
secular order and enforced it of its own authority. However, this required all sover-
67 Mahlmann (2007) 278–279: “It is an eminently political concept, not only because it 
raises fundamental questions of law and political organization but also because, within 
its framework, concrete political disputes are fought out about the distribution of power 
in a society and its relationship to other organizational entities – from the theory of 
political absolutism to the limits of the powers of the individual state in the light of 
modern human rights.”
68 Mahlmann (2007) 279.
69 Niesen (2008) 1206.
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eign rights – including the right to use force – distributed substantively and terri-
torially among many independent wielders of power under the medieval order to be 
concentrated in one pair of hands to constitute an all-inclusive power centre. The 
downside was the corresponding complete disempowerment of societal forces.”70
Dieter Grimm therefore rightly stresses that the political unity formula of 
sovereignty serves also as a legitimation formula clad in the language of law:
“Bodin called this new sort of overall authority sovereignty, which he defined as 
supreme and unrestricted governmental power. For those who wielded it, it meant 
the power to legally bind everyone in their area of authority without themselves 
being legally bound. For Bodin, sovereignty in this sense was indivisible. Shared 
sovereignty was not sovereignty. Sovereignty was therefore not a collective term or 
generic concept for single sovereign rights but a unitary concept describing a new 
quality of rule and which thus marked the passage from the Middle Ages to modern 
times. Under these circumstances, it corresponded to nothing in the real world at 
the time of its development. ‘Sovereignty’ was a theoretical construct, not a theory 
conceptualizing reality but one that anticipated reality, that guided and legitimated 
changes to it.”71
The key tool in implementing what was attributed to the sovereignty con-
cept is, however, law. Law – and this means above all enacted law – occupies 
first place in the governmental repertoire of the sovereign state; Ulrich K. 
Preuß:
“Whoever has the authority to make law with unilateral sovereignty is sovereign. 
This means two things: first, the institutionalized supremacy of rule and second its 
expression in the form of enacted law. Bodin put it with the greatest clarity when he 
contrasted sovereignty with the traditional mode of lawmaking by contract or 
‘covenant’: ‘A law and a covenant must … not be confused. A law proceeds from 
him who has sovereign power, and by it he binds the subject to obedience, but 
cannot bind himself. A covenant is a mutual undertaking between a prince and his 
subjects, equally binding on both parties, and neither can contravene it to the 
prejudice of the other, without his consent (Bodin 1576/1981: chap. 8: 70). Law 
and contract are different manifestations of law, so that only the contract but also the 
law emanating from sovereign rule is therefore a mode of political integration – a 
novel one that Bodin was the first to explicate.”72
Since, however, law is always involved, we ought to take a brief look at the 
juridical construction of sovereignty.
70 Grimm (2007) 304.
71 Grimm (2007) 304–305.
72 Preuss (2007) 314.
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D. The juridical construction of sovereign state authority
In his impressive work on state and sovereignty, Helmut Quaritsch73
addresses the juridical construction for concentrating public authority envis-
aged in Bodin’s sovereignty theory. He identifies three elements of sovereign state 
authority: unity, singularity, and unilaterality.
The singularity of state authority in the hands of the sovereign is effected by 
monopolizing lawmaking power, that is, by monopolizing the competence that 
is the core of sovereignty: “donner loy á tous en general, et á chacun en 
particulier”. Quaritsch:
“Vesting ‘donner-loy’ competence with its deduced powers exclusively in the sover-
eign meant that, in this monopolized domain, to raise an objection to a sovereign, 
irreversible (‘absolute’) decision was, ipso jure, unlawful; denial of obedience was 
resistance, which could and had to be broken by physical force. The primacy of the 
lawmaking institutions and the normative complex created by them was thus estab-
lished in the most important field of domestic action by the sovereign: setting 
generally applicable rules of behaviour.”74
The unity of state authority is established and ensured by means of an organ-
izational construction, which we shall be examining below: public office, that 
is to say, the understanding of rule as the exercise of a public office entrusted to the 
holder. Under Bodin’s conception of sovereignty, the authority entrusting an 
office to someone, supervising his exercise thereof, and dismissing the hold-
er, can perforce be only the sovereign himself. Helmut Quaritsch:
“Public authority takes … only two forms: the sovereign and the holder of public 
office. Someone who exercises public authority as officeholder is among the ‘gov-
ernmental’ institutions appointed by the sovereign; his area of responsibility is 
assigned to him, he himself is an agent. It was therefore possible for the holder of 
sovereignty to withdraw the powers entrusted to the current officeholder at any 
time, to assign them to another or exercise them himself. This established not only 
the primacy but also the substantial unity of the power existing in a ‘république’. 
The concentration and categorization of all powers – including those of the sover-
eign – of command and coercion under the heading of ‘puissance publique’ 
excluded any thought of sovereignty and public authority being independent of 
one another. The sovereign’s power of disposition over his subjects and the exercise 
of public authority brought together all non-sovereign authorities with powers of 
command and coercion in a single entity.”75
73 Quaritsch (1970).
74 Quaritsch (1970) 267.
75 Quaritsch (1970) 268 f.
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Finally, with regard to the unilaterality of state authority, the requirement of 
sovereign rule for unilateral decision making follows from the nature of sov-
ereignty itself as a concept for ensuring the capacity of the state to act, also 
and particularly where antagonistic interest structures and confessional 
schism prevail. Having defined the first characteristic of sovereignty (“The 
first attribute of the sovereign prince is … the power to make law binding on 
all his subjects in general and on each in particular.”), Bodin immediately 
adds: “But to avoid any ambiguity one must add that he does so without the 
consent of any superior, equal, of inferior being necessary. If the prince can 
only make law with the consent of a superior he is a subject; if of an equal he 
shares his sovereignty; if of an inferior, whether it be a council of magnates 
or the people, it is not he who is sovereign.”76
This strong emphasis on the need for unilateral decision-making authority 
is a logical consequence of the function Bodin attributed to his sovereignty 
theory as a reaction to the civil war in France “by establishing the legal basis for 
powerful kingship to ensure peace between the confessions and to reconstruct 
the broken order of the commonwealth in stability”77 Quaritsch:
“The background to the demand for unilateral decision-making was the experi-
ence of the later Middle Ages and the civil wars of the sixteenth century. The 
harmony of values and interests presupposed by the dualistic conception had 
fallen victim to ‘growing social differentiation’ (Luhmann) and confessional dis-
sension. The conflicts resulting from this disintegration had reached dimensions 
and intensity such that the hitherto recognized authorities were no longer able to 
handle them through consensus. Bodin’s solution was to exclude the representa-
tives of disintegration from conflict management decisions: ‘Tous les états demeur-
ent en pleine subiection du Roy, qui n’est aucunement tenu de suyvre leur advis, 
ny accorder leur requestes’. This posited a system that, in social-scientific terms, 
transferred societal conflicts to the environment of the state machinery of govern-
ment and thus made them solvable. The estates were thus deprived of the oppor-
tunity to continue pursuing their views, interests, and objectives as binding ele-
ments of the action programme of their organizations and to lay legal claim to 
them before the royal leadership of the association. The realization of this principle 
put control in the organization on a completely different footing completely alien 
to that which had prevailed throughout the thousand years of the Middle Ages: 
76 Bodin (1955); quoted from the English edition, 82.
77 Bodin (1955).
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the plurality of ruling powers was revoked and replaced by a relationship of 
protection and obedience applicable to and binding on all members of the 
order.”78
So much on the legal construction elements of Bodin’s sovereignty theory.
E. On balance
When sovereignty is discussed or written about today, what is generally at 
issue is “whether the concept of sovereignty still corresponds to something 
real and is therefore suitable for describing current conditions”,79 whether it 
has not long since eroded,80 and how it is to be understood in political 
multi-level systems such as the European Union.81 We have not addressed 
all this,82 because our focus is solely on the role that the language of law plays
when it comes to describing and understanding one of the key concepts in the 
political history of ideas.
The result is clear. As the semantic mix of the state concept has shown, the 
state cannot be adequately described without the vocabulary of law. When 
dealing with the politically momentous and successful concept of sover-
eignty, we find that law and politics cannot be kept apart. The recipe is 
primarily political, even though the necessary ingredients have always been 
of legal provenance. Things might be no different with the key concept of 
‘constitution.’
78 Quaritsch (1970) 271 f.
79 Grimm (2007) 304.
80 See, for example, van Staden / Vollaard (2002).
81 See Grimm (2012) 275–292.
82 See our own contribution: Schuppert, G. F. (2007b).
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Chapter Three
Constitution
What we have learned about the concepts of state and sovereignty repeats 
itself when we come to the constitution. Whereas “state” proved to be a 
semantic mix, and “sovereignty” a “legalo-political” concept, “constitution” 
appears to be a halfway-house concept between law and politics, since con-
stitutions – to quote Günter Frankenberg – “give societies politico-legal form”:
“Constitutions give societies politico-legal form as an entity – state, nation, people, 
federation, or union. They lay down the principles, institutional arrangements, and 
decision-making procedures by which societies go about governing themselves and 
by which they seek to safeguard their cohesion. At the same time, constitutions 
betray the hopes and fears of their authors about the two main problems: justifying 
legitimate authority and establishing societal integration. The essential character of 
constitutions – both functions and content – finds legal expression in their primacy 
over all other legal rules of national law. As a sort of ‘normative nobility’ they form 
the apex of the normative pyramid, after having come into being in some special 
way such as by referendum. Once in place, they can be amended only by a special 
procedure, generally by a qualified majority vote – if revision by lawmakers duly 
empowered to this effect is not entirely excluded.”83
If constitutions are therefore a both political and legal form societies give 
themselves to organize the life of the polity, the language of constitutionalism
is both a political and legal language. This self-evidence invites a number of 
additional comments to throw light from various angles on the interlocking 
of law and politics apparent in the constitution as an institution.84
A. The constitution as an institution between the politicization
of law and the juridification of politics
In premodern societies, law was deemed valid by virtue of immemorial 
tradition or by divine institution: the notion that law could be made was 
alien to them. When tradition and religion lost their power to validate law, 
Dieter Grimm argues, the relationship between law and politics changed 
fundamentally – with the emergence of the early modern territorial state and 
the positivization of law: “Law had become makeable and could be deployed 
83 Frankenberg, G. (2008) 1411.
84 See North (1990) [transl. 1992] on the stabilization function of institutions, taking the 
example of the constitution.
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as a tool for political purposes. This reversed the old primacy. Politics now 
ranked higher than law and lent it content and validity.”85
This absolutist period of politicization of law was brought to an end by the 
burgeoning power of the bourgeoisie and their ultimately incontestable 
demand for the lawmaking powers of the monarchical sovereign to be 
abolished, once again reversing the relationship between politics and law. 
The politicization of law was succeeded by the juridification of politics. As 
Grimm shows, the vehicle for this reversal was the constitution:
“The desired limitation of political disposition over law could … itself be achieved 
only through law. Although this law then had to be superior to enacted law, it could 
not be supra-positive. The solution to this problem was the constitution. Unlike natural 
law, it was positive law. However, introducing the constitution made positive law 
reflexive: it was divided into two different normative complexes, the first laying 
down the conditions for making and validating the second. Normsetting was thus 
itself normativized. Although politics retained its power to make law for society, it 
no longer enjoyed the freedom of the absolute monarch: it was itself subject to the 
binding force of law. First of all, this involved procedural rules that had to be 
respected if a political decision was to be accepted as a collectively binding norm. 
Second, however, substantive demands were made of enacted law in the shape of 
basic rights, flouting which could nullify it.”86
So much on Dieter Grimm’s outline of historical developments.
B. The constitution as the order of the political
In our “Staatswissenschaft”87 we had posited that the complicated categori-
zation of the worlds of law and politics through the hybrid institution of the 
constitution can succeed only if both worlds are catered for, resulting neither 
in total politicization of law nor in total juridification of politics.
Nowhere do we find this thesis better formulated than by Ulrich K. 
Preuß, who has this to say about the constitution as the interface of law and 
politics:
“In the constitution, law meets politics. But this is not the place for a rerun of the 
drama – particularly popular in Germany – of irreconcilable opposition between, on 
the one hand, the legal neutrality, objectivity, reason, justice, procedural orientation, 
85 Grimm (2001) 13–32, here 18.
86 Grimm (2001) 20.
87 Schuppert, G. F. (2003) 743ff.
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discursivity, and protective quality of law and, on the other, the political partisan-
ship, fixation on power and will, irrationality, strategic orientation on success, 
unobjectiveness, and decisionism of politics. This would contribute little to under-
standing the concept of constitution. What goes to make up the constitution con-
cept is not the fact that it connects law with politics but the difficulty of developing 
a concept of constitution in which the creative force of politics can unfold.
The heart of the current international debate on the concept of constitution thus 
lies in the search for institutional conditions under which democratic politics can be 
rediscovered in its creative importance as a medium of human problem resolution 
and given its rightful place.”88
If, as we agree, a concept of constitution needs to be developed in which the 
creative force of politics can unfold, but within the framework of the consti-
tution, thinking in dichotomies – the world of law versus the world of 
politics – will not be very helpful:
“The constitution as the ‘order of the political’ would be very inadequately defined 
were we to understand it as the embodiment of an ultimately insoluble tension 
between the irrational abyss of politics and the rationalization achievements of law, 
especially its formality and its bent for systematic consistency. Splitting the constitu-
tion into a rule-of-law logic and an opposing political logic, or the assertion – typical of 
anti-liberal constitutional critics – that the liberal and democratic elements of mod-
ern civil constitutions contradict one another exemplify a basic current of theory 
that claims the constitution can at best curb the incomprehensible force of the 
political from without, but can never tame and reform its inherent wildness.”89
An adequate understanding of the constitution can therefore be gained only 
by avoiding thinking in terms of any essential opposition between law and 
politics, cancelling out this opposition in the function the constitution per-
forms in ordering the political. Preuß:
“This is clearly much more and much more demanding than erecting barriers 
against absolutist political authority with its proclivity for the arbitrary. ‘A consti-
tution is that which results from an effort to constitute’ – this simple sentence 
resumes the entire complexity of the constitutional programme. A constitution con-
stitutes a political community. What seem to be purely negative provisions, such as 
defensive rights or the separation of powers and mutual checks and balances also 
constitute an order, not by eliminating politics but rather by channelling its energies 
in a manner that enables it to establish the framework conditions for societal liberty. 
The programme of traditional constitutionalism, too, whose concise message can be 
expressed in two words: ‘limited government’, thus contains no less than the high-
flying goal of establishing a political order. But it is a concept in which the political 
88 Preuss (ed.) (1994) 7–36, here 7ff., 8 f.
89 Preuss (1994) 9.
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(the quintessence of the aspirations to unity and identity at large in a society) is 
constituted as a medium of societal self-government, i. e., in which the political is set 
at liberty in civilized form. It faces the seeming chaos of societal multiplicity and 
diversity not as an unfathomable, uncomprehended and redeeming ‘Other’, as a 
promise of salvation, and thus as an ever-looming threat. As an ordering force itself, 
it is subject to the necessity of form, of limitation, and of mediating between oppo-
sites.”90
C. Constitutional law as political law
There is broad agreement that constitutional law is close to politics, is “pol-
itics-related law” – as Böckenförde puts it,91 “political law”, as Isensee calls it, 
albeit in inverted commas. On the literary topos of “political law”, Isensee is 
therefore probably safe in asserting that:
“Constitutional law is ‘political law’ – that is the usual topos, if not commonplace, 
of the literature on constitutional law and theory. Whoever avails themselves of it 
can expect broad agreement. But they cannot rely on everyone who agrees meaning 
the same thing. The statement is unclear and ambiguous. What is clear, however, in 
speaking of ‘political law’ is the intention to attribute a special quality to constitu-
tional law that distinguishes it from other law, whatever this distinction might 
be.”92
What, then, is this special quality of constitutional law that makes of it a sort 
of hybrid type of law rooted in both the world of law and the world of 
politics? Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde:
“In a specific sense, constitutional law is politics-related law. This is because it is the 
field of law closest to politics and which directly interlocks with it. It regulates access to 
the political decision-making power concentrated in the state, determines the pro-
cedures by which it is exercised, and sets limits to it. It accordingly regulates and 
distributes positions of power and decision-making with regard to shaping and 
ordering life in society, sets the possibilities and limits of determining the future, 
orders and channels the process of political will-formation. Regardless of their con-
tent, the provisions of the constitution are related per se to politics, act as structur-
ing and regulative factor in the political life of the state polity. This politics-related-
ness also means that constitutional law repeatedly switches to the modality, the 
aggregate state of the political, which is characterized by specific tensions. It cannot 
be detached from this context because it always relates to the ordering and regu-
90 Preuss (1994) 11 f.
91 Böckenförde (1969).
92 Isensee (1992) 103ff., 104.
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lation of political power, and thus to the central domain of constant political dis-
putation.”93
Even if constitutional law disputes never cease to be legal disputes, they are 
often also in the aggregate state of political controversies:
“The provisions and principles of constitutional law are far more direct that those in 
other fields of law, an expression of political notions of order, political decisions, or 
of compromises; with respect to the subject of regulation, they address a specific 
politics-related content. The fundamental concepts of constitutional law such as 
democracy, the rule of law, the federal state, the free democratic basic order, are 
not by chance but necessarily politico-ideological concepts. As a consequence, dis-
putes under constitutional law also display a specific politics-related content and 
therefore easily, if not necessarily end up in the aggregate state of political contro-
versy. This does not mean that they cease to be legal disputes.”94
The simultaneity of the political and legal aggregate state of constitutional law 
disputes suggests that we can indeed speak of constitutional law as a hybrid 
type of law.
D. The constitution as key element of a polity’s political culture
However difficult it may be to define political culture with any precision95
– some describe it as trying to nail jello to the wall96 – there can be no doubt 
that the constitution is a key element in the political culture of a polity and 
that constitutional culture97 and administrative culture98 are important ele-
ments in the overarching political culture of a country. Jürgen Gebhardt99
posits that, in the medium of political culture, the constitution unfolds its 
symbolic and instrumental functions in two ways: “In fulfilling its symbolic 
function, it explicates the guiding regulatory principle of political society, 
thus normativizing the regulatory and meaning content of political culture. 
In fulfilling its instrumental function, it regulates the political process, thus 
supplying the rules of the game for the political system.”100
93 Böckenförde (1969) 320 f.
94 Böckenförde (1969) 321.
95 For a comprehensive description see Schuppert, G. F. (2008).
96 Kaase (eds.) (1983) 144–171.
97 See Gebhardt (ed.) (1999).
98 For informative overviews see Jann (2000); Wallerath (2000) and Priebe (2000).
99 Gebhardt (ed.) (1999) 7–14.
100 Gebhardt (ed.) (1999) 8.
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Of decisive importance is the function of the constitution as rallying point for 
the politico-cultural self-understanding of a society. Hans Vorländer:
“Constitutions are not only part of a specific political culture, they are also an 
important rallying point for a society’s politico-cultural self-understanding. Consti-
tutions perform a communal service towards determining how a society sees itself as a 
political community. In the first place, rules that constitute the political order lay 
down procedural and institutional arrangements on the political process and polit-
ical behaviour. From the multitude of contingent rules, those are selected that are to 
apply for the order being constituted.101 At the same time, however, these rules stake 
out the communicative and deliberative space of a political community. Constitutional 
disputes are therefore always about the rules by which a political community forms, 
changes, and maintains itself. Constitutional discussions are societal discourses about self-
understanding. They shape the forums in which disputation about norms and thus 
about the community’s constitutive values and obligations takes place. A dispute 
about the constitutionality of placing crucifixes in school classrooms by order of the 
state is primarily a dispute about the status of religion and its symbolic representa-
tion in the public life of a political community.That such a dispute, like many in the 
past, is fought out by political forces and societal actors around and about the 
constitution and not infrequently on the back of the constitutional court can, in 
“judicial-state” intensification, be criticized as a weakness of parliamentary democ-
racy; on the other hand, it impressively demonstrates that the constitution has 
become the footing for political disputation. Where the constitution becomes the 
vanishing point of politics and society, things may look bad for the democratic 
culture of debate, but the constitution is accepted as the highest authority.”102
Vorländer describes what he calls the communal services of the constitution:
“These disputes about the constitution can themselves become tradition. They inte-
grate a society by conducting conflicts on the basis of the constitution: ‘The Con-
stitution is best understood as an historically rooted tradition of theory and practice 
– an evolving language of politics through which Americans have learned to talk to 
one another in the course of their centuries-long struggle over the national identity.’ 
As American constitutional history shows, the constitution becomes a narrative of 
societal self-understanding. Constitutional development reflects great societal con-
flicts, historical turning points, phases of change and watersheds in the values held 
by the polity, and relations between political and societal institutions. The history of 
the constitution and its interpretation become a mirror of the societal and cultural 
development of a political community, it can reflect the historical learning processes of a 
democratic society. Interpretation of the constitution by the – far from exclusive – 
circle of interpreters reveals shared meanings, as well as temporary or lasting cleav-
ages. If it is true that the great metanarrative of liberal democracies has come to an 
101 See Luhmann (1973).
102 Vorländer (1999).
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end (Richard Rorty), the constitution can stop the gap in the expectation or at least 
hope that the controversy about it and its fundamental institutions, procedures, and 
values will lead to habitual appropriation of the democratic and liberal principles 
characteristic of a constitutional community. This is ultimately the essence of talk 
about ‘constitutional patriotism’, whose civil-religious overstatement is the ‘consti-
tutional cult.’ The constitution then becomes a bible or prayerbook of societal self-
reassurance.”103
So much on some of the views we have collected on mutual relations 
between law and politics. Before concluding, we will cast take a glance at 
the juristic construction of the institution “constitution.”
E. Construction plan and key juristic elements
of the institution “constitution”
As far as the construction plan of modern constitutions is concerned, Günter 
Frankenberg identifies four regulatory fields that practically all constitutions 
address:
* “On questions of justice, catalogues of basic rights flanked by rule-of-law princi-
ples and procedures provide essentially identical answers throughout the world: 
with the protection of equal freedom, constitutions guarantee all liberty for 
individual and collective self-determination, they institutionalize and limit the 
legitimate power of all state and public authorities.
* With respect to the the good life or the common good, constitutions affirm values 
to be translated into state objectives and constitutional missions – such as solid-
arity, keeping of the peace, public welfare, or the advancement of women; or 
into obligations of the state such as protecting life and health, or the family and 
child education; or which are realized in civic obligations such as military service 
or tax liability.
* Constitutions devote most space to rules organizing the state. They answer the 
questions informed by historical experience about political prudence with insti-
tutions and procedures for political decision-making and by assigning and dis-
tributing authority among organs of the state and ensuring mutual checks and 
balances.
* The fourth element concerns the validity, amendment, and protection of a consti-
tution. These meta-rules shape the self-reflexivity and modernity of constitutions 
in the narrow sense of the term. They ensure that these constitutions draw their 
legitimacy from within themselves and exclude transcendental sources of legiti-
macy by regularly honouring the people as sovereign, tying any change to a 
decision by this sovereign or their representatives.”104
103 Vorländer (1999) 82–83.
104 Frankenberg, G. (2008) 1413.
252 Part Four
After this, as far as we can judge, correct list of contents, we need only name 
the three juridical elements on which the well-functioning of the constitutional 
state105 depends:
Rainer Wahl has resumed these three basic elements of constitutional 
statehood with exemplary clarity and concision:
“The constitutional state is based on the understanding that the written constitution 
is the basic law and the highest authority in the legal order. This general idea is given 
precise legal substance through the formulation and recognition of two legal prin-
ciples: normativity of the constitution and primacy of the constitution. The first and 
logically superior principle, normativity of the constitution, states that the written 
constitution is not merely declamation, declaration, or political programme but 
itself binding law. The second principle, primacy of the constitution, is based in legal 
theoretical terms on the concept of the hierarchical structure of the legal order: the 
constitution is at the apex of the hierarchy of legal norms; subordinate to it is the 
‘simple’ statute and the statutory instrument based on special legal empowerment. 
The primacy of the constitution finds expression in the principle of the constitu-
tionality of all law (Article 20 III of the Basic Law). At the same time, the primacy of 
the constitution means that the lawmaker is subordinate to it.
In a third important step, this substantive superiority of the constitution to all 
other law is joined by the implementation and effectuation of this primacy by an
elaborate system of constitutional jurisdiction. The possibility of court supervision 
secures substantive material superiority by sanctioning violation of the constitution 
through statutory law by nullification. Disputes on constitutional law are fought 
out before the courts, ending with a binding ruling by the highest court.
Taken together, these three elements, the normativity of the constitution, the 
primacy of the constitution, and constitutional jurisdiction form the legal heart of 
the (developed) constitutional state in the second half of the twentieth century.”106
105 On the constitutional state as state type see Schuppert, G. F. (2003) 743–834.
106 Wahl (2001) 1041.
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Having explored what constitutions generally regulate and the basis of their 
– also political – impact and authority, we conclude the chapter with a look 
at how constitutions actually come about.
F. How constitutions come about
All our reflections from various perspectives on the concept of constitution 
and constitutional functions have shown that the institution of the consti-
tution is at home in the border country between law and politics and the 
language of constitutionalism is accordingly also a language of politics and a 
language of law. A last and particularly weighty argument should convince 
any reader not yet persuaded that law and politics are inseparably entwined 
in the institution of the constitution. It is the concept of “constituent power”, 
which clearly straddles law and politics.
The constituent power of the people – a boundary concept
between law and politics
As constitutional history shows, constitutions are produced in specific his-
torico-political situations, mostly in the throes of radical change by which 
one political order is replaced by another. Since the French Revolution, what 
“erupts” under these circumstances has been called “pouvoir constituant”, 
“constituent power”, which, according to the democratic theory of govern-
ment, can lie only with the people.107 Although “constituent power” has 
the air of a concept of legal competence, there are no legal rules determining 
that, when, and how this constitution-making authority of the people comes 
into its own: the politico-legal “big bang” of making a constitution occurs in the 
absence of a constitution as binding normative order and without a set of 
rules providing instructions for drawing up a constitution as binding legal 
regime: “As the pouvoir constituant that antecedes the legal constitution, the 
constituent power of the people cannot be legally established by the con-
stitution itself, nor can the forms in which it expresses itself be fixed. It has 
107 This was clearly the assumption of the fathers and mothers of the Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany: in the preamble we find: “The German people have adop-
ted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law.” On the whole complex see 
Schuppert, G. F. (1984) 37ff.
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and retains an original, direct, as well as elemental quality. Accordingly, it is 
in a position – precisely as a political factor – to seek out and create forms of 
expression on its own.”108
However, if the constituent power cannot be legally domesticated, the 
process of producing a constitution can be understood only as a political act. 
In the demanding diction of constitutional theory, Ernst-Wolfgang Böcken-
förde comments on this simple conclusion:
“The constitution does not derive normative stabilization and regulatory force from 
a legal norm that stands above it or from a special sanction, which does not exist. 
Instead, it derives it from an idea of order established once, sustained, and norma-
tively solidified by political decision borne by the people or by the crucial groups and 
powers within society. The power that brings forth and legitimizes the constitution 
must consequently present itself – also – as a political entity. Notions of what is just 
and right, ideas of political order attain formative and legitimatory force for human 
coexistence only when affirmed by people or groups of people as living conviction 
and embodied in an upholding political force or authority. Thus, the constituent 
power – as a concept of constitutional theory and constitutional doctrine – cannot 
be defined either as a merely hypothetical or a purely natural law basic norm. It 
must be understood as a real political factor that establishes the normative validity 
of the constitution. Of course, as such it cannot exist within or on the basis of the 
constitution, for example as an ‘organ’ created by the constitution; it must precede 
the constitution and the pouvoirs constitués established and limited by it. Precisely 
this precedence and superiority vis-à-vis the pouvoirs constitués represent the char-
acteristic nature of the constituent power.109
This also means that constituent power is always latently present; at any time 
it can actualize itself or remain dormant for a longer period if the constitu-
tion it has created proves to be both stable and adaptable110 and – ideally – 
even borne by a living constitutional patriotism:111
“If the constituent power of the people is (also) a real political factor and force 
necessary to legitimize the constitution and its claim to validity, it cannot be juristi-
cally relegated to oblivion once it has fulfilled this function; it is and remains this 
factor and force. It would be curious to imagine that the necessary legitimation of 
the constitution could be reduced to the single point in time of its (revolutionary) 
creation, after which it would retain validity by a virtually self-sustaining process, 
independent of the continued existence of this legitimation. If the fundamental 
decisions of the constitution lack an enduring or self-renewing existential grounding 
108 Böckenförde (2011) 105.
109 Böckenförde (2011) 100.
110 See my reflections on the subject in: Schuppert, G. F. (1995a).
111 See Gebhardt (1993) 31ff.
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through the political and legal convictions that are alive in the concrete community 
united in the state, the constitution itself would inevitably erode. Its normativity 
would either trickle away between competing basic constitutional conceptions in 
search of a different order, or it would fall victim to general apathy.”112
Even if – as we have seen – the constituent power cannot be domesticated 
legally, the process of making a constitution must be organized in one way 
or another. Böckenförde:
“It is a priori impossible to separate a fundamental, boundary concept of constitu-
tional law from its entanglement with politics. What is possible, however, and what 
constitutes an important task of constitutional law, is this: (1) the actions of the 
constituent power of the people, which can never be shut out, can be somehow 
circumscribed; (2) suitable measures can ensure that its expression triggers procedures 
provided for the purpose, thus cushioning and channelling it, but also allowing for 
actualization.”113
As far as the practice of constitution-making is concerned, there are various 
procedures that come into question, two in particular: convoking a constituent 
national assembly, and appointing an assembly to draft a constitution followed 
by a plebiscite.
First procedure: a constituent national assembly that has arisen from dem-
ocratic elections, and which itself decides on and positivizes constitutional 
law (in its more detailed version in basic decisions already rendered). A 
confirmation or decision by the people in the sense of citizens eligible to 
vote does not take place. This is how the Weimar constitution came about in 
1919. It was agreed upon and enacted by the Weimar National Assembly, 
which had been elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage. …
Second procedure: a constitution-making assembly, a ‘convention’, which is 
summoned or democratically elected. It submits the text of the constitution 
as a proposal to the people, which itself decides to accept or reject it. The 
constitutions of the southern German Länder after 1945 (Bavaria, Württem-
berg-Baden, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate) as well as those of Bremen and 
North Rhine-Westphalia, were deliberated and agreed upon by popularly 
elected Landtage (state parliaments), which doubled up as constitution-mak-
ing conventions, and were subsequently adopted by referendum.”114
112 Böckenförde (2011) 106.
113 Böckenförde (2011) 107.
114 Böckenförde (2011) 108–109.
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But constitutions come into being not only through quasi “eruption”of the 
constituent power of the people; another case, no less frequent in constitu-
tional history, is constitution-making by contract. The most recent example of 
contractualist constitution making115 is the contractual network of the 
‘union of states’ that goes by the name European Union, an act of constitut-
ing a transnational basic order that has provoked intensive discussion on 
whether constitution is a suitable descriptor;116 we shall not be going into 
this controversy here. In constitutional history, at any rate, contracted constitu-
tions are to be regarded as a separate type of constitution-making. Under the 
heading “consociational systems of governance”, Arthur Benz has this to say:117
“The forms of authority that developed here [what is meant is in deviation from the 
dominant model of the sovereign territorial state] did not initially point in the 
direction of the modern state that established itself only later in these areas. It was 
characterized by a mixture of estate-based separation of powers and federal union, 
which is also referred to as consociational governance. However, this rough descrip-
tion hides considerable differences. The Swiss federation of rural communities had 
little in common with the alliances between Italian city republics secured only 
through diplomacy or with the more strongly institutionalized association of Hanse-
atic cities, in which the patrician class of merchants ruled, or the Republic of the 
United Netherlands with its estate-based institutions. The German Reich, which 
since 1648 had developed more and more into a union of states, comprised princi-
palities under absolute monarchs and free cities with estate-based systems of govern-
ment and free cities under the paramountcy of an increasingly weak emperor. But all 
these structures differed significantly from the model of the emerging territorial 
state. Its existence posed a challenge for the political theory of the time. What had 
to be clarified was whether these forms of rule were deviations from the normal 
development model, that is to say, forms that would not survive the conflicts of the 
modern age, or whether they were closer to a natural, just, and stable government 
than the emerging absolutist state. The former view was that taken by theoreticians 
such as Bodin and Pufendorf, the latter that adopted by a group of theoreticians long 
forgotten or neglected by the history of ideas who were inspired by Calvinist or 
Jewish thought, but who also drew on Aristotle and the humanism of antiquity.”118
We can let this intellectual dissension be, but the encounter with the con-
stitution as contract gives occasion to take a brief glance at the concept of 
contract with regard to its importance in the history of ideas.
115 See Frankenberg, G. (2008) 1412.
116 See Grimm (2005).
117 Benz (2008) 24.
118 Benz (2008) 24.
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Chapter Four
Contract
The reader can rest assured that we plan no juridical lecture on the concept 
and function of the contract. Keeping in mind our fundamental objective of 
examining the importance of the language of law in the context of a global 
history of ideas, we shall consider the concept of the contract,119 which 
without a doubt belongs to the language of law, from the perspective of 
various disciplines. The aim is to demonstrate the eminent importance of 
this key legal concept in other disciplines particularly relevant to the history 
of ideas. However, we begin with a number of comments from the ethnol-
ogy and sociology of law.
A. The contract as a tool for producing binding force
When people sociate in whatever form, social relations develop between 
them that, to put it in lay terms, work better if the parties are fully conscious 
of what is expected and what social obligations might be involved. Kiyomi 
von Frankenberg, writing about the “generation of obligation prior to and 
alongside positive law”,120 addresses the importance of exchanges in pre-state 
societies.121 This is interesting because considering exchanges as an informal 
procedure for generating obligation casts particular light on the specific 
“institutional competence” of the contract as type of institution.
As far as the functional logic of exchange is concerned, the key concept is 
reciprocity:
119 In brief, there are entire areas of law in which the contract is a crucial structuring tool. 
This is the case for international law, which is essentially international contract law, and 
for used to be called public ecclesiastical law, since relations between the state and Chris-
tian confessions in Germany are organized almost exclusively by contract.
120 Frankenberg, K. (2015).
121 See Frankenberg, K. (2015) 37: “By stateless society we understand orders in which law is 
not exclusively legal in nature but, because of low differentiation and low professionaliza-
tion, is interwoven with other (religious, moral, and political) institutions. For instance, 
‘judges’ can also assume lawmaking or priestly functions. The law is neither differentiated 
in terms of fields of law nor codified in written form, and is therefore not to be distin-
guished from social norms.”
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“The basis of exchange theory122 is the realization that the acceptance of a gift 
obliges the recipient to counter-performance and that this reciprocity constitutes 
a ‘crux of all human behaviour.’123 The behaviours required in exchanges develop 
not only for reasons of expediency but on the basis of the reciprocity norm. It states 
simply that whoever gives something to another obliges this recipient to make a gift 
in return. Every exchange is based on three obligations: to make gifts, to accept gifts, 
and to return gifts. The universal, comprehensible norm of reciprocity underlying 
every exchange is important for maintaining social systems. The reception of advan-
tages imposes counter-performance that confirms a social relationship. Whoever 
accepts a gift is under obligation to the giver. If the recipient wishes to escape 
possible retaliation by the giver and to maintain the possibility of further cooper-
ation, he must return the gift. A gift is both favour and obligation because the giver 
gives the recipient a ‘loan’ in the confidence that the latter will return the gift to 
prove themselves worthy of trust as cooperation partner. This reciprocity in social 
exchange is considered a key element, indeed the ‘most important basic rule’124 for 
the initiation, stability, and regulation of social interaction. In its negative form, too 
– retaliation in accordance with the law of talion (‘eye for an eye, tooth for a 
tooth’) – the role of the reciprocity principle for the maintenance of social systems 
is clearly apparent.”125
This fundamental norm of reciprocity is juridified through the institution of the 
contract; that is to say, the social norm becomes a legal norm:
“Exchange theory is concerned with so-called social exchange (for instance of 
objects, services, or information), which differs from the economic exchange of 
goods in that counter-performance in social exchange is always indeterminate and 
not set at an exact price, so that this form of exchange can generate feelings of 
personal obligation, gratitude and trust. A contract, by contrast, lays down exactly 
what rights and duties the contracting parties have. The result is that the parties 
have no obligation over and above what the contract specifies. In particular, no 
personal gratitude is owed. … In our present-day differentiated legal system, 
exchange in the form of contracts is omnipresent. Synallagmatic exchange, for 
instance of labour for wages or goods for money has long since become so for-
malized that non-compliance with its terms is actionable. But there are also non-juri-
dified forms of exchange, which from their structure recall those in stateless societies 
without centralized authority. Such exchange is resorted to in situations for which 
there is no (recognized) legal solution. In such situations, the parties face the prob-
lem of developing a common, effective frame of reference126 to normatively struc-
122 A leading theoretician is Blau (1964).
123 Thurnwald (1934) 5.
124 Stegbauer (2002) 19.
125 Frankenberg, K. (2015) 35–36.
126 Goffmann (1977) 367; see also Esser (1999) 259ff. and Hillmann (2007), headword 
“Bezugsrahmen” (“Frame of reference”). Frames of reference contain organizational prin-
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ture cooperation that is not legally secured, thus obviating the risk of having to rely 
solely on interpersonal trust and having to break off cooperation if this trust is 
disappointed.”127
In brief, the contract formalizes the fundamental social norm of reciprocity 
and – the most important ingredient – also provides for coercive compli-
ance. According to new institutional economics, and notably its most prom-
inent representative – Douglass Cecil North128 – economic prosperity 
requires two absolutely indispensable basic institutions: legally protected 
property and legally enforceable contracts:
“Perhaps the key hypothesis of institutional economics is: growth and development 
depend decisively on the given valid institutions. Both the willingness and capacity 
to specialize and thus contribute to a stronger division of labour and to invest in 
durable capital goods depends essentially on the security of property rights. As we 
… shall see, property rights are a central component of the institutions to be 
economically analysed. Their content, and the costs that have to be met to impose 
them, and thus to obtain legal satisfaction if someone else has breached my property 
rights, are considered key determinants in explaining growth and development. 
Douglass North … points out that the inability of societies to developed effective 
and low-cost mechanisms for enforcing compliance with contracts is the most 
important reason for historical stagnation and for the current underdevelopment 
in the Third World.”129
If the effectiveness of the contract lies in its potentially strong binding force 
and in its secured enforceability through what we have called specific “norm 
enforcement regimes”,130 two consequences automatically ensue: the power 
problem of asymmetrical contracts and the justice problem of a content 
acceptable to both contracting parties. Not only jurisprudence concerns 
itself with these problems.
ciples that determine how situations develop. They can be understood as the normative 
structure of a specific situation; but their normative nature is social not legal.
127 Frankenberg, K. (2015) 33–34.
128 His magnum opus of now almost canonic status is entitled “Institutions, Institutional 
Change, and Economic Performance”, North (1990); see also North et al. (2009).
129 Voigt (2002) 1–2.
130 Schuppert, G. F. (2016b) Chapter 4: “From the Plurality of Normative Orders to the 
Plurality of Norm Enforcement Regimes: Jurisdictional Communities and their Specific 
Jurisdictional Cultures”.
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B. The contract as a power and justice problem
I. Contracts as a power problem: the double task of constitutional law
1. Freedom of contract and private autonomy
In liberal and particularly in market economy societies, everyone is in prin-
ciple free to conclude contracts with everyone, and – within certain legal 
limits – on any subject. The legal terms are freedom of contract and private 
autonomy. Werner Flumes classical definition of private autonomy is “the 
principle of the self-development of legal relations by the individual in 
accordance with his will”.131 In constitutional law terms, private autonomy 
a consequence of the general freedom of action protected by Article 2 (1) of 
the Basic Law132 and, at the same time – when it is a question of legal 
economic transactions – of the freedom of occupation protected by Article 
12 (1) of the Basic Law. Private autonomy is thus another term for self-
determination. But precisely because contracts are enforceable before the 
courts and can be enforced by the state, this self-determination cannot be 
limitless, it must be tied to constitutional law. Alexander Hellgardt:
“To the extent that the legal system guarantees private autonomy, it recognizes the 
self-determination of the private sphere without this requiring further justification: 
stat pro ratione voluntas.133 Private autonomy in this sense means material self-
determination, which, owing to such a ‘declaration of will’ justifies recognizing a 
subjective right that can, where need be, be enforced by state courts. However, it is 
precisely this legal consequence – the deployment of state means of enforcement 
owing to the free self-determination of the private party – that reconnects material 
private autonomy to constitutional law: if the state attaches legal consequences up 
to and including coercion to private autonomous action, the basic civil liberties of 
the private person require a minimum of control by the state. The state is under 
obligation to protect; it may enforce contractual claims by sovereign means only if 
they can be attributed to the private autonomy of the affected party.134 This is at any 
rate where an act of self-determination is really at issue.”135
131 Flume (1992).
132 See BVerfGE 8, 274, 328; 89, 214, 231.
133 Flume (1992) 6: “The validity of the principle of private autonomy means recognition of 
the ‘self-sovereignty’ of the individual in the creative development of legal relations.”
134 In detail, Canaris (1999) 37–51.
135 Hellgarth (2016) 69.
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However, as the Federal Constitutional Court decided in its famous ruling 
on sureties (Bürgschaftsentscheidung), such real self-determination can be lack-
ing if there is structural asymmetry between the contracting parties that as a 
rule excludes the genuine self-determination of the “weaker” party: “For the 
civil courts this gives rise to the duty to ensure, in interpreting and applying 
general clauses, that contracts do not serve as a tool for heteronomous 
control. If the contracting parties have agreed on a permissible arrangement, 
further monitoring of contractual content is generally unnecessary. If, how-
ever, the content of the contract is unusually burdensome for one party and 
the balance of interests is clearly unreasonable, the courts are unlikely to rule 
simply that ‘a contract is a contract is a contract’. They must clarify whether 
the contractual arrangement is a consequence of structurally unequal nego-
tiating strength, and, where necessary, intervene in the framework of the 
general clauses of valid civil law. How they are to proceed and what result 
they must come to are primarily a question of ordinary law, to which the 
constitution gives broad latitude. The private autonomy guaranteed by basic 
rights may, however, be breached if the problem of disturbed contractual 
parity has not been seen or its elimination attempted by unsuitable 
means.”136
2. Private power in contract law
Private autonomy always brings the risk of an economically more powerful 
contracting party using his economic superiority to impose his own interests 
at the cost of the other.137 For a realistic assessment of this danger, it is 
therefore useful to identify types of contract that can be considered poten-
tially dangerous. Notable among them are long-term contracts such as138
* employment contracts,
* tenancy agreements,
* commercial agency contracts, and
* franchise agreements.
136 BVerfGE 89, 214ff., 234.
137 See the interesting reflections in Franck (2016).
138 See Riesenhuber (2016).
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In these fields, the courts have the task of limiting the dangers arising from 
actual economic asymmetry, for instance with the so-called rental brake; but 
as this very example shows, what is at issue is not so much controlling the 
content of dangerous contracts but – ultimately – regulating the housing or 
labour market.139
It is not far from dangerous contracts to unjust contracts, which we shall 
now look at briefly.
II. Contracts as a justice problem: the contract law literature
of 16th century moral theology
The problem of the just or unjust contract was a concern not only of 
jurisprudence but also of – notably Spanish – moral theology, which pro-
duced a contract law literature of its own. Thomas Duve comments:
“A few years after the conclusion of the Council of Trent, a number of works 
appeared in the Spanish monarchy that could be described as popular, late-scholastic 
contract law literature – texts addressing merchants and traders, instructing them on 
the principles of contract law. There had, of course, already been such moral theo-
logical treatises on contract law in the late Middle Ages. But then a considerable 
number were published and rapidly diffused outside Europe, too. Probably the best 
known of these works were the Tratos y contratos de mercaderes (1569, from the 
second edition: Summa de tratos y contratos) by Tomás de Mercado, the Arte de los 
contractos von Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz (1573), and the Tratado utilísmo de 
todos los contratos von Francisco García (1583).140
On the reach and importance of the moral theological contract law litera-
ture, Duve remarks:
“Just how closely these contract law designs were associated with expansion [to 
India and Latin America] and how this normative order secured validity over long 
distances are shown by Tomás de Mercado’s Tratos y contratos de mercaderes. It was 
dedicated to the Consulado de Mercaderes of Seville, the merchant guild – with 
jurisdictional powers – of the port city where in 1503 the Casa de Contratación
was established and through which traffic with the New World was channelled. 
In his preface, Mercado states that he wrote the book at the request and for the use 
of these merchants, on the basis of experience that he had personally gathered in 
New Spain, i. e., present-day Mexico, in Seville, and Salamanca. Such a book was 
doubtless needed, for there was no comparable exposition, and Seville, which had 
139 See Riesenhuber (2016) 199ff.
140 Duve (2011) 147ff., 160.
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always been a major trading city, had, since the discovery of America, lost its margin-
al status to become the ‘centre for all merchants of the world.’ Merchandise was 
delivered there from everywhere, even from Turkey, to be transported to America, 
where ‘everything had such an excessive price.’ The city, he remarks, had ‘embraced 
all sorts of business’, all were now merchants and traders who had once engaged in 
other activities. It was therefore all the more important to show ‘what was allowed 
and what was not allowed’. For: ‘in business, not to know what is just and what is 
not just means not to know anything, for the most important thing that every 
Christian must know is not to lose his eternal salvation in the attempt to amass 
worldly goods’.”141
Authors like Mercado were thus ultimately concerned about the salvation of 
their fellow humans: “The incentive to comply with norms should be not 
validity prescribed by the state or by the pope, but fear for one’s own 
salvation.142 However, if this was not about statutory law sanctioned by 
the state or a particularist Spanish regulatory regime, but a contract theory 
as element of a “philosophical system”,143 his demand for compliance was 
universal in nature. The moral-theological contract theories were accordingly 
designs for a global normative order in the sense of, to quote Duve, “global 
salvisic Catholicism”:
“From the point of view of these authors, the moral-theological, philosophically 
grounded and canonistically furnished design for a normative order was universal 
because it was based on fundamental ontological assumptions independent of space 
and time. Precisely in this universality lay the resounding force of Spanish late 
scholastic thought, which set limits to the pope and the crown, but which ulti-
mately provided a philosophical theoretical basis for expansion. This universality is 
evident even in contract law: where the types of contract reflect a higher order, then 
they exist throughout the world. They are reality. Law based on such fundamental 
ontological assumptions can abstract from particularist rights and tradition, it can 
permit adaptation, it is particularly suitable for reproduction in a global dimension.
This ontology with which the intellectual mobilisation of late scholastics 
underpinned many fields of law also meant that the new normative order, 
living from tradition but not bound by it, was more universalist than canon 
law could be: it addressed not only the baptised, as was the case with canon 
law, but all humanity. It was thus not limited to the orbis christianus. Its 
creators regarded it as a normative order that could claim authority through-
141 Duve (2011) 160–161.
142 Duve (2011) 162.
143 Duve (2011) 163.
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out the world, as contract law and as international law, or in relation to 
human rights, probably the best-known historical cases of application for 
this universalist world-view.”144
After this moral-theological perspective on the entire world, we conclude 
our excursus on the institution of contract with a look not at real but at 
virtual contracts, a figure of thought that also encompassed everyone in the 
world.
III. Contract theories as proceduralist justification theories
Contract theories, whose best known representatives are Thomas Hobbes 
and Jean Jacques Rousseau,145 provide an intellectual construction by 
which political authority can be justified without reference to God or any sort 
of natural law. Writing about “contract law as justification theory”, Wolfgang 
Kersting146 explains this justificatory function of contract theories in the 
“Handbuch der Politischen Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie” (“Manual 
of Political Philosophy and Social Philosophy”):
“‘Contract theories’ are conceptions in moral, social, and political philosophy that 
see the moral principles of human action, the rational basis for the institutional 
order of society and the conditions for the legitimation of political authority in a 
hypothetical contract concluded between free and equal individuals in a well-
defined initial state, and therefore declare the general capacity for consent to be 
the fundamental criterion of validity. Contract theories are based on justification-
theoretical proceduralism. The conceptual experiment on which they focus is the 
systematic elaboration of the conviction, typical of modernity, that society’s need 
for justification can no longer be met by recourse to the will of God or an objective 
natural value order. The waning of the theological world-view, the disappearance of 
the traditional qualitative concept of nature in the light of modern scientific fac-
tuality, the decline of the firmly established social order with its integrated values 
under the growing onslaught of adaptation to civil society and the economization of 
societal conditions required cultural justificatory practices to be reorganized in line 
with the new intellectual basis of the modern world, with humankind’s new con-
ditions of self and world.”147
144 Duve (2011) 164–165.
145 See Schaal / Heidenreich (2006) 65ff. (Hobbes) and 139ff. (Rousseau).
146 See Kersting (1994); also: Kersting (2004).
147 Kersting (2008) 1430.
The Role of Key Legal Concepts in a Global History of Ideas 265
Under contract theory, contracts were hence hypothetical, having nothing to 
do with the binding force of real contracts;148 their – imaginary – conclusion 
was therefore not the outcome of negotiation:
“In contractualist contracts there is no negotiating; the parties do not meet one 
another half way; they set out no compromises. Their function is moral-epistemo-
logical, heuristic. They are used as a means of identifying constraints on freedom 
that can win general recognition. Contractualist arguments are therefore always 
about consensus, albeit not deliberative, discursive consensus: consensus of this sort 
cannot prejudice the theory. Consensus in contractualist argumentation is theoretically 
deduced strategic consensus; it is based on a generalized egoism embedded in recip-
rocal instrumentalization. It is achieved by radically homogenizing interests; only 
where all parties have an interest in agreement can a representative decision be 
reached that is convincing for everyone, for every reader, and which is thus a 
generally acceptable outcome.”149
How the concept of the social contract functioned as a theoretical legitimation 
concept is best shown by the models offered by Thomas Hobbes and Jean 
Jacques Rousseau. We begin with a brief explication of Hobbes’ contract 
model by Wolfgang Kersting:
“The contract is concluded in the state of nature, which, in the absence of valid rules 
and institutional structures, is a state of war where distrust and a propensity for 
violence prevail and everyone sees everyone as an enemy. To escape this intolerable 
situation, individuals conclude a contract under which they mutually promise to 
waive their rights and their →freedom and to found a →state, which is vested with 
invincible →power, ensuring a life free of violence for the community. Hobbes’ social 
contract is a contract that justifies authority, not a contract that limits authority. Individ-
uals waive their →rights unconditionally; Hobbes’ contractual state therefore pos-
sesses absolute power. It is constrained neither by liberal basic rights, nor by 
→human rights or natural law principles. Hobbes’ social contract presents the curi-
ous, paradoxical picture of a radical individualist justification of absolute power, a 
legitimation of state absolutism through the unreserved will of the individual to self-
commitment.”150
Although Rousseau, too, presupposed a humanity in a state of nature, he 
argues in a quite different direction:
“Rousseau, too, attributes an inalienable right to liberty to human beings. But this 
requires much more than a guarantee of general freedom of action; it requires 
autonomy, material self-determination. But how is legitimate political →authority 
148 Kersting (2001).
149 Kersting (2008) 1431–1432.
150 Kersting (2001) 82.
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possible under the conditions of inalienable self-rule? Only if, so to speak, all citizens 
have power in the state and make laws for themselves with one voice. Autonomy is 
then assured, since everyone remains subject only to their own law; then the general 
will, the volonté générale, is always the will of each individual, as well. Because it 
guarantees unrestricted freedom, Rousseau’s social contract must necessarily lead to 
a republic, to direct →democracy. Any other political organization of authority is 
illegitimate. →Sovereignty is due only to the →people. Rousseau’s social contract is 
the conceptual symbol of the political self-empowerment of the people.”151
We conclude our excursus on the contract with another passage from Wolf-
gang Kersting stressing the universal applicability of the legitimation concept of 
contract theory, which explains its central role in the political history of ideas:
“The contract is a highly flexible justificatory tool, which can be used in connection 
with a broad range of starting positions, issues, and conflict scenarios. The contrac-
tualist theory programme is therefore by no means limited to the classical issues of 
legitimating and limiting authority. Current practical philosophy shows that the 
tasks justifying moral principles and institutions, validating democracy and ground-
ing a theory of collective action can also be tackled from a contractualist perspective. 
If a person concludes a contractual agreement with another, he gives his consent to 
the duties and correlative rights that accrue to him and the other party through this 
agreement. In so far as his consent is freely given and fair contractual negotiations 
have taken place, he has no right to complain about the normative consequences 
arising from this contractual agreement and must accept them as binding. The 
fundamental philosophical idea behind modern justice-theoretical contractualism 
is, in the course of appropriate generalization, to interpret the whole of society 
together with all its various institutional structures and arrangements as a contrac-
tual relationship and to derive the binding force of societal and political institutions, 
of the social and political constitution from universal consent for all members of 
society qua contracting parties.”152
151 Kersting (2001) 82–83.
152 Kersting (2008) 1434–1435.
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Concluding Observations and Remarks
In the introduction to this book, we had asked whether and why a global 
history of ideas should also be written in the language of law, and came to 
the conclusion that the language of law – understood as a language of 
politics – had an essential contribution to make to any future global history 
of ideas.
Four observations have been central to our positive assessment of the 
potential the language of law offers as a language of politics.
First, discussion of the legitimacy of political authority as social-critical 
discourse is generally conducted as a legal discourse. This is demonstrated, 
above all, by the fact the revolutionary seizures of power are always legalo-
semantic seizures of power, as well, which always come in the guise of a new 
language that requires either new concepts or reinterprets existing legal 
concepts.
Second, that the language of law always manages to contribute some-
thing to the global dimension of a history of ideas, as shown by the language 
of global constitutionalism or worldwide rule-of-law promotion. Third, this 
globalization “gene” of the language of law as a language of politics is also 
evident in the spread of justice discourses at the global level, where, as 
inevitable response to the ongoing globalization process, global justice is 
in increasing demand, thus broadening the very concept of justice (catch-
words: environmental justice, climate justice).
And fourth, a future world order – however conceived – can, it would 
seem, not be described without the language of law. Zürn’s overview1 of the 
subject “speaks volumes”.
Now, some 270 pages later, the critical question needs to be raised of 
whether the positive assessment to be found on pages 19/20 has been justi-
fied. The answer, I believe, is clear: a global history of ideas that wishes to be 
taken seriously cannot be written without the language of law. We shall not 
1 Zürn (2011b).
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repeat in detail the “evidence” we have presented in the course of this book, 
but the rich panorama revealed from perusing the broad field of the global 
history of ideas through the eyes of the law is well worth noting. We sum up 
under the following headings, which, having already been dealt with at 
length, need only brief explication without extensive references in the foot-
notes.
A. The statization of the world
The state is the predominant model of political authority throughout the 
world, regardless of periodic assertions of its demise. As Wolfgang Reinhard 
has commented, it is the jurists who perfected the theory of state, who in 
1837 declared the state a legal person and who finally developed an author-
itative definition. According to Georg Jellinek’s 1900 omnipresent “general 
theory of the state”, the modern state has three characteristics: a state territory 
over which it has exclusive authority, a state people as sedentary association 
of persons with permanent membership, and a sovereign state authority. 
Jurists see themselves as particularly committed trustees of the state concept, 
because they need it in international law, where the state is the most impor-
tant subject, but also in constitutional law, where it is an entity to which 
legal responsibilities can be attributed.
So much for the statization of the world.
B. Four more or less successful “triumphs” under the banner of law
I. The “triumph” of natural law
The great systematic natural law theories from the seventeenth century by 
Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch de Spinoza, John Locke, and Samuel 
Pufendorf revolutionized legal and political thought and enjoyed an unpre-
cedented triumph throughout a western world covered by a network of 
natural-law experts occupying chairs at universities. Michael Stolleis has 
pointed to the close link between the successful expansion of natural-law 
thought and the first wave of globalization since the discovery of America 
and the Copernican revolution, and speculates about the development of a 
future “natural law without God” under the headings “universal human 
rights”, “emerging international criminal law”, and “worldwide networks of 
270 Concluding Observations and Remarks
transnational law and non-state law”. Here, too, we observe the triumph of a 
legal idea.
II. The “triumph” of the constitutional idea and the stalling
triumph of the idea of constitutional jurisdiction
Almost every modern state “affords itself” the becoming mantle of a con-
stitution, which generally means a great deal more than a supreme organiza-
tional statute; the emphasis is on the function of a constitution as focal point 
of the politico-cultural self-understanding of a society. As Hans Vorländer has 
stressed, the rules spelled out in the constitution define the communicative 
and deliberative space of a political community: “Constitutional discourses 
are societal self-understanding discourses.”2 The role of the American con-
stitution as the “civil religion” of the United States marking the identity of 
the polity is an impressive demonstration of this.
The institution of constitutional jurisdiction, too, has spread almost epi-
demically, albeit as an institution with varying competences. The judges of 
the Federal Constitutional Court have a tale to tell about the endless queue 
of delegations from around the world on pilgrimages to Karlsruhe – the 
Mecca, as it were, of the rule of law. That constitutional courts have come 
under massive pressure and are being politically disempowered, as currently 
in Poland and Hungary, is because the juridification of politics associated 
with the establishment of powerful constitutional jurisdiction is a thorn in 
the flesh of ruling authoritarian regimes – which is no argument against the 
idea of constitutional jurisdiction: quite the contrary.
III. The “triumph” of the idea of human rights
We deliberately speak of a triumph of the idea of human rights, not a 
triumph of human rights themselves, which in many parts of the world 
are not being respected or are trampled under foot. Nonetheless, they can 
be described as the political creed of modernity; they have standard-setting 
force that places semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes, too, in the 
often annoying position of having to justify themselves.
2 Vorländer (1999) 82.
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But for another reason, too, the idea of human rights is an important com-
ponent of any global history of ideas. As with other legal concepts and terms, 
concepts formulated in the form of law – like the constitution – often belong to 
both the sphere of law and the sphere of politics, or – like human rights – are at 
home in both the world of law and the world of ethics. They consequently 
perform a bridging function. The language of human rights has to be a multi-
lingual language, which can enter discourses on the good and just order of a 
society as a language of morality, law, and politics. Only then can the human 
rights project successfully bridge ethics, law and politics.
IV. The “triumph” of the idea of global validity for the rule of law
The language of the rule of law does not present itself with the same moral 
and Christian ethical might as the language of human rights. It is more of a 
language of rules and procedures, which takes account of the organizational 
requirements of statehood, emphasizing the institutional virtues of the rule-
of-law principle. For this reason, rule-of-law principles are also, on closer 
inspection, the hard core of good governance. This explains why the rule-of-
law promotion industry operating worldwide finds it so attractive to draw 
on all forms of rule-of-law organizational and procedural law – catchwords: 
separation of powers, independent judiciary.
Then there is what we call the justice gene of the rule of law, which 
manifests itself above all in the idea of institutional justice: “buon governo 
e giustizia” – as depicted in the Lorenzetti’s famous allegory of good govern-
ment – are inseparable.
So much for the four “triumphs” under the banner of law. Finally, we cast 
a brief glance at a number of key concepts originating from the world of law 
without which no history of political ideas is conceivable.
C. Three key concepts from the world of law intrinsic to
the global history of ideas
I. Sovereignty
The idea of the sovereign state, too, clearly demonstrates that concepts of the 
political history of ideas belong both to the world of politics and to that of 
law. For some authors, sovereignty is a key concept in politics, for others a 
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central concept of international and constitutional law. Dieter Grimm gives 
what is possibly the best definition when he calls sovereignty a “basic legal-
political concept.”3 He describes the political unity formula of sovereignty as 
a legitimation formula couched in the language of law, aptly capturing 
sovereignty’s belonging to two worlds.
II. Contract
The situation with the concept of contract is quite similar to that of sover-
eignty. On the one hand, the contract is a legal tool for generating obligation; 
on the other, in the form of social contract, it play a crucial role in the political 
philosophy of early modernity. Without the figure of thought of the hypo-
thetical social contract, as we have known since Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 
there is no escape from the “state of nature” or justification for a civil society of 
property owners. Political philosophy’s “social contract theories” operate as 
proceduralist theories to justify political authority,4 and as such are a legit-
imation concept based on consensus indispensable for modern constitution-
al law.
III. Property
We had not yet addressed property, an obvious gap when it comes to provid-
ing a concluding overview and one we shall seek to close to at least some 
extent, stressing once again, quite simply, that concepts are not always at 
home in only one language: they may be used in the languages of more than 
one discipline. As Hannes Siegrist and David Sugarman have convincingly 
shown,5 several scholarly disciplines can be described as “property sciences”, 
each with its own language of property. Five can be identified:
* The language of law; property is above all a legal institution that attributes 
certain rights to a given owner – rights of use, rights of disposal, rights of 
exclusion – and which requires non-owners to respect these ownership rights.
3 Grimm (2007).
4 Kersting (2004).
5 Siegrist / Sugarman (ed.) (1999) 1ff.
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* The language of theology, which understands property as an element of the 
divine order of creation, where God is and remains the primal owner but 
entrusts the legal organization of property to man-made law.
* The language of political philosophy, which has developed a basic narrative to 
justify and legitimize private property – differing only in nuances – in which the 
concepts “state of nature” and “social contract” play a central role.
* The language of institutional economics, which treats property as a conglomer-
ate of property rights that are precisely defined by the legal system and have 
above all to be guaranteed, in order to minimize economic transaction costs and 
make effective economic activity possible in the first place; this also requires 
contracts to be enforceable.
* The language of anthropology, which treats property as a form of relationship 
with the world and the establishment of property as an act of appropriating the 
world, and which posits a basic anthropological need to have something of one’s 
own.
These comments should suffice to demonstrate the multilinguality of the 
language of property. We finish with a few remarks on the language of law as 
a language of political authority.
D. The language of law as the language of political authority
We begin with the observation – which has run through the entire book – 
that law, politics, and power are clearly inseparable. The often cited “final 
proof” is constitutional jurisdiction. We have discussed this in connection 
with the constitutional court’s control over foreign policy,6 but this is not 
our concern here. We are interested not in whether politics is made in 
Karlsruhe – perhaps even in excess – but in the function of law for the 
operation of all political sociation.
This fits in neatly with the Hans Mohr’s succinct statement “political 
culture is unthinkable without law”,7 which we can only confirm from 
our experience in studying the difficult to define phenomenon of “political 
culture.”8
But it goes beyond the link between law and the values and political 
culture of a polity – which alone would justify writing a history of political 
ideas in the language of law, too. It has to do with the history of the modern 
6 See my dissertation: Schuppert, G. F. (1973).
7 Mohr (1999) 109.
8 Schuppert, G. F. (2008) 659ff.: “Politische Kultur als Strukturierungsaufgabe des Rechts”.
274 Concluding Observations and Remarks
state as a history not only of power but also of law. That this is so is more 
than apparent when we recall that the hard core of Bodin’s sovereignty 
theory consists precisely in claiming the monopoly of lawmaking for the 
absolutist territorial ruler; we have discussed this in detail in the section on 
the concept of sovereignty. Nor should we forget the historically well-
founded observation that seizures of power generally take the form of seiz-
ures of law; witness the notorious example of National Socialism.
Rather than listing further proofs for the entanglement of law, politics, 
and power, we conclude by giving the floor to Martti Koskenniemi, a special-
ist in international law we have often cited, who calls on us to shake off our 
inability “to recognize law as a central element of authority”. In the same dis-
cussion, he added: “The second point – and this has long been my concern – 
is to demonstrate the central role of law in constellations of power and 
dominance – in everything we do … It is not about getting rid of law but 
of better understanding and applying it.”9
In precisely this sense, we are also concerned to understand law as a 
central element of authority and give it its due place in a global history of 
ideas. It is our firm conviction that a history of political ideas would not only 
be incomplete but also deficient if law were not to be taken into sufficient 
account as one of the pillars of political authority and political culture. We 
believe that the reflections and findings presented in this book more than 
justify writing a history of political ideas also in the language of law. In brief, 
the language of law is – from A to Z – also and above all a language of 
politics and therefore necessarily a subject for the political history of ideas.
9 Kemmerer (2015, German ed.) 46.
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